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The evolution of infantry battalion commanders in the First World War progressed from a 
pre-war system based mainly on promotion by seniority to one largely based on merit. It 
remained a weighted process, however, favouring the professional officer, particularly 
during the first two years, and biased against the Territorial. The quality of the pre-war 
officer appears higher than has been estimated. 
 
Average command lasted 8.5 months. Eleven per cent of COs were killed, ten per cent 
promoted, and 18 per cent invalided. The army practised quality control, removing 38 per 
cent from command, although reduction in removals as the war progressed indicates a 
refinement of quality. The army committed itself to professional development, teaching 
technical aspects of the CO role, as well as command and leadership. 
 
Citizens of 1914 with no previous military experience rose to command, this progress 
taking on average three years. Despite the social opening-up of the officer corps, these men 
tended to be from the professional class. By The Hundred Days, infantry battalion 
commanders were a mix of professional soldiers, pre-war auxiliaries and citizens - 
younger, fitter and richly experienced; many being quick thinkers, self-assured, and 
endowed with great personal courage and well-developed tactical ability. 
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There are no bad regiments, only bad colonels. 
       Attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte1 
 
This thesis examines the evolution of the infantry battalion commanders of the regiments 
of the line of the British Army during the First World War.2 
 
The battalion was the building block of the infantry,3 its basic tactical unit.4 The 
Commanding Officer (CO) was a Lieutenant-Colonel. Each British regiment (with the 
exception of the ten Territorial Force regiments) had at least two Regular battalions,5 one 
Special Reserve battalion,6 and most had at least one Territorial battalion.7 A regiment 
could, in 1914, have between four and 26 Lieutenant-Colonels. 
                                                      
1
 A. D. Vandam, ‘Officers in the French Army’, North American Review,  165 (413)  (1897), pp. 722-732 
2
 The infantry regiments of the British Army were listed in precedence related to order on parade, the 
regiment to the extreme right of the monarch (left of the line),  having the lowest number. Until the reforms 
of 1881, the regiments were numbered, thus, the Royal Scots, next in line after the Guards regiments, were 
the 1st Regiment of Foot. 
3
 The infantry battalion was a unit comprising, in 1914, 1007 officers and men deployed in four rifle 
companies – see Chapter Two for more detail. The word battalion comes from Old French bataillon, from 
Italian battaglione, augmentative of battaglia (battle), from Late Latin battualia, originally from Latin 
battuere (pound, beat hit, strike). [Oxford English Reference Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), p.119]. 
4
 Andy Simpson states that “the infantry division, consisting of three brigades of four battalions apiece, was 
considered at the time to be the basic tactical unit of all arms”. (A. Simpson, ‘The Operational Role of British 
Corps Command on the Western Front 1914-1918’, PhD thesis, University of London, 2001, p.20). Field 
Service Regulations Part II states: “The basis of the field army organization is the division”. [General Staff, 
Field Service Regulations Part II – Organization and Administration (War Office, October 1914), p.25]. The 
division was therefore the organisational structure of a combined arms formation, the infantry battalion was 
the basic tactical unit of the infantry thereof. 
5
 The Royal Fusiliers, King’s Royal Rifle Corps, Rifle Brigade, Middlesex and Worcestershire Regiments 
had four Regular battalions. 
6
 Twenty-two of the 70 regiments of infantry of the line had one and four had two Extra Reserve battalions. 
See Appendix Three. 
7
 Irish regiments had none. The Territorial London Regiment had 26. 
2 
 
In 1997 John Bourne identified: 
A fundamental weakness in the British historiography of the war, which 
has traditionally concentrated on the activities of GHQ and its 
relationship with a small number of army commanders, or on the 
experiences of the ordinary soldier in the front-line trench. The chain of 
command which stretched between them … has been as little studied as 
commanders themselves. Filling this gap remains a major task for 
historians of the First World War.8 
 
In the intervening years, some of this deficit has been remedied. Both Simon Robbins9 and 
John Bourne10 have produced studies of corps, division and brigade command; Changboo 
Kang has studied the officer corps of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment;11 and an initial 
descriptive study has been made of non-commissioned officers.12 The level of battalion 
command has, however, yet to be examined. 
 
The importance of studying the battalion level of formation is set out by Chris McCarthy. 
Whilst acknowledging that the Western Front was dominated by artillery, he observes that 
“instead of declining into obsolescence, the infantry unit evolved to become a key element 
in the ‘weapons system’ that in 1918 carried the BEF to victory”.13 The principal reason 
for studying battalion commanders is given by David French: “Whether on the battlefield 
                                                      
8
 J.M. Bourne, ‘British Generals in the First World War’, in G.D. Sheffield, ed.,  Leadership and Command: 
the Anglo-American Military Experience since 1861 (London: Brassey’s, 1997), p.94 
9
 S. Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18: Defeat Into Victory (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 
2005). 
10
 J. Bourne, ‘British Divisional Commanders during the Great War: First Thoughts’,  Gun Fire: A Journal of 
First World War History, 29 (no date), p. 26 
11
 C. Kang, ‘The British Regimental Officer on the Western Front in the Great War, with Special Reference 
to the Royal Warwickshire Regiment’, unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham (2007). Several 
recent descriptive studies have also been published. These include: J. Lewis-Stempel, Six Weeks – The Short 
and Gallant Life of the British Officer in the First World War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2010); and 
C. Moore-Bick, Playing the Game: The British Junior Infantry Officer on the Western Front 1914-1918 
(Solihull: Helion, 2011). 
12
 S. Penny, ‘Discipline and Morale: the British Non-Commissioned Officer on the Western Front 1914-
1918’, unpublished M.Phil thesis, De Montfort University (2003) 
13
 C. McCarthy, ‘Queen of the Battlefield: The Development of Command Organisation and Tactics in the 
British Infantry Battalion during the Great War’, in G. Sheffield & D. Todman, eds., Command and Control 
on the Western Front (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004), p.173 
3 
 
or in barracks, the most important person in any unit was its CO. His knowledge could 
make or break his unit”.14 In the closest that the British Army came to doctrine, emphasis 
was placed on the judgement of the ‘man on the spot’,15 and the battalion commander was 
most often the senior officer in that generally uncomfortable location.16 Linking these two 
themes is Patrick Brennan’s claim that battalion commanders “were central”17 to the 
process of “tactical learning” that brought battlefield success.18 
 
The unprecedented expansion of the British army during the war has been described by 
Peter Simkins as resulting in “the largest and most complex single organisation created by 
the British nation up to that time”.19 UK enlistment from all sources to 11 November 1918 
totalled 4,970,902 men, and 5,704,000 served.20 At the outbreak of war the officer corps 
numbered 28,060;21 and at the Armistice it numbered 164,255;22 229,316 commissions 
having been granted.23 The infantry battalions of the regiments of the line expanded in 
number from 470 to 1,762. The first question for this research is who the COs were, and 
how and where resources were found from the small officer corps of 1914 to cope with the 
burgeoning requirement for battalion commanders. 
                                                      
14
 D. French, Military Identities: The Regimental System, The British Army and the British People c. 1870-
2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 147 
15
 General Staff, Field Service Regulations Part I (War Office, 1909), p.27 
16
 With SS143’s emphasis on the platoon as the tactical unit, the platoon commander is most correctly seen as 
the ultimate ‘man on the spot’ from 1917 onwards. [General Staff, SS143: Instructions for the Training of 
Platoons for Offensive Action (War Office, February 1917)]. 
17
 Italics in original. 
18
 P.H. Brennan, ‘Good Men for a Hard Job: Infantry Battalion Commanders in the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force’, Canadian Army Journal, 9 (1) (2006), pp.9-28 
19
 P. Simkins, Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies 1914-1916 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007),  
p. xiv 
20
 Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War 1914-1920 (London: HMSO, 
1922), p. 363; Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, p. xiv 
21
  On 4 August 1914 there were 12,738 Regular Officers; 2,557 Special Reserve; 9,563 Territorial; and 
3,202 in the Reserve of Officers. Statistics, p.234 
22
 On 11 November 1918 there were 74,200 Regular and New Army officers; 28,000 Special Reserve 
officers; 60,055 Territorial officers; and 2,000 in the Reserve of Officers. (Statistics, p.234). 
23
 War Office, Statistics, pp.234-35. See also Chapter Six, Table 6.1. 
4 
 
The second question concerns the need for these men to be able - the matter of quality. The 
quality of the pre-war British officer has been the subject of considerable debate, in which 
a principal critic has been Tim Travers.24 Travers’ thesis is that the officer corps on the eve 
of war was still largely Victorian and public school in many of its attitudes, with “an 
overwhelming emphasis on individual personalities, and on social and regimental 
hierarchies”, a system operating through “the influence of dominant personalities, of social 
traditions, and of personal friendships and rivalries”. Put simply, they were professionals 
lacking professionalism. Travers relegates the lessons of the Second Boer War (1899-
1902) simply to forcing “a discussion of new tactics”, insights “often altered to fit the 
traditional ideal”. Travers’ critical arguments are only set out for the highest levels of army 
command and he states that “this does not mean that at the lower levels the army was not 
well trained and well led in 1914”.25 What levels exactly he deems competent are not 
specified. 
 
Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly continue this theme, describing the officer corps as 
“drawn from a tiny section of society” with selection processes being “far from rigorous”. 
They state that officer training “was of a poor standard” and that “professional 
development was very limited”, with most promotion “simply by seniority”.26 These 
negative observations of the officer corps need, however, to address the single most 
important fact, namely that it was under its guidance that the supposedly more professional 
                                                      
24
 T. Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern 
Warfare 1900-1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2003), pp.3-36 
25
 Travers, Killing Ground,  p.6 
26
 T. Bowman and M. Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training and Deploying the British Army 
1902-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp.39-40 
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German Army was beaten.27 Bowman and Connelly argue that the successful expansion 
was “based on rapidly commissioning groups, principally promising NCOs and OTC 
cadets”,28 yet as this thesis demonstrates, during the victorious Hundred Days nearly half 
of infantry battalions were led by pre-war professional officers.29 
 
Simon Robbins acknowledges many of Travers’ observations concerning the senior officer 
group, yet points out that:  
The interpretation that the social background of the officer corps was 
responsible for the failings of the Army … while providing a possible 
answer for the shortcomings of some officers remains dubious and 
conveys the impression of monolithic stupidity among the officer corps 
which is not convincing.30 
 
He concludes: “Enjoying the social activities of their class and era did not preclude soldiers 
from being professional once on the battlefield”.31 
 
Travers’ evidence is nearly always anecdotal, rarely data-driven. His sole comment 
concerning battalion commanders is a reference to Brigadier-General J.A.L. Haldane’s 
alleged attempt to:  
Get rid of a certain Colonel Churcher before the war. Subsequently 
Churcher’s conduct at Mons was such that he was sent home …. Overall, 
Haldane recalled that three out of four Battalion commanding officers 
were not fit for command, and all had been sent home by the end of 
September 1914. Haldane may have been over-critical, but the ratio of 
incompetent officers in the 10th Infantry Brigade was probably not 
unique.32 
                                                      
27
 For the alleged superiority of the German army and its command see M. Samuels, Command or Control?: 
Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies 1888-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 1995). 
28
 Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, p.40 
29
 See Chapter Three, Table 3.2. The Hundred Days campaign of 1918 is the period 8 August to 11 
November 1918. 
30
 Robbins, Generalship, p.17 
31
 Robbins, Generalship, p.17 
32
 Travers, Killing Ground, p.14 
6 
 
10 Brigade was not actually at Mons, first seeing action at Le Cateau on 26 August. 
Haldane had, however, long been unhappy with the performance of Lieutenant-Colonel 
D.W. Churcher, 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, who was replaced on 10 September 1914.33 The 
other two COs ‘sent home’ were Lieutenant-Colonels J.F. Elkington, 1st Royal 
Warwickshire, and A.E. Mainwaring, 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, who were both court-
martialled after their surrender of St Quentin on 27 August 1914.34 Travers therefore 
chooses one of the most unusual occurrences of the war involving battalion commanders as 
a means of condemning them en masse. If it is intended to imply that 75 per cent of the 
BEF’s infantry COs of 1914 were incompetent, then the data presented in this thesis shows 
this to be incorrect.35 
 
Travers’ assertion that the British Army’s failings in South Africa led merely to 
“discussion of new tactics” is also inaccurate - the period 1902-14 was one of significant 
change. The administrative and organisational changes are well documented.36 Much less 
                                                      
33
 P.T. Scott, Dishonoured (London: Tom Donovan, 1994) pp. 4-5. Scott quotes Haldane concerning 
Churcher: “There is too much ‘eyewash’ about this battalion; they do not take interest in anything but sport 
and the C.O. is a humbug”. Humbug or not, Churcher served as a GSO2 from 15 December 1914 and a 
GSO1 from 1 July 1916 until the end of the war. 
34
 Two parties of these battalions, led by their exhausted COs, arrived at St Quentin on 27 August 1914 from 
the Battle of Le Cateau the previous day. The mayor implored them to sign a surrender document to save the 
townspeople from any fighting with the pursuing German Army. The COs complied, but an element of 2nd 
Cavalry Brigade, led by Major G.T.M. Bridges intervened, recovered the document, and galvanised the pair 
and their battalion remnants. Both Lieutenant-Colonels were court-martialled and cashiered. Mainwaring, not 
a well man, returned to civilian life. Elkington joined the Foreign Legion serving on the Western Front until 
wounded. He was reinstated in his original rank and awarded the DSO. See also Chapter Three, section 3.3.6. 
35
 The army had its contemporary critics during this period, who were prepared to speculate about even more 
negative percentages than Travers. Viscount Esher, a member of the Elgin South African War Commission, 
declared in 1904 that “only two out of every forty regimental officers were any good at all. The rest were 
‘loafers’”, an obviously untestable assertion.[B. Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College (London: 
Eyre Methuen, 1972), p.183]. 
36
 See, for instance, E.M. Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1980). Administrative changes, which had little direct impact on the average regimental officer, included the 
abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief, the establishment of the Army Council, and the establishment 
of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Staff reform centred on the creation of a General Staff and the 
revitalisation of the Staff College. Organisational reform, which had most impact on the Militia and 




acknowledged is the fact that by the end of the Boer War, the British Army had undergone 
a revolution in tactics,37 changes which affected every regimental officer and soldier, 
advances downplayed by Travers. 
 
The infantry had adopted ‘fire and movement’ tactics to address the problem of crossing 
the fire-swept zone by changing from attack in formation to advancing in extended order in 
rushes using cover. Secondly, there had been considerable advances in artillery-infantry 
cooperation, and a form of direct suppressive fire was regularly used.38 Thirdly, British 
eyes had opened to sophisticated use of trenches, and entrenchment to repel counterattack 
became standard practice. Lastly, the army came to appreciate the value of individual 
marksmanship in addition to the power of volley fire, leading to a major focus on this area 
in the inter-war years. These profound changes were encapsulated in Combined Training 
1902.39 At a battalion level there were further changes, with an emphasis (stemming 
directly from open order assault) on junior leadership, battalion organisation changing 
from eight to four companies in 1913, giving more officers per company.40 Field Service 
Regulations 1909, which is referred to by modern historians far more frequently than 
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 S. Jones, ‘The Influence of the Boer War (1899-1902) on the Tactical Development of the Regular British 
Army 1902-1914’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Wolverhampton, (2009). [See also: S. Jones, From 
Boer War to World War: Tactical Reform of the British Army 1902-1914 (Oklahoma: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2012)]. A.J. Risio, ‘Building the Old Contemptibles: British Military Transformation and 
Tactical Development from the Boer War to the Great War 1899-1914’, unpublished Master of Military Art 
& Science thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology and Fort Leavenworth, (2005). 
38
 The artillery was also becoming increasingly aware of the importance of indirect fire. 
39
 War Office, Combined Training (London: HMSO, 1902). 
40
 The Territorial Force still had to change to a four company system on the outbreak of war. In terms of 
equipment the Short Magazine Lee Enfield Mark I (SMLE) was procured in 1903, and the only area of 
infantry weaponry in which the British lagged was the machine gun, not necessarily in number but, as 
Spencer Jones suggests, more in tactical doctrine, being seen primarily as a weapon of defence (Jones, 
‘Influence’, pp.85-7). The School of Musketry at Hythe was, in contrast, advocating the use of the light 
machine gun in attack. Other equipment developments in communication included increase in the use of 
telephones and changes in signalling. 
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Combined Training,41 arguably impacted less directly than the latter on the battalion’s 
effectiveness in combat. One author describes the comparison as from “baseline new 
doctrine in Combined Training 1902 to the capstone doctrine in Field Service Regulations 
1909”.42 
 
Mark Connelly, whilst critical in general terms of the officer corps, is clear in his study of 
the East Kent Regiment that training was taken seriously,43 and that “pre-war soldiering for 
the Buffs concentrated on sharpening rifle and bayonet skills and adapting training to the 
lessons learnt in the South African War”.44 The implication is whatever the overarching 
problems in the composition of the officer corps and its formative training, within-battalion 
skill development was active and on-going. Simon Robbins quotes a contemporary source: 
“Impressed by its tactical expertise the Germans called the British professional Army ‘a 
perfect thing apart’”.45 Without good quality officering at the battalion level this perception 
would not have been possible. John Bourne concludes: 
It is difficult to reconcile the fit, adaptable, energetic, resourceful, 
pragmatic men who emerge from the prewar Army’s multi-biography 
with the somnolent, dogma-ridden, unprofessional, unreflecting 
institution depicted by Tim Travers and Martin Samuels. 
 
In terms of the evolution of battalion commanders during in the First World War, many of 
the officers who served at this level had been Lieutenants or Captains during this period, 
                                                      
41
 War Office, Field Service Regulations - Parts One and Two (London: HMSO, 1909). For example, G. 
Sheffield & D. Todman, Command and Control on the Western Front – The British Army’s Experience 
1914-18 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004), in which there are references on 12 pages. FSR dealt primarily with 
operations. 
42
 Risio, ‘Building’, p.9. Army mandarins of the time would, however, have shuddered at the idea of having 
created ‘doctrine’. 
43
 The East Kent Regiment was known as “The Buffs” because it had been issued soft buff leather coats 
when it first served abroad in the Netherlands. 
44
 M. Connelly, Steady the Buffs! A Regiment, A Region and the Great War (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), Kindle edition location 199 
45
 Colonel R. Macleod, Memoirs, p.99, Macleod Papers 1/1, LHCMA. Quoted in Robbins, Generalship, p.91 
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and had either learnt their craft in war or experienced the developments of the ensuing 12 
years. The course of their earlier professional development had been redolent with change. 
Not all could or would adapt and evolve either in peacetime or war, but those who were 
able and willing to apply learning and foster it in others would likely be those who proved 
successful in battalion command.46 The third question for this research therefore considers 
not simply overall quality, but exactly what qualities were perceived as making an 
effective CO. 
 
Garth Pratten’s discussion of historiography in his study of Australian COs during the 
Second World War is just as applicable to the First. In official histories and divisional 
histories, battalion commanders are “seldom discussed at length”. In unit histories, the 
focus on the “birth narrative” means that the “first CO often receives the most attention”, 
and whilst “humorous anecdotes featuring the CO are recounted with relish” and acts of 
“bravery or endurance” described, there is very often little concluded “of their tactical 
abilities or of their ultimate effectiveness as a commander”.47 Criticism is sparing and, in 
British regimental histories, brief eulogy is the rule.  
 
Tim Travers is correct to observe that the British Army, governed by seniority, was largely 
antithetical to the rise of talent on merit. The fourth question for this research is therefore 
to what extent a meritocracy developed at the level of battalion command. Arnold Harvey 
is the only British historian to have shown an interest in battalion command during the war 
                                                      
46
 Garth Pratten, in his discussion of the first battalion commanders of the Australian Imperial Force in World 
War Two, cites contemporary opinion that many of these COs were handicapped by their First World War 
experience, having failed to train within an evolving doctrine since that point – in short, they had not 
experienced enough change to be able to evolve further. G. Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders in the 
Second World War (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp.32-4 
47
 Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders, pp.6-8 
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in an account of promotion in the “catastrophically overheated demand for battalion 
commanders”. His view is not particularly positive, concluding that “the appointment of 
the officers … does not indicate they were, or were ever considered to be, military 
geniuses of a calibre superior to what might be found in the Regular army”.48 
 
Patrick Brennan alone has shown sustained interest in systematically studying First World 
War battalion commanders, and that purely in the Canadian Corps.49 Of 179 COs who 
served, 75 per cent were Militia and nine per cent Regulars,50 with six per cent having no 
previous military experience, the remaining 10 per cent being retired. The Canadian 
reliance on amateur soldiers limits his study’s comparability to the British Army. The 
average age of his cohort was 45 in 1914, dropping to 37 in November 1918: “A clear 
reflection of the physical, psychological and intellectual demands of combat command on 
the Western Front”.51 Average tenure was nine and a half months; just over a quarter were 
wounded at least once, with one in eight being killed in action. Two were promoted to 
division and 11 to brigade command. Whilst Brennan was able to identify the disposal of 
officers leaving post, he found difficulty in determining whether officers had been 
‘sacked’. He concluded, indeed, that “one is struck that so few were removed from their 
posts”.52 On the other hand, there were a significant number of long-serving COs: “Men 
who obviously performed well, clearly possessing the requirements for the job, and yet 
                                                      
48
 A.D. Harvey, ‘A Good War: Wartime Officers Who Rose to Command Level in the First World War’, 
RUSI Journal, 153 (2) (2008), pp.76-80 
49
 P.H. Brennan, ‘Good Men for a Hard Job: Infantry Battalion Commanders in the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force’, Canadian Army Journal, 9 (1) (2006), pp. 9-28. Brennan has also produced a somewhat more 
anecdotal study of psychological breakdown in Canadian senior officers, [P.H.  Brennan, ‘Completely Worn 
Out by Service in France’, Canadian Military History, 18 (2) (2009), pp. 5-14]. 
50
 Four British and 12 Canadian. The Canadian regular army in 1914 only numbered 3110 men –
http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/history/firstwar/canada/Canada3 (accessed 11 March 2013). 
51
 Brennan, ‘Good Men’, p.15 
52
 Brennan, ‘Good Men’, p.20. Italics in original. 
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were never promoted”.53 Brennan is thus indicating a difference between a ‘good fighting 
battalion commander’ and an officer suitable for commanding larger formations. 
 
The analysis upon which this thesis depends is prosopographical in nature. As Katherine 
Keats-Rohan has noted: “Prosopography is about what the analysis of the sum of data 
about many individuals can tell us about the different types of connexion between them, 
and hence about how they operated within and upon the institutions - social, political, 
legal, economic, intellectual - of their time”.54 She describes the link between 
prosopography and computing as “a marriage made in heaven”, at least for highly 
structured information. For this study, therefore, a computerised database of all infantry 
COs of regiments of the line of the British Army during the First World War was 
constructed covering basic biographical details and details of their pre-war and war 
service, containing over 5000 individuals.55 
 
This was achieved by examining the Monthly Army List56 and synthesising the sometimes 
inaccurate information57 with regimental, division and battalion histories (as well as the 
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 Brennan, ‘Good Men’, p.28 
54
 K.S.B. Keats-Rohan, ‘Prosopography and Computing: A Marriage Made in Heaven?’, History and 
Computing, 12 (2000), pp.1-11. A similar method was utilised by John Bourne and Simon Robbins in their 
study of generals. 
55
 Utilising Microsoft Access. This is attached in abbreviated form in Appendix One as a Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet. 
56
 The National Archives holds a variety of Army Lists, detailing the officers serving in all branches of the 
army, from 1759 onwards. Two types are used in this study. Firstly, the official Monthly Army List, which 
began publication in 1798, and which is organised by branch of the army and by regiment, listing for the 
infantry the Regular, Special Reserve and Territorial battalions, in that order. Officers are listed by rank in 
order of seniority (date of rank). Secondly, the official Quarterly Army List, which lists Regular and retired 
officers only (i.e. not active Territorial or Special Reserve officers, although it lists retired Territorial and 
Special Reserve officers). The list is organised without regard to branch of the army or regiment, listing 
officers by rank and seniority (gradation), containing date of birth, promotions, and staff service, as well as 
war service (in the annual January issue). Hart’s Army List, an unofficial production, which contained 
elements of both official lists, ceased publication in 1915, and the final issue was also used. 
57




records of regimental museums in certain cases), then checking this information against the 
relevant London Gazette entries.58 Gaps were completed by reference to unit war diaries,59 
which were reviewed wherever possible. Biographical and service details for Regular 
officers were abstracted from The Quarterly Army List, and for Territorial officers and 
civilians relevant biographical information was also abstracted from civil registration 
records and census returns,60 as well as from regimental, division and battalion histories. 
 
This method identified a range of individuals, including Majors or lower ranks who stood 
in for their CO, but the analysis here includes only those who served as Acting, 
Temporary, Brevet or substantive Lieutenant-Colonels.61 Such a database could never be 
entirely complete, as not even battalion Adjutants necessarily recorded all changes of 
command, but it is reasonably certain that all the principal individuals have been identified. 
 
Written accounts, diaries and letters, published and unpublished, of other ranks, officers 
and in particular Commanding Officers were utilised where appropriate to provide 
illustration. COs have left comparatively few written records, the reason for which is not 
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 The London Gazette has been an official journal of record of the British government since 1665, recording, 
amongst other things, the promotions and appointments of military officers, hence the term “gazetted” in 
relation to rank. 
59
 Battalion War Diaries were the formal daily record of the unit’s activities, written by the Adjutant on a 
standardised form, and (usually) signed at the end of the month by the CO. A copy was sent to the higher 
formation and the regimental depot. These are held in The National Archives, Kew. 
60
 Civil registration of births, deaths and marriages began in 1837, records being held by the General Register 
Office, and available from a variety of web-based services. The annual population census began detailed 
personal recording on a ten-year cycle from 1841 onwards, original returns being held by The National 
Archives, and again available from a variety of web-based services up to and including 1911. 
61
 Substantive rank is a permanent regimental rank governing pay and allowances; brevet rank is an army 
rank given in recognition of service, and not being commissioned, had no financial implications. Both acting 
and temporary rank were gazetted, acting rank being relinquished on leaving the specific post, temporary 
rank lasting beyond a specific post if required (and hence having pension implications). No distinction 
between the acting, temporary or substantive rank of Lieutenant-Colonel is made in this study as they all 
represent a formal appointment to battalion command. 
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clear.62 Some chose to write unit histories, formally or otherwise, and these in general give 
little insight into the process or experience of command.63 Other volumes are more 
revealing, such as the edited memoirs of Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Villiers-Stuart.64 
Published volumes of letters and surviving manuscript correspondence tend to yield more 
candid observations.65 Other ranks refer little to their COs, and officer memoirs are patchy 
in their discussion, although Alan Thomas’s A Life Apart is an example of keen 
observation and analysis in his dissection of Lieutenant-Colonel W.R.A. Dawson.66 
 
The argument is structured chronologically, examining the battalion commanders of the 
army of 1914; those of the New Armies during their development in 1914-15; their 
changing characteristics in the period 1915-1918; and their final evolutionary point in the 
victorious armies of The Hundred Days in 1918. Key moments of contrast are used in the 
developing chronology; the Battle of Neuve Chapelle (10-13 March 1915); the first day of 
the Battle of Loos (25 September 1915); the first day of the Battle of the Somme (1 July 
1916); the first days of the Battle of Arras (9 April 1917) and Third Ypres (31 July 1917); 
and finally the pivotal moment of The Hundred Days campaign, 29 September 1918.67 The 
COs of three of the most effective divisions in attack during The Hundred Days identified 
                                                      
62
 They may simply, as expressed in Chapter Five, have had enough of paperwork. 
63
 J.M. Findlay, With the 8th Scottish Rifles 1914-1919 (London: Blackie, 1926), is such a volume. 
64
 R.M. Maxwell, Villiers-Stuart Goes to War (Edinburgh: Pentland, 1990). 
65
 A. Nason (ed.), For Love and Courage - The Letters of Lieutenant Colonel E.W. Hermon from the Western 
Front 1914-1917 (London: Preface, 2008); and R. Fielding, War Letters to a Wife, J. Walker (ed.), 
(Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2001), are good examples of the published genre. IWM Docs 12339, containing the 
letters of Brigadier-General G.A. Stevens, is a good example of the manuscript genre. 
66
 A. Thomas, A Life Apart (London: Gollancz, 1968). Dawson commanded 6th Royal West Kent from 
November 1916 to October 1918. See Chapter Four, section 4.2. 
67
 When all five armies of the BEF were in action on the Western Front together for the first time, and the 
Hindenburg Line was broken. 
14 
 
by Peter Simkins [the 5th (Regular), 9th (New Army), and 42nd (Territorial)] are used as 
contrast to the overall analysis. 68 
 
Chapter One examines the Regular, Territorial and Special Reserve battalion commanders 
of the army at the outbreak of war. In reviewing their careers it attempts to evaluate the 
quality of the men who had risen to command in a system based largely on seniority. 
Finally, it considers the erosion of this stock of officers in the fierce battles of 1914. 
 
Chapter Two reviews the process of providing COs for the rapidly expanding army, 
namely the Service battalions of the New Armies and the second-line battalions of the 
Territorial Force. The principles applied in providing COs are elucidated; turnover prior to 
going on active service is examined; and an attempt is made to evaluate their quality, 
placing the negative image of the retired ‘dugout’ officer into a factually derived 
perspective.  
 
Chapter Three considers general patterns in the evolution of battalion commanders in the 
period 1915-18, particularly institutional aspects including origin within the army and 
regimental affiliation; individual aspects including age, rank in 1914, staff service, and 
length and number of commands. It further examines turnover month by month and by 
battalion with the reasons for this, namely death, invalidity, promotion, and replacement. 
 
Chapter Four explores the different evolutionary patterns of COs in Regular, Service and 
Territorial units, both across the whole army and in the 5th, 9th and 42nd Divisions, and 
                                                      
68
 From information supplied by Peter Simkins. See also his ‘Co-stars or Supporting Cast? British Divisions 
in The Hundred Days, 1918’ in P. Griffith, ed., British Fighting Methods in the Great War (London: Frank 
Cass, 1996), pp.50-69. 
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presents a case study of a battalion of each type. It also considers the army’s formal 
attempts to train COs.  
 
Chapter Five reviews leadership and battalion command. From the examination of 
memoirs, diaries and letters, the experiences of other ranks, officers, and COs are brought 
together. An attempt is made to reach a view on the key elements of leadership and 
command both on the battlefield and as understood by the British Army at the time, within 
the framework of modern theories of leadership.  
 
Chapters Six and Seven concentrate on the development of merit-based promotion in the 
army. Chapter Six concerns the rise of citizen COs, men who had not previously served. 
Their characteristics and the pace of their advancement are reviewed. Chapter Seven 
considers the battalion commanders of The Hundred Days campaign, investigating the 
experience, abilities, and qualities of the COs of this critical period, both in general and in 




“Their Heart Failed Not” – The Battalion Commanders 
of August 19141 
 
 
The Colonel, usually spoken of as “the CO” (Commanding Officer) and 
spoken to as “Sir,” is “IT,” and must be treated accordingly. On 
Parade, you will treat him as you would the King (whose authority he 
represents), off parade as you would treat a rich uncle from whom you 
have expectations. Honour and obey him; perhaps you may even learn 
to love him – in time! 
 
      Advice to New Army recruits 2 
 
The infantry battalion Commanding Officer, the Lieutenant-Colonel, was generally 
referred to as “The Colonel”,3 a title not to be confused with the post of Colonel of the 
regiment, a senior serving or retired officer appointed for life as the “titular head” of the 
regiment.4 In contrast, a substantive Colonel held a non-regimental post. 
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 “They went forth first a little Army: All its men were true as steel. The hordes of the enemy were hurled 
against them; they fell back, but their heart failed not”. Psalm written by A.W. Pollard, used at a special 
service in 1918. Quoted in: J.E. Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium 1914, Vol. II (London: 
Macmillan, 1925), p.465 
2
 Unknown, A Regimental “Who’s Who” p.20, reproduced in T. Carter, Birmingham Pals (Barnsley: Pen & 
Sword, 1997), p.65 
3
 The title ‘Colonel’, perhaps the most obscure in the panoply of military ranks, arose in use in the late 
sixteenth century and derives from the Italian colonello, a ‘little column’. Whilst it might be romantic to see 
the rank deriving from the man at the head of the ‘little column’, it has been suggested that the word column 
did not acquire a military meaning until late in the seventeenth century, and that the ‘little column’ in 
question may have been a baton of office. [J. Corbett, ‘The Colonel and his Command,’ American Historical 
Review, 2 (1) (1896), pp.1-11]. Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Villiers-Stuart, 9th Rifle Brigade, however, noted 
that General E.H.H. Allenby, then commanding V Corps: “Always addressed battalion commanders as 
‘Colonel’ – I never heard any other high officer do that”. R.M. Maxwell, Villiers-Stuart Goes to War 
(Kippielaw: Pentland Press, 1990), p.61 
4
 D. French, Military Identities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.79. The Regimental Colonel had 
certain official functions, including appraising potential officers, and presided (unpaid) over such institutions 




A Lieutenant-Colonel’s command in 1914 numbered 1007 men; 30 officers and 977 other 
ranks. A Major was second-in-command. Battalion Headquarters (HQ), comprising six 
officers and 93 men, included the Adjutant, responsible for battalion administration, who 
was either a Captain or Lieutenant, as was the Quartermaster.5 A Lieutenant commanded 
the machine-gun section, and an officer of the Royal Army Medical Corps was attached. 
The Regimental Sergeant-Major and a number of Sergeants and other Non-Commissioned 
Officers (NCO) fulfilled specialist roles.6 The bulk of the battalion was made up by four 
rifle companies, each commanded by either a Major or Captain with a Captain as second-
in-command. Each company had four platoons commanded by a Lieutenant or 2nd 
Lieutenant. 
 
1.1 The Regular COs of August 1914 
In April 1914 there were 1171 Lieutenant-Colonels on the active list.7 Of the 167 Regular 
infantry Lieutenant-Colonels, ten were in staff/training posts or on half-pay, the remainder 
comprising the COs of the 73 infantry regiments. 
 
1.1.1 Careers to appointment 
The social origins of senior officers during this period are well documented. Edward 
Spiers’ analysis of Colonels of 1914 reveals seven per cent from the peerage and 
baronetage; 26 per cent from the gentry; 23 per cent from an armed services background;8 
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 Responsible for stores and transport. 
6
 R. Gibson & P. Oldfield, Sheffield City Battalion (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2006), p.222 
7
 The Quarterly Army List for the Quarter Ending 31st March 1914 (London: HMSO, 1914), p. 312. Indian 
Army 323; Cavalry and Infantry 232; Indian Medical Service 151; Royal Artillery 137; Royal Army Medical 
Corps 124, Royal Engineers 87; Army Pay Department 47; Army Service Corps 23, Royal Marines 23; Army 
Ordnance Department 18; Army Veterinary Corps 6. 
8
 A significant proportion being “either sons of serving officers or had relatives in the services”. [S. Robbins, 
British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18 (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p.6]. 
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14 per cent from the clergy; and 12 per cent professional.9 A Lieutenant-Colonelcy was 
largely the province of the landed gentry and upper middle classes.10 
 
Only four COs of August 1914 were titled, namely: Lieutenant-Colonels Lord R. Le N. 
Ardee (1st Grenadier Guards);11 The Hon. G.H. Morris (1st Irish Guards);12 The Hon. C.J 
Sackville-West (4th Kings Royal Rifle Corps);13 and Sir E.R. Bradford Bt. (2nd Seaforth 
Highlanders).14 The preponderance were in prestige regiments.  
 
To illustrate the variety of backgrounds, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Grant-Duff, 1st Black 
Watch, was the son of Sir M. Grant-Duff (Liberal MP and Privy Counsellor),15 and had 
been educated at Wellington College and the Royal Military College (RMC).16 Another 
with a non-military background, Lieutenant-Colonel L.J. Bols, 1st Dorsetshire, (a future 
                                                      
9
 E. M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902 (Manchester: University Press, 1992), p.94. The 
remaining 18 per cent were “other” or “don’t know.” 
10
 Timothy Bowman and Mark Connelly, analysing a sample of RMC cadets 1910-14, found the occupations 
of the fathers to be 39 per cent services officer; 30 per cent “gentleman”; eight per cent “other” (with 
“industrialists” and “new professionals” comprising few of the number); five per cent each clergy and legal; 
four per cent civil service; and three per cent each medical, civil engineer, and titled. T. Bowman and M. 
Connelly, The Edwardian Army: Recruiting, Training and Deploying the British Army 1902-1914 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), p.9; percentages extrapolated from Table 1.1. 
11
 Reginald le Normand Ardee (family name Brabazon, 13th Earl of Meath) was also a CO in the Irish Guards 
between 18 September 1914 and 3 November 1914. Wounded twice, which removed him from active 
service, he returned as Brigadier-General in February 1918, commanding 4 (Guards) Brigade for two months. 
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 George Henry Morris (second son of Michael Morris, 1st Baron Killanin) was killed in action on 1 
September 1914 at Villers-Cotterets on the retreat from Mons. 
13
 Charles John Sackville-West (later 4th Baron Sackville of Knole) became GSO2 on 30 September 1914, 
and went on to command three brigades (21, 190 & 182) between December 1915 and September 1917. 
14
 Evelyn Ridley Bradford (2nd Baronet Bradford) was killed in action 14 September 1914 on the Aisne. 
15
 Cementing his relationship with the aristocracy, he married the Hon. Ursula Lubbock, daughter of the 1st 
Baron Avebury. 
16
 At the point the COs of August 1914 were entering RMC Sandhurst, 55 prominent public schools and 
universities supplied all the RMC cadets. [P. E. Razzell, ‘Social Origins of Officers in the Indian and British 
Home Army: 1758-1862’, British Journal of Sociology, 14 (1963), p.259]. During the Second Boer War 62 
per cent of Regular officers came from public schools, with 41 per cent from the 10 most prominent, with 11 
per cent from Eton alone. [A. H. H. MacLean,  Public Schools and the War in South Africa, (London: 
Stanford, 1902), p.12]. 
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Lieutenant-General) was the son of a Belgian diplomat, born in Cape Town and educated 
at Lancing College.17 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel A.D. Geddes, 2nd Buffs, was a model of military lineage,18 being 
educated at Cheltenham College and the son of Colonel J.G. Geddes.19 Lieutenant-Colonel 
O.G. Godfrey-Faussett, 1st Essex, educated at Wellington College, was similarly the son of 
a Colonel.20 Lieutenant-Colonel G.B. Laurie, 1st Royal Irish Rifles, was the son of 
Lieutenant-General J.W. Laurie, but had been educated in Canada and attended military 
college there.21 Lieutenant-Colonel V.W. de Falbe, 1st North Staffordshire, was of foreign 
ancestry but had more humble military connections, being the son of a Danish Navy 
Captain.22 In contrast, Lieutenant-Colonel C.E.A. Jourdain, 2nd Loyal North Lancashire,23 
was the son of the rector of  Mapleton, (Lieutenant-Colonel G.M. Gloster, 1st  
Devonshire,24 also had a clerical father); the father of Lieutenant Colonel L.I. Wood, 2nd 
Border,25 was a Suffolk solicitor; whilst the father of Lieutenant-Colonel A.W. 
Abercrombie, 2nd Connaught Rangers,26 was a Bengal civil servant. 
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 Louis Jean Bols commanded 84 Brigade between February and September 1915, and then served in staff 
posts as BGGS XII Corps for two months and MGGS Third Army between October 1915 and September 
1917. 
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 Augustus David Geddes was killed by a shell landing on Battalion HQ on 24 April 1915, during the 
Second Battle of Ypres. His brothers John Gordon Geddes and George Hessing Geddes were respectively a 
Brigadier-General and Lieutenant-Colonel of Royal Artillery. 
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 Late 44th and 76th Regiments. 
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 Owen Godfrey Godfrey-Faussett was killed in action 2 May 1915 on Gallipoli. The Turks called him by 
name, and he was shot by a sniper. 
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 George Brenton Laurie was killed in action on 12 March 1915 at Neuve Chapelle. 
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 Vigant William de Falbe commanded 185 Brigade, January 1916 to August 1917. 
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command until killed in action 29 July 1918, although his battalion only first saw active service in late 1916. 
His brother, Henry Francis Newdigate Jourdain of the Connaught Rangers commanded three battalions 
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 Gerald Meade Gloster was wounded in October 1914, and returned as Brigadier-General with 64 Brigade 
between August 1915 and June 1916. 
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 Lewis Ironside Wood was wounded in October 1914, returned to duty and was killed at Ypres on 16 May 
1915. 
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Of those who had military siblings, Lieutenant-Colonel W.L. Loring, 2nd Royal 
Warwickshire, was one of three serving brothers, all of whom were dead by November 
1915.27 On a more illustrious level, Lieutenant-Colonel C.L. Nicholson, 2nd East 
Lancashire, was one of three brothers who became Major-Generals,28 another brother 










Ranks 3% 7% 1% 
Militia/SR/Volunteers/TF 41% 35% 28% 
RMC/RMA31 51% 49% 71% 
University 4% 7% 
Probationer32 <1% NA NA 
Empire <1% 1% 0% 
Other NA 1% 0% 
 
Table 1.1: Comparison of entry routes of Regular COs with all officer entry routes to the 
infantry 
 
The COs of August 1914 had entered the army over a 12 year period.33 Their routes to 
commissioned rank are indicated in Table 1.1. An RMC graduate was more likely, and a 
                                                      
27
 Walter Latham Loring’s brothers were Major C.B. Loring of the 37th Lancers, Indian Army, (killed 26 
December 1914); and Captain W. Loring of the Scottish Horse (died of wounds 24  October 1915). Walter 
Loring himself was killed on 23 October 1914. 
28
 Cecil Lothian Nicholson was promoted Brigadier-General (16 Brigade) on 16 June 1916, and Major-
General on 25 July 1916 with 34th Division, a post he retained for the rest of the war. 
29
 Commissions in infantry and ASC as 2nd Lieutenants only – Quartermasters are excluded. HMSO, Return 
as to the Number of Commissions Granted During Each of the Years 1885 to 1906 Inclusive, Parliamentary 
Paper 111, (1907), pp.403-5 
30
 Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, p.12; data extrapolated from Table 1.2, taken from the ‘Records 
of Service’ of officers of eight Regular battalions. 
31
 The Royal Military College (RMC) Sandhurst trained infantry officers, the Royal Military Academy 
(RMA) Woolwich trained artillery officers. 
32
 Entry to Foot Guards only. 
33
 The earliest commissions were those given to B.E Ward (CO 1st Middlesex) and H.E. Lawrence (CO 2nd 
East Surrey), both of whom had been commissioned on 10 May 1882; the last being A. McN. Dykes (CO 1st 
Royal Lancaster) who had been commissioned 2nd Lieutenant on 12 December 1894. 
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Militia entrant or a man who had been commissioned from the ranks was less likely to 
achieve battalion command than overall percentages would predict. 34 The years spent at 
RMC collectively covered the years 1880-92. The bulk attended in the period following the 
War Office assumption of responsibility, when it was made compulsory that all 
commissioned officers should be RMC graduates,35 and educational standards required for 
admission were tightened.36 
 
They had taken nearly 25 years to reach the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.37 Forty (25 per 
cent) had achieved brevet Major appointments;38 and 16 (10 per cent) brevet Lieutenant-
Colonel. At the outbreak of war, three were brevet Colonels (S.C.F. Jackson, 1st 
Hampshire;39 W.C.G. Heneker, 2nd North Staffordshire;40 and W.R. Marshall, 1st Sherwood 
                                                      
34
 From 1872, each regiment was allowed to nominate one 2nd Lieutenant for commission each year, as long 
as he was between 19 and 22, had attended at least two annual trainings, and had passed the required 
examination. To give an example, Lieutenant-Colonel H.O.S Cadogan, CO 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers on the 
outbreak of war, was schooled at the Royal Academy, Gosport, where he failed the exam for both Woolwich 
and Sandhurst, passing ‘The Preliminary’ but not ‘The Further.’ He was commissioned in the 4th Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers, and came under the patronage of Colonel Hon. Savage Mostyn, late CO of the 1st Battalion. 
He attended a crammer in Camberley run by Lieutenant-Colonel T.G.R. Mallock and after 11 months passed 
the Militia Comprehensive Exam and acquired a commission in his patron’s late battalion. [H. Cadogan, The 
Road to Armageddon (Wrexham: Bridge Books, 2009), pp.23-6]. 
35
 Excluding Militia officers and promoted NCOs. 
36
 Curriculum change, to “a far wider and more practical curriculum”, was, however, only effected from 
about 1890 onwards. A. Sheppard, Sandhurst (Aylesbury: Country Life, 1980), p.95. Timothy Bowman and 
Mark Connelly produce evidence from the Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Education and 
Training of Officers of the Army (Cd. 982) (1902) to suggest that the education at RMC was still found 
wanting and that following this report standards were raised. (Bowman and Connelly, Edwardian Army, 
pp.18-19). 
37
 They had spent on average two years five months as 2nd Lieutenant; seven years six months as Lieutenant 
(53.5 per cent of first commissions were as Lieutenant); nine years three months as Captain; and seven years 
nine months as Major. 
38
 All bar two were granted during the Second Boer War. A brevet appointment was army rather than 
regimental, and was given (often in the field) in response to exceptional proficiency. 
39
 Sydney Charles Fishburn Jackson was wounded and taken prisoner at an engagement at Nauroy, 27 August 
1914, on the retreat from Mons. 
40 William Charles Giffard Heneker was promoted Brigadier-General in March 1915, serving with 54 & 190 
Brigades, before becoming Major-General commanding 8th Division from December 1916 until the end of 
the war.  
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Foresters).41 Sixteen per cent of the group had achieved the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in a 
different regiment from the one in which they had achieved their Majority, indicating that 
the regimental system was not sufficiently rigid to prevent the able moving for 
promotion.42 
 
Since the abolition of purchase of commissions,43 promotion beyond the rank of Lieutenant 
had been governed by seniority within the regimental list balanced by the positive 
recommendation of the CO and confirmatory success in qualifying examinations.44 This 
was not a system designed to allow officers of equal ability the same opportunity to rise to 
battalion command. As the Official Historian noted: “Military talent is rare and is not 
immediately evident. Seniority rules bar its ascent”.45 Lieutenant-Colonel H.O.S. Cadogan, 
1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers, was, however, able to write to his mother from India: “Lloyd, 
who is senior to me, [has] been passed over and … I [have] got command of this 
Battalion”.46 In the three years prior to August 1914, 15 per cent of CO appointments 
                                                      
41
 William Raine Marshall was promoted Brigadier-General in January 1915 with 87 Brigade; Major-General 
in June 1915 with 42nd & 29th Divisions in Gallipoli; and Lieutenant General on 24 September 1916 with III 
Indian Corps in Mesopotamia. 
42
 Prior to the abolition of purchase, officers moved frequently between regiments to achieve promotion. 
Following abolition, promotion was based on seniority within regiment and “this usually kept the Lieutenant-
Colonelcy in the regiment itself”. (Spiers, Late Victorian Army, p.93). 
43
 The price of commissions, governed by regulations, had remained steady since 1821 with adjustments 
made in 1860. The price of a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in a line regiment was £4,500 (£321,000 in 2008 values). 
If a Majority was sold for its price of £3,200 (£228,000), a further £1,300 (£92,700) therefore had to be 
found. [C. G. Slater, ‘The Problem of Purchase Abolition in the British Army 1856-1862’, South African 
Military History Society Journal,  2(6) 1979, www.samilitaryhistory.org  accessed 26 November 2010)]. 
44
 HMSO, Parliamentary Paper C.1569 Report of the Royal Commission on Army Promotion and Retirement 
(1876). 
45
 J.E. Edmonds & & R. Maxwell-Hyslop, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Vol. V (London: 
Imperial War Museum, original date 1947) p.593 
46
 Cadogan, Armageddon, p.157, letter dated 7 April 1912.  Cadogan wrote: “I must say I shall be a very 
proud man indeed for I shall be one of the youngest Colonels in the service, being only two days over 44 … I 
shall be entitled to my pension two days after reaching my 48th year … £420 a year is a very different 
pension from £200 which is all I should have got if I had been passed over.” It is likely that in these 15 per 
cent of cases the more senior Majors had every good reason not to wish to be passed over, and that most 




involved passing over a more senior Major, indicating that the seniority principle was not 
immutable. 
 
The examination for promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel was a test of “Tactical Fitness for 
Command”.47 The candidate would firstly be examined in a three hour theoretical paper. 
This consisted of a tactical problem involving the operations of a force “not exceeding a 
brigade of infantry with a brigade of artillery and a regiment of cavalry, and a proportion 
of mounted infantry, RE, ASC, and RAMC”.48 The candidate then had to write: “(i) A 
general appreciation of the situation; (ii) The action which he proposes to take; and (iii) 
The orders necessary for the execution of his plan”.49  
 
The second part of the examination took place in the field with troops,50 overseen by a 
board of three officers, the president of which was a General. The task was to command in:  
Any minor tactical operations which may be ordered, a mixed force, of 
which the strength must not be less than one battalion of infantry, a 
battery of artillery, and one squadron of cavalry, to which may be added 
… a proportion of mounted infantry and RE. 
 
 
The exams, both written and practical, it will be noted, encompassed combined arms 
operations. In the practical exam, which was against a real ‘enemy’, the candidate was 
given the “general idea” the night before and a “special idea” on the ground, to which he 
had half-an-hour to respond and issue his written orders. Credit was given for 
“intelligence, judgment, commonsense, and readiness of resource in making the best of any 
situation”. The balance of marks was 300 for the written exam, 100 for the practical test. 
                                                      
47
 HMSO, The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army, 1912. Reprinted with Amendments Published in 
Army Orders up to 1 August 1914, Appendices XII & XIII, pp.452-456 
48
 Royal Engineers, Army Service Corps and Royal Army Medical Corps. 
49
 Candidates with a psc (Passed Staff College) qualification could forego Part I. 
50
 Outside the UK the candidate might be examined by a staff ride only, over 3 days. 
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Success was not a formality – 38 per cent of candidates failed “Fitness to Command” in 
1912.51 
 
1.1.2 Age, tenure and further promotion 
The Regular COs had an average age of 47 years 11.5 months, and had been in post an 
average 23 months when war broke out.52 
 
The changes in army organisation effective from 1 July 1881 decreed that “a Lieutenant-
Colonel, after 5 years’ actual service, will become a Colonel, and will be eligible for 
employment during 5 years or until the age of 55; when, if he is not promoted to Major-
General, retirement will be compulsory”.53 He was limited to four years in command of a 
battalion.54 
 
What might these COs have been looking forward to in terms of career progression 
following the surrender of command? The August 1914 Army List reveals the fate of their 
predecessors. For just over half (52 per cent), the end of battalion command had effectively 
meant the end of career. Fourteen were Colonels and 55 Lieutenant-Colonels in the 
                                                      
51
 TNA PRO WO 279/57. Report on the Staff Conference held at the Staff College, Camberley, 17-20 Jan. 
1927. [Cited in D. French, Military Identities: The Regimental System, The British Army and the British 
People c. 1870-2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.158]. Adrian Carton de Wiart, taking his 
exam for promotion to Major, “failed gloriously”, but noted: “How lucky that wars wash out examinations”. 
[A. Carton de Wiart, Happy Odyssey (London: Pan, 1950) p.39]. 
52
 Two had been in post for only one month, namely D.C. Boger, CO 1st Cheshires;  and R.A. Rooth, CO 1st 
Royal Dublin Fusiliers;  whilst D.M. Stuart, CO 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers,  had served 47 of his allotted 48 
months. Boger was badly wounded in the leg at Mons and taken prisoner. After escaping from hospital, he 
was the first soldier to be sheltered by Nurse Edith Cavell, after hiding for three months. Attempting to reach 
England via Ghent, he was recaptured and spent the rest of the war as a POW. Rooth was killed in action on 
25 April 1915 on Gallipoli landing from the River Clyde at Cape Helles. Stuart served as Brigadier-General 
from 8 July 1915 to 19 January 1916 with 58 Brigade, but thereafter was OC No. 2 District. 
53
 HMSO, Parliamentary Paper C.2922 Revised Memorandum Showing Principal Changes in Army 
Organization from July 1881(1881). 
54
 The Lieutenant-Colonel’s pay was to be 18 shillings a day, and for COs of the Foot Guards, an extra £200 
per annum was payable. 
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Reserve of Officers.55 Sixteen were untraceable, and hence likely to be in complete 
retirement or dead. 
Post   
Brigade Commander 22 
District Commander 3 
CO Nigeria Regiment 1 
Training Establishment 5 
Attached General Staff (Brigadier-General) 1 
GSO Overseas 3 




Departmental Assistant-Director 2 
Assistant Military Secretary 1 
Other (unspecified) 5 
Unemployed active list 12 
Half-pay 3 
 
Table 1.2: Posts held in August 1914 by predecessors of Regular COs 
 
Of the remaining 72, all but six were full Colonels, and one was a Temporary Brigadier-
General. Their various posts are listed in Table 1.2. Thirty per cent had achieved brigade 
commands; 30 per cent were in staff posts, and seven per cent were in training posts. 
Twenty-two per cent, however, were unemployed or on half-pay. 
 
1.1.3 War service 
Nineteen (12 per cent) of the Regular COs had had no previous war service. The remaining 
138 had served in approximately two campaigns each.56 Table 1.3 shows the spread of 
active service and number of participating COs. 
                                                      
55
 Officers who retired and received retired pay were required to serve in the Reserve of Officers. 
56
 1.7 precisely. 
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War Service   
First Sudan War 1884-5 7 
Third Burma War 1885-9 14 
Hazara War (North-West Frontier) 1888 3 
Zulu War (South Africa) 1888 1 
Chin-Lushai War (Burma) 1889-90 6 
Zhob Expedition (North-West Frontier) 1890 3 
Manipur Expedition (North-East India) 1891 1 
Hazara Expedition (North-West Frontier) 1891 3 
Miranzai Expeditions (North-West Frontier) 1891 1 
Isazai Expedition (North-West Frontier) 1892 1 
Chin Hills Expedition (Burma) 1892-3 1 
Burma Expedition 1889-92 7 
First Matabele War (Rhodesia) 1893 2 
Waziristan Expedition (North-West Frontier) 1894-5 1 
Defence and Relief of Chitral (North-West Frontier) 1895 6 
Sana Kachin Expedition (Burma) 1895-6 1 
Third Ashanti War (West Africa) 1895-6 1 
Dongola Expedition (Sudan) 1896 2 
Bechuanaland Expedition (South Africa) 1896-7 2 
Niger Operations (West Africa) 1897-8 3 
North-West Frontier (including Tirah campaign) 1897-8 31 
Reconquest of Sudan 1896-9 12 
Sierra Leone Operations (West Africa) 1898-9 1 
Uganda Operations (East Africa) 1898-9 2 
Benin Expedition (West Africa) 1899 1 
Second Boer War 1899-1902 110 
Fourth Ashanti War (West Africa) 1900 1 
Boxer Rebellion (China) 1900 3 
Southern Nigeria Operations (West Africa) 1901-3 1 
Somaliland Operations (East Africa) 1902-4 2 
Aden (interior) Operations 1903 1 
Tibet Expedition 1903-4 1 
North-West Frontier 1908 4 
 




Lieutenant-Colonel F.G. Anley, 2nd Essex, had served in six campaigns: Sudan 1884-5; 
Dongola 1896; Nile 1897, 1898 and 1899; and South Africa 1899-1902.57  Three had 
served in five campaigns each. E.P. Strickland, CO 1st Manchester,58 had served in Burma 
1887-9, Dongola 1896, and Nile 1897, 1898, and 1899; Lieutenant-Colonel C.R. Ballard, 
1st Norfolk,59 had served in  Burma 1891-2, Chitral 1895, North-West Frontier 1897-8, 
South Africa 1899-1902, and East Africa 1902-4; and Lieutenant-Colonel H.R. Davies, 2nd 
Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire,60 had served in Burma 1887-8, North-West Frontier 
1897-8, Tirah 1897-8, China 1900, and South Africa 1901-2. 
 
Six COs had served in four campaigns; 19 in three; and 32 in two. Of the remaining 77 
who had experienced only one campaign, all except 16 had served in the Second Boer 
War. Sixteen and a half per cent of the collective war experience had been gained against 
African tribes; 37 per cent had been gained in Asia (primarily India and Burma) and 46.5 
per cent against the Boers. 
 
Thirteen had previous experience of command in the field. Lieutenant-Colonel W.C.G. 
Heneker, 2nd North Staffordshire, had been thrice in command in Southern Nigeria 1902-
3.61 Eight had commanded mounted infantry in South Africa. Others had commanded 
                                                      
57
 Frederick Gore Anley became Brigadier-General of 12 Brigade in October 1914 until June 1916, and was 
later Commander Machine Gun Corps and Major-General, January-June 1917. 
58
 Edward Peter Strickland served as Brigadier-General between January 1915 and June 1916 with the 
Bareilly, Jullundur & 98 Brigades; and was promoted Major-General 1st Division from June 1916 until the 
end of the war. 
59
 Colin Robert Ballard became Brigadier-General between November 1914 and April 1917 with 7, 95 & 57 
Brigades, and then became Military Attaché to Rumania. 
60
 Henry Rodolph Davies was Brigadier-General between February 1915 and May 1917 with 3 & 33 Brigade; 
and was Major-General from 12 May 1917 with 11th Division. 
61
 Heneker wrote a book of tactical guidance, Bush Warfare (London: H. Rees, 1907), based on his 
experiences, indicating, as does the Journal of the Royal United Services Institution for the period, that 
British regimental officers of this period had questing minds unrecognised by Tim Travers. 
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colonial or native troops. Lieutenant-Colonel J. Ponsonby, 1st Coldstream Guards,62 had 
commanded the 5th New Zealand Regiment in South Africa, where Lieutenant-Colonel 
G.C. Knight, 1st Loyal North Lancashire,63 had both raised and commanded the 1st New 
South Wales Mounted Infantry Regiment. Lieutenant-Colonel W.M. Watson, 1st Duke of 
Wellington’s,64 had commanded a Chinese regiment at the relief of Tientsin and Peking. 
 
1.1.4 Staff service in peace 
Some form of staff service was the mark of both an ambitious officer and one perceived as 
having the qualities to rise in the regiment or army.65 It was not, however, necessary to 
have such service to rise to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel as 19 (12 per cent) of the 
Regular COs had not served in any staff post. 
 
At the most basic level of staff experience, battalion administration, 56 (36 per cent) had 
been Adjutants to a Regular battalion and 59 (38 per cent) Adjutants in their regiment’s 
Militia or Volunteers. Overall, 59 per cent (92) had thus served.66 
 
Outside the regiment a range of staff positions were to be had, which might lead to, or 
result from, passing the two-year course at the Staff College, Camberley to become psc.67 
                                                      
62
 John Ponsonby became Brigadier-General in August 1915 with 2 (Guards) Brigade; and Major-General in 
August 1917 with 40th then 5th Division. 
63
 Guy Cunninghame Knight was killed by shrapnel on the Marne, 11 September 1914. 
64
 William Milward Watson became a Brigade Commander in India on 1 January 1916. 
65
 To what extent it might also have been the result of patronage is unclear. Timothy Bowman and Mark 
Connelly suggest that the effects of patronage were limited in the Edwardian army. (Bowman and Connelly, 
Edwardian Army, pp.36-7). 
66
 Some had served as both Regular and Auxiliary Adjutants. The adjutancy carried extra pay. Lieutenant-
Colonel H.O.S. Cadogan, CO 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers on the outbreak of war, then a Second-Lieutenant 
with the battalion in India in the late 1880s, was relying on extra finance from his widowed mother and wrote 
to her: “It must be such a drag on you, if only I could get the adjutancy of the regiment it would be 
everything but they only give it to such senior subalterns and generally to a captain”. (Cadogan, 
Armageddon, p. 83). 
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Thirty-four of the Regular COs (22 per cent) were psc. Eight (26 per cent) had attended in 
the period immediately prior to the Second Boer War when a “new progressive spirit” was 
apparent,68 and the remaining 74 per cent in its aftermath, a period when the course 
became “more practical and up to date”,69 incorporating the lessons of that conflict. 
 
Forty-six per cent (72) had achieved extra-regimental staff posts. Lieutenant-Colonel C.L. 
Nicholson, 2nd East Lancashire,70 had perhaps the most richly experienced staff career. A 
pre-1899 psc, he had served as ADC to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief, Gibraltar 
1891-3, as Staff Captain then DAQMG for Mobilisation, India (1901), and had then been 
DAQMG at the headquarters of Bengal East Command for four years, returning as 
DAQMG for Mobilisation before returning home and serving successively as Brigade-
Major to 15 and 16 Brigades, Irish Command (1905-9), and finally serving as a GSO2 in 
South Africa (1911-12). 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel S.C.F. Jackson, 1st Hampshire had no psc qualification, but had served 
as ADC to a Major-General, Bengal (1889-93), as ADC to the Commander-in-Chief, East 
Indies (1893-4), and as a Station Staff Officer, India (1897) before moving to be DAAG at 
                                                                                                                                                                 
67
 Officers who were “in every respect thoroughly good regimental officers” (HMSO, The King’s 
Regulations and Orders for the Army, 1912 p.163) were eligible to be recommended for attendance by their 
COs after three years’ service. 
68
 B. Bond, The Victorian Army and the Staff College (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), p.148. The authors of 
this spirit were Colonels H.J.T. Hildyard and G.F.R. Henderson. Hildyard reduced the importance of 
examinations, and introduced continuous assessment of classroom and field exercises. Henderson introduced 
the thoroughly modern technique of role-play to work through the decision making of campaign 
commanders. That Staff College graduates who had obtained their psc prior to this period were not 
universally admired is indicated by Lieutenant-Colonel H.O.S. Cadogan, who wrote of his then CO: “He is 
most awfully unpopular … he is a Staff College man for one thing and therefore does not know his drill and 
has impracticable theories about everything which he has tried until they do not succeed”. (Cadogan, 
Armageddon, pp.48-9). 
69
 Under a new Commandant, (Sir Henry Rawlinson from 1903). Bond, Victorian Army, p.197 
70
 Nicholson, as already noted, rose to the rank of Major-General in 1916. 
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Army HQ in Bombay (1897-1902). He had then served as DAAQMG to both 8th and 6th 
Divisions, Irish Command (1906-10). 
 
If Viscount Esher’s vision had been for Staff College graduates to provide a professionally 
trained General Staff,71 then indeed some of the Regular COs of 1914 had scaled these 
heights. Lieutenant-Colonel A. Grant-Duff psc, 1st Black Watch, had been Assistant 
Military Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence from October 1910 to September 
1913, where he had been responsible for the production of the ‘War Book’.72 Lieutenant-
Colonel A.D. Geddes psc, 2nd Buffs, had been both GSO3 and GSO2 at Army 
Headquarters (1904-8) and then had spent two years as GSO2 at the War Office. 
Lieutenant-Colonels A.R.S. Martin psc, 1st Royal Lancaster,73 and D.C. Boger (without 
psc), 1st Cheshire, had both been attached to the General Staff at the War Office, as had 
Lieutenant-Colonel H.P. Hancox psc, 2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers. 
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 Reginald Baliol Brett, 2nd Viscount Esher (1852-1930), was a member of the Elgin South African War 
Commission, and chaired the War Office Reconstitution Committee, which proposed changes in the re-
organization of the War Office, including the setting up of the Committee of Imperial Defence. 
72
 The War Book: “Detailed the steps to be taken to mobilize the army, the additional duties of each branch 
and the extra staff required”. [C. Messenger, Call to Arms (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2005), p.29]. 
It was instigated by the Committee of Imperial Defence. Covering 12 Government departments in 12 
chapters it charted the incremental steps from “precautionary” to “strained relations” to “war stage”, i.e. full 
mobilisation to meet any threat. Grant-Duff devised a column format which allowed easy reference to what 
each department might do at each stage. (http://pw20c.mcmaster.ca/case-study/adrian-grant-duff-preparing-
first-world-war, accessed 20 June 2012.) Sadly, for a man of such obvious ability, Adrian Grant-Duff was 
killed early in the war on 14 September 1914, on the Aisne. 
73




Location Post No psc psc 
Overseas ADC to Viceroy/Governor/C-in-C/General Officer 10 4 
Overseas Military attaché 1 2 
Overseas Assistant or Military Secretary 3   
Overseas Training post 6 2 
Overseas GSO2 2 3 
Overseas Brigade Major 4 5 
Overseas DAAG 6 9 
Overseas DAAQMG 4 6 
Overseas DAQMG   6 
Overseas Staff Officer/Captain  8 3 
Overseas Adjutant 1   
Home ADC to King 1   
Home ADC to General Officer 3 1 
Home Attached General Staff 4 4 
Home Assistant or Military Secretary 2   
Home GSO2 HQ/Division   14 
Home GSO3 HQ   3 
Home Brigade Major   12 
Home GSO2/DAAG Staff College   10 
Home DAAG HQ/District 2 4 
Home DAAQMG HQ/District 5 5 
Home Staff Captain 8 3 
Home Post RMC Sandhurst 7 6 
Home Other training post 6 6 
Home Other 5 2 
 
Table 1.4: Peacetime staff experience of Regular COs 
Three officers had served as Military Attachés. Lieutenant-Colonel H.C. Lowther (without 
psc), 1st Scots Guards,74 had served in Madrid, Lisbon and Paris; and Lieutenant-Colonel 
J.D. McLachlan psc, 1st Cameron Highlanders,75 in Washington and Mexico. Lieutenant-
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 Henry Cecil Lowther was promoted Brigadier-General in November 1914 with 1 (Guards) Brigade, and in 
September 1915 became Military Secretary at GHQ BEF for four months. He later served as a MGGS from 
October 1917. 
75
 James Douglas McLachlan became GSO1 in April 1915, Brigadier-General with 8 Brigade in October 




Colonel C. Wanliss (without psc), 2nd South Lancashire, had likely had his patience tried at 
the Seistan Arbitration Commission.76 
 
Table 1.4 sets out the range of peacetime staff experience. The main difference between 
those who were psc and those not is in home appointments. An officer did not become a 
GSO2, a GSO3, or a Brigade Major (or, more obviously, gain a Staff College post) in the 
UK without having the qualification.77 
 
1.1.5 Staff service in war 
Sixty-one (44 per cent) of the 139 COs who had war service had performed extra-
regimental staff service in war. Twenty-four (17 per cent), had served as Adjutants to their 
battalions in the field, 11 proceeding to extra-regimental service. 
 
Of the eight who were psc by the time of the Second Boer War, four had no staff 
experience in war by 1914; and only Lieutenant-Colonel C.R. Ballard, 1st Norfolk, had rich 
war staff service experience. He had been Transport Officer in Tirah, 1898; and in South 
Africa 1899-1902 was variously Adjutant of Roberts’ Light Horse, Staff Captain to a 
Station Commandant, and Staff Officer to a Mounted Infantry Corps Mobile Column. 
Lastly, in 1903 he had been Transport Officer to the Somaliland Field Force. Six of the 23 
who acquired their psc status after the Boer War had no wartime staff experience by 1914. 
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 This notoriously protracted commission (1903-5) laid down the boundaries between Persia and 
Afghanistan.  
77
 This challenges Martin Samuels’ assertion that the army was in the grip of a ‘cult of rank’ where battalion 
officers were almost excluded from the work of the General Staff. See M. Samuels, Command or Control? 





  psc pre-1899 psc post-1902 No psc 
  (4 officers) (16 officers) (37 officers) 
ADC to Lieutenant-General   2   
ADC Major-General   1 1 
Brigade Major   2 1 
DAAG 2 6 3 
DAAG Intelligence     1 
Provost Marshall     1 
Assistant Provost Marshall 1     
Commandant   4 7 
Staff Captain Intelligence   1 1 
Staff Officer 4 5 8 
Station Staff Officer     4 
Railway Staff Officer   1   
Transport Officer 2 1 1 
Disembarkation Officer   1   
Garrison Adjutant     3 
Orderly Officer     2 
Censor   1 1 
Signalling Officer     1 
Special Service Officer   1 11 
 
Table 1.5: Wartime staff posts held by Regular COs 
 
If the officer was of the group identified as suitable for staff progression, not having the 
psc initials was no bar to a rich war staff experience. Lieutenant-Colonel T.O. Marden, 1st 
Welsh,78 had served in South Africa as variously Commandant Worcester; Railway Staff 
Officer; Staff Officer to the Commandant, Colesberg; Staff Officer to the Assistant 
Inspector General; on Lines of Communication work; and as Commandant, Colesburg. 
More prestigiously, Lieutenant-Colonel N.R. McMahon, 4th Royal Fusiliers, had served in 
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 Thomas Owen Marden was wounded 24 May 1915 at 2nd Ypres. He was promoted Brigadier-General 
between November 1915 and August 1917 with 114 Brigade; and then served as Major-General with 6th 
Division until the end of the war. 
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South Africa as ADC to a Major-General commanding an Infantry Brigade, and as 
Brigade-Major and DAAG.79 
 
Prestigious staff jobs could however go to men (some perhaps favourites, some 
undoubtedly talented) who did not have a psc and who were never going to obtain one. 
Thus, Lieutenant-Colonel C.S. Davidson, 2nd South Staffordshire,80 was ADC to the 
Major-General of an Infantry Brigade in South Africa, and later Brigade-Major. As can be 




1.2 The Special Reserve COs of August 1914 
The Special Reserve had been created out of the Militia by the 1907 reforms with the 
express purpose of providing reinforcements for the Regular army.81 In August 1914 there 
were 101 Special/Extra Reserve Battalion COs in post.82 
 
Given that only four battalions saw active service, these officers will not be considered in 
detail.83 Suffice it to say that they were of two sorts. Forty per cent were ex-Regulars, who 
had an average age of 48 years seven months and who had been retired on average exactly 
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 Both were to attend Staff College in the post-Second Boer War period. Norman Reginald McMahon was 
Chief Instructor and Staff Officer, School of Musketry, Hythe, for four years from June 1905. In 1907 he 
advocated the provision of six machine guns per battalion. Rebuffed, the ‘Musketry Maniac’ was 
instrumental in the development of the 15 aimed-shot ‘mad minute’ enshrined in Musketry Regulations 
(1909), and put to effective use at Mons in August 1914.  [M. Barthrop, The Old Contemptibles (Oxford: 
Osprey, 1989), p.22]. He was killed in action at Ypres on 11 November 1914, prior to taking command of 10 
Brigade. 
80
 Charles Steer Davidson commanded 123 Brigade for a year from September 1915. 
81
 The Territorial and Reserve Forces Act (1907), the work of R.B. Haldane as Secretary of State for War. 80 
per cent of the Militia and Militia Reserve joined the Special Reserve. (Messenger, Call To Arms, p.22). 
82
 74 Reserve and 27 Extra Reserve Battalions. 
83
 See Appendices Two and Four for further discussion of the Special Reserve COs on the outbreak of and 
during the war. 
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seven years. The rest were officers whose careers had been spent entirely in the Special 
Reserve. 
 
1.3 The Territorial Force COs of August 1914 
The Territorial Force (TF) had been created out of the Volunteers by the 1907 reforms with 
the express purpose of providing home defence. In August 1914 there were 207 Territorial 
Force COs.  
 
1.3.1 Ex-Regulars 
Thirty-three of the TF COs (16 per cent) were ex-Regulars. They had an average age of 45 
years four months, and were therefore two years six months younger than their 
counterparts who had remained in the Regular army. Ten per cent had retired as 
Lieutenant, 45 per cent as Captain, and 45 per cent as Major, and they had been retired for 
an average of 8 years three months.84 It is probable that these men retired because they 
were unlikely to be promoted beyond the rank of Major. Three, however, were recently 
retired Lieutenant-Colonels from the Indian Army.85 
 
  Ranks Militia RMC/University/Probationer 
Regular COs 1% 28% 71% 
Ex-Regular TF COs 0% 35% 65% 
 
Table 1.6: Entry routes of ex-Regular TF COs in post August 1914 compared with entry 
routes of Regular COs 
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 The longest retired having done so in November 1900, the most recently retired having done so in 
February 1913. 
85
 Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh David McIntyre, CO 5th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; Lieutenant-Colonel 
Hugh Morris Allen, CO 5th Black Watch; and Lieutenant-Colonel George Dashwood Maxwell Moore, CO 6th 
London. All retired between May 1911 and October 1913. 
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Table 1.6 shows their entry routes into the army. None had been commissioned from the 
ranks, and there was a higher level of Militia entrants. As Table 1.7 shows, they had a 
much lower level of occupancy of staff posts than their Regular counterparts. All these 
features suggest their careers prospects in the Regular army had been more limited. 
 
  Pre-WW1 Staff Service Pre-WW1 war Staff Service 
Regular COs 82% 91% 
Ex-Regular TF COs 30% 55% 
 
Table 1.7: Peace and wartime Staff service of ex-Regular TF COs in post August 1914 
and Regular COs 
 
 
1.3.2 Former Volunteer COs 
 
The remaining 174 TF COs had all been Volunteers. Their average age was 47 years eight 
months, with considerable variation.86 Lieutenant-Colonel Sir M. Sykes, 5th Yorkshire, was 
the youngest at 35 years five months, whilst 32 per cent (28) were over the age of 50, the 
oldest being Lieutenant-Colonel A. R. Meggy, 4th Essex, who was 59 years three months 
old.87 
 
Officers commanding TF units were “appointed for 4 years, but extensions (not more than 
two) for 4 years” could be granted. Officers other than those holding commands or staff 
appointments were required to retire at 60, but again might be “allowed an extension of 
service, which will not be granted for more than 2 years at a time, or beyond 65”.88 The 
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 88 COs, ages accurate to 1.5 months with a quarter midpoint taken from the Registrar General’s quarterly 
registers of births, marriages and deaths. 
87
 Sir Mark Sykes would earn notoriety for his part in the Asia Minor or Sykes-Picot Agreement, which 
defined British and French spheres of interest and control in the post-war Middle East, Arthur Robert Meggy 
retired just prior to his battalion’s departure for Gallipoli. 
88
 The Territorial Year Book (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1909), p.22 
37 
 
207 TF COs had been in post for an average of three years and one month. Forty-six (22 
per cent) had been in post over four years, 15 being COs of Volunteer battalions, and two 
had been in post since before the turn of the century.89 Overall, 95 per cent of TF CO 
appointments were within-regiment. 
 
There was clear reason for a TF CO to keep hold of his command, as relinquishing it was 
very likely to be the end of his career. Of the predecessors of the TF COs of August 1914, 
only 12 out of 207 (6 per cent) were actively employed. Four had found another battalion 
command, six had found other posts (although three were ‘unattached’), and two had 
achieved promotion.90 
 
1.3.3 War service 
Of the 34 ex-Regular TF COs, seven (20 per cent) had no war service. Of the remaining 
26, three had served in three campaigns, seven in two, and the remainder in one campaign. 
Of the 173 ‘pure’ TF COs, 138 (80 per cent) had no previous war service. The remainder 
had service in the Second Boer War only. 
 
Table 1.8 shows the spread of active service. One per cent of the collective war experience 
had been gained against African tribes; 21 per cent had been gained in Asia (primarily 
India and Burma), and 78 per cent against the Boers. 
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 Lieutenant-Colonel Cecil Socera Clarke had been a CO since 18 January 1899, originally with the 1st 
Volunteer Battalion, Sussex Regiment; and the Earl of Denbigh and Desmond had been CO of the 
Honourable Artillery Company since 4 March 1893. Clarke was transferred as CO to the second-line 
battalion in October 1914 and was retired by the end of 1915; Desmond was promoted full Colonel before the 
end of August 1914 and never took his battalion abroad. 
90
 Charles Strathavon Heathcote-Drummond-Willoughby, formerly a Scots Guards officer and CO 15th 
London Regiment, was a Colonel commanding the 6th London TF Infantry Brigade; and Noel Lee, formerly 
of the 6th Manchester Regiment, was a Colonel commanding the Manchester TF Infantry Brigade.  
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Active service TF only Ex-Regular 
Third Burma War 1885-9   3 
Hazara Expedition (North-West Frontier) 1891   1 
Chin Hills Expedition (Burma) 1892-3   1 
Defence and Relief of Chitral (North-West Frontier) 1895   1 
Third Ashanti War (West Africa) 1895-6   1 
North-West Frontier (including Tirah campaign) 1897-8   5 
Second Boer War 1899-1902 34 19 
Boxer Rebellion (China) 1900   2 
Waziristan (North-West Frontier) 1901-2   1 
Tibet Expedition 1903-4   1 
North-West Frontier 1908   2 
 
Table 1.8: War service of TF COs 
 
1.4 The Quality of the Battalion Commanders of August 1914 
 
1.4.1 The Regulars 
The education of the Regular Lieutenant-Colonels of August 1914 was better than that of 
their predecessors, but was very patchy. Around 70 per cent had attended RMC, yet 
virtually all had done so before the course had become more practical in the 1890s. Their 
basic military education was therefore inferior compared to that of most of the Captains 
who in 1914 might have aspired to succeed them. Twenty two per cent were, however, psc, 
and three-quarters of these had attended Camberley after 1902 when the lessons both 
contained in Combined Training 1902 and the Boer War in general were central, an era 
when one instructor described that “some of very best soldiers in the army were to be met 
at Camberley”.91 
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 Lieutenant-Colonel E.S. May, quoted in Bond, Victorian Army,  p.195 
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Not all knowledge was acquired via formal education. In terms of ‘on the job’ 
development only 12 per cent had not served in any staff post, and whilst the regimental 
system has been criticised for keeping officers’ “mental horizons … confined to their own 
regiments”,92 64 per cent had performed extra-regimental staff service in peace and war. 
Fifty-nine per cent had been regimental Adjutants. Given that the latter post was within the 
gift of the CO, it may be presumed that the most able served as Adjutants, not least as any 
CO would have wished it so to ensure that their own work load was as light as possible. 
The Regular COs were, therefore, largely administratively able.93 
 
The true value of their war service is a matter for debate. David French has asserted that 
“between 1870 and 1970 the British army fought only four wars in which it found itself 
fighting against an enemy that was equipped to the same modern standard as itself, and 
was organized into large combined arms formations”. Prior to the First World War, the 
only conflict that met this criterion was “the opening months of the Second Anglo-Boer 
War”.94 
 
Forty-seven per cent of Regular COs had accumulated war service in South Africa in 
1899.95 This experience had been at the highest rank of Captain,96 and all but ten had not 
had command experience. However, it was not simply the experience of 1899, but the 
processed lessons of these months which became established practice during 1900, which 
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 French, Military Identities, p.3 
93
 The Adjutant’s job was “to organize the daily routine, run an office, cope with correspondence, write 
orders, answer queries from brigade, anticipate company needs, stave off troubles and ensure the proper 
deportment of ORs and junior officers. A quick mind helped”. [K. Radley, ‘First Canadian Division, CEF 
1914-1918’unpublished PhD Thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa (2000), p.85]. The CO usually selected his 
Adjutant: “From the most able and promising of his peers”. [D. Langley, Duty Done: 2nd Battalion The Royal 
Welch Fusiliers in the Great War (Caernarfon: Royal Welch Fusiliers Museum, 2001), p.111]. 
94
 French, Military Identities,  p.265 
95
 HMSO, Quarterly Army List, January 1914. 
96
 Except for two brevet-Majors. 
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were important; and 71 per cent of COs saw service 1900-02. Their key learning had likely 
been done before they were too set in their ways. 
 
Much of their war experience, both before and after the Second Boer War, had been in the 
‘policemen of the empire’ role. G.F. Ellison, psc (a keen military observer who ended the 
First World War as a Major-General having served in staff posts),97 writing in the 
immediate aftermath of the Boer War, had deep reservations about the value of this ‘small 
war’ military service. 
 
Whilst not suggesting complete inapplicability to a large force European conflict, Ellison 
believed that “the qualities of both body and mind that make for success in the leadership 
of small expeditions and for the conquest of savage tribes” did not enable a commander to 
develop the mental facility “to deal with administrative questions of the most complex 
nature or to solve strategical problems on which the fate of nations may depend”, 
continuing: “Something more is required than mere physical bravery, a strong will, nerves 
of iron and a body impervious to fatigue”. The prime dangers in a small force were, he 
believed, those of developing a failure to delegate and believing that in the power of 
improvisation lay the “whole art of successful administration”.98 
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 Sir Gerald Francis Ellison (1861-1947). He served as close adviser to R. B. Haldane whilst he was devising 
his army reforms of 1907. 
98
 G. F. Ellison, Considerations Influencing the Selection of Officers for Command and the Staff, NAM 8704-
35 Ellison Mss. No. 30. Ellison’s main complaint, mirroring Esher, was the lack of an intellectual approach 
to a science of soldiering. He thought that the small war experience could lead to “a dangerous narrowing of 
the intellectual vision” through the view that “war could only be learnt from war”, and, moreover, that only 
the British way in war was worth learning from. In short, the army had learnt the wrong thing by 




The campaigns of conquest, suppression of insurrection or punitive expeditions indeed 
bore little resemblance to continental European warfare, but this was counterbalanced to 
some extent by the South African experience. The British army of 1914 had experience of 
tactical diversity, and in its campaigns conducted amidst hostile geography and nature, its 
commanders had become masters of small-force tactics and logistics. Whilst they had 
passed through some sort of intellectual quality-control for promotion, it was the rich 
patina of experience that marked this group as exceptional in terms of staff and war 
service. 
 
Far from necessarily suffering from narrowed vision, the Regular COs of 1914 had the 
potential for a broad vision provided by varied empire experience balanced against nearly 
12 years of training suitable to continental war with the revised tactics of the post-1902 
period. Not all achieved this, of course. Lieutenant-Colonel W.M. Bliss, 2nd Scottish 
Rifles, had become CO on 10 October 1913. Aged 48, he had no war experience, but had 
served as a Regular Adjutant 1894-98. One of his officers described him as “Crimean in 
many ways – steeped in outmoded tradition and not prone to delegation of duties”. 
Reviewing his officers’ opinions of him, John Baynes summarises: “He might not have 
been very clever … [but] … he was genuine and sincere, and within his limitations a 
sound, practical officer”.99 
 
For the COs of August 1914, their war experience suited them to managing battalions in 
the encounter battles of 1914, and may even have been particularly appropriate in handling 
the retreat from Mons. Once trenches were dug for more than momentary inhabitation, 
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 J. Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage (London: Cassell, 1967), p. 113. This had not been a 




their store of experience, as for all officers, irrespective of nationality, no longer served 
them as well. 
 
No objective competence rating can be achieved for the Regular COs. In terms of 
perceived incompetence, in addition to the two who were court-martialled, Lieutenant-
Colonels Elkington and Mainwaring,100 six infantry Lieutenant-Colonels were relieved of 
command before 31 December 1914.101 This does not necessarily mean they were 
incompetent. Of these, Lieutenant-Colonel N.A.L. Corry, 2nd Grenadier Guards, had been 
sent home for withdrawing without orders (being out of contact with his Brigadier) from 
Bois la Haut (Mons) on 23 August 1914, and the War Office noted him as “not an 
inefficiency case”.102 Corry had simply fallen foul of the vagaries of being the ‘man on the 
spot’.103 
 
The remaining five were a different matter. Lieutenant-Colonel C. Wanliss was sent home 
on 29 August 1914, judged “totally unfit to command in the field” by his divisional 
commander.104 Lieutenant-Colonel D.W. Churcher, 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, was replaced 
                                                      
100
 See Introduction. 
101
 D/APC/HD/ABLW/187116 Army Personnel Centre – War Office letter dated 17 January 1915 in the file 
of Lieutenant-Colonel Cecil Wanliss. 
102
 D/APC/HD/ABLW/187116 Army Personnel Centre 
103
 “Colonel Corry determined to take upon himself the responsibility of ordering the retirement of the two 
battalions.  His impression was that in the case like this, when local conditions could not be known to the 
Divisional Staff, it was for the man on the spot to make his own decision. Superior authority, however, 
afterwards held that while under exceptional circumstances such powers might well be delegated to the man 
in mediis rebus, in a case like this it could not be admitted that an officer in actual touch with the enemy was 
the best judge of how long a position should be held.  It was felt that there were many considerations in the 
decision of the sort, of which the officer in the front line could know very little. Colonel Corry was therefore 
severely blamed to his action, and was a fortnight later relieved of his command”. Sir F. Ponsonby, The 
Grenadier Guards in the Great War, 1914-1918 Vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1920), p. 27. Corry assumed 
command of 3rd Grenadier Guards on 29 November 1914, and took them to France. 
104
 Major-General H. Hamilton. This decision was approved by Lieutenant-General Smith-Dorrien, Field- 
Marshal French and F. W. N. McCracken, his Brigadier. Wanliss was put on the sick list, prescribed 
complete rest, and was sent back to England. He saw the report on him prepared by McCracken, and 
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on 10 September 1914.105 Similarly, Lieutenant-Colonels H.P. Hancox of the 2nd Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers; J.K. O’Meagher of the 2nd Munster Fusiliers; and H.P. Creagh-
Osborne of the 1st Royal Lancaster were sent home.106 
 
It is possible to assess viability as a CO in the wider group in terms of endurance and 
promotability. If the number of COs who were either killed in action (40 – 24 having been 
killed before the end of 1914);107 wounded unable to return to command (14);108 prisoners 
of war (eight);109 or who remained in India (five);110 is subtracted, 90 COs remain whose 
progress can be followed. Of these, 15 were invalided (i.e. either their constitution was 
genuinely not up to active service or invalidity was used as a euphemism),111 15 were 
                                                                                                                                                                 
endorsed by Major General F.D.V. Wing and Smith-Dorrien, and submitted a detailed rebuttal, but the Army 
Council felt they had “no alternative but to accept the opinion formed” by the reporting officers.   
105
 See Introduction. He clearly had an unhappy pre-war relationship with his Brigade Commander, who 
viewed him as running a less than competent battalion. 
106
 Henry Percy Hancox served as AA&QMG from 12 October 1914 to 18 October 1915, and after periods 
on half-pay, ended the war in the Labour Corps. John Kevin O’Meagher commanded a Service battalion, 8th 
Munster, from 6 September 1914 to 8 May 1915, following which he served as in a Special Appointment as 
Staff Captain, and finally commanded the 3rd Garrison Royal Irish Fusiliers from 7 December 1916 to 2 
October 1918. Herbert Pearson Creagh-Osborne, a Depot Major in 1914, returned to active service 
commanding Hood Battalion, Royal Naval Division, briefly in December 1916 (see Chapter Three section 
3.3.3). 
107
 A further 16 commanding as a Major or lower rank also killed during 1914 whilst acting-up. 
108
 Lieutenant-Colonels M.C. Coles (2nd Queen’s); H.E.B. Newenham (2nd Royal Fusiliers); St. J.A. Cox (2nd 
Royal Irish); H.E.B. Leach (1st South Wales Borderers); C.M. Stephenson (2nd King’s Own Scottish 
Borderers); W.B. Wallace (1st Suffolk); J.A.C. Gibbs (2nd Duke of Wellington’s); M.D. Graham (1st Royal 
Berkshire); C.P. Higginson (1st Shropshire Light Infantry); A.W. Hasted (1st Wiltshire); R.W.H. Ronaldson 
(1st Highland Light Infantry); D.L. MacEwen (2nd Cameron Highlanders); W.T.M. Reeve (2nd Leinster); 
H.M. Biddulph (1st Rifle Brigade).  
109
 Lieutenant-Colonels R.G.I. Bolton (2nd Scots Guards – POW 26 October 1914); H. McMicking (2nd Royal 
Scots – POW 27 August 1914); S.H. Enderby (2nd Northumberland Fusiliers – POW 8 May 1915); 
D.C.Boger (1st Cheshire – POW 24 August 1914); S.C.F. Jackson (1st Hampshire – POW 27 August 1914); 
E.A.F. Lethbridge (1st Ox & Bucks – POW 29 April 1916); R.C. Bond (2nd Yorkshire Light Infantry – POW 
26 August 1914); J.F. Forbes (2nd Wiltshire – POW 24 October 1914). 
110
 Lieutenant-Colonels G. D. Crocker (2nd Kings Liverpool); E.H.R.C.R. Platt (2nd Somerset Light Infantry); 
G. Christian (1st Green Howards); W.M. Watson (1st Duke of Wellington’s); and C.C. Luard (1st Durham 
Light Infantry). 
111
 Lieutenant-Colonels H.C. de la M. Hill (1st Buffs – to OC MGC Training Centre); E.H. Swayne (1st 
Somerset Light Infantry – to Training Reserve); H. Delme-Radcliffe (2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers – to Training 
Reserve); A.E. Lascelles (1st Worcestershire – to Special Employment); H.D. Lawrence (2nd East Surrey – to 
Special Employment); W.M. Campbell (2nd Black Watch – Temporary Brigadier-General UK); R.H. Hayes 
(2nd Middlesex – to Home Service Battalion); H.L. James (2nd Manchester – instructional duties); F.H. Neish 
(1st Gordon Highlanders – retired); H.L. Henderson (1st Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders – Commandant 
Lines of Communication); S.R.L. White (1st Leinster – to home service battalion); E.O. Smith (1st 
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retired or sidelined into inactive administrative posts;112 and two court-martialled.113 One 
took up a series of senior staff posts.114 Twenty-eight were promoted to brigade 
command,115 25 to divisional command,116 and three to corps command,117 giving a 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Northamptonshire – to Special Appointment); A.C. Lovett (1st Gloucestershire – to Brigade Commander not 
on active service); B.F.B. Stuart (3rd Worcestershire - to Brigade Commander not on active service); A.A. 
Wolfe-Murray (2nd Highland Light Infantry - to Brigade Commander not on active service). 
112
 Lieutenant-Colonels N.A.L. Corry (2nd Grenadier Guards - relieved of command on 9 September 1914 as 
a result of ordering retirement of his battalion and the Irish Guards at Mons on 23 August 1914, restored to 
command of 3rd Battalion but placed on half-pay January 1916);  H.W.U. Coates (2nd Bedfordshire – never 
saw active service, to half pay in 1915); D.A. Callender (1st Royal Scots – to Labour Corps); R. Fowler-
Butler (1st Royal Fusiliers – to Commandant Lines of Communications); G.F. Phillips (2nd West Yorkshire – 
Military Attache & District Commander); M.J. Sweetman (2nd East Yorkshire – to training reserve); H.V.S. 
Ormond (1st Lancashire Fusiliers – to training reserve); H.P. Hancox (2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers – to 
AAQMG & Labour Corps); C. Wanliss (2nd South Lancashire – to training reserve); A.G. Marrable (1st 
Yorkshire Light Infantry – Commandant); E.C. Cobbold (2nd York & Lancaster – to Special Reserve 
battalion); B.W.L. McMahon (2nd Durham Light Infantry – to Scholl of Musketry); H.P. Moulton-Barrett (2nd 
Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders – to Special Appointment); H.E. Tizard (1st Royal Munster Fusiliers – to 
training reserve); J.K. O’Meagher (2nd Royal Muster Fusiliers – to Special Appointment). 
113
 Lieutenant-Colonels J.F. Elkington (1st Royal Warwicks) and A.E. Mainwaring (2nd Royal Dublin 
Fusiliers). 
114
 Lieutenant-Colonel D.W. Churcher psc became a GSO2 then a GSO1 to the end of the war. 
115
 14 were appointed to Brigade command alone, namely Lieutenant-Colonels E.C.Peebles (2nd Norfolk – 19 
Brigade 25 January 1916); J.O. Travers (2nd Devonshire – 199 Brigade 20 May 1916); F.W. Towsey (1st 
West Yorkshire – 122 Brigade 27 September 1915); C.R.J Griffith (1st Bedfordshire 108 Brigade 4 December 
1915); T.H.F. Pearse (2nd Cheshire – 84 Brigade 27 September 1915); H.G. Casson (2nd South Wales 
Borderers – 87 Brigade 11 July 1915); C.B. Westmacott (2nd Worcestershire – 2 Brigade 23 November 
1914); M.N. Turner (1st Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry – 15 Brigade 28 June 1915); R.M. Ovens (1st 
South Staffordshire – 149 Brigade 14 September 1916); C.S. Davidson (2nd South Staffordshire – 123 
Brigade 30 September 1915); C.S. Prichard (2nd Northamptonshire 119 Brigade 8 May 1916); E. Pearce-
Serocold (2nd King’s Royal Rifle Corps – 68 Brigade 3 June 1915); C. Gosling (3rd King’s Royal Rifle Corps 
– 7 Brigade 23July 1915); H.S. Ainslie (1st Northumberland Fusiliers – 18 Brigade 29 May 1915). 14 were 
appointed to Brigade command and to subsequent staff posts, namely Lieutenant-Colonels R. le N. Ardee (1st 
Grenadier Guards – 4 Guards Brigade 8 February 1918); H.C. Lowther (1st Scots Guards – 1 Guards Brigade 
13 November 1914); C.R. Ballard (1st Norfolk – 7 Brigade 23 November 1914); G.M Gloster (1st Devonshire 
– 64 Brigade 18 August 1915); D.M. Stuart (2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers – 58 Brigade 8 July 1915); H.D. Tuson 
(2nd Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry -  23 Brigade 7 September 1915); C.L. Macnab (1st Royal Sussex - 1 
Royal Naval Bde 27 May 1916); F.G. Anley (2nd Essex – 12 Bde 4 October 1914); C.J. Sackville-West (4th 
King’s Royal Rifle Corps – 21 Brigade 8 December 1915); V.W. De Falbe (1st North Staffordshire – 185 
Brigade 4 January 1916); J.D. McLachlan (1st Cameron Highlanders – 8 Brigade 3 October 1915). 
116
 Lieutenant-Colonels J. Ponsonby (1st Coldstream Guards – 40th Division 4 August 1917); C.E. Pereira (2nd 
Coldstream Guards – 2nd Division 27 December 1916); G.P.T Feilding (3rd Coldstream Guards – Guards 
Division 3 January 1916); W.E.B. Smith (1st Lincolnshire - 52nd Division 11 July 1916); H.L. Croker (1st 
Leicestershire – 28th Division 21 March 1915); C.G. Blackader (2nd Leicestershire – 38th Division 12 July 
1916); W.D. Smith (1st Royal Scots Fusiliers – 20th Division 8 March 1916); P.R. Robertson (1st 
Cameronians  - 17th Division 13 July 1916 ); D.E. Cayley (4th Worcestershire – 29th Division 19 March 
1918); C.L. Nicholson (2nd East Lancashire – 34th Division 25 July 1916); J.R. Longley (1st East Surrey – 10th 
Div 21 December 1915); F.A. Dudgeon (1st South Lancashire – 56th Division 10 August 1917); T.O. Marden 
(1st Welsh – 6th Division 21 August 1918); H.R. Davies (2nd Ox & Bucks – 11th Division 1 May 1917); E. 
Feetham (1st Royal Berkshire – 39th Division 20 August 1917); R.J. Bridgford (2nd Shropshire Light Infantry 
-  31st Division 21 March 1918); C.P.A. Hull (4th Middlesex – 56th Division 6 February 1916); E.P Strickland 
(1st Manchester – 1st Division 12 June 1916); W.C.G. Heneker (2nd North Staffordshire – 8th Division 8 
December 1916); A.B. Ritchie (1st Seaforth Highlanders – 11th Division 5 December 1916); P.R.Wood (2nd 
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viability, or ‘endurance or promotability’ rate of 64 per cent. The indication is that nearly 
two thirds of these COs were leaders of stamina and quality. 
 
1.4.2 The Auxiliaries 
Of the auxiliary infantry, the Special/Extra Reserve had always received more extensive 
training than the Territorials.118 Their officers were, of course, denied staff experience.119 
The auxiliary COs, apart from those who were ex-Regulars, were, therefore, deficient in 
both education and staff experience. 
 
In respect of the Special Reserve, only four battalions would actually see active service as 
units,120 and only one was taken overseas by its CO of August 1914.121 In all, 15 of the SR 
COs of August 1914 saw active service. Eight saw service as COs of Service battalions;122 
five with TF battalions; and one, briefly, with a Regular battalion. Sixty per cent were ex-
Regulars and hence previous professional experience was one of the principal reasons they 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Royal Irish Fusiliers – 33rd Division 12 September 1917); H.S.L. Ravenshaw (1st Connaught Rangers – 27th 
Division 23 September 1916); G.H. Thesiger (4th Rifle Brigade – 9th Division 9 September 1915); L.J. Bols 
(1st Dorsetshire – 24th Division 18 May 1917); E. Northey (1st King’s Royal Rifle Corps was promoted 
Major-General commanding the Nyasaland Rhodesia Field Force in German East Africa). 
117
 Lieutenant-Colonels R.B. Stephens (2nd Rifle Brigade – X Corps 3 July 1918); W.R Marshall (1st 
Sherwood Foresters – III Indian (Tigris) Corps 24 September 1916); R.H.K Butler (2nd Lancashire Fusiliers – 
III Corps 26 February 1918). 
118
 The Militia officer had four months training in his first year and one month in every subsequent year. The 
TF officer had to partake in drills, (40 in the first year, 10 thereafter), and 15 days annual summer camp, and 
undergo a course in musketry. The one month Initial Course at a training centre was optional, but to progress 
beyond Captain, the 21 day course at the School of Musketry, Hythe, was obligatory. 
119
 Regulars filled the role of Adjutant in their Battalions. 
120
 The four were Extra Reserve Battalions of the Liverpool, Bedfordshire and North & South Staffordshire 
Regiments. Haldane had always intended that the Extra Reserve Battalions “might be sent to the 
Mediterranean as garrison battalions or to the Continent for line of communication duties”. [K.W. 
Mitchinson, Defending Albion (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.5]. 
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 Lieutenant-Colonel  J.W. Allen of the 4th King’s Liverpool, who saw 456 days active service. The CO of 
the 4th North Staffordshire, Lieutenant-Colonel B.I. Way was transferred to the 8th East Yorkshire and was 
wounded twice as CO before retiring. The 4th South Staffordshire were taken overseas by a pre-war Regular 
Major (T.R. Stokoe) and the 4th Bedfordshire by their senior Major (R.P. Croft). 
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 See, for instance, Chapter Two, Table 2.4. 
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were selected for active service. One, indeed, was promoted to brigade command.123 Each 
spent nearly ten months on average on active service, and one, the redoubtable Lieutenant-
Colonel G.T.B. Wilson (4th Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders) had four active service 
commands, (including 60 days with 2/7th Lancashire Fusiliers, 359 with 1/4th King’s Own 
Scottish Borderers, and 333 with 2/6th Manchester). It may be concluded that some were 
capable of giving better service than might have been expected.124 
 
The TF COs were similarly deficient in not only education and staff experience, but also 
exposure to war. Even the ex-Regulars had only half as much war experience as their 
active Regular counterparts,125 and that of the ex-Volunteers was confined to South Africa, 
eight per cent of them having seen service there in 1899 and 26 per cent between 1900 and 
1902. 
 
Again, no objective competence rating can be calculated for the TF COs of August 1914. 
The first test of suitability for command was, of course, whether they took their battalions 
on active service. (Whilst it might be argued that they were never primarily intended to see 
service abroad,126 TF COs certainly faced the potential of commanding their battalions in 
action on home soil). 
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 Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Corrie Lewin (3rd Connaught Rangers) was promoted to the command of 40 
Brigade on 19 October 1915. 
124
 Lord Kitchener, on taking up post as Secretary of State for War described these men as “those old 
gentlemen I have seen parading with umbrellas in Hyde Park,” confusing them with the National Reserve. 
(C. Harris, ‘Kitchener and the Territorials’ The Times, 28 August 1928, p. 13. Sir Charles Harris was 
Assistant Financial Secretary, War Office, throughout the war.) 
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 See Tables 1:3 and 1:8. 
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 Haldane “expressed the hope that between one-sixth and one-quarter” of the TF would “actually opt to 
undertake a foreign service obligation”. [Hansard,4th Series Vol. 169, 1301, 25 February 1907, cited in 
Mitchinson, Defending Albion, p.6]. 
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Of the 206 battalions,127 26 COs did not see active service because their battalions 
remained in England or were posted to a non-combat zone. Of the remaining 180, 71 were 
removed from the command of their battalions before they went abroad. The remaining 
109 give an ‘appropriate to command in war’ rate of 61 per cent.128 
 
The reasons for 39 per cent not proceeding on active service are probably twofold.129 (It 
was not connected with previous experience as 56 per cent of ‘Territorial only’ COs went 
abroad in comparison with 60 per cent of ex-Regulars). Firstly, their regimental histories 
often refer to age and health. Whilst health remains an unknown factor,130 the TF COs who 
did not take their battalions abroad were only two years older than those who did.131 It is, 
of course, possible that in these part-time soldiers who might be less fit than Regulars of 
the same age, two years made a difference. It is more likely that ‘age and health’ was to an 
extent euphemistic and that foremost was perceived appropriateness/competence. Lord 
Derby132 described Lieutenant-Colonel H.L. Beckwith of the 4th Loyal North Lancashire as 
“absolutely useless … to show you what sort of man he is he says he cannot go out now to 
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 There were technically 207 battalions, but one, 7th King’s Liverpool, the one remaining Volunteer 
battalion, was not commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel. 
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 Seven of the TF COs of August 1914 saw active service at the heads of battalions other than those they 
were commanding at the outbreak of war. 
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 Lieutenant-Colonel David Christie Campbell, CO 1/6th Black Watch, was removed from command by 
death, in the autumn of 1914, and hence never had the chance to lead his battalion. Lieutenant-Colonel Sir 
Mark Sykes, CO 1/5th Green Howards, was pressed into service by Lord Kitchener onto the de Bunsen 
Committee, advising on Middle-Eastern affairs. Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Alexander Firth, CO 1/4th York 
& Lancaster, who was a member of the prominent Sheffield steel family, resigned to pursue a career the 
munitions industry. Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Naish, 1/4th Hampshire, was an ordained clergyman whose 
bishop would not allow him to go overseas with his battalion. The point is the same – these three men were 
inappropriately positioned for battalion command if, in the event of war, they could not lead their battalions. 
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 Lieutenant-Colonel William Johnston Younger (4th Royal Scots), for instance, resigned his commission on 
the grounds of ill-health in January 1915 without seeing active service. 
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 48 years three months versus 46 years three months, on average. 
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 The 17th Earl of Derby, MP, appointed Director-General of Recruitment in 1915, was one of the 
originators of the local recruitment (‘Pal’s Battalions’) movement. 
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the Front but he would be ready to go out later when the weather gets warmer”.133 The best 
perspective that might be put on the refusal of Lieutenant-Colonel R.G. Hayes, 15th 
London, to take the Imperial Service Obligation was that he recognised his limitations.134 
Garth Pratten’s observation on Australian Militia COs on the outbreak of World War Two 
is absolutely applicable to these auxiliary COs: “Senior command was perhaps beyond all 
but the most committed part-time officer”.135 As William Mitchinson summarises: 
“Although usually keen and proud of their unit, many … were, in the opinion of the 
professionals, not up to the task of commanding a battalion”.136 The TF County 
Associations had clearly had difficult in asserting authority over the local interests 
involved in battalion command that had historically been marked.137 
 
The first Territorial battalion to go into action was, famously, the 1/14th Battalion, London 
Regiment (London Scottish), on the Messines Ridge on 31 October. Having landed in 
France on 16 September it had been put to lines of communication duties. Sent to Ypres on 
29 October, it was commanded by 42 year-old Lieutenant-Colonel G.A. Malcolm, an East 
India merchant and ‘pure’ TF CO,  who on 10 October was “greatly indignant” about being 
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 Derby papers LRO 920 DER(17)33 13 February 1915 [quoted in P. Simkins,  Kitchener’s Army: The 
Raising of the New Armies 1914-1916  (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007) p.221]. Beckwith resigned in October 
1914, but later served as a Major in the Labour Corps. 
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 The Imperial Service Obligation was a voluntary agreement to serve overseas. Robert George Hayes was 
relegated to the 2/15th, then the 3/15th. His leadership example seems to have degraded morale and led to a 
good deal of refusal of Imperial Service in his battalion. One of the other ranks noted that the arrival of his 
successor, the Earl of Arran, “bucked things up a lot”. J. Knight, The Civil Service Rifles in the Great War 
(Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2004), p.33 
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 G. Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War (Melbourne: Cambridge 
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 Volunteer battalions had been very much the personal fiefdoms of their COs – indeed, they had a major 
personal interest, being personally responsible for any debts incurred. 
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“too late to have a look in”.138 Malcolm’s ‘look in’ lasted until 15 February 1915, when he 
was invalided home. 
 
Of the 109 TF COs of 1914 who proceeded to command battalions on active service, 
thirty-seven per cent were lost to command through being killed (15), seriously wounded 
(five), or invalided (20).  Nineteen (17 per cent) were relieved and retired, and 18 (16 per 
cent) were relieved but employed further in third-line battalion commands or 
administrative jobs.139 Fifteen commanded their units into late 1917/1918, and four were 
promoted Brigadier General.140 
 
In an attempt to review the overall viability as CO of those who took their battalions to 
war, a period in command of six months will be assumed as likely to reveal the effects of 
age, health and ability. Removing those who could not have furthered their careers because 
of death or serious wounds, there remains a group of 89 men and of these 63 (71 per cent) 
were promoted or served over six months, and hence were viable commanders. 
 
If the group who did not take their battalions overseas are included, the overall viability 
rate for the TF COs in a sustained continental war falls to 31 per cent. This may not have 
been what they were primarily intended to do, but it was what they were required to do. 
The majority were not up to the challenge. 
                                                      
138
 J.C. Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew (London: Jane’s, 1987), p. 69 
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 Those who were given another job were in post for 330 days (16 per cent served under three months, five 
per cent between three and six months, and 79 per cent served over six months); those who were not given 
another job were in post for 243 days, indicating that the group who were retired had less endurance/ability. 
Of this latter group, 31 per cent served under three months, 16 per cent between three and six months, and 53 
per cent served over six months. 
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 Lieutenant-Colonel Viscount Hampden (1st Hertfordshire - 140 Brigade, 15 July 1916); Lieutenant-
Colonel A. A. Howell (1/3rd London – 167 Brigade, 30 June 1916) on 11 October 1916; Lieutenant-Colonel 
F. G. Lewis (1/13th London – 142 Brigade, 14 August 1915); Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. Pollok-McCall (1/5th 
Royal Scots Fusiliers – 25 Brigade, 3 June 1918). 
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1.5 Attrition of Command in the BEF in 1914 
By the end of 1914 the BEF had passed through the battles of Mons, Le Cateau, the Marne 
and the Aisne, and had been violently mauled at First Ypres. By this time there were 123 
Regular and 23 TF battalions in France. After First Ypres141 it has been claimed that “in 
most cases, there were barely one officer and 30 men left” from the battalions who had 
arrived in France in 1914.142  
 
By 31 December 1914, 1,278 officers had died, 2,209 were wounded, and 783 were 
missing or prisoners, comprising a total of 4,041 Regular officers (4271 including Indian 
Army and Territorials), or nearly 32 per cent of the 12,738 Regular officers of August 
1914.143 Keith Simpson notes that from 1st Queen’s, of 26 officers, 24 were casualties by 
this date; from 1st Norfolk, 15 of 26; from 3rd Worcestershire, 15 of 28; and from 1st 
Northamptonshire, 26 of 26.144 
 
By the end of 1914, 18 of the Regular COs of August 1914 were dead.145 Five were 
prisoners of war.146 Two had been lost through court martial, six had been promoted to 
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 Lieutenant-Colonels A.McN. Dykes (1st Kings Own Royal Lancaster) and C.A.H. Brett (2nd Suffolk) were 
killed on 26 August 1914 at Le Cateau. Lieutenant-Colonel G.H. Morris (1st Irish Guards) was killed at 
Villers-Cotterets on 1 September 1914. Lieutenant-Colonel G.C. Knight (1st Loyal North Lancashires) was 
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brigade command, twenty-four had been wounded, 10 had been invalided, and six 
replaced. On 31 December 1914, 52 (42 per cent) original Regular Lieutenant-Colonels 
were still in command of their battalions. The high levels of dead and wounded may be 
seen as either profligacy with a crucial resource, or a reflection of the ferocity of the 
fighting. Fifty-four battalions (44 per cent) were commanded by men who were Majors at 
the outbreak of war;147 16 (13 per cent) were commanded by men who had been 
Captains,148 and one by a 2nd Lieutenant.149 (All of the TF battalions were still commanded 
by the men who had brought them to France, except for two COs who had swiftly been 
invalided).150 
 
This snapshot suggests that notwithstanding a 58 per cent attrition in original COs, the 
state of battalion command in the BEF would not appear at first glance to have been fatally 
‘deskilled’ given the proportion of Lieutenant-Colonels and pre-war Majors in command. 
At times, however, the situation had been desperate. 
 
1st Coldstream Guards had landed in France on 13 August 1914 under Lieutenant-Colonel 
J. Ponsonby. When he was wounded on 15 September 1914, the second-in-command, 
Major the Hon. L. d’H Hamilton took over only to be killed on 29 October 1914. Depletion 
of officers meant that Lieutenant J. Boyd took over for two days, being replaced on 1 
                                                                                                                                                                 
1914, C.B. Morland (2nd Welsh) on 31 October 1914, and N.R. McMahon on 11 November 1914. 
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Alexander (3rd Rifle Brigade) died of wounds on 22 November 1914.  
146
 Lieutenant-Colonels D.C. Boger (1st Cheshires), and R.C. Bond (2nd Kings Own Yorkshire Light Infantry 
at Le Cateau on 26 August 1914, Lieutenant-Colonel H. McMicking (2nd Royal Scots) on 27 August 1914, 
and Lieutenant-Colonel J.F. Forbes (2nd Wiltshire) on 24 October 1914, and Lieutenant-Colonel R.G.I. 
Bolton (2nd Scots Guards) on 26 October 1914. 
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 One was a retired Regular who was a Major in the Special Reserve, the other a retired Regular Major. 
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 One was a retired Captain from the Special Reserve, the other a retired Regular Captain. 
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 2nd Lieutenant G.C.B Clark, 2nd Royal Scots had, however, been promoted to Major. 
150
 Lieutenant-Colonel G.A. Blair (1/10th Liverpool), a Major in the TF Reserve in August 1914, was 
invalided on 25 November 1914, after 23 days in France. Lieutenant-Colonel G.B. Heywood (1/6th Cheshire) 
a TF Captain in August 1914 was invalided on 18 December 1914 after 38 days in France. 
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November by Captain E.G. Christie-Miller, who was taken prisoner the following day. 
Command devolved on Lieutenant Boyd again for another two days before he was 
replaced by Captain G.J. Edwards, who was superseded by the return of Lieutenant-
Colonel Ponsonby on 21 November. 
 
1st Cheshire found themselves in similar straits. After Lieutenant-Colonel D.C. Boger was 
taken prisoner on 24 August 1914, there were no Majors present to assume command of 
the shattered battalion, and Captain J.L. Shore became CO until 16 September. His 
replacement by Major F.B. Young, a Major from the Reserve of Officers, was part of a 
succession of seven COs during the month of October. Young was replaced by Major C.B. 
Vandeleur, (1st Scottish Rifles), who was succeeded by three Captains of 1st Cheshire,151 
and one of 2nd Munster Fusiliers.152 Lieutenant T.L. Frost of 1st Cheshire was in command 
as October came to a close. He was replaced after five days by a Major from the Reserve 
of Officers, J.A. Busfeild, who gave way to Major H.S. Hodgkin, a Regular Captain in 
August 1914, who was in command at the year’s end. 
 
The flavour of being in temporary command during this period is given by Captain H.C. 
Rees, 2nd Welsh.153 On 31 October 1914 at Gheluvelt, after the death of Lieutenant-Colonel 
C.B. Morland,154 Rees was left in command with one other officer and 25 men. On 18 or 
19 January 1915, he gave way to Captain W.M. Hore. Rees was the sixth senior (and 
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 Captains F.H. Mahony, J.L Shore (again) and B.E. Massy. 
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 Captain G.A. Woods. Neither the Munsters nor the Scottish Rifles were in the same brigade as the 
Cheshires – this extra-regimental support was therefore very ad hoc. 
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 As the first of four brigade commands, Rees would be commanding 94 Brigade opposing Serre on 1 July 
1916. 
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 “It was then that a shell burst in front … mortally wounding Colonel Morland on my right. It was a final 
blow. Colonel Morland was a terrible loss. I never saw him the slightest degree upset by anything that 
happened. He remained to the very end as cool and collected as if he was on parade at home”. Brigadier-
General H. C. Rees, A Personal Record of the First 7 Months of the War, IWM 77/179/1 
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second most junior) Captain in the 2nd Battalion; Hore (who had been serving with the 3rd 
Battalion on the outbreak of war) was the fifth senior.155 Rees noted: 
Captain Hore arrived from England and being just senior to me, I had 
to relinquish command of the battalion. I remained as second-in-
command and discussed on most questions connected with the battalion 
as it was very difficult for him just out from home to at once grasp the 
tactics of the war. 
 
In an encounter with Brigadier-General J. Gough:156  
I asked him to let me go home to England for a job. I pointed out that I 
had commanded the battalion through three strenuous months, and that 
having built them up from the remnants remaining after the First Battle 
of Ypres, I found my position somewhat difficult.  
 
These comments inform us firstly about Rees’s vanity and ambition; secondly about the 
bond a CO could develop with a battalion he was rebuilding; and thirdly how the 
traditional principle of seniority could override hard-won experience and demotivate a 
keen and able officer. Lastly, and positively, it suggests that junior officers were quickly 
learning new tactics and the skills of command. 
 
Balancing the picture of those in command on 31 December 1914 against the accounts of 
both 1st Coldstream Guards and 1st Cheshire, and other examples such as 2nd Welsh being 
commanded by their second most junior Captain for three months, the most alarming 
reality for the BEF was that attrition was taking place not just at senior level but also 
extensively at the level of middle-ranking officers. 
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If, as James Edmonds states, “in every respect the Expeditionary Force of 1914 was 
incomparably the best trained, best organized, and best equipped British Army which ever 
went forth to war”,157 then the Regular COs of 1914 were almost certainly the most 
competent group of COs that the army had ever put in the field. Contrary to Tim Travers’ 
assertion that the supposed 75 per cent incompetence rate of COs in 10 Brigade was 
probably “not unique”,158 an overall 64 per cent ‘endurance or promotability’ competence 
rate is indicated. 
 
Whatever the limitations of their education, their richly textured biographies speak to 
considerable ‘on the job’ professional development. They possessed a considerable depth 
of staff and wartime experience, particularly of tactical diversity, within an army somewhat 
less hidebound by seniority and regimental particularism than has been supposed. They 
had ascended their professional ladder during a period of change when the infantry became 
much more tactically suited to the continental war of which it lacked experience. From the 
percentage who failed the test of “Fitness to Command”, their promotion had been no 
formality.  
 
In comparison, however, only a third of the Territorial Force COs, a group which, in its 
defence, had not been intended to embark on continental campaigning, proved viable 
battalion commanders. Many lacked the fitness, stamina and will required, let alone the 
ability. 
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The ferocity of the fighting of 1914 and the requirement to provide brigade command to 
the expanding army, however, began to erode not only the stock of experienced senior 
officers available to the Regular battalions, but also the stock of middle-ranking officers. 
These men would be increasingly required to step up to the mark of battalion command not 
only in their own units but also those of the New Armies and the expanding Territorial 





Raising the New Armies and Expanding the Territorial 
Force – Battalion Command 1914-15 
 
 
‘Dug-outs.’ They were but ghosts of the past inserted by the War 
Office to fill a blank cubby hole. 
       Colonel W.N. Nicholson1 
 
As the BEF in France was locked in its struggle with the German army, so Lord Kitchener, 
Secretary of State for War, was enacting his most important contribution to victory, the 
raising of the New Armies.2  
 
2.1 New Army Infantry Service Battalions 
During 1914-15, 703 New Army infantry Service Battalions were raised. Of these, 404 saw 
active service, including 40 pioneer battalions.3 One hundred and fifty-three were retained 
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2
 Lord Kitchener of Khartoum, a career soldier of the Royal Engineers, had joined the Egyptian Army and 
risen to be its Sirdar, or Commander-in-Chief. Following his victory at Omdurman in 1898 he became 
Governor-General of Sudan. He was Commander-in-Chief in South Africa from November 1900, and 
subsequently Commander-in-Chief in India to 1909. He was British agent in Egypt in 1914, but was on leave 
in London when war broke out.  A national hero who would inspire unity behind a government of whom he 
was a member, he became Secretary of State for War on 5 August 1914. Kitchener’s decision to raise the 
New Armies outside of the existing structure of the Territorial Force has provoked controversy. Charles 
Messenger is typical in attributing this simply to “deep prejudice against ‘amateur’ soldiers”. [C. Messenger, 
Call to Arms - The British Army 1914-18 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2005), p.94]. Whilst there may 
be truth in this attitude, Peter Simkins presents a reasoned argument that Kitchener took into account the 
possibility of invasion, in the repulsion of which the TF would have been expected to play a major role, 
against a background of initial sluggish commitment to Imperial Service on the part of TF battalions. [P. 
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in the UK as reserve battalions; 54 saw service abroad or in the UK as Labour, Transport 
or Dock Work battalions; and 92 served as Garrison or Home Service battalions. 
 
2.1.1 First COs: K1 
Kitchener’s call to arms for the first 100,000 volunteers to create six new divisions was 
published on 7 August 1914.  
 
Of the 80 K1 battalions raised,4 all were supplied with professional officers as CO, 82 per 
cent receiving active Regulars, 65 Majors and a Lieutenant-Colonel. One received an 
active Indian Army Lieutenant-Colonel.5 Seven were given retired Regulars from the 
Reserve of Officers, including five Lieutenant-Colonels, one Major and a Captain, who 
had been retired on average only one year eight months (range three years four months to 
one month) and had an average age of 49 years five months. Three battalions received COs 
from amongst active Special Reserve officers (two Lieutenant-Colonels already 
commanding SR battalions and one Major,6 all retired Regulars) with an average age of 42 
years eight months. Lastly, three were allocated other ex-Regulars (a Colonel, Major and 
Captain) who had been retired on average seven years seven months (range 10 years to 
four years five months), with an average age of 51 years eight months.7 
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 Each infantry regiment of the line raised one new battalion, but the Royal Scots, Highland Light Infantry, 
Royal Munster Fusiliers, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Royal Irish Fusiliers and the Royal Fusiliers provided two, 
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2.1.2 First COs: K2 
Kitchener’s second appeal for a further 100,000 was made on 27 August 1914.8 Seventy-
nine K2 battalions were raised.9  
 
The well had not entirely run dry on active Regulars, and seven Majors and four 
Lieutenant-Colonels (two of the latter on half-pay), as well as one Colonel and four 
Lieutenant-Colonels from the Indian Army were appointed. Twenty per cent active 
professional soldiers were found for K2 compared with 84 per cent for K1. There was, 
therefore, a large increase in the number of retired officers used; 12 per cent for K1 
compared with 78 per cent for K2. From the Reserve of Officers there were two Colonels, 
11 Lieutenant-Colonels, 11 Majors and one Captain.10 Their average age was 50 years 
three months, and they had been retired on average two years nine months (range 11 years 
seven months to 10 days). Of the other retired officers, 25 were Colonels (substantive, 
brevet or honorary), seven Lieutenant-Colonels, and five Majors. All were ex-Regulars. In 
addition, one Lieutenant-Colonel from the unattached list of the Special Reserve was 
                                                                                                                                                                 
(Messenger, Call to Arms, p.23). The military authorities thus kept track of officers who had left the Reserve 
of Officers. 
8
 This tranche of  recruits was intended to bring all Special Reserve battalions up to a strength of 2000 
(Minutes of meeting of the Military Members of the Army Council, 27 August 1914, TNA WO 163/44, cited 
in Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, p.60). The second series of six divisions was, however, authorised on 1 
September 1914. 
9
 The King’s Own Scottish Borderers, Gordon Highlanders, Royal Irish, Royal Inniskilling, Royal Dublin 
and Royal Munster Fusiliers raised two; and the King’s Royal Rifle Corps and Rifle Brigade raised three K2 
battalions. 
10
 Captain Sir Mervyn Edward Manningham-Buller Bt. had retired from the Rifle Brigade, having served as 
Adjutant, on 3 January 1903. He was invalided from 12th Rifle Brigade in September 1915 and saw no 
further active service. 
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appointed.11 Their average age was 55 years seven months, and they had been retired on 
average seven years 11 months (range 23 years to eight months).12  
 
2.1.3 First COs: K3 
On 9 September 1914 Kitchener authorised the formation of twelve more divisions, the 
Third New Army being raised immediately, the Fourth to be formed from any surplus sent 
to the Special Reserve battalions.13 Eighty-nine K3 battalions were formed.14 
 
Five active Regulars were found to command. They were somewhat more remote from 
regimental employ; a Colonel and a Lieutenant-Colonel on the unemployed active list; a 
Lieutenant-Colonel on half-pay; and two Majors, one attached to the Colonial Office. 
Fifteen active Indian Army officers were used, seven Colonels and eight Lieutenant-
Colonels. Only one officer from the Special Reserve was appointed, an ex-Regular Major; 
and for the first time, a Territorial Force Major was used, (an ex-regular Captain).15  
Seventy-five per cent of K3 COs were retired officers. From the Reserve of Officers there 
                                                      
11
 Lieutenant-Colonel William Kemmis was the first non-regular appointee to a Kitchener battalion, namely 
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1900-1, and had served as Commandant, Port Elizabeth. 
12
 Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Stuart St. Aubyn, 12th King’s Royal Rifle Corps, had retired from the King’s 
Royal Rifle Corps as a Captain in 1891, but had been recalled during the Boer War. 
13
 Minutes of meetings of the Military Members of the Army Council, 9 October 1914, TNA WO 163/44 
cited in Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, p.69. The decision was subsequently taken to redesignate the K4 
battalions as Reserve Battalions. Command of these is considered in Appendix Three. 
14
 Thirteen regiments formed no K3 battalions, 17 formed two, five formed three, and two formed four. The 
13 active Irish ‘UVF’ battalions that made up 36th (Ulster) Division were chronological compatriots of K3 
although conceptually they were locally-raised. Of the 13 active battalions, one received a regular Major as 
CO; two received Indian Army Colonels; seven received COs from the Reserve of Officers (three Lieutenant-
Colonels, two Majors and two Captains) with an average age of 46 years seven months and having been 
retired six years three months; and the remaining three received other retired officers (a Colonel, Lieutenant-
Colonel and Major). The average age of the retired officers was 49 years, and they had been retired on 
average six years eight months. Eighty-five per cent were from outside the regiment, but 46 per cent had 
served in Irish regiments. Timothy Bowman notes that only 7 had been “UVF members”. [T. Bowman, 
‘Officering Kitchener's Armies: A Case Study of the 36th (Ulster) Division’, War In History, 16 (2) (2009), 
pp. 189-212]. 
15
 Major Sir William Stewart-Dick-Cunyngham Bt. had retired from the Black Watch as a Regular Captain 




were three Colonels, seven Lieutenant-Colonels, nine Majors and a Captain. Their average 
age was 50 years six months, and they had been retired on average five years seven months 
(range 14 years eight months to five months). Of the other retired officers, 28 were 
Colonels, 15 Lieutenant-Colonels, three Majors and one a Captain. Eighty-seven per cent 
were retired Regulars/Indian Army, half coming from the latter.16 Their average age was 
55 years four months, and they had been retired on average five years five months (range 
21 years six months17 to two months). 
 
2.1.4 First COs: Locally-raised battalions 
Towards the end of August 1914, battalions began to be raised through various local 
authorities, some of these becoming known as “Pals” battalions.18 Through this 
mechanism, the War Office deferred the cost and relieved pressure on the recruiting 
system.19 
 
One hundred and twenty-eight locally-raised battalions were formed for active service.20 
Seven received active Regulars as COs (two Lieutenant-Colonels, four Majors and one 
Captain), and three received Indian Army officers (two Colonels and a Lieutenant-
Colonel). Six received Special Reserve officers (four Majors and two Captains); and two 
                                                      
16
 Colonel Arthur Craigie FitzHardinge Vincent, first CO of the 10th Yorkshire Regiment, was a retired 
officer of the Scottish Rifles, but his retirement as a Colonel was from the Ceylon Volunteers. 
17
 Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Curties, 11th Royal Warwickshire, had retired from the Militia Royal Engineers 
(Milford Haven Division Submarine Miners) as a Captain on 8 February 1893. 
18
 ‘Pals’ in terms of recruitment from specific workplaces or local association. This recruiting concept was 
not the brainchild of, but was given its main impetus by Lord Derby, then chairman of the West Lancashire 
Territorial Association. Much modern sentimentality collects around these battalions, omitting to remember 
that the first-line Territorial battalions were often recruited on much the same principles. 
19
 Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, p.87 
20
 Four locally-raised bantam battalions were amalgamated with other battalions prior to going overseas. 
Command of the 64 locally-raised reserve battalions is considered in Appendix Three. 
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received TF Majors. One received a Colonel of empire volunteers.21 Eighty-three per cent 
received retired officers. Twenty-five were from the Reserve of Officers (three Colonels, 
three Lieutenant-Colonels, nine Majors, nine Captains and a Lieutenant22) with an average 
age of 49 years and having been retired on average seven years seven months (range 21 
years six months23 to two days after the outbreak of war). Five were from the TF Reserve 
(two Colonels, a Lieutenant-Colonel, a Major and a Captain).24 Of the 76 remaining, 29 
were Colonels, 14 Lieutenant-Colonels, 18 Majors, 13 Captains and two Lieutenants,25 
with an average age of 52 years seven months, and having been retired seven years 10 
months (range 27 years one month26 to three months). Thirty-eight per cent were retired 
Regulars, 33 per cent Territorials/Volunteers, 18 per cent Special Reserve/Militia, nine per 
cent Indian Army, and two per cent empire volunteers. Three battalions received 
local/national politicians.27 
                                                      
21
 Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Edward Pemberton Pigott of the Bombay, Baroda & Central India Railway 
Volunteer Rifles was given command of 12th Suffolk. 
22
 Lieutenant-Colonel John Stuart-Wortley, 21st Royal Fusiliers was a retired regular Lieutenant of the 
Highland Light Infantry, although he had entered the Regular army from the post of Captain of Militia in the 
Scottish Rifles. He had been commissioned into the Scottish Horse during the Second Boer War whilst a 
private in the Imperial Yeomanry. He was seconded to the North Nigeria Regiment, and was in charge of the 
transport in the Anglo-French Boundary Expedition to Lake Chad in 1903. He was posted to the 11th 
Sudanese Regiment, and became a civil administrator until 1912. His perceived talent justified his elevation 
to battalion command in early September 1914, (having been made an ADC on 5 August 1914). When the 
21st Royal Fusiliers became GHQ troops in 1916, he was transferred to the South Staffordshire Regiment and 
was given command of the 2/6th Battalion, being killed at Bullecourt, 21 March 1918. 
23
 Lord Southampton, appointed CO 18th Durham Light Infantry, had retired from the 10th Hussars as a 
Captain on 1 February 1893 and was 47 years old. 
24
 Formed in March 1910, the TF Reserve was supposed to have an establishment of 100,000 men but only 
numbered approximately 2000 when war broke out.  
25
 Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. William Frederick John North, 26th Royal Fusiliers, had retired as a 
Lieutenant of the Oxfordshire Hussars in October 1896. Lieutenant-Colonel L.F. Beatson had retired as a 
regular Lieutenant from the Warwickshire Regiment in October 1893. 
26
 Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Edward Fawcus, 19th Northumberland Fusiliers, had retired from the 5th Surrey 
Volunteers as a Captain on 25 June 1870. 
27
 Lieutenant-Colonel William Emsley Raley, 14th York & Lancaster, was a solicitor and Barnsley Alderman; 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Harry Webb Bt., an MP, commanded 13th Gloucestershire and 14th Worcestershire, 




Detailed analysis of the appointment of the first New Army COs indicates the priorities of 
the War Office concerning battalion command during the first months of the war. 
 
The first principle was use of available active Regular soldiers (see Table 2:1). If 
Kitchener, as he avowed, “could take no account of anything but Regular soldiers”,28 then 
this was completely achieved with K1, the primary mechanism being the use of 54 Majors 
serving as Depot Commanders.29 These Majors had an average age of 44 years three 
months; 60 per cent had served as Adjutants; and 42 per cent had extra-regimental staff 
service. They were three years 8.5 months younger than the Lieutenant-Colonels of their 
regiments, had a comparable amount of war service,30 had more frequently acted as 
Adjutant, and had performed nearly as much extra-regimental staff service. Lieutenant-
Colonel W.D. Villiers-Stuart, a Gurkha officer commanding 9th Rifle Brigade, was, 
however, disparaging towards ‘Depot Majors’ on active service who “knew nothing of 
field fortifications”.31 There is, however, no objective reason to believe that ‘Depot 
                                                      
28
 C. Harris, “Kitchener and the Territorials”, The Times, 28 August 1928, p. 13 
29
 The Regimental Depot was the regiment’s headquarters, where recruits were trained, stores assembled, and 
officers and other ranks awaiting posting were based. The Depot Commander was attached to the Special 
Reserve battalion based at the depot, and hence did not go overseas with his regular battalion. In addition to 
Regular officers attached to the Special Reserve who remained in the UK on the outbreak of war, a small 
cadre of officers and NCOs remained to organise and train the K1 battalions. 
30
 An average of 1.5 campaigns compared with the Lieutenant-Colonels’ 1.7. 
31
 R.M. Maxwell, Villiers-Stuart Goes to War (Edinburgh: Pentland Press, 1990) p.92. Villiers-Stuart was 
vituperous concerning Lieutenant-Colonel A. Grant, also a Gurkha officer, the first commander of the 9th 
Rifle Brigade. He states: “Apparently, when Kitchener was selecting officers from the Indian Army list of 
officers on leave he said, ‘Well, he’ll either cause a mutiny or produce a first class battalion.’ When 
Kitchener was making out these appointments, the ‘Depot Majors’ got wind of it and demanded command of 
the new battalions as their ‘right’. Though he tried to prevent it, the Depot Majors’ lobby was too powerful 
for Kitchener – but those officers who had already been appointed did not lose their positions and Grant was 
one of these.” The idea of the advocates of a group of Regular Majors being “too powerful” for Kitchener in 
August 1914 is barely credible. Grant was the only Indian Army appointee for K1, and, as will be seen, 
Kitchener did no such choosing. No Depot Major was appointed for the Rifle Brigade as the depot was 
commanded on the outbreak of war by a full Colonel, and indeed other non-Depot Major appointments in K1 
were made where the depot commander was either a Colonel or a Captain, or when two K1 battalions were 
raised and the ‘Depot Major’ had already been used. It is of course possible that given Kitchener’s lack of 
detailed knowledge of the UK-based army that the potential use of Depot Majors was pointed out to him. 
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Majors’ had any less ability or knowledge, based on their experience, than those 
commanding the Regular battalions. They were simply men whose position in the list of 
seniority meant that they would never be the CO or senior Major of a battalion. 
 
    K1 K2 K3 Local 
Regular Col 0 0 1 0 
  
Lt-
Col 1 4 2 2 
  
Maj 65 7 2 4 
  
Capt 0 0 0 1 
  
  82% 14% 6% 6% 
Indian Col 0 1 7 2 
Army Lt-Col 1 4 8 1 
  
  1% 6% 17% 2% 
Special Lt-Col 3 1 0 0 
Reserve Maj 1 0 1 4 
  
Capt 0 0 0 2 
  
  5% 1% 1% 5% 
Territorial Force Maj 0 0 1 2 
 
  0% 0% 1% 2% 
Empire Lt-Col 0 0 0 1 
    0% 0% 0% <1% 
 
Table 2.1: Active officers appointed as first COs to Service Battalions 
The second principle was next use of retired Regular officers (see Table 2:2). Seventy-
eight per cent were used for K2 as against 12 per cent for K1, with more recently retired 
officers being used first. K1 COs had been retired one year eight months; K2 two years 
nine months; K3 five years seven months; and locally-raised battalions six years six 
months. All had similar average ages, (49 years 10 months overall), being just under two 




The third principle, emerging in K2 appointments, was use of the most senior remaining 
officers, i.e. those with experience of battalion command. Forty-four per cent of the retired 
officers were Colonels, a fact which served to push up the age of retired officers: 51 years 
eight months for K1; 55 years seven months for K2; 55 years four months for K3; and 52 
years four months for locally-raised battalions. 
  
  
  K1 K2 K3 Local 
Regular Col 1 27 19 5 
  
Lt-Col 5 18 12 4 
  
Maj 2 16 10 19 
  
Capt 2 1 0 11 
  
Lt 0 0 0 1 
  
  13% 79% 46% 32% 
Indian Col 0 0 9 5 
Army Lt-Col 0 0 9 4 
  
Maj 0 0 2 0 
  
Capt 0 0 0 1 
  
  0% 0% 22% 8% 
Special Col 0 0 2 7 
Reserve/ Lt-Col 0 0 1 2 
Militia Maj 0 0 0 5 
  Capt 0 0 2 4 
  
Lt 0 0 0 1 
  
  0% 0% 6% 15% 
Territorial Col 0 0 0 16 
Force/ Lt-Col 0 0 0 8 
Volunteers Maj 0 0 0 3 
  
Capt 0 0 0 6 
  
Lt 0 0 0 1 
    0% 0% 0% 28% 
Empire Col 0 0 1 1 
  Lt-Col 0 0 0 0 
  Maj 0 0 0 1 
  Capt 0 0 0 1 
    0% 0% 1% 2% 
 
Table 2.2: Retired officers appointed as first COs to Service Battalions 
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The fourth principle was then to use active and retired Indian Army officers, a convention 
emerging in K3. Colonel W.A.B. Dennys sheds light on the process. A retired Indian Army 
Colonel and Brigade Commander,32 he was living in the UK at the outbreak of war, and 
was asked by General Sir Edward Barrow, Military Secretary at the India Office, to head 
the “Classification Staff”,33 identifying Indian Army officers in England.34 “Very soon 
letters came pouring in from both the War Office and I.O. (India Office) asking for 
recommendations … we put the names in order of preference”.35 After six weeks, (a date 
that corresponds well to the authorisation of K3), “an urgent letter came from the War 
Office, asking that the retired Colonels of the I.A. would kindly sink all personal interests 
for higher appointments, in order to take command of regiments about to be raised in 
Kitchener’s Army”. Not only did Kitchener have no predilection towards Indian officers as 
COs at the outset, he seemingly played no major part in the process beyond general policy 
direction. 
 
The fifth and last principle was the eventual greater use of ex-Special Reserve/Militia and 
ex-Territorial Force/Volunteer officers, notably in locally-raised battalions.36 Service 
battalions raised by the War Office virtually completely shunned the initial use of TF 
officers.  
 
                                                      
32
 William Annesley Burton Dennys had commanded 31st Punjabis for seven years and the Bannu Brigade for 
three months in 1906 and from May to November 1908. 
33
 With two other colonels. 
34
 The information was obtained from the Pay Department. Dennys had a total approaching 2000 names of 
retired/active officers, and sent out forms to each asking for information. 
35
 W.A.B. Dennys, Some Reminiscences of My Life (Privately printed, 1935). 
36
 Including bantam battalions, which were often locally-raised. 
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In K1, 92.5 per cent of appointments were within regiment;37 in K2 82 per cent; in K3 40 
per cent; whilst for locally-raised battalions the figure was 26 per cent. Peter Simkins 
notes: 
In the Pals battalions, command was generally given to an elderly retired 
officer on the recommendation of the Mayor or head of the raising 
committee. While open to abuse this method of selection also had some 
virtues, as such officers often lived in the town or city concerned and 
were known to the raisers as a result of their connections with a local 
Volunteer, Militia or Territorial unit.38  
 
For these locally-raised units, however, over two-thirds of COs were certainly not local in 
the strict regimental sense. 
 
At the beginning of September 1914 Kitchener instructed the Adjutant-General to: 
Get from Post Offices names and addresses of every officer to whom 
letters are arriving addressed Colonel, Major, Captain and Lieutenant; 
and write a civil letter to each of them, if he has not already sent in his 
name, inviting him to do so in such a manner that he can hardly refuse.39  
 
Whether these intrusive tactics were required to deliver command at battalion level is 
unlikely given the analysis above which reveals clear evolving priorities and strategies, 
indicating a process less than haphazard. There were certainly plenty of formal sources for 
locating retired senior officers in addition to local knowledge which would have readily 
primed the process of local suggestion balanced against central confirmation. 
 
The most obvious and easily accessible source of the Regular officers desired was the 
Reserve of Officers, on which all officers receiving retired pay were required to be 
                                                      
37
 The CO of the Service battalion had served in the same regiment. 
38
 Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, p.219 
39
 Notes on Supply of Officers: Instructions of Secretary of State, 6 September 1914, Adjutant-General’s 
papers, TNA WO 162/2, cited in Simkins, Kitchener’s Army,  p.217 
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registered, confirming their addresses each year. In August 1914, however, there were 103 
ex-Regular Lieutenant-Colonels in the Reserve of Officers, only potentially sufficient to 
cover one tranche of New Army recruitment. Ninety-eight of these were unoccupied at the 
outbreak of war, five enjoying administrative posts overseas. Two were appointed to 
brigade command; 23 to staff posts (16 more slotting into depot command, replacing the 
Majors appointed to K1); 31 to battalion command, with 26 remaining unemployed. This 
indicates firstly that battalion command was far from being the only demand on resources 
at senior level, more being placed in staff/administrative posts than as COs. Secondly, the 
number remaining unemployed indicates that there was clear reflection on suitability, and 
that exclusion applied rather than senior appointment at any price. 
 
2.2 Taking the Service Battalions to War 
Many first-appointed did not, however, take their battalions on active service. In K1, 65 
per cent were taken abroad by their first CO. Twenty-nine per cent had one change of CO, 
and six per cent two changes. In K2, 53 per cent were taken abroad by their first CO. 
Thirty-three per cent had one change, 11 per cent two changes, and three per cent three 
changes. In K3, 52 per cent were taken abroad by their first CO. Thirty-six per cent had 
one change, 11 per cent two changes, and one per cent four changes. Of the locally-raised 
battalions, only 41 per cent were taken abroad by their first CO. Fifty one per cent had one 
change, six per cent two changes, and two per cent three changes. 
 
The increasing number of changes through K1 to the locally-raised battalions is not 
surprising, given the increasing number (and varied pedigrees) of retired officers 
employed. The 35 per cent turnover in K1 is for the most part accounted for by the 
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replacement of 21 Regular Majors promoted CO, 15 being transferred as COs to their 
Regular battalion in France, indicating both the attrition of those battalions and the priority 
given by the BEF and War Office to keeping the fighting units properly officered. Two 
were transferred to other service battalions, one to a Brigade-Major post; and three appear 
to have been genuine cases of ill-health (rather than using this as a euphemism for 
sacking). Only one seems not to have been up to the mark, being transferred back to depot 
command. 40 
 
Examples indicate the nature of these battalion command changes. The 12th Highland Light 
Infantry (K2) underwent three changes of CO before going on active service. Lieutenant-
Colonel A. Giles,41 an Indian Army Lieutenant-Colonel, lasted 60 days in command 
(seeing no further service in the war), to be replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel A.S. Begbie, 
another Indian Lieutenant-Colonel,42 who lasted 124 days (several months later receiving a 
Special Appointment graded Staff Captain). The next CO was Lieutenant-Colonel F.M. 
Sandys-Lumsdaine,43 who served for 123 days (later serving as CO with the 2/6th Argyll 
and Sutherland Highlanders, a home service battalion), being replaced seven days before 
the battalion left for active service under Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Purvis, a Regular captain 
retired seven years from the regiment.44 The subsequent careers indicate that these men 
emerged as unfit for command or active service.  
 
                                                      
40
 Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peyton Sadler, 9th Sherwood Foresters, whose tenure of command lasted from 9 
August 1914 until 25 October 1914. 
41
 Albert Giles, aged 52 in 1914, was still on the active list, but had commanded 11th Rajputs. 
42
 Arundel Sinclair Begbie had, aged 48 in 1915, had commanded 16th Rajputs, and had retired in August 
1914. 
43
 Francis Myles Sandys-Lumsdaine, aged 48 in 1914, was a retired Regular Major of the Highland Light 
Infantry, and had been retired for 18 months. 
44
 John Henry Purvis had been acting as an ADC from 18 September 1914 to 6 January 1915, and 
commanded until 6 March 1916 when he was replaced and not used as a CO again. 
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The 8th Leicestershire (K3) underwent four changes of command. Colonel E.R. Scott,45 an 
ex-Regular, lasted 14 days in command whereupon he was transferred to the 10th Essex 
(where he lasted 148 days before being transferred again to the 2/4th Loyal North 
Lancashire, from whence he retired again without seeing active service). The second CO 
was Colonel C.H. Shepherd,46 also an ex-Regular, who lasted 53 days before replacement 
(being used again approximately a year later as CO 1st Garrison Battalion Lincolnshire 
Regiment in India). The third was the retired Indian Army Lieutenant-Colonel H.P. Bell,47 
who served for 180 days (being appointed a Group Commander in France in November 
1914). Bell was replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel F.J. Radford,48 an ex-Regular who had 
already been replaced as a Brigade-Major, but who only served 46 days, a new CO 
(Lieutenant-Colonel J.G. Mignon, a Regular 13 years retired from the regiment)49 being 
appointed the day before the battalion went on active service. Again, an active process was 
clearly evaluating fitness for command. Twenty-eight battalions (seven per cent) 
experienced a change of CO in the two months prior to active service. 
 
Of the COs of K1 14 per cent were removed before going on active service and not used 
again to command a battalion on active service; for K2 the figure was 26 per cent; for K3, 
32 per cent; and for locally-raised battalions, 35 per cent. Overall, 27 per cent of the COs 
appointed to command New Army battalions were removed before they went on active 
service, clearly unsuitable for such service on likely grounds of either physical fitness or 
                                                      
45
 Edmund Richard Scott was a 57 year-old brevet Colonel, a retired Regular Lieutenant-Colonel of the 
Leicestershire Regiment, who had been retired for just over seven years in August 1914. 
46
 Charles Herbert Shepherd was a 68 year-old substantive ex-Regular Colonel who had been retired over 11 
years in August 1914. 
47
 Henry Phillips Bell, aged 48 in August 1914, had been retired one month from the 44th Infantry. 
48
 Frederic John Radford, aged 42 in 1914, was an ex-Regular Major of the Sherwood Foresters, who had 
retired in August 1912. Radford finished the war in the Labour Corps. 
49




competence. The 27 per cent replacement figure compares favourably with the 39 per cent 
of TF COs50 who were removed from command before their battalions proceeded overseas. 
 
The problems faced in some divisions, however, are indicated by the account of Captain 
H.C. Rees, 2nd Welsh,51 who was appointed GSO1 38th (Welsh) Division on 21 April 1915. 
Here: 
The standard of knowledge of the brigadiers and commanding officers 
was, as a rule, so low that any progress in field training was manifestly 
impossible. I therefore started staff rides for the senior officers. These 
staff rides soon convinced the General … that changes were absolutely 
essential.52 Eventually two Brigadiers and nine of the original 
Commanding Officers were replaced before the division sailed for 
France.53 
 
As 38th Division comprised locally-raised battalions, a group identified above as having the 
highest rate of CO replacement, Rees’ experiences are unsurprising.54 
 
2.3 The New Territorial Force Battalions 
Despite any prejudice in Kitchener’s attitude towards the TF, it was allowed to continue 
recruiting, and orders issued from 21 August 1914 permitted County Associations to form 
second-line battalions for each first-line battalion accepted for overseas service, and to 
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 See Chapter One, section 1.4.2 
51
 See also Chapter One, section 1.5. 
52
 Major-General I. Phillips. 
53
 IWM 77/179/1Brigadier-General H. C. Rees,  ‘A Personal Record of the First 7 Months of the War’,  p.80 
54
 The offending COs, who were all replaced in the month prior to going on active service, can be identified 
as: Lieutenant-Colonel C.E. Willes, 13th Royal Welsh Fusiliers, a Regular captain retired in 1905 who had 
subsequently served in the Volunteers; Lieutenant-Colonel W.A.L. Fox-Pitt 15th Royal Welsh Fusiliers, an 
ex-Grenadier Guards Major who had retired in 1904; Colonel T.A. Wynne-Jones, retired from the TF in 
1913; Colonel E.L. Holloway, 10th Welsh Regiment, retired from the Indian Army (Pioneers) in 1913; 
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Watts, 13th Welsh Regiment, retired from the Special Reserve in 1910; Lieutenant-
Colonel H.W. Benson, 14th Welsh Regiment, a Regular Major retired in 1903; Lieutenant M.J.G. Scobie, 15th 
Welsh Regiment, a retired honorary TF Colonel; Lieutenant-Colonel the Hon. H.R.L. Lloyd-Mostyn, a 
Colonel of Militia retired in 1904; Lieutenant-Colonel H.E. Porter, 11th South Wales Borderers, an Indian 
Army Major retired in 1901. 
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raise a third-line unit when the first-line went overseas.55 During 1914-15, 205 second and 
211 third/fourth-line TF infantry battalions were raised. Of these, 97 second and seven 
third-line battalions saw active service, the remainder becoming reserve/home service 
battalions. 
 
Of the 97 second-line battalions (see Table 2.3), one received a Regular officer as first 
CO.56 Twenty-eight per cent received active TF officers (14 were COs removed from the 
first-line battalion; 12 were Majors and two Captains, all from their first-line units). 57 
Seven per cent received retired Regulars; and four per cent received retired Special 
Reserve/Militia officers. The remainder (60 per cent) received retired TF officers. Of this 
group, 29 were (mainly honorary) Colonels, 17 Lieutenant-Colonels, nine Majors and three 
Captains. The retired officers had an average age of 49 years eight months and had been 
retired on average five years two months (range 23 years 11 months58 to two months). 
Overall 82 per cent were, retired or otherwise, internal regimental appointments; and 88 
per cent were TF or retired Volunteers.59  
 
A strong local and Territorial character is therefore clear, although notably shunning any 
local Special Reserve officers, a matter unsurprising as the County Associations were 
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 Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, pp.45-6 
56
 Major Cecil Fane of the 12th Lancers became CO of 2/7th Sherwood Foresters. 
57
 Whilst one of the two Captains was from the first-line battalion, the other, Captain F.W.D. Bendall, 
promoted to CO 2/3rd London, was an unattached TF Captain commanding the Bridlington Grammar School 
OTC at the outbreak of war, where, as a Cambridge graduate, he was classics teacher. He later commanded 
both 1/7th & 1/8th Middlesex. After being wounded in 1917, he published a book of poetry, Front Line Lyrics 
(London: E. Mathews, 1918). After the war he became an Inspector of Schools, and in the Second World 
War served as Director of Army Education. 
58
 Lieutenant-Colonel John E. Jameson, 2/24th London, had retired from the Worcestershire Yeomanry as a 
Major on 26 August 1890. 
59
 Twenty per cent of these were ex-Regulars. 
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putting forward nominations for War Office approval. As with the Service Battalions, a 
preference for the most senior officers available (Colonels) is obvious. 
 
  
Colonel Lt-Col Major Captain Lieutenant 2nd Lieutenant 
  1st AS 1st AS 1st AS 1st AS 1st AS 1st AS 
Active                         
Regular 0 0 0 0 1 4 2 16 0 2 0 0 
Ind Army 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SR 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 
TF 0 0 14 2 12 11 2 13 0 1 0 0 
Retired                         
Regular 1 0 1 2 2 4 2 5 0 2 0 1 
SR/Militia 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
TF/Vols 29 5 17 7 9 3 3 6 0 0 0 0 
Empire 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 
Table 2.3: Officers appointed as first COs to second-line TF Battalions and those taking 
battalions on active service (AS) 
 
 
These battalions saw active service at different points in the war. Of the 10 that went 
overseas in 1915, eight were commanded by their first COs, two by their second. Of the 29 
who went overseas in 1916, eight were commanded by their first COs; 15 had been 
commanded by one previous CO; six by two. Of the 55 who went overseas in 1917, 15 
were taken by their first CO; 25 by their second; 16 by their third; and one by their fourth. 
Of the two who finally went overseas in 1918, one had been commanded by two previous 
COs, the other three. 
 
Again, to give a flavour of the nature of these changes, command of 2/9th King’s Liverpool 
went first to Lieutenant-Colonel L. Watts,60 displaced from the 1/9th Battalion, on 22 
December 1914. On 18 June 1915 he was replaced by Colonel R. Eccles, an ex-Regular, 
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 This battalion went overseas on 14 February 1917. 
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who had been removed from command of the 14th Durham Light Infantry.61 Watts returned 
on 1 November 1915 as Eccles died, being replaced on 8 January 1916 by Lieutenant-
Colonel T.F. Parkinson, a Major from the Kent Cyclist Battalion, who was in turn replaced 
on 10 October 1916 by Lieutenant-Colonel A.F.S. Leggatt, a Regular Captain of the 2nd 
Royal Scots promoted Major, who had been in France and Flanders since 14 August 1914, 
and who took the battalion to war four months later. Clearly whilst some attention was 
being paid to suitability for command throughout, as active service approached, the issue 
of fitness for warfare on the Western Front came into sharper focus.62 
 
Table 2.3 indicates that, as with the Service Battalions, there was a notable decrease in 
reliance on retired Colonels for active service. This trend was also noticeable for retired 
Lieutenant-Colonels, and only two out of 14 of the ex-first-line battalion COs eventually 
saw active service. There was a marked increase (as might be expected from the example 
of the elevation of Captain Leggatt to command 2/9th Liverpool at war) in the number of 
active Regular and TF Captains being the first CO to take their battalions on active service.  
 
2.4 Dugouts 
As noted at the start of this chapter, the phrase ‘dugout’ swiftly became common parlance 
in place of the word ‘retired’, attracting over the years a dismissive quality, redolent of the 
plump, pompous and irascible Colonel Blimp.63 Captain I.H. Beith described how his CO, 
                                                      
61
 Robert Eccles was a 62 year-old brevet Colonel who had retired 10 years previously from the Oxfordshire 
& Buckinghamshire Light Infantry. 
62
 Leggatt served as CO until being wounded on 11 June 1917. 
63
 Colonel Blimp was a cartoon character created by David Low for the London Evening Standard in the 
1930s, a jingoistic British stereotype. 
74 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel A.F. Mackenzie,64 10th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (K1), was 
“pleased to call himself a ‘dug-out’”. He noted how “a fortnight ago he was fishing in the 
Garry, his fighting days avowedly behind him, and only the Special Reserve between him 
and embonpoint”.65 
  
Second-Lieutenant A. Thomas, 4/4th Royal West Kent, noted: “I had expected the C.O. to 
be a tall, lean hard-bitten man, with at least two rows of medals – terribly efficient and 
exacting”. Instead, Lieutenant-Colonel C.D. Disney-Roebuck was “short and plump and 
gave the impression of soft living … the C.O. did not in fact look like a soldier at all ... he 
looked like a city man and his manners had the silkiness of a financier’s”.66 Second-
Lieutenant H. Macmillan, 14th King’s Royal Rifle Corps, found his battalion commanded 
by 56 year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Sir T.E. Milbourne-Swinnerton-Pilkington, who had 
retired as a Regular Major in 1898 and as an Honorary Colonel of Special Reserve in 1908: 
“With his white hair, rubicund complexion, and aquiline nose, he was a figure from the 
past … lovable and bewildered”.67 
 
Retired COs were often easy to lampoon, their idiosyncrasies a popular subject for record. 
Second-Lieutenant S. Cloete, 9th King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, noted how his CO, 
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Lieutenant-Colonel G.L. Holland, Indian Army “sometimes, in a fit of absent mindedness, 
addressed his Yorkshiremen in Hindustani”.68  
 
On what grounds would a retired officer prove adequate or inadequate as CO? Firstly, an 
issue which applied to all officers, retired or otherwise, was simple grounds of general 
attitude. Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Villiers-Stuart, second CO of 9th Rifle Brigade, 
described the coup against his predecessor (and fellow Gurkha), the hard-of-hearing 
Colonel A. Grant, whom he had described as “a rotten soldier – apart from his pluck”. He 
continued:  
I was ordered to report to the Brigadier. I saw at once that Champain69 
had been going behind the back of the CO and making insinuations to the 
BM (Brigade-Major), whom he had known before. The Brigadier told me 
that he had heard that Colonel Grant’s officers were all agreed that they 
could not serve under him any longer. 
 
 Villiers-Stuart denied that this was true in his case and that Grant had been "scrupulously 
fair" to him, having given him "a free hand in my work and always listened to anything I 
have to say". Other officers were interviewed: 
And then Grant went in. When he came out he told me that he had 
resigned his command. That I was to act for him temporarily and that he 
would always remember what I had done for him and how I had spoken 
of him to the Brigadier.70  
 
Secondly, there was the issue of age and the linked matter of physical fitness and stamina.  
Colonel W.A.B. Dennys raised and commanded the K3 10th Loyal North Lancashire on the 
Western Front until 23 December 1915, when: 
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Our Army Corps Commander, General Sir E. (sic) Snow … said that he 
didn’t consider it was fair on me that I, at the age of fifty-six, and with 
my experience, should have to serve under … Brigadiers, who were 
subalterns at the time I left India He therefore asked me if I would like 
to have the command of a Brigade at home, as I was too old to have one 
in France … I had not once gone sick.71 
 
Reading between the lines, age was the issue. 
 
J.F.C. Fuller quoted Baron von der Goltz:72 “Good health and a robust constitution are 
invaluable to a general ... In a sick body, the mind cannot possibly remain permanently 
fresh and clear”, continuing: “The three pillars of generalship - courage, creative 
intelligence and physical fitness” were “the attributes of youth rather than of middle age”.73 
If true of generals, then this was even more applicable to battalion commanders. 
 
The Barnsley Chronicle recorded the cause of the removal of Lieutenant-Colonel J. 
Hewitt,74 the first CO of 13th York & Lancaster, on 13 November 1915, as “inability to 
physically stand the strain of an overseas campaign.” Hewitt had clearly been previously 
marked for overseas service, having been sent on a Commanding Officers’ course in York 
in March 1915 and on a CO training visit to France in July 1915.75 The health of the CO of 
14th York & Lancaster, Lieutenant-Colonel W.E. Raley, broke down at camp in June 1915, 
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and he was replaced.76 Similarly, Colonel C.V. Mainwaring, ex-Indian Army and CO 12th 
York and Lancaster, departed without warning from their training camp: “He had been in 
poor health for some time due to the lengthy spell he had spent in the Far East. He was not 
seen again by the battalion during the war”.77 In 16th and 18th West Yorkshire, in camp at 
Ripon: “There was muttering in the ranks when it was noticed that both of the Pals’ 
Colonels had a tendency to stay in camp during bad weather when the men were sent on 
route marches”.78 In contrast, Major F.P. Crozier, 9th Royal Irish Rifles, described his CO 
Lieutenant-Colonel G.S. Ormerod, 58 years old in 1914, as a “grand old chap … he has 
suffered agonies lest it should be said he was too old for war”, and once on French soil, 
was “younger than ever”.79 
 
Others had carried embonpoint to a fine art. Second-Lieutenant B.H. Liddell Hart (11th 
King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry) described Lieutenant-Colonel J.W. Stead, a retired 
TF CO, as “ludicrously fat”.80 Lieutenant-Colonel E.E. “Bullfrog” Wilford (who replaced 
Lieutenant-Colonel Hewitt in 13th York & Lancaster) was reported by Private T. Oughton 
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to be “a big fellow. I don’t know how his horse carried him”.81 Wilford was an active 
Indian Army Major, indicating that not all active officers were free from excess weight.82 
 
Thirdly, there was the issue of current military knowledge, which might be thought to be 
closely related to date of retirement. Peter Simkins states:  
Many retired officers who were suddenly handed senior commands found 
that they could not adapt to the changes wrought in drill, tactics and 
equipment in the decade before the war, and particularly since the 
introduction of the new Field Service Regulations in 1909.83  
 
In this he followed Captain Basil Williams, contemporary historian of the New Armies, 
who wrote: “Others were not up to date, and had not the capacity for making themselves 
so”.84 Almost certainly it was the issue of ‘capacity’ that was key. 
 
The time points of development of revised tactics in the British Army during and following 
the Second Boer War, set out in the Introduction, allow certain conclusions to be drawn 
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about officers’ possession of up-to-date knowledge. Every infantry officer serving in South 
Africa to 1902 would have been perfectly aware of tactical development. Any Regular 
officer in the post-war years would have trained using the new precepts. By 1910 the 
auxiliaries were also using the Combined Training 1902 tactics.85 The only issue would 
have been whether in all units across the army the changes would have been practiced with 
the same vigour. Any Regular officer retiring in 1902 with experience in South Africa 
would have been largely tactically up-to-date, as would any regular without South African 
experience retiring after, say 1903.86 Any auxiliary officer serving in South Africa would 
also have been largely up-to-date, and, theoretically, any auxiliary officer retiring after 
1910. It is the group of auxiliaries who did not have experience of South Africa and who 
retired at the time of the organisational changes of 1908, who would have been most out of 
date.87 
 
If the premise is taken that the earlier a CO’s retirement, the more out-of-date and the less 
likely he would be to take his Service Battalion on active service, then Figure 2.1 is 
instructive. The direction of the curve for number of CO’s taking their battalions on active 
service is as might be expected, rising with later retirement dates (i.e. officers retired for 
shorter periods taking their battalions overseas in greater numbers). 
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Figure 2.1: Retirement years of ‘dug out’ COs either not suitable for active service, or 
first to take service battalions on active service 
 
The direction of the curve for COs removed from command and never seeing active 
service is counterintuitive. With the exception of one or two years, it mirrors the curve for 
COs proceeding to active service, with many officers recently retired being discounted, 
when the premise would predict the reverse. The only conclusion is that date of retirement 
per se, with associated possible knowledge problems, did not particularly affect a CO’s 
chance of seeing active service.88 As Williams suggests, it was likely individual capacity to 
become up-to-date rather than being out-of-date that mattered. 
 
Table 2.4 shows the main changes in Service battalions from first CO to first active service 
CO, namely a reduction in the use of retired Colonels and an increase in the use of retired 
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Regular Majors and Captains, and active Regular Captains. These COs had an average age 
of 47 years and those who were not active had been retired seven years five months. 
 
  
Colonel Lt-Col Major Captain Lieutenant 2nd Lieutenant 
  1st AS 1st AS 1st AS 1st AS 1st AS 1st AS 
Active                         
Regular 1 0 9 4 78 67 1 16 0 0 0 0 
Ind Army 10 8 14 11 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 
SR 0 3 4 6 6 9 2 4 0 0 0 0 
TF 0 0 1 0 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Empire 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Retired                         
Regular 52 14 39 37 47 64 14 44 1 6 0 1 
Ind Army 14 7 13 8 2 5 1 1 0 0 0 0 
SR/Militia 9 6 3 6 5 4 6 7 1 1 0 0 
TF/Vols 16 3 8 5 3 4 6 4 1 2 0 0 
Empire 2 2 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 2.4: Comparison of first COs of Service Battalions with those taking 
battalions on active service (AS) 
 
In comparison with the data presented on first COs above (overall average age 50 years six 
months; time since retirement five years five months), those who took their battalions on 
active service were somewhat younger. Those who proceeded on active service who were 
retired in August 1914 had, however, been retired two years longer than the first-appointed 
COs. This, again, reinforces the ‘capacity’ argument. 
 
Brigade or division commanders were very active in ensuring poor COs were replaced. 
Local judgement (as implied by Rees’ account) about individual ability, balanced by health 
and stamina, was the key to proceeding to active service. Major-General I. Maxse, training 
the 18th Division, for example sought the removal of Lieutenant-Colonel C.J. Hawker, 10th 
Royal Fusiliers, an unemployed Lieutenant-Colonel of the Coldstream Guards, on the 
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grounds that he would “ruin a magnificent battalion”.89 Maxse’s GSO1, Lieutenant-
Colonel T.H. Shoubridge, wrote to his wife from France in October 1915: “I can’t tell you 
how much all the trouble the General took about getting good Brigadiers and COs is 
repaying him now”.90 
 
A good summary of the reasons for a CO’s removal are set out in the case of Lieutenant-
Colonel R.A.A. Bottomley of 2/5th West Yorkshire.91 Forty-three year old Bottomley had 
retired as CO of 6th West Yorkshire on 11 May 1910, and was described in the 1907 
Annual Inspection report as “able and energetic”.92 However, Brigadier-General V.W. de 
Falbe, who took over 185 Brigade on 4 January 1916, replaced him on 20 May 1916. De 
Falbe, who had commanded 1st North Staffordshire on active service for 15 months, had 
reported on Bottomley on 27 January 1916, finding him “fit”, but now, with greater 
knowledge, stated that Bottomley did not “possess the qualities and experience necessary 
for the successful training of a battalion for active service”. He observed that he lacked 
“the power of organizing”, was indecisive, left “matters to his subordinates without 
exercising the supervision necessary”, thus showing “want of initiative and power of 
command”. Southern Command concurred, but noted: “Ill health has been a contributory 
cause”. Bottomley never served again.93 Not only does this clarify what was expected of 
COs, but also indicates the active role of brigade commanders in sifting them. 
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2.5 Quality of COs who Took their Battalions to War 
Excluding the COs of pioneer battalions, the careers of 347 COs who first took Service 
Battalions overseas can be followed. These men spent on average exactly eight months in 
command on active service (range six days to three years eight months).94 
 
Fifty-six (16 per cent) were killed in action or died of wounds.95 Lieutenant-Colonel E.H. 
Chapman, 6th Yorkshire, had the unhappy honour to be the first CO to die in the first 
offensive action of a New Army battalion on 7 August 1915 on Gallipoli.96 In 1915, 13 
were killed on Gallipoli and 12 at Loos, Lieutenant-Colonel M.V. Hilton, 7th East 
Lancashire, having the ill-luck to be killed at Loos (20 October 1915) on the day he was 
appointed Brigadier-General.97 Twenty-one were killed on the Somme (nine on the first 
day), and one in Mesopotamia. Nine were simple, if tragic, ‘trench wastage’ in France and 
Flanders, typical of these deaths being that of Lieutenant-Colonel F.H. Gaskell, 16th Welsh, 
who had already been wounded in November 1914 serving with the 2nd Welsh, shot by a 
sniper at night on 17 May 1916.98 
 
In an attempt to review the overall viability as COs of those who took their Service 
battalions to war, a cut-off of six months will be again be taken as likely to reveal the 
effects of age, health and ability. Removing those who could not have furthered their 
careers through death (56) or serious wounds (12), there remains a group of 277 men 
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whose careers can be followed. Eleven are known to have been invalided and 57 were 
replaced, not known to have been wounded or invalided, i.e. 25 per cent of the cohort. 
Seventy-five per cent achieved over six months’ active service or were promoted, and 
hence were viable commanders, a level bearing good comparison with the ‘endurance or 
promotability’ rate of 64 per cent of the regular COs of August 1914.99 
 
Forty-eight were promoted Brigadier-General (17 per cent of those who could possibly 
have been promoted). Twenty-nine were active professionals in August 1914. One was a 
Regular Lieutenant-Colonel, twenty-one were Regular Majors100 and four were Regular 
Captains;101 and one was a Colonel and two were Lieutenant-Colonels of the Indian Army. 
The remainder were retired at the outbreak of war (12 Regulars,102 four Indian Army, and 
two from the Special Reserve/Militia). Only the two retired from the Special 
Reserve/Militia had no previous professional service,103 so 96 per cent of those promoted 
from this group to Brigadier-General had a professional background. 
 
The careers of 97 COs who first took second-line Territorial Battalions overseas can also 
be followed. These men spent on average 7.9 months in command on active service (range 
                                                      
99
 See Chapter One section 1.4.1 
100
 44 per cent of the group of Regular Majors who took Service Battalions on active service. 
101
 22 per cent of the group of Regular Captains who took Service Battalions on active service. 
102
 Notable amongst these was Lieutenant-Colonel James Dayrolles Crosbie, 11th Lancashire Fusiliers. He 
had retired from the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, where he had served as Adjutant, on 20 January 1893. On 4 June 
1916 he was promoted Brigadier-General commanding 12th Brigade, 4th Division, which he was commanding 
on the first day of the Somme offensive. He served until 17 January 1917, then serving until November 1918 
as CO of a home service unit, 16th Queen’s. 
103
 Lieutenant-Colonel Noble Fleming Jenkins, 7th East Yorkshire, had retired from the Special Reserve of 
the Border Regiment on 29 August 1910, and was promoted Brigadier-General 75 Brigade on 8 February 
1916, although he was removed on 9 July 1916 to become Deputy Commandant of the Machine Gun Corps 
training centre. Lieutenant-Colonel John Henry Lloyd, 15th Lancashire Fusiliers, had retired from the Militia 
of the Royal Lancaster Regiment on 18 December 1907, and was promoted Brigadier-General 90 Brigade, 18 
October 1916 to 18 November 1917, later serving as Assistant Controller of Salvage. 
85 
 
six days to one year nine months),104 almost identical to their Service Battalion 
counterparts. Only five of this cohort were killed in action (five per cent, a figure three 
times lower than the first active Service battalion COs, probably because they were seeing 
service later in the war when there was more concern not to lose COs in action). 
 
Removing those who could not have furthered their careers through death (five) or serious 
wounds (two), there remains a group of 90 men whose careers can be followed. Ten are 
known to have been invalided, and 29 were replaced, not known to have been wounded or 
invalided, i.e. 43 per cent of the cohort. Fifty-seven per cent had over six months active 
service or were promoted, and hence were viable commanders, somewhat less than the 
viability rate of 75 per cent of their Service battalion counterparts, and that of the 71 per 
cent for COs of first-line TF battalions who first took their units overseas. 
 
Only two of this group were promoted to Brigadier-General, namely Lieutenant-Colonel 
H.E.P. Nash, 2/4th Duke of Wellington’s (a Regular Major of the Royal Scots in August 
1914);105 and Lieutenant-Colonel W.J. Woodcock, 2/7th Manchester (a Special Reserve 
Major of the Lancashire Fusiliers in August 1914, but an ex-Regular).106 
 
The previous war experience of these men makes good comparison with the Regular and 
TF COs of August 1914. Of the first active Service battalion COs only 18 per cent had 
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seen no active service (compared with 12 per cent for the Regular COs of August 1914), 
the remainder serving on average in approximately two campaigns each.107 Fifty-five per 
cent of the first active second-line TF COs had no previous active service (compared with 
50 per cent of the TF COs of August 1914), the remainder serving on average in one 
campaign.108 The picture was different, owing to the mixed nature of the groups, in relation 
to staff service. Fifty-two per cent of the first active Service Battalion COs had had staff 
experience (compared with 88 per cent of regular COs of August 1914),109 and 25 per cent 
of the first active second-line TF COs (compared with 8 per cent for the TF COs of August 
1914).110 
 
The examples of three officers convey the rich experience possessed by some of those who 
took their Service battalions on active service. Lieutenant-Colonel T.B. Sellar, 8th King’s 
Own Scottish Borderers, had retired as a Regular Major from that regiment in May 1913. 
He had no staff experience but had been with the Chitral Relief Force (1895), and had 
served on the North-West Frontier (1897-8), Tirah (1897-8), and in South Africa (1899-
1900) as a Captain (including the defence of Ladysmith). He had been with his battalion in 
the UK following the introduction of Combined Training, 1902, and with the exception of 
absence of experience of the four company system, was almost completely up-to-date. He 
served from the battalion’s formation to his wounding on 28 October 1916, and returned to 
command the merged 7/8th battalion on 20 January 1917 until his wounds got the better of 
him and he was invalided on 21 April 1917.  
 
                                                      
107
 1.9, an average higher than the 1.7 campaigns of Regular COs of August 1914. 
108
 1.2, an average higher than the .3 campaigns of TF COs of August 1914. 
109
 See Chapter One section 1.1.5 
110
 See Chapter One section 1.3.1 
87 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel D.H.A. Dick, 14th Highland Light Infantry, who was a Major in the 3rd 
Royal Scots Fusiliers had served as Adjutant to this battalion before retiring as a Regular 
Major in July 1910. He had served on the North-West Frontier (1897-8 with the Tochi 
Field Force), in Tirah (1897-8), and in South Africa (1899-1900) as a Captain, including 
the Battle of Colenso and the relief of Ladysmith. Like Sellar, with the caveat of lack of 
experience of the four company system, he was thus almost completely up-to-date. The 
battalion’s second CO, having already commanded the 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers for two 
extended periods in 1914-5, he served from 24 November 1915 to 19 May 1917.111  
 
Lieutenant-Colonel F.E.P. Curzon, 6th Royal Irish Regiment, had retired as a Lieutenant-
Colonel from that regiment in 1907. He had, without the benefit of Staff College 
attendance, served two spells as an Adjutant with the Scottish Rifles and Royal Irish Rifles, 
two spells as ADC (firstly to GOC Southern District, 1889-90, and secondly to the 
Governor and C-in-C Gibraltar, 1890-91), had been a Special Service Officer with the 
Rhodesian Field Force, and a DAAG during the Second Boer War. He had seen service on 
the Nile (1898, Battle of Khartoum), Sierra Leone (1898-9) and South Africa (1899-1902). 
The battalion’s first CO, he served until killed in action on 9 September 1916, at Ginchy. 
 
There were therefore clearly many richly experienced and competent COs amongst the 
‘dug-outs’ and others who were the first to take the Service and second-line TF battalions 
to war. Lieutenant-Colonel P.W. Machell, 11th Border, became his battalion’s factotum in 
the early days, and demonstrating the required power of organisation and initiative: 
Every detail had to be taught by him, for the officers, with very few 
exceptions, knew no more than the men, and had to be taught themselves 
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before they could teach. The simplest orderly room work, such as making 
out ‘crimes’ ‘guard reports’, and ‘details’ etc. were done by him … All 
attestations were made out, and recruits personally approved by him … 
He organised the feeding of the men … He arranged for the hutting, the 
clothing, the water supply, the lighting and conservancy of the camp … 
These things alone would have occupied the activities of six ordinary 
men, but in addition to all this the CO was constantly on parade, training 
and smartening up both officers and men, drawing up the programmes of 
work and seeing that they were carried out.112 
 
Machell had retired as a Regular Captain from the Essex Regiment on 30 September 1896, 
when he was 34. He had served in four campaigns in the Sudan and had been attached to 
the Egyptian Army. Following his retirement he served as Inspector General of the 
Egyptian Coastguard, and as Advisor to the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior until 1908, 
when he took up a post with the London County Council. It is therefore not surprising that 
his organisational capabilities proved high. Machell had corresponding high expectations 
of others, an NCO writing after his death: “To some of the men he may have appeared in 
the light of a martinet, as at time he was most severe in irony when dealing with 
defaulters”.113 Machell was killed on 1 July 1916 with 10 of his officers and 100 ORs, 
attempting to reach the Leipzig Salient, debouching from Authuille Wood. 
 
A burden of training fell on these retired officers.114 C.E. Montague, a Sergeant in the 24th 
Royal Fusiliers, was sarcastic about that offered by Colonel A. de B.V. Paget, a brevet 
Colonel retired in 1903 from the Durham Light Infantry, whom he described as “the old, 
cold colonel, upright, dutiful, drawn away by a genuine patriotism from his roses and 
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 P.G.W. Diggle, in V.M. (ed.) Record of the XIth (Service) Battalion Border Regiment (Lonsdale) from 
September 1914 to July 1st 1916 (Whitehead: Appleby, ND), pp.7-8. (Captain Diggle was the battalion 
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2011. 
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croquet”,  lecturing with Infantry Training 1914 in his hand, “bringing his laboured jets of 
darkness to show the way though sunlight, elucidating plainness itself with the tangled 
clues of his own mind’s confusion”.115 In comparison, however, the energy of Lieutenant-
Colonel W.D. Villiers-Stuart surpassed Machell. Being particularly interested in the use of 
machine guns, with Vickers guns being unavailable: “I wrote to Erith and asked them 
(Maxim’s people) if they could let me have one for instructional purposes – and they sent 
me one at once … I started classes on it for the young officers”.116 Similarly, after 
problems with bayonet training: “I started classes in the evenings for the officers and in a 
short time bayonet fighting was done well”. He continued: “I made sure that the battalion 
learned how to dig properly and how to ring and revet trenches”.117 Training his men hard 
to give them the best possible chances, Villiers-Stuart wrote ominously before going on 
active service: “I knew what was going to happen to all these boys who were so close to 
my heart”.118 
 
As 1915 progressed, the personal burden on the CO of providing training altered. Major 
A.G. Wauchope of the Black Watch,119 wounded and in the UK as a bombing trainer, 
noted: 
A syllabus of work was brought out by the War Office for a course of 
twelve weeks training, and for the average recruit this was found 
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 C.E. Montague, Disenchantment (London: Chatto & Windus, 1924), p.22. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles 
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sufficient. Specialist officers paid periodical visits of inspection, each 
specialist being convinced that his speciality only could win the war, be 
it bombing, bayonet fighting, musketry or physical drill. The 
Commanding Officer had to satisfy each and every specialist officer, to 
preserve his temper and maintain a well-balanced system of training.120 
 
 
It is clear that both officers and other ranks recognised and appreciated organisational 
ability in these early COs where it existed.  Second-Lieutenant F. Buckley, 3/7th 
Northumberland Fusiliers, wrote of his CO, Lieutenant-Colonel J.J. Gillespie, a Territorial 
Major, that he was “a man of great personality … a great organiser and a hard worker” 
who did “much to make the drafts efficient”.121 Private O. Burgess of the 14th York & 
Lancaster wrote of Lieutenant-Colonel W.B. Hulke who took his battalion overseas: “He 
was a regular Army man and he knew his job”.122 Lieutenant J.L. Middleton, 12th York & 
Lancaster, wrote in his diary of Colonel C.V. Mainwaring, ex-Indian Army, that he “looks 
a terror” but “the men worked harder than ever under Mainwaring’s leadership”, and that 
they had “the greatest respect for him”.123 Captain J.H. Beith stated of Lieutenant-Colonel 
A.F. Mackenzie how on the parade ground he liked “a clean finish to any piece of work”, 
yet he was also capable of overlooking shortcomings that needed no remark: “He was a 
good Colonel”. 124 
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A prime example of the enduring Service battalion CO is Lieutenant-Colonel A.W. 
Rickman, 11th East Lancashire. He was the second CO, taking over from Colonel R. 
Sharples, on 1 March 1915.125 Thirty-nine years old in August 1914, he had retired as a 
Captain from the 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers, having served in South Africa 1899-1902, 
and was a Captain in the Special Reserve of that regiment on the outbreak of war. He was 
awarded the DSO for his efforts at Serre on 1 July 1916,126 on which day he was wounded 
by a shell and invalided, returning to command on 31 May 1917. He was wounded again 
on 11 November 1917, returning in time for the German offensives of 1918, winning a bar 
to his DSO leading his battalion on 12-13 April 1918.127 He took over temporary command 
of 92 Brigade before returning to his battalion.128 
 
Inevitably, empire ‘characters’ are represented in this group. One such colourful individual 
was Lieutenant-Colonel D.P. Driscoll, of the (somewhat atypical) 25th Royal Fusiliers,129 
who commanded his battalion throughout its career. Driscoll was probably born in Burma, 
and was 53 in August 1914. He had served in the Indian Merchant Navy and was involved 
in the Burma campaign of 1866-8. After leaving the navy he is thought to have served in 
the Upper Burma Rifles, becoming a crack shot. On the outbreak of the Boer War he 
travelled to South Africa and joined the Border Mounted Rifles, being asked in 1900 to 
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 Richard Sharples, a 64 year-old retired TF Colonel, returned to retirement. 
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form ‘Driscoll’s Scouts’. In 1907 he joined the Legion of Frontiersmen, a group of 
adventurers comprising a patriotic paramilitary group, rising by 1914 to be its head.130 
 
Perhaps the most extraordinary career was that of Lieutenant-Colonel I. Thord-Gray, who 
took over command of 11th Northumberland Fusiliers on 18 June 1915 and took them on 
active service. A Swede,131 Thord-Gray had joined the Cape Mounted Rifles as a Private in 
1897, fighting in Bechuanaland and Pondoland (1897) and the Second Boer War, 
following which he joined the South African Constabulary in 1902. Between 1903 and 
1906 he served in various units (Lydenburg Militia, Royston’s Horse, and the Nairobi 
Mounted Police), and also with German forces in South-West Africa, before serving with 
the Americans in the Philippine Constabulary in 1906. He spent some time as planter in 
Malaya, but served with the French Foreign Legion in Tonkin in 1909, with the Italians in 
the Italian-Turkish war of 1911 in modern-day Libya, and with Sun Yat Sen in China in 
1912. In 1913-14 he fought in the Mexican War as commander of artillery with Pancho 
Villa, and later as Chief of Staff of the 1st Mexican Army as a Colonel.  
 
Predictably, he joined the British army as a Major in October 1914. After a period as CO 
11th Northumberland Fusiliers (allegedly resigning after a row with his Brigadier) he was 
appointed CO 25th London Regiment, although the battalion was disbanded, after which he 
was suspected of being a German agent, a case of mistaken identity. Resigning from the 
British Army, he joined the American Army in 1917, being appointed Brigade Commander 
in the aborted Theodore Roosevelt Division. He served as a Lieutenant-Colonel in the 
Canadian Expeditionary Force to Russia, then as commander of the 1st Siberian Assault 
                                                      
130
 www.nigeldriscoll.au accessed 24 February 2011. 
131
 Born in Stockholm 17th April 1878 as Ivar Thord Hallström. 
93 
 
Division, before being wounded and becoming a Major-General and representative of the 
Provisional Siberian Government. His last foreign military venture was as Lieutenant-
General in the revolutionary army of Venezuela in 1928.132 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Initial provision of commanding officers to the newly-raised infantry battalions was made 
according to a developing set of principles. Service Battalion appointments reflected, in 
order, deference to: (i) active Regular army status; (ii) retired Regular status; (iii) seniority 
of rank of retired professional officers; (iv) Indian Army status; (v) and, lastly, sparing use 
of auxiliaries. In the second-line Territorial units, TF pedigree and seniority of rank were 
the guiding principles. Kitchener units were provided with command from a better stocked 
pond than were the locally-raised and second-line TF battalions. 
 
Anecdotal accounts and the data presented indicate, unsurprisingly, that a number of COs 
proved unfit for command. In the intervening months between unit establishment and 
active service, a weeding-out process took place, conducted at brigade and divisional 
levels, amounting to 27 per cent of COs of the Service Battalions, never to see active 
service.  
 
That this process generated a reasonably good quality of CO is reflected in the fact that 75 
per cent of New Army COs achieved over six months active service or were promoted. The 
figure for second-line Territorials was less at 57 per cent, reflecting the limitations of the 
stock of officers from whom these COs were selected. Although many of the Service 
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Battalion COs saw their active service in the quieter months prior to (but also during) the 
Somme offensive, there were clearly many talented individuals, as indicated by the rate of 
promotion to brigade command. Overall, the data again speaks to a greater depth of 
competence in the reserves available to the British officer corps during the early part of the 
war than it has been given credit for. 
 
The stereotype of the ‘dug-out’ CO, at least on the battlefield, as old and out-of-touch is 
therefore found unsound. Length of time since retirement proved not to be a factor in 
proceeding on active service, indicating that even in this early period, merit-based selection 
was operating. Ability was the key, those without fitness, stamina or capacity being 







Evolution of Battalion Command  
– Organisational and Individual Aspects 
 
 
I haven't the slightest idea why I was pitchforked into this job - except 
that the last CO was booted and the former second-in-command has gone 
home sick and I don't know how long I'm expected to remain. 
 
    Lieutenant-Colonel H.E. Trevor, 13 November 19151 
 
To date, 5185 infantry battalion commanders have been identified serving between 4 
August 1914 and 11 November 1918 with the rank of substantive, temporary or acting 
Lieutenant-Colonel.2 Of these, 4055 (78 per cent) saw active service. 
 
The prosopographical approach to this group of officers identifies overall patterns of 
evolution in command, both organisational and individual in nature. Organisational aspects 
mainly concern source of officers. Individual aspects include age, progression in rank, and 
army experience such as staff service. Overall patterns of turnover and matters bearing on 
it can be examined, such as number, length and reasons for leaving command. 
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 IWM P229 HET/3, H.E.Trevor, Letters 
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 A substantive rank is a permanent rank. Acting rank was granted to officers to fulfil particular posts, and 
was confirmed after 28 days and the individual granted the pay of that rank. It was gazetted on confirmation, 
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for War, Harold Tennant stating: “I have to announce a new departure ... In the case of a Lieutenant-Colonel 
being appointed a Brigadier-General, or his being wounded or sick, the next senior officer will command for 
a month in his previously existing rank, and if the vacancy extends beyond a month he will then commence 
to draw the pay and allowances of a Lieutenant-Colonel, and he will be granted the temporary rank”. In the 
post-war period Acting rank was converted to Temporary rank automatically after three months in post. 
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3.1 Evolution – Organisational Characteristics 
3.1.1 Source of Commanding Officers 
Table 3.1 shows that the Regular army of August 1914 provided 45 per cent of active 
infantry COs during the war.3 Given that only 18 per cent of battalions were Regular, their 
disproportionate contribution is clear. If retired Regulars and active/retired Indian Army 
officers are included, professional soldiers provided 60 per cent of active COs. Conversely, 
serving Territorials of 1914 provided 18 per cent of active COs (rising to 24 per cent when 
retired TF officers are taken into account) yet Territorial battalions comprised 35 per cent 
of active infantry battalions. Territorial officers were therefore under-represented.4 The 
Special/Extra Reserve provided six per cent, and Empire regiments two per cent of COs. 
Men who were citizens in 1914 provided eight per cent.5 
 Commands 
Regular 45% 
Retired Regular 11% 
Indian Army 2% 
Retired Indian Army 2% 
Special Reserve 4% 
Retired Special Reserve 2%  
Territorial 18% 
Retired Territorial 6% 
Empire 1% 
Retired Empire 1% 
Citizens 8% 
 
Table 3.1: Relative contribution of various arms of the infantry to active battalion 
command 
 
The position on 29 September 1918 was somewhat different, as Table 3.2 shows, with a 
lower number of retired officers (22 compared with 18 per cent). This is unsurprising, 
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 Of the 12,738 Regular officers of 4 August 1914 [War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort of the British 
Empire, (1922) p.234], 13 per cent would become battalion COs of an active infantry battalion. 
4This is examined in more detail in Chapter Four section 4.3.1  
5This group is examined in detail in Chapter Six.  
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older retired officers having been called on earlier in the war.6 There was a lower number 
of active Regular/professional officers (47 per cent overall compared with 32), and a 
higher number of Territorial officers (24 per cent overall compared with 31), with the 
contribution of Special Reserve officers dropping (six per cent overall compared with 
four). The significant discrepancy is in the increased number of citizen COs, (eight per cent 
overall compared with 22). 
 




Reserve Empire Citizens Total 
Active 32% 0% 25% 2% 1% 22% 82% 
Retired 8% >1% 6% 2% 2% n/a 18% 
Total 40% >1% 31% 4% 3% 22% 100% 
 
Table 3.2: Relative contribution of various bodies of the infantry to active battalion 




Table 3.3 shows that the infantry provided 93 per cent of infantry COs, the only other 
significant contributor being the cavalry. Two hundred and thirty-nine cavalrymen 
commanded infantry battalions on active service, and of these 42 per cent were active or 
retired Yeomanry;7 34 per cent were active or retired Regular cavalrymen; 17 per cent 
were active or retired Indian Army cavalrymen; five per cent were from Empire regiments; 
and two per cent Special Reserve.8 In this area, the Territorial Force in the form of the 
Yeomanry was well represented. 
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To provide an example of a cavalryman turned infantry CO, A.M. Mills was a Captain in 
the 18th King George’s Own Lancers in August 1914, Adjutant and Quartermaster at the 
Quetta College.9 His regiment joined the Indian Cavalry Corps in France in late 1914, and 
after serving as a Staff Captain with the Ambala Brigade from 5 June to 8 November 1915, 
Mills went to 14th Gloucestershire as a Major, second-in-command. As he noted:  
The New Army battalions … needed senior officers. The British infantry 
of the line had been milked dry of officers, but in the cavalry, and more 
especially the Indian cavalry, which had not so far been seriously 
engaged, there was a suitable source of supply.10  
 
He served as CO of the 17th Lancashire Fusiliers from 19 April 1916 to 5 July 1917.11 
  
  % 
Infantry 93 
Cavalry 6 
Royal Artillery <1 
Royal Engineers <1 
Royal Marines <1 
Royal Flying Corps <1 
Royal Navy <1 
 
Table 3.3: Relative contribution of various arms of the services to active battalion 
command 
 
In contrast, D.W.C. Davies-Evans was a Major in the Pembroke Yeomanry in August 
1914.12 The battalion was dismounted in the UK in November 1915 and sent to Egypt in 
March 1916. Davies-Evans was transferred to 8th Lincolnshire in France and commanded 
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 NAM 1965-06-17, papers of Major-General Sir Arthur Mordaunt Mills. 
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 Mills spent a period of time away recovering from being wounded in a bombardment near Trones Wood on 
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between 14 January and 12 February 1917, being transferred to 8th Somerset Light Infantry 
as a Major, later commanding 11th Rifle Brigade from 23 April to 2 May 1918; 2/5th 
Lincolnshire from 21 May to 1 August 1918; and 2/8th Worcestershire from 28 August 
until the Armistice. 
 
On 29 September 1918, there were 37 cavalry officers commanding infantry battalions in 
France and Flanders, seven per cent of COs in post on that date. The contribution of the 
cavalry, although small, remained constant. Thirteen COs on that day originated from the 
artillery; 20 from the Royal Engineers;13 and six from the Royal Marines, (all retired 
officers). Five originated outside the army, being retired Royal Navy personnel.14  
 
One officer was serving with the Royal Flying Corps in August 1914. C.J. Burke was a 
Major of the Royal Irish Regiment, and had served with the Aeroplane and Balloon School 
before commanding II(AC) Squadron for two years prior to the war. He commanded 2nd 
Wing RFC in France then served as Commandant of the Central Flying School before 
commanding 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers from 20 October to 20 December 1916 and 1st East 
                                                      
13
 Nine were Regular Lieutenants/Captains in August 1914, namely: Captain W.L. de M. Carey (Lieutenant-
Colonel 14th Leicestershire from 10 October 1918 to the Armistice); Lieutenant A.A. Chase (Lieutenant-
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Essex from 19 April to 7 September 1918); Lieutenant G.B.F. Smyth (Lieutenant-Colonel 6th Scottish 
Borderers from 15 October 1916 to 3 October 1918); and  Captain F.V. Thompson (Lieutenant-Colonel 9th 
Essex from 25 May to 14 October 1917). 
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 Of these the most senior was Lieutenant-Commander Sir Henry Archer Colt. Aged 33 in August 1914 he 
had become a midshipman in 1898, retiring in 1912. He commanded 12th Gloucestershire from 25 October 
1917 to 19 October 1918 and was twice wounded. During the Second World War he was a Squadron Leader 




Lancashire from 13 February to 9 April 1917, being killed on the opening day of the Battle 
of Arras. He was said to be “a better leader of men than a pilot”!15  
 
All the artillerymen were retired, apart from T.A. Cubitt, a Regular Major of the Royal 
Artillery who commanded 8th Lincolnshire from 12 February to 5 April 1917, before being 
promoted to command 57 Brigade.16 One Engineer of interest was G.P. Pollitt, a pre-war 
chemical engineer who enlisted as a despatch rider in August 1914, and was commissioned 
2nd Lieutenant on 25 October 1914, first in the Intelligence Corps then the Royal 
Engineers, rising to the rank of Major commanding a battalion of the Special Brigade on 9 
January 1916. He won a bar to his DSO for courage and leadership in his conduct of gas 
operations at Bullecourt in May 1917,17 and a second bar for “example and leadership” 
whilst commanding the 11th Lancashire Fusiliers in the German attack of 27 May 1918 on 
the Aisne.18 He had commanded 1/6th Lancashire Fusiliers from 4 April to 12 May 1918, 
and the 11th Battalion from 14 to 28 May 1918.19 
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 http://www.twosqnassoc.co.uk/pages/bosses/burke.htm (accessed 16 November 2011) Charles James 
Burke was aged 32 in August 1914. 
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 Thomas Astley Cubitt, psc, aged 43 in 1914, had served prior to the Great War as a Brigade-Major. He had 
served in five campaigns in West Africa between 1898 and 1903. 
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under his command owed their spirit and determination in no small degree to his magnificent example.” 
London Gazette, 17 July 1917, p.7210 
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 “For conspicuous gallantry during the fighting on 27th May, 1918, on the Aisne. He had his battalion in 
repeated local counter-attacks against overwhelming odds, holding up the enemy and inflicting severe 
casualties. Thanks to his example and leadership his battalion put up a splendid defence when over forty per 
cent, of them had become casualties and the remainder were almost surrounded.” London Gazette, 10 
December 1919, p.15280 
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 The VC and DSO Book Vol. III (Uckfield: Naval & Military Press, 2010), p.324. George Paton Pollitt was 
aged 36 in 1914. In the post war period he became director of Brunner, Mond & Co, which became part of 
ICI in 1926. 
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3.1.2 Regimental affiliation 
David French notes that “regiments were culturally defined organizations that were bound 
together by shared historical memories, customs and a myth of descent”.20 Paddy Griffith 
claims that “the cap-badge continued to exercise a powerful magnetism and tribalism 
throughout the war”, especially for officers “in the tightly knit ‘social club’ that was their 
battalion headquarters’ mess”.21 French, however, warns that “it is too easy to exaggerate 
the extent to which regimental particularism stood in the way of modernity”.22 That we 
should temper our view of regimental particularism was confirmed in Chapter One, where 
it was noted that 16 per cent of the Regular COs of August 1914 had achieved their 
Lieutenant-Colonelcy in a different regiment from that in which they obtained their 
Majority. The exigencies of war were only likely to accelerate this cross-pollination. 
 
    Internal External 
Loos 25 September 1915 78% 22% 
Somme 01 July 1916 54% 46% 
Arras 09 April 1917 58% 42% 
Third Ypres 31 July 1917 47% 53% 
Hundred Days: France & Flanders 29 September 1918 47% 53% 
Hundred Days: other 29 September 1918 49% 51% 
 
Table 3.4: Internal/external regimental origin of active COs 
 
The position at the time of the Battle of Loos in September 1915, as Table 3.4 shows, was 
not radically different from that of the pre-war Regulars, (16 to 22 per cent external). From 
this point onwards, however, there was a rapidly accelerating trend for COs on active 
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22
 French, Military Identities, pp. 259-60 
102 
 
service to be external to the regiment.23 Nine months later, on the opening day of the 
Somme campaign, external appointees had doubled to 46 per cent.24 Although the figure 
dropped to 42 per cent external at the opening of the Battle of Arras, from mid-1917 the 
figures hover around a rough 50:50 split. 
 
As Table 3.5 shows, however, the overall figures hide a distinct pattern. On 29 September 
1918, the Regular battalions maintained a high proportion of internal appointments, 73 per 
cent. The first-line Territorial battalions had a rate of 48 per cent,25 Service Battalions 39 
per cent. The second-line Territorial Battalions had the lowest internal appointment rate, 10 
per cent. Thus, battalions with a pre-war identity maintained a stronger regimental 
particularism, with the Regulars perpetuating a particularly high level of exclusivity. 
  
Internal External 
Regular 73% 27% 
New Army 39% 61% 





Table 3.5: Internal/external regimental origin of active COs according to battalion type 
on 29 September 1918 
 
An amusing note on the matter of external appointment can be found in the War Diary of 
1/7th Warwickshire on 22 May 1915.26 The Adjutant, Captain B. Johnstone, wrote: “Col. L. 
Hanbury joined for duty … there are several Lt-Cols of 7 Warwicks yet a stranger has been 
                                                      
23
 External is defined as the CO having had no previous service with the regiment in question. 
24
 The first six months of 1916, despite the BEF conducting no major campaign, were ones of constant 
turnover (see Figure 3.9), with battalion command clearly under ongoing review with new COs increasingly 
reflecting perceived ability rather than simple progression by seniority and regimental affiliation. 
25
 These battalions, as noted in Chapter One section 1.3, had a pre-war 95 per cent internal regimental 
appointment rate. 
26
 TNA WO/95/2756 War Diary 1/7th Royal Warwickshire Regiment 
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appointed”. Johnstone missed the irony of the fact that he was himself ‘a stranger’ from the 
West Kent Regiment, although he had served as Adjutant since 26 March 1913, his own 
case indicating that a sense of belonging could swiftly develop.27 
 
3.2 Evolution – Individual Characteristics 
3.2.1 Age 
 
Alfred Vagts, in his discussion of age and generalship, notes: “The long-range record of 
military history speaks clearly against the army leader of advanced years, though, of 
course, not absolutely in favour of youth – youth does not safeguard against military 
folly”.28 Experience may the best safeguard against folly and age is often the price paid for 
its acquisition, the hothouse of war lowering that price. 
 
In Chapter Two, it was noted that the issue of the age of ‘dugouts’ was inevitably linked 
with matters of physical fitness and stamina. The Official Historian suggested that “age is 
biological and should not be reckoned by the calendar. Each case should be judged for 
itself”. He continued:  
Activity is the criterion; in 1914 some Lieutenant-Colonels could be seen 
running forward with the best of athletes; others collapsed because they 
were worn out by marching a few miles; not being able to ride their 
horses in battle, and two were tried by court martial for dereliction of 




                                                      
27
 Bede Johnstone was fortunate that this battalion’s COs were not apparently in the habit of signing off the 
War Diary each month. He was to command the 1st Royal West Kent from 25 August 1917 to 9 October 
1918. Lionel Henry Hanbury, aged 52 in 1914, and a retired Royal Berkshire Territorial, commanded 2/4th 
Royal Berkshire between 23 September 1914 and 18 May 1915, giving up command nine days before they 
went on active service, but was transferred at this point to command 1/7th Royal Warwickshire in France, a 
command he held from 22 May 1915 to 29 September 1916. He finally served as a Staff Lieutenant from 25 
September 1917 to 12 January 1918, retiring before the war’s end. 
28
 A. Vagts, ‘Age and Field Command’, Military Affairs, 6 (1942), pp.13-20 
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    Average age Youngest Oldest 
 Outbreak 04 August 1914 47 yrs 10 mth 37 yrs 11 mth (Reg) 




  31 yrs 3 mth (TF) 59 yrs 3 mth (TF) 
Loos 25 September 1915 44 yrs 8 mth 30 yrs 0 mth 65 yrs 2 mth 
Somme 01 July 1916 42 yrs 1 mth 26 yrs 10 mth 57 yrs 5 mth 
Arras 09 April 1917 38 yrs 5 mth 25 yrs 1 month 53 yrs 6 mth 
Third Ypres 31 July 1917 36 yrs 7 mth 24 yrs 8 mth 52 yrs 2 mth 
Hundred 
Days: F&F 29 September 1918 34 yrs 11 mth 21 yrs 5 mth 48 yrs  8 mth 
Hundred 
Days: Other 29 September 1918 39 yrs 0 mth 24 yrs 0 mth 51 yrs 8 mth 
 
Table 3.6: Average and range of ages of COs 
 
He further states: “In 1917 an order was issued that no one over the age of 35 should be 
given command of a battalion”.29 David French notes the War Office conclusion that “in 
the closing stages of both World Wars the average age of unit commanders in the teeth 
arms was between 28 and 36”, and that it was regarded as “conclusively proved” that this 
was the best age.30 Decline in the average ages of COs of August 1914 is therefore to be 
expected. 
 
Table 3.6 shows the average and range of ages of infantry COs.31 As can be seen, the 
average age of Lieutenant-Colonels in France and Flanders dropped 12 years 11 months 
between August 1914 and 29 September 1918, from 47 years 10 months to 34 years 11 
months. This drop should not be attributed solely to design, as it was clearly strongly 
connected to attrition resulting from death, wounding, invalidity or promotion/removal of 
                                                      
29
 Brigadier-General J.E. Edmonds & Lieutenant-Colonel R. Maxwell-Hyslop, Military Operations France 
and Belgium 1918, Vol. 5 (London: Imperial War Museum, 1993, originally published 1947), p.613 
30
 French, Military Identities, p.275, citing TNA WO 32/13253. Memo of Military Secretary, 25 November 
1946. 
31
 Excluding the COs of pioneer battalions, who tended to have longevity in command and to be older. 
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older COs. Any design element appears in the deliberate replacement of older COs for 
fitness reasons. Succession by younger men was, however, inevitable. 
 
The widest spread of ages was demonstrated at the Battle of Loos. The youngest, 
Lieutenant-Colonel A.F.A.N. Thorne, 3rd Grenadier Guards, had temporarily replaced 
Colonel N.A.L Corry at the age of exactly 30.32 Lieutenant-Colonel F.C. Romer, CO 8th 
Buffs, who was killed at Loos on 26 September 1915, was the oldest CO fatality of the war 
at the age of 63. Frederick Charles Romer was born on 15 February 1853 and had become 
a Lieutenant in the Essex Rifles at the age of 20. He had served in South Africa 1900-1, 
and had retired as Lieutenant-Colonel of the 6th Lancashire Fusiliers in 1908. In 1914, he 
raised and trained the 8th Buffs. As Honorary Secretary of Boodles Club, he brought with 
him two fellow members as Majors, three as Captains, and one as a Lieutenant, as well as 
two of the club waiters.33 Romer died leading his battalion against the German second 
position. Wounded in the shoulder he insisted on staying with his men, and was then shot 
through the heart.34 
 
                                                      
32
 Augustus Francis Andrew Nicol ‘Bulgy’ Thorne was born in 1875, son of an East India/China merchant 
and with no family military tradition, attended Eton and RMC, and was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in the 
3rd Grenadier Guards on 2 March 1904. Having been Assistant Adjutant of the 1st Battalion (1908) he was 
assigned to 1st Guards Brigade as a Staff Captain on the outbreak of war. He was promoted Major on 30 
September 1915 and sent to the 1st Battalion on March 17 as second-in-command. He returned to command 
the battalion from 18 September 1916 to 31 August 1918, and was promoted Brigadier-General 184 Brigade 
on 14 October 1918. Noel Armar Lowry Corry, who had commanded both 2nd and 3rd Grenadier Guards, was 
promoted Brigadier-General AAG.ost-war he was Military Attaché in Berlin, and commanded 48th Division 
1939-40, then relegated to Army Commander in Scotland, finishing the war as Head of the Allied Mission to 
Norway.  
33
 http://www.kentfallen.com/pdf%20reports/sandwich.pdf accessed 11 October 2011. 
34
 Lieutnant Aschenbach, observation officer of the 6th gun battery of the German 233 Feld-Artillerie-
Regiment, remembered seeing “a white-haired Colonel on the wire” where Romer fell 
(http://www.greatwar.co.uk/french-flanders-artois/memorial-loos-memorial.htm, accessed 11 October 2011).  
His son Malcolm Romer commanded the 1st Scots Guards (1 September 1917 to 6 March 1918) and 3rd 
Scots Guards (24 September 1918 to 11 November 1918). 
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The youngest CO in the order of battle for 1 July 1916 was Lieutenant-Colonel J. Micklem 
of 1/6th Gloucestershire, who was 26 years nine months old.35 The oldest CO who went 
into action that day was Brevet Colonel W.N. Wylie, CO 21st Manchester, aged 56, whose 
battalion was involved in the capture of Mametz.36 He served until 15 May 1917, having 
been in post for 903 days. 
 
The celebrated Lieutenant-Colonel R.B. Bradford was the youngest CO on the opening day 
of the Battle of Arras,37 commanding 1/9th Durham Light Infantry at a month over 25. The 
oldest was Lieutenant-Colonel J.E.G. Groves, CO 1/5th Cheshire, who was just over 52, 
and who commanded from the outbreak of war to 12 March 1918, a total of 1316 days.38 
The youngest CO on the first day of the Third Battle of Ypres was Lieutenant-Colonel E.B. 
Greer, CO 2nd Irish Guards, who was nearly 25.39 The oldest was Lieutenant-Colonel C.C. 
Carr, CO 11th Royal Fusiliers, who was just over 52. Carr served from the formation of the 
battalion until 12 September 1917, a total of 1102 days.40  
 
                                                      
35
 John Micklem was a Captain of 1st Rifle Brigade in August 1914. He commanded 1/6th Gloucestershire 
from 10 July 1915 to 7 January 1917. He later served in various staff posts, transferring to the Tank Corps 
where he rose to be Brigadier-General 4th Tank Brigade in the last few days of the war. 
36
 William Wylie Norman was a retired Indian Army Lieutenant-Colonel, 22nd Cavalry, and had served in 
Tirah 1897-8. Clearly a thoughtful soldier, he was the author of The Service Sketching Case & Note Book 
(London: Gale & Polden, 1891), and Cavalry Reconnaissance (London:  H. Rees, 1911). 
37
 Roland Boys Bradford was a Regular 2nd Lieutenant of Durham Light Infantry at the outbreak of war. He 
commanded the 1/9th Battalion between 15 September 1916 and 5 November 1917. Awarded the Victoria 
Cross on the Somme, he was destined to become the youngest Brigadier-General in the BEF, with 186 
Brigade, on 10 November 1917. 
38
 John Edward Grimble Groves was commanding 1/5th Cheshire in August 1914, and continued until 12 
March 1918. He was the Chairman of Groves and Withnall, brewers, and returned in this capacity post-war. 
39
 Eric Beresford Greer was a 22 year-old Lieutenant of the Irish Guards in August 1914. He commanded  2nd 
Irish Guards from 13 January 1917 until he was killed on the opening day of the Third Battle of Ypres, 31 
July 1917, by a shrapnel ball or bullet standing outside advance battalion HQ at Boezinghe on the first 
objective. 
40
 Charles Catley Carr, a 49 year-old retired Major of the Royal Fusiliers in August 1914, commanded the 
11th Battalion between 6 September 1914 and 12 September 1917, and after wounding, commanded 51st 
Graduated Battalion, Highland Light Infantry 
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In respect of those in post on 29 September 1918, a total of 41 per cent were over 35. 
(Pioneer COs are included on this occasion to give a sense of the complete age range). Of 
these, 60 per cent were appointed in 1918, the oldest being Lieutenant-Colonel E.H.St.L. 
Clarke, who was 57 when given command of 21st West Yorkshire (Pioneers) on 13 
October 1915,41 at which point a fellow Pioneer CO, Lieutenant-Colonel C.V. Trower of 
the 5th South Wales Borderers was nearly 61, the oldest infantry CO in France, having 
served since 6 September 1914.42 
 
The oldest ‘combat’ Territorial CO on 29 September was Lieutenant-Colonel W. Oddie of 
the 1/5th West Yorkshire, who was 51 and who had been in post since November 1917.43 
The oldest ‘combat’ CO appointed in 1918 was a Territorial, Lieutenant-Colonel F.J. 
Popham, 2/5th Royal Lancaster, who was nearly 48 when given command on 7 August 
1918.44 The oldest appointee to a Regular battalion in 1918 was Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. 
Gallagher of 2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, who was nearly 47 when promoted on 15 
September, making him the oldest Regular CO on 29 September 1918.45 The oldest 
Service Battalion CO appointed for the first time in 1918 was Lieutenant-Colonel H.T. 
Pomfret, who was 45 when given command of 11th Manchester on 28 September 1918.46 
                                                      
41
 Edward Henry St. Lawrence Clarke, born in 1857, had commanded 12th Worcestershire, a reserve 
battalion, from 4 November 1914 until 13 October 1915 when he was transferred to 21st West Yorkshire, a 
command he held until the Armistice. 
42
 Courtney Vor Trower, born in 1856, was a retired Regular brevet Colonel of the South Wales Borderers in 
August 1914. He commanded the 5th Battalion from 6 September 1914 until his resignation on 14 October 
1918. 
43
 William Oddie, born in 1867, was a Territorial Major of 5th West Yorkshire in August 1914, and 
commanded until the Armistice. 
44
 Francis James Popham, born in 1871, was a retired Lieutenant of the London Yeomanry in August 1914. 
He commanded 2/5th Royal Lancaster until the Armistice. 
45
 Albert Ernest Gallagher, born in 1872, was a retired Captain of the Royal Munster Fusiliers in August 
1914, and commanded 2nd Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers until 2 October 1918. 
46
 Hugh Tunbridge Pomfret, born in 1873, was a retired Territorial Lieutenant of the Manchester Regiment in 
August 1914, and commanded the 11th Battalion until the Armistice. 
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Lieutenant-Colonel C.E. Hudson of the 2nd Sherwood Foresters was the oldest Service 
battalion CO on 29 September, being 47 and having been appointed in November 1917.47 
 
Clearly, there was a group of older COs whose constitutions and abilities outweighed any 
burden of their years. Brigadier-General F.P. Crozier, 119 Brigade, was sent Lieutenant-
Colonel H.C. Metcalfe in January 1918 to command 21st Middlesex. He described 
Metcalfe as “an old soldier of some fifty-odd summers”,48 and as he had “not been in 
France before”, Crozier doubted his ability.49 Yet in the German Spring offensive: 
“Metcalfe is a stone wall when necessary, a thrusting lance when required”, Crozier 
naming the first requirement in this fighting as “physical fitness”.50 
 
In contrast, of the Dominion contingents, the average age of Australian Imperial Force 
infantry COs in August 1918 was “less than 33”.51 The average age of their Canadian 
Expeditionary Force counterparts prior to 1 January 1917 was 41 years six months (range 
28 to 57 years). For COs appointed in 1918, the average age was 35 years eight months 
(range 26 to 44 years), 61 per cent of these being above the Official Historian’s quoted 35 
year cut-off.52 The British figure of 34 years 11 months sits between these two figures. 
 
                                                      
47
 Charles Edward Hudson, born in 1871, was a tea planter in Ceylon in August 1914 (he had previously 
failed his first year RMC exams), and had previously commanded 11th Sherwood Foresters from 8 November 
1917 until wounded in Italy on 15 June 1918. 
48
 He was in fact 54. 
49
 Herbert Charles Metcalfe had retired in 1902 as a Regular Captain of the Northamptonshire Regiment with 
service as Inspector of Musketry, and DAAG (Scottish Command). He served as a Staff Lieutenant in 1917. 
50
 F.P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land (London: Jonathan  Cape, 1930), p.194. Metcalfe’s command 
was terminated on 11 April 1918 by wounding. Crozier took his successor to visit him in hospital: “There we 
see the old warrior with leg tied up to the roof, while on the foot flies a miniature Union Jack!” (p.210). His 
replacement, Lieutenant-Colonel G.F.P. Worthington was a 2nd Lieutenant of the West India Regiment in 
August 1914, and was 24 when he took command. 
51
 G. Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p.33 
52
 Calculations made from memoranda dated March 1941: Directorate of History and Heritage, Ottawa, ON 
92/252 Series 7 Box 125 File 102. 
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It is clear that any order concerning the prohibition of new commands to over-35s was 
notable by its breach. Of the ‘over 35’ appointees in 1918, 22 per cent were, however, COs 
of pioneer battalions, older COs therefore being disproportionately appointed to such units. 
Nearly 30 per cent of all ‘combat’ COs appointed in 1918 in post on 29 September were, 
however, over 35. 
 
The grave of Lieutenant-Colonel E.G. Bowden bears the following legend: “Promoted on 
the field of action from 2nd Lieutenant, he was one of the youngest Colonels in the British 
Army”,53 being 24 years and two months old at his death. Youth and high rank bore a 
fascination and pride then as now.   Brigadier-General F.P. Crozier, observing “this is a 
war for youngsters”, took the 24 year-old “baby-faced” Lieutenant-Colonel G.F.P 
Worthington into a hotel whereupon a ‘Blimpish’ Major mistakenly assailed him: “Well, 
why the devil don’t you salute, you damned young cub?”54 The youngest known CO on 29 
September 1918 was Lieutenant-Colonel A.L.W. Newth of the 16th Cheshire, who was 21 
when appointed on 30 April 1918, and he was likely the youngest of the war.55 At least 25 
were younger than Bowden. Whilst it might be thought that the fact that COs became 
progressively younger is evidence of an emerging meritocracy of youth, the reality that 
older than average COs were still appointed in 1918 supports the Official Historian’s view 
that age is purely biological, and not a bar to the appointment of a competent commander.  
                                                      
53
  Buried in Cabaret Rouge cemetery, Souchez, Eric Gordon Bowden was a civilian in 1914, working as a 
clerk to a civil engineer. He commanded 11th Royal West Surrey from 23 March 1918 until 2 May 1918. 
54
 Crozier, Brass Hat, pp.210-11. Godfrey Francis Puget Worthington, born in 1894, was a 2nd Lieutenant of 
the West India Regiment in August 194, and commanded 21st Middlesex from 11 April 1918 until 17 May 
1918. 
55
 Arthur Leslie Walter Newth, was born in 1897 and commanded 1/6th Cheshire from 30 April 1918 to the 




Given the decrease in average age of infantry COs between 1914 and 1918, it could be 
safely predicted that the ranks of those who had been active in August 1914 and who were 
commanding battalions on 29 September 1918 in France and Flanders, would be 
comparatively junior at the outbreak of war. Table 3.7 confirms this. 
 
ORs 2nd Lieutenant Lieutenant Captain Major Lieutenant-Colonel 
7% 7% 28% 46% 11% 1% 
 
Table 3.7: August 1914 ranks of COs of 29 September 1918 
Sir Douglas Haig noted in his diary on 25 June 1915 that progress, “even if ample guns etc. 
provided”, would be achieved only when “young capable commanders are brought to the 
front. Captains to command Battalions; Majors Brigades etc”.56 His prophecy was fulfilled 
to the extent that nearly half (46 per cent) of infantry COs on 29 September 1918 were 
Captains in August 1914.57 
 
Haig may not have foreseen that seven per cent of COs on 29 September 1918 would have 
been of the other ranks in August 1914. During the war, 69 ORs of August 1914 
commanded battalions on active service, one per cent of the total ORs commissioned.58 
Sixty-eight per cent were Regulars, 23 per cent Territorials, one per cent Special Reserve, 
and, perhaps surprisingly, 8 per cent from empire regiments. Of the 28 individuals in post 
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 National Library of Scotland, Acc. 3155, Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Manuscript Diary, 25 June 
1915. 
57
 Although in 1915 a proportion of such would have been Majors, and many of the 2nd 
Lieutenants/Lieutenants of August 1914 who made up 35 per cent of COs on 29 September 1918 may have 
been Captains by the time Haig was writing. 
58
 6,713 permanent officers were commissioned from the ranks during the war. [HMSO, Statistics of the 




on 29 September 1918, three Regular ORs were commanding Regular battalions. 
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Daly, 1st East Lancashire, had served in the ranks for nearly nine 
years and had been commissioned 2nd Lieutenant from Warrant Officer Class II on 9 April 
1916, and served as CO from 25 October 1917 to the Armistice, the journey from 2nd 
Lieutenant to Lieutenant-Colonel taking just over 18 months. Both 1st and 2nd Battalions of 
the Royal Irish Rifles were commanded in 1918 by other ranks (ORs) of August 1914, 
namely Lieutenant-Colonels J.P. Hunt and J.H. Bridcutt. Hunt, a retired Colour Sergeant of 
the Royal Dublin Fusiliers, commanded 9th Dublin Fusiliers from 4 June 1917 to 25 
October 1917 and 1st Royal Irish Rifles from 28 March 1918. Bridcutt, who had served in 
the Coldstream Guards for over 12 years was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant from Warrant 
Officer Class I in the Somerset Light Infantry on 6 March 1915. He commanded 12th 
Middlesex from 8 September to 30 November 1917, and 2nd Royal Irish Rifles from 31 
August 1918 until his death on 1 October 1918 on the Menin Road, Ypres.59 
 
Twelve Service and 13 Territorial battalions were commanded by ORs of August 1914 on 
29 September 1918.  
 
3.2.3 Staff service - Adjutancy 
Of all active COs who had been below the rank of Major in 1914,60 19 per cent had been 
battalion Adjutants during the war prior to appointment.  The figure on 29 September 1918 
was 20 per cent, indicating a constant level. There was therefore an association, if weak, 
                                                      
59
 Captain A.O. Pollard of 1/1st Honourable Artillery Company encountered him a month prior to his 
appointment when he was CO of No. 2 Reinforcement Training Camp at Abbeville.  He was deeply 
impressed by his organisational ability in setting up the camp, noting: “He was an ex-sergeant-major of the 
Coldstreams which will amply explain why such an undertaking was not beyond him”. Pollard added: “He 
was a great man and deserved better luck than he received”. [A.O. Pollard, Fire-Eater (Uckfield: Naval & 
Military, n.d.) p.255]. 
60
 It was rare for a Major to act as adjutant. 
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between adjutancy (an indication of organisational competence) and later battalion 
command.61 
 
3.2.4 Staff service - Extra-regimental 
Fourteen per cent (552) of all active COs with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel had 
experience of staff service post-August 1914 prior to appointment to command.62 The link 
between appointment as CO and staff service was therefore weaker than its association 
with adjutancy. 
 
Of the appointments in G (General Staff), A (Adjutant General), and Q (Quartermaster 
General),63 as Table 3.8 shows, 185 were GSO1/2/3, 32 DAAG/AAG, and 24 
DAQMG/AQMG. Forty-six were in joint A and Q posts (DAA&QMG/AA&QMG). There 
were therefore nearly double the appointments in G than in A and Q combined. When the 
227 Brigade-Major appointments are taken into consideration, the predominance of G can 
be appreciated. It is understandable that men who were going to progress to battalion 
command would be more likely to have an operational staff background.  
 
                                                      
61
 This was lower than the figure of 59 per cent for Regular COs of August 1914. (Chapter One section 
1.1.4). 
62
 This was lower than the figure of 46 per cent for Regular COs of August 1914. (Chapter One section 
1.1.4). Of those COs who had also had prior staff service outside the battalion and who had a rank below 
Major in August 1914, 22 per cent had acted as Adjutant during the war prior to staff appointment. 
Possession of the Adjutancy therefore did not significantly increase the likelihood of an extra-battalion staff 
appointment in those who would become COs. 
63
 The General Staff consisted of General Staff Officers 1st, 2nd and 3rd Grade, respectively GSO1 
(Lieutenant-Colonels), GSO2 (Majors) and GSO3 (Captains), and dealt with operations, intelligence and 
training matters. (At brigade level the ‘G’ post was a Brigade-Major). The Adjutant-General's or 'A' Staff 
consisted of Assistant Adjutants-General (AAG, Lieutenant-Colonel), Deputy Assistant Adjutants-General 
(DAAG, Majors) and Staff Captains, and dealt with personnel matters (appointments and promotions, 
discipline, unit organisation, medals and awards, pay etc.). The Quartermaster-General's or 'Q' Staff consisted 
of Assistant Quartermasters-General (AQMG, Lieutenant-Colonel), Deputy Assistant Quartermasters-
General (DAQMG, Majors) and Staff Captains, and dealt with supply, equipment, transport and veterinary 
matters. In some formations some of the functions of the A and Q Branches were combined, with an 
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General (AA&QMG) as the senior administrative staff officer. 
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To examine the G group in more detail, there were 285 GSO1, 526 GSO2 and 644 GSO3 
appointments during the war.64 Those who went on to become COs comprised only seven, 
15 and 13 per cent of these groups respectively.  
  G A Q A & Q Other 
General Staff Officer 1 21         
General Staff Officer 2 80         
General Staff Officer 3 84         
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General   26       
Assistant Adjutant General   6       
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General     21     
Assistant Quartermaster General     3     
Deputy Assistant Adjutant & Quartermaster 
General       34   
Assistant Adjutant & Quartermaster General       12   
Brigade Major         227 
Staff Captain         120 
Staff Lieutenant         5 
Aide de Camp         29 
Assistant Provost Marshal         19 
AMS         3 
Special Appointment         45 
War Office Appointment         18 
School Post         25 
Officer Training Post         41 
Transport Post         15 
 
Table 3.8: Staff posts held by active infantry COs prior to assuming command 
 
From probably late 1915 and certainly 1916, officers were being sent on the 
recommendation of their CO for a month’s staff attachment to Brigade. If they wished, 
they could have a further month’s attachment to a higher formation. This was often not 
popular, such officers wishing to return to front line duty where promotion was more 
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 Personal communication, Paul Harris, King’s College, University of London. 
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likely.65 Captain A. Hanbury-Sparrow, a future CO, was sent as staff learner to Corps in 
1916. He felt out of place, observing that “the attitude of the staff was beyond question 
akin to that of the economic world”, continuing: "You missed, in fact, the cult atmosphere 
of the trenches … you were a peg in a round hole, and when you left, it was with a flea in 
your ear".66 
 
As noted in Chapter One, 22 per cent of the 157 Regular COs in post in August 1914 had 
passed staff college. Of all the 1478 Regular officers serving as active COs with the rank 
of Lieutenant-Colonel during the war, 128 (nine per cent) were psc, and when those in post 
at the outbreak of war are removed from the equation, this figure drops to 7 per cent. Few 
officers with a psc therefore served as COs. 
 
Seventy-six per cent of GSO1s who later became COs were, perhaps unsurprisingly, psc, 
and 52 per cent proceeded to brigade command, the overlap between these two groups 
being 82 per cent, i.e. only two who were promoted were not psc.67 Forty-seven per cent of 
GSO2s who later became COs were psc, and 40 per cent proceeded to brigade command, 
the overlap between the two groups being 84 per cent. Eighteen per cent of GSO3s who 
later became COs were psc, and only 8 per cent proceeded to brigade command, the 
overlap between the two groups being 43 per cent. Twelve per cent of Brigade-Majors who 
later became COs were psc, 21 per cent proceeding to brigade command, the overlap 
between the two groups being 29 per cent. 
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 Personal communication, Paul Harris, King’s College, University of London. 
66
 A. Hanbury-Sparrow, The Land-Locked Lake (London: Hazel, Watson & Viney, 1932), pp.189-190. 
Arthur Alan Hanbury Hanbury-Sparrow was a 22 year-old Regular Lieutenant of the Royal Berkshire 
Regiment in August 1914. He was a GSO3 from 22 May to 3 July 1916. He did not command a battalion 
until July 1917.  
67
 Only one of these, H.R. Cumming, gave the appearance of being rotated quickly through battalion 
command (17 days with 2nd Durham Light Infantry) before promotion. 
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The average rate of promotion (see below) of COs to brigade command was 10 per cent. 
The association between serving in a staff post, a substantial period as a CO and promotion 
to Brigadier-General was therefore highest for GSO1s and GSO2s by a factor of five and 
four respectively, with GSO3s not advantaged at all, and Brigade-Majors advantaged by a 
factor of two. 
 
The existence of only a small overlap between the combat and staff groups indicates the 
shortage of skilled staff officers, men with psc, experience, or clear ability being hived off 
for the rapidly expanding staff domain, and hence bypassing battalion command. 
 
3.3 Turnover 
3.3.1 Turnover by month 
Figure 3.1 shows the monthly number of CO appointments, both total and active-service 
only. There are three peaks. The first, and naturally most pronounced peak, was the period 
September to November 1914, marking the creation of the New Armies. The second peak 
was the period July to October 1916, corresponding with the Battle of the Somme. The 
third peak was the period March to May 1918, marking the German offensives. July 1916 
and April 1918 saw the most rapid turnover of active COs of the war. Although the 
average monthly total for 1917 (81) is much the same as 1916 (83), what is remarkable is 
that the BEF in France and Flanders was fighting virtually continuously for 10 months 
during 1917,68 compared with five months in 1916, and it might have been predicted that 
higher monthly turnover totals might have been manifest (which was only the case for July 
1917). The conclusion can be drawn that in terms of infantry battalion command, the BEF  
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 From February to November this period included the German retirement to the Hindenburg Line and the 









had its most settled year in 1917 despite its overall activity, implying that by this time it 
had a group of largely competent and experienced men, younger and more resistant to 
exhaustion. Further, it was husbanding its resources more effectively by alternating 
Commanding Officer and second-in-command on days of offensive action. It is also 
notable that the turnover of the first half of 1916, when no major campaigns were in 
progress, is much the same as 1917, indicating considerable honing of battalion command 
prior to the Somme. 
 
 
3.3.2 Turnover by battalion 
 
Of battalions on active service which had been in existence from the start of the war,69  
Regular battalions had an average seven COs (range two to 14) between August 1914 and 
the Armistice.70 The handful of Special/Extra Reserve battalions on active service had an 
average six COs (range four to nine).71 The first-line Territorial battalions had an average 
of between five and six (range two to 12).72 Of battalions which came into existence during 
the war, New Army Service battalions had an average five COs (range two to 12),73 and 
the second and third-line active TF battalions had an average of four (range two to eight).74  
 
It is not surprising that the Regular battalions had the highest turnover as they bore the 
brunt of the 1914 fighting and were more subject to loss of COs to promotion. The 2nd 
Royal Munster Fusiliers was one of two battalions having the highest turnover of 14 COs 
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 Excluding pioneer, labour, garrison etc. battalions on active service. 
70
 The exact average was 7.2. 
71
 The exact average was 5.7. 
72
 The exact average was 5.55. 
73
 The exact average was 5.2. 
74
 The exact average was 3.7. 
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(ten others standing in without the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel).75 Six were replaced; one 
was wounded and one invalided; four were killed in action;76 and one was cashiered.77  
 
3.3.3 Number of commands 
Seventy-nine per cent of those who commanded infantry battalions on active service did so 
only once.78 Twenty-one per cent had multiple commands.79 
 
As Table 3.9 shows, the highest number of battalion commands as Lieutenant-Colonel held 
by an individual who saw active service was six, and this was achieved by two COs, albeit 
both with mixed results. Lieutenant-Colonel H.E. Walshe, second-in-command of 2nd 
South Staffordshire (6 Brigade, 2nd Division) in August 1914, commanded 1st Dorsetshire 
(15 Brigade, 5th Division) from 12 December 1914 to 3 January 1915.80 An example of the 
attrition of command in 1914, the first two COs, Lieutenant-Colonels L.J. Bols and C. 
Saunders had both been wounded,81 and the battalion had subsequently been commanded 
by a Captain and a Major.82 The unit’s resources (and perhaps those of brigade and 
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 The other was 1st Dorsetshire. 
76
 Lieutenant-Colonels G.J. Ryan, 22 January 1915; V.G.H. Rickard, 9 May 1915; W.B. Lyons, 20 August 
1916; and H.R.H. Ireland, 21 March 1918. 
77
 Lieutenant-Colonel T.T. Stubbs was cashiered by verdict of court martial for drunkenness on 25 March 
1916. Drunkenness was the most common offence causing an officer’s court-martial. In contrast, Temporary 
Lieutenant-Colonel Grey d’Estoteville Herbert Fullerton, CO 9th Warwickshire in Mesopotamia was tried 
after 33 days in post on two charges related to his command of his battalion when it had been subject to a 
night attack by arabs on 26/27 June 1916. Having immediately been forced to relinquish command, he was 
found guilty and sentenced “to be reprimanded” for “conduct to the prejudice of good order and military 
discipline” when he did not reform his column properly in the aftermath. He was found not guilty of failing 
to safeguard his unit through not posting protective detachments. (TNA WO 374/26035, Officers’ Services, 
Grey d’Estoteville Herbert Fullerton). 
78
 By ‘once’ is meant the command of the same battalion, so if a CO returned after a period of absence, this is 
counted as the same command. 
79
 By ‘multiple’ is meant that the individual commanded different battalions. 
80
 Henry Ernest Walshe was 48 in August 1914 and had served in South Africa 1899-1902. 
81
 Neither would return to infantry battalion command, Bols through promotion (see Chapter One), and 
Saunders through lengthy recovery although he was an Acting Lieutenant-Colonel in the Tank Corps in mid-
1918. 
82
 Captain H.S. Williams (14-19 November 1914) and Major W.A.C. Cumming (19–22 November 1914). 
Neither of these officers would ever have the opportunity to command again as both were later killed. 
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division) were so depleted that Walshe was drafted in from another division. After 22 days 
Bols returned, and Walshe reverted to his own battalion, having missed his opportunity to 
command it, Lieutenant-Colonel C.S. Davidson having been invalided three days earlier,83 
being replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel P.C.L. Routledge.84 
 
  Commands 
  Six Five Four Three  Two One 
Regular 2 7 20 85 306 1052 
Retired Regular   1 1 13 69 450 
Indian Army     1 8 84 
Retired Indian Army       4 6 64 
Special Reserve   1 2 11 38 199 
Retired Special Reserve       3 19 123 
Territorial     3 16 83 619 
Retired Territorial       6 36 281 
Empire     1   6 17 
Retired Empire       1 5 26 
Citizens       6 50 204 
Retired Royal Navy         1 2 
% >1 >1 1 4 16 79 
 
Table 3.9: Number of commands held by individual active COs  
 
Walshe missed his chance again when Routledge was killed in action on 17 May 1915, 
having been transferred to command 1st South Staffordshire on 5 April, taking over from 
Captain A.B. Beauman, who had commanded for a month after Lieutenant-Colonel A.C. 
Buckle was invalided.85 He remained in command until 29 July before returning to his 
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 Charles Steer Davidson was commanding the battalion in August 1914 and did so in fits and starts until 24 
September 1915 when he was promoted Brigadier General, 123 Brigade. 
84
 Philip Charles Lytton Routledge was another Regular Major of 2nd South Staffordshire in August 1914. He 
was killed in action at Festubert on 17 May 1915. 
85
 Walshe was again transferred across Divisions (2nd to 7th), but was of course a within-regiment 
appointment. Archibald Bentley Beauman, a Regular Lieutenant of the South Staffordshire Regiment in 
August 1914, would command 1st South Staffordshire from 23 September 1916 until 25 May 1918 when he 
was promoted  Brigadier-General, 69 Brigade. Arthur Charles Buckle, a Major of 1st South Staffordshire in 
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regiment, but his perceived talent was now rewarded with promotion to Temporary 
Brigadier-General, 27 Brigade, from 14 October 1915 to 14 March 1916 when he was 
demoted.86 According to one source he was “sick”,87 but he returned to command his old 
battalion for five days from 25 March 1916, whereupon he was transferred to command 
24th Royal Fusiliers until 18 June 1916. He then had a period away from active service 
during which he was placed on half-pay,88 from whence he was restored on 1 March 1917 
to command 3rd Royal Berkshire, moving on 14 March 1917 to command another home 
service unit, 8th Dorsetshire.89 Walshe had likely ‘burnt out’, a probable example of a 
talented officer thrust into multiple commands at a time, 1914-15, which might be 
considered the harshest period of the war for regimental officers. 
 
The second CO who commanded six battalions was Lieutenant-Colonel H.P. Creagh-
Osborne.90 Depot Major of the Royal Lancaster Regiment in August 1914, he was given 
command of the 6th Battalion on 19 August 1914, being transferred to France to take 
command of the 1st Battalion after Lieutenant-Colonel A.McN. Dykes was killed (26 
August 1914) and the senior Major, R.G. Parker, was wounded.91 However, on 18 
                                                                                                                                                                 
August 1914 returned to command 2nd Northamptonshire from 24 June 1915 to 7 July 1916 when he was 
wounded in the attack on Contalmaison, serving in 1917 as the CO of a Training Reserve Battalion. 
86
 In terms of his demotion from Brigadier, the divisional history implies that at this time Major-General 
W.T. Furse “strove to foster the offensive spirit throughout the Division … he exhorted all the battalions to 
make 'No Man's Land' 'Ninth Division Land'”. It may be that burn-out had left Walshe insufficiently 
aggressive. [J Ewing, The History of the 9th (Scottish) Division 1914-1919 (London: John Murray, 1921), 
p.77]. 
87
 A.F. Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions, Part 3a, New Army Divisions (9-26) (Uckfield: Naval & Military 
Press, 2007), p.4 
88
 From 25 August 1916. 
89
 Which he did until they were disbanded in December 1917. 
90
 Herbert Pearson Creagh-Osborne was 40 in August 1914, and had previously served as a Staff Captain and 
DAAG, seeing active service on the Nile in 1898. 
91
 Alfred Mcnair Dykes psc had commanded the battalion from the outbreak of war, and was killed at Le 
Cateau on 26 August 1914 (see later in this chapter). Robert Gabbett Parker commanded between 26 August 
and 9 September 1914. After his recovery Parker served in staff posts, finishing the war as BGGS, IV Corps, 
from 19 March 1918. 
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November 1914 he was removed for inefficiency.92 He was given command of 7th King’s 
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, training in the UK, a month later. On 18 March 1915, he 
was transferred to command 5th Middlesex, a Special Reserve unit. He returned thence to 
active service, commanding Hood Battalion, 63rd (Royal Naval) Division, in France on 12 
December 1916. Lieutenant-Commander A.M. Asquith had arrived two days earlier to take 
command, but was told by Major-General C. Shute that he had “insufficient knowledge of 
trench warfare in France”.93 Asquith had spent 207 days on Gallipoli and 164 days on the 
Western Front, Creagh-Osborne only 46 days two years earlier - Shute simply wanted 
Regular officers in command.94 Creagh-Osborne went sick on 3 January 1917, although 
attempts to rehabilitate him continued as he was sent to command 2/5th Royal Lancaster in 
April 1917. He did not, however, stay the course, for on 20 September 1917 he returned to 
the UK to a Special Appointment, becoming Commandant of a School of Instruction in 
April 1918. 
 
Nine Lieutenant-Colonels held five commands, and unlike Creagh-Osborne and Walshe 
they all lasted in command well into 1918 and two were promoted to brigade command.95 
Five had been Regular Captains in August 1914 (including the two promoted);96 two were 
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 Army Personnel Centre D/APC/HD/ABLW/187116 – War Office letter dated 17 January 1915 in the file 
of Lieutenant-Colonel C. Wanliss. The page for the days in question is interestingly missing from the unit 
war diary (TNA WO/95/1506). 
93
 C. Page, Command in the Royal Naval Division (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1999), p.99. Arthur Melland 
Asquith, aged 31 in 1914, was commissioned Temporary Sub-Lieutenant on 23 September 1914 in the Royal 
Naval Volunteer Reserve. He served with Anson Battalion during the 1914 Antwerp operations, but was 
transferred to Hood Battalion in October 1914. 
94
 This was a matter which sparked a clash between the Admiralty and the War Office concerning awarding 
battalion command over the heads of those with long Royal Naval Division service (TNA ADM 1/8477-309, 
cited in Page, Command, p.112). 
95
 R.I. Rawson served as GOC 103 Brigade from 31 August 1918 to the Armistice, and P.W. Brown as GOC 
71 Brigade from 19 August 1917 to the Armistice. 
96
 Lieutenant-Colonels F.R.F. Sworder, B. Cruddas, R.I. Rawson, P.W. Brown and H.W. Weldon. 
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Regular Majors;97 one an ex-Regular CO from the Special Reserve;98 and one a retired 
Regular Lieutenant.99 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel R.I. Rawson demonstrated endurance and promotability.100 A Regular 
Captain of the Gloucestershire Regiment in August 1914 he was Adjutant of the 4th 
Battalion, and his first command was 8th Worcestershire (48th Division), from 4 to 19 
October 1915, whence he was transferred to command 1/6th Argyll & Sutherland 
Highlanders (51st Division) until 17 March 1917 (by which time the battalion had been 
converted into a Pioneer unit), and he was later transferred to 12th Gloucestershire (32nd 
Division), commanding from 18 March to 31 August 1917. He was then rested, returning 
to the UK to command 4th Welsh from 22 November 1917 to 9 April 1918, returning to 
France to command 1st Royal Fusiliers from 19 April to 24 August 1918, when he spent a 
further week in command of 12th Gloucestershire, at which point he was appointed GOC 
103 Brigade. He had spent 794 days in command of infantry battalions. 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel B. Cruddas demonstrated extraordinary endurance.101 Whether he had 
potential beyond battalion command was untested, mainly because of serving between 
October 1915 and June 1918 in Salonika where there was reduced opportunity for 
advancement. A Regular Captain of the Northumberland Fusiliers, he was Adjutant of the 
4th Battalion in August 1914, with which unit he went to France in April 1915, thus, like 
Rawson, missing the depredations visited on the Regular army. He was transferred to the 
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 Lieutenant-Colonels C.S. Worthington and J.D. Mather. 
98
 Lieutenant-Colonel G.T.B. Wilson. 
99
 Lieutenant-Colonel P.S. Hall. 
100
 Robert Ian Rawson, aged 39 in August 1914, had served in South-Africa 1899-1902 and in Sudan in 1905 
and 1910 whilst employed with the Egyptian Army. 
101
 Bernard Cruddas, aged 32 in August 1914, had been commissioned in 1900. 
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1st Battalion, but his first command was of 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers from 12 to 29 
October 1915 after Lieutenant-Colonel C.A. Armstrong had been killed at Loos.102 
Superseded, Cruddas remained with the battalion and proceeded to Salonika, where on 18 
February 1916 he was appointed to command 8th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light 
Infantry (Pioneers) until 17 April 1917, when he was transferred to command 9th South 
Lancashire until 12 May 1918. In June he was recalled to the Western Front, taking 
command of 1/4th Royal Scots Fusiliers until 26 September 1918, when he came full circle, 
assuming command of 1st Northumberland Fusiliers on 26 September 1918.103 Despite 
attacks of malaria, Cruddas served until the Armistice, having spent 976 days in command 
of infantry battalions. The history of the 1st and 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers notes: 
“Throughout the War … the Fifth were fortunate in never having to look outside the 
Regiment for an officer to command either of their battalions … Cruddas had varied and 
valuable experience”.104 
 
Thirty active Lieutenant-Colonels had four commands. Twenty-one (73 per cent) were 
Regulars (one retired), six being Majors, 12 Captains, three Lieutenants, and one a 2nd 
Lieutenant in August 1914. One was a Major of an Empire regiment,105 one a Special 
Reserve Captain,106 one a Militia Major,107 and three were Territorials.108 
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 Charles Arthur Armstrong, born in 1873, was the second most senior Captain in the Northumberland 
Fusiliers in August 1914, but had been  a Captain for 14 years, and whilst being a brevet Major, probably had 
little chance of promotion, and in 1913 had been sent to the Belfast University Officer Training Corps as 
Adjutant. He commanded 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers from 10 June to 1 October 1915, when he was shot 
through the head raising himself above the parapet to orient himself during the attack on the Hohenzollern 
Redoubt. 
103
 When Lieutenant-Colonel W.N. Herbert was appointed to command 112 Brigade. 
104
 H.R. Sandilands, The Fifth in the Great War (Dover: Grigg & Son, 1938), p.264. The Northumberland 
Fusiliers had been the Fifth Regiment of Foot. 
105
 Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Methuen, South Rhodesian Volunteers. 
106
 Lieutenant-Colonel J.N. De La Perrelle, 7th Royal Fusiliers. 
107
 Lieutenant-Colonel R.R. Raymer, Jersey Militia. 
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Lieutenant-Colonel N.M.S. Irwin was the most junior in August 1914 of those who held 
four commands,109 being a 2nd Lieutenant, and took up his first on 12 April 1917,110 when 
Lieutenant-Colonel S.G. Mullock was killed returning from a COs conference at 
Fampoux.111 He was replaced on 31 May by Major R.N. Thompson who had already 
commanded the battalion.112 Irwin’s next command was of 2nd Lincolnshire on 19 August 
1917, a post he held until 1 February 1918. He subsequently served as CO 8th 
Leicestershire after Lieutenant-Colonel A.T. le M. Utterson was taken prisoner,113 from 6 
April 1918 to 28 June 1918, whence he was transferred to command 1st Lincolnshire, a 
post he held until the Armistice.114 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel E.I. de S. Thorpe is another example of an officer of robust ability.115 
A Major of 1st Bedfordshire in August 1914, he took command of the 2nd Battalion on 17 
April 1915 until 20 May, at which point he was transferred to command 2nd Border, a post 
he held for two years (with two periods of absence) until 19 May 1917. Thorpe then 
commanded 1/6th Lancashire Fusiliers from 13 September 1917 to 28 December 1917 
(returning briefly to command 2nd Bedfordshire from 28 December 1917 to 16 January 
1918) and lastly commanded his old battalion, 1st Bedfordshire, from 7 February 1918 to 
                                                                                                                                                                 
108
 Lieutenant-Colonel H.C. Woodcock, Lieutenant-Colonel Gloucestershire Regiment; Lieutenant-Colonel 
D.W.C Davies-Evans, Major Pembroke Yeomanry; and Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. Campion, Captain Sussex 
Regiment. 
109
 Noel Mackintosh Stuart Irwin, aged 22 in August 1914, was a 2nd Lieutenant of 2nd Essex. 
110
 By which time he held the rank of Major. 
111
 Sidney Goss Mullock, aged 32 in August 1914, was a Special Reserve Captain of 3rd Essex, and 
commanded from 26 January to 12 April. 
112
 Richard Neville Thompson, a 32 year-old Regular Captain of the Essex Regiment in August 1914, 
commanded 2nd Essex on five occasions between July 1916 and May 1918, serving 446 days in command. 
113
 Archibald Tito le Marchant Utterson, aged 29 in August 1914, was a Regular Captain of the Leicestershire 
Regiment. He commanded 8th Leicestershire from 29 June 1917 until his capture on 21 March 1918. 
114
 Irwin commanded 6 Brigade in France in 1940, taking command of 2nd Division in the retreat to Dunkirk. 
In 1942 he commanded IV Corps in Iraq, thence promoted to command Eastern Army in India. Relieved of 
command after the abortive 1942-3 Arakan operation he never saw active service again, finishing his career 
as a Lieutenant-General. 
115
 Edward Ivan de Sausmarez Thorpe, aged 43 in August 1914, had seen active service in Niger, 1897. 
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16 April 1918. At this point he was briefly promoted Brigadier-General with 152 Brigade 
until 28 April, then with 107 Brigade until 14 September 1918, his appointment being 
terminated by wounding. 
 
One hundred and forty-six Lieutenant-Colonels who had active service had three 
commands and six hundred and twenty-six had two.  
 
The group who had three commands is dominated by Regular officers (68 per cent). It is in 
this group that citizens of 1914 (six)116 and promoted ORs (three)117 appear. Of the 
promoted ORs, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Naden had served with the 4th Volunteer Battalion 
Cheshire Regiment and 6th Cheshire, seeing service in South Africa 1900-1.118 He was a 
Company Sergeant Major with 1/6th Cheshire in France in 1914, and was commissioned 
2nd Lieutenant in the battalion on 21 February 1915. He served as Adjutant in 1916, taking 
over temporary command after the wounding of Lieutenant-Colonel W.H. Stanway on 31 
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 Apart from R.S.H. Stafford (see below), the other five were: W.E. Thomas, a bank clerk, (CO 7th East 
Yorkshire from 24 November 1917 to 30 March 1918; 10th West Yorkshire from 31 March to 27 April 1918; 
and 7th Border from 27 September to 21 October 1918 ); A.C. Barnes, son of a barrister, (CO 9th Yorkshire 
from 24 December 1916 to 26 January 1917; 1/4th Yorkshire from 11 June to 26 October 1918; and 15th 
Durham Light Infantry from 15 October to the Armistice); J.H. Foster, a teacher, (CO 14th Highland Light 
Infantry from 1 to 28 September 1917; 6th Northamptonshire from 29 May to 8 August 1918; and  1/7th 
Highland Light Infantry from 19 September 1918 to the Armistice); M.R. Dickson (CO 8th Royal Scots 
Fusiliers from 15 January to 15 October 1917; 8th Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry from 6 May to 28 
October 1918; and 12th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders from 29 October 1918 to the Armistice); A.D. 
Derviche-Jones, a solicitor, (CO 2/8th London from 2 June 1917 to 6 February 1918; 1/8th London from 31 
July 1918 to the Armistice, during which he briefly commanded 1/12th London). 
117
 Apart from Frank Naden, the other two were Lieutenant Albert Grover, a retired OR of the Bedfordshire 
Regiment, who commanded 3/4th London (18 June to 12 September 1918), 1/8th London (24 September to 14 
October 1918), and 1/12th London (15 October 1918 to the Armistice); and James Walsh, a regular OR who 
was only commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in the Liverpool Regiment on 30 January 1916, yet commanded 13th 
Essex (22 November 1917 to 10 February 1918), 6th Northamptonshire 17 to 29 May 1918, and 3/2nd London 
from 10 August 1918 to the Armistice. 
118
 Roots and Branches, the Naden/Nadin/Neden/Nedin Family Society Magazine, ed. D. L. Nadin, 10 (2). 
Frank Naden was born 1878-9, the exact year of his birth being uncertain. 
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July 1917.119 Thereafter he was CO 14th Hampshire from 3 November 1917 to 15 January 
1918. He commanded his old battalion from 25 to 29 April 1918, and lastly 7th Royal Irish 
Regiment from 11 September 1918 to the Armistice.120  
 
Of the civilians, Lieutenant-Colonel R.S.H. Stafford, an ex-OTC cadet, had joined the 
Egyptian Civil Service in 1913, but returned to be commissioned into 6th King’s Royal 
Rifle Corps as 2nd Lieutenant on 6 March 1915.121 A rare example of a citizen commanding 
a Regular battalion, an indication of his ability, he commanded 1st KRRC from 9 to 23 July 
1917; 2/7th Liverpool from 2 to 7 September 1917; and 17th Middlesex from 9 September 
1917 to 22 February 1918; commanding 1st KRRC again from 23 February to 1 June 1918 
before moving to a staff post. 
Commands 
Two Three Four Five Six 
60% 68% 73% 100% 100% 
 
Table 3.10: Contribution of professional soldiers to multiple battalion command 
Of the 626 who had two commands, 60 per cent were Regulars (either active or retired in 
1914). As Table 3.10 shows, professional soldiers, who provided 60 per cent of battalion 
commands overall, contributed disproportionately to multiple battalion command, their 
numbers rising steadily as number of commands increase. 
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 William Henry Stanway had been in the ranks for just under 15 years when commissioned 2nd Lieutenant 
in the Royal Welsh Fusiliers on 28 October 1914. He commanded 1/6th Cheshire from 4 July 1916 until his 
wounding. 
120
 Naden won the DSO and two bars. A flavour of this officer’s ability and command style is given by his 
citation for his second bar to the DSO. “Near Neuve Eglise, on 1st September, 1918, he had launched his 
battalion to attack the village when he received orders to change direction from south to east. This was done, 
but the leading companies moved too far to the right. Seeing this, he personally led the right company on to 
its proper objective in the face of considerable machinegun and trench mortar fire. He was shortly afterwards 
wounded. But on this and the previous day he showed an absolute disregard of danger, and by his fine 
example and leadership inspired all ranks”. London Gazette, 4 October 1919, p.12214. 
121
 Ronald Semphill Howard Stafford was born in 1879. 
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Finally, one CO who had four commands warrants individual attention, namely 
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Sherwood-Kelly.122 A mercurial South African, Sherwood-Kelly had 
served in the Boer War as a Lieutenant in the Imperial Light Horse, and later as a Sergeant, 
demoted to Private, in Somaliland. Sherwood-Kelly was gazetted Major in 10th Norfolk in 
November 1914, but requested transfer and on 23 July 1915 joined 1st Kings Own Scottish 
Borderers in Gallipoli. Lieutenant-Colonel G.B. Stoney was killed on 15 October 1915,123 
and ‘Bomb’ Kelly, whom the battalion history describes as having “a quite remarkable 
disregard for danger”,124 does not appear to have been first choice as CO, Captain C.S. 
Stirling-Cookson being appointed Temporary Major until 27 October, Sherwood-Kelly 
taking over on the 28th.125 What is remarkable is that there is no reference to him in the 
unit war diary until the following January, when the comings and goings of other officers 
were commonplace reference. The reality is that Sherwood-Kelly was undoubtedly 
unpopular - an outsider, an empire OR, commanding a Regular battalion. Leaving the 
KOSB on 22 January 1916, he served briefly as CO 1st Essex until he was wounded on 4 
June by a bullet through the lung. Recuperating, he was returned to the KOSB depot, 
where his unpopular past may have caught up with him. On 5 October he wrote to his CO 
asking to be returned to 10th Norfolk as he found “some officers and many of the men at 
present in camp who served with the 1st Battalion during my command”.126 On 29 March 
1917 he took over command of 1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, whom he led until 
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 Jack Sherwood-Kelly was born in 1880 in Cape Colony. 
123
 George Butler Stoney, aged 37 in August 1914, was a Regular Captain of King’s Own Scottish Borderers 
serving with the Egyptian Army. He commanded the 1st Battalion from 13 May to 15 October 1915, when he 
was killed by a shell in Battalion HQ dugout on Gallipoli. 
124
 S. Gillon, The K.O.S.B in the Great War (London: Thomas Nelson, 1930), p.166 
125
 Charles Selby Stirling-Cookson was never to command a battalion, serving as Staff Captain and Brigade 
Major from February 1916. 
126
 TNA WO 339/13469, Officers Services, John Sherwood-Kelly 
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invalided on 4 December 1917, winning the VC at Cambrai on 20 November.127 He finally 
commanded 12th Norfolk (Yeomanry) in France from 23 September 1918.128 
 
3.3.4 Length of command 
Table 3.11 shows the average length in days a Lieutenant-Colonel spent in command of a 





One command 252 
Two commands 326 
Three commands 386 
Four commands 496 
Five commands 706 
Six commands 258 
 
Table 3.11:  Length of battalion command129 
nearly eight and a half months, a figure slightly less than the nine and a half months 
indicated by Patrick Brennan for the COs of Canadian battalions.130 
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 His VC citation reads: “For most conspicuous bravery and fearless leading when a party of men of another 
unit detailed to cover the passage of the canal by his battalion were held up on the near side of the canal by 
heavy rifle fire directed on the bridge. Lt.-Col. Sherwood-Kelly at once ordered covering fire, personally led 
the lea-ding company of his battalion across the canal and, after crossing, reconnoitred under heavy rifle and 
machine gun fire the high ground held by the enemy. The left flank of his battalion advancing to the assault 
of this objective was held up by a thick belt of wire, whereupon he crossed to that flank, and with a Lewis 
gun team, forced his way under heavy fire through obstacles, got the gun into position on the far side, and 
covered the advance of his battalion through the wire, thereby enabling them to capture the position. Later, he 
personally led a charge against some pits from which a heavy fire was being directed on his men, captured 
the pits, together with five machine guns and forty six prisoners, and killed a large number of the enemy. The 
great gallantry displayed by this officer throughout the day inspired the .greatest confidence in his men, and it 
was mainly due to his example and devotion to duty that his battalion was enabled to capture and hold their 
objective”. London Gazette, 11 January 1918, p.722 
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 Sherwood-Kelly was to command a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment in Russia in 1919, a venture 
which ended in his court martial after his outspoken public criticism of the campaign. 
129
 The reason for the counterintuitive lower number of days for those who had six commands is due to the 
unusual careers of these two individuals as noted in the previous section. 
130
 P.H. Brennan, ‘Good Men for a Hard Job: Infantry Battalion Commanders in the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force’, Canadian Army Journal, 9 (1) (2006), pp. 9-28. Lieutenant General Guy Simonds, the GOC of II 
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Table 3.12 shows the average number of days in post served by COs commanding on the 
opening days of major battles. The figures suggest officers who had considerable 
experience of battlefield command. The high average for 1 July 1916, the opening day of 
the Battle of Somme, is, however, inflated by the number of COs who had commanded 
New Army battalions in the UK since they were raised.   
 
    Days in post 
Neuve Chapelle 10 March 1915 138 
Loos  25 September 1915 206 
Somme 01 July 1916 277 
Arras 09 April 1917 214 
Third Ypres 31 July 1917 252 
Cambrai 20 November 1917 223 
Hundred Days: F&F 29 September 1918 185 
Hundred Days:Other 29 September 1918 372 
 
Table 3.12:  Average days in post for COs prior to major battles 
Perhaps the most interesting figures pertain to 1918. Apart from the Battle of Neuve 
Chapelle in early 1915, when the BEF had been depleted by the campaigns of 1914, 29 
September 1918 yields the lowest average of days in post, reflecting the rapid turnover 
caused by death and wounding during the German offensives from March to May 1918. 
The reality is that the successful armies of The Hundred Days were led by men with less 
average experience of command, albeit with rich experience of fighting. On that day in 
other theatres of war, the length of time previously in post was double, reflecting the much 
lower turnover.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
Canadian Corps, sent a memo to Canadian Military Headquarters in the UK in October 1944 in which he 
stated: “It has been amply demonstrated both in North Africa and Italy that when active operations are 
continuous, the Commanding Officer of an infantry battalion is good for about four to six months”, 
recommending that rotating Commanding Officers out of their positions after a few months be made standard 
practice. Quoted by M. Dorosh, http://www.battlefront.com/community/showthread.php?t=32644 (accessed 
2 April 2013). 
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3.3.5 Killed in action 
Seven hundred and twenty-seven officers with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel died during 
the war according to Soldiers Died in the Great War, but this may be an underestimate.131 
The database compiled here includes 452 infantry Lieutenant-Colonels killed in action or 
died of wounds whilst commanding their battalions, an 11 per cent attrition rate through 
death resulting from action.132 Patrick Brennan cites a 12.5 per cent rate for Canadian COs, 
noting: “It would seem that battalion commanders – if they were going to command 
effectively – had to place themselves in harm’s way”.133 
 
  1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 
Total deaths 24 108 97 99 124 
Deaths per month 5.6 9 8.1 8.2 11 
 
Table 3.13: Infantry COs killed in action/died of wounds 
Table 3.13 sets out the deaths per year, and the average number of CO deaths per month. 
With only four and a half months of campaigning, 1914 produced the lowest number of 
CO deaths. However, this was from only 146 battalions, in comparison with the 507 of 29 
September 1918. Multiplying the 1914 monthly total by a factor of three and a half gives a 
projected figure of nearly 20, indicative of the lethal nature of the fighting of that year. 
  
The CO of 1914 typically led from the front, and of the two commanding officers who died 
when II Corps stood and fought at Le Cateau, both died in this location. Lieutenant-
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Colonel C.A.H. Brett of 2nd Suffolk, found his battalion in a poor position.134 Brett 
gathered his officers and told them “they were committed to it, and everyone must do the 
best he could … there was to be no retirement”.135 Brett placed himself with his forward 
companies, and was killed early on by a shell. In the same battle, the 2nd Royal Lancasters, 
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel A. McN. Dykes,136 found themselves on top of a hill at 
Haucourt under heavy shellfire. In the frontline, Dykes fell early on, shouting instructions: 
“Men, if you want your lives for God’s sake extend”, and finally, “Good bye, boys”.137 
 
1915 contained the second highest casualty rate of the four years 1915-18, reflecting 
perhaps the lack of tactical/operational sophistication of the fighting. Six COs were killed 
at Neuve Chapelle, 29 at Loos (11 on the opening day, 25 September 1915), and ‘trench 
wastage’ was high.138 The years 1916 and 1917 produced an almost identical number of 
CO monthly deaths. Twenty-eight COs (with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel) died on the 
opening day of the Somme battle, 20 during the remainder of July. At the Battle of Flers-
Courcelette, 15 September 1916, a further 10 COs died, within a total of 31 from 1 August 
to 14 November 1916, giving a total of 79 during the whole battle. Only three COs were 
killed on the opening day of the Battle of Arras, 9 April 1917, 21 dying during the 
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extended campaign.139 Eight died on the opening day of Third Ypres, 31 July 1917, and 42 
during the four months of operations.  
 
The two years 1916 and 1917 are broadly comparable in terms of number of battalions 
engaged, and given the reduction in number of battalions in February 1918,140 it was 1918 
that produced the disproportionately highest number of total CO deaths of these three 
years. Twelve died on the opening day of the German spring offensive, 21 March 1918, 
and five the following day. During the period of the German offensives from 21 March to 
17 July 1918, 73 infantry COs with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel were killed, 36 before 
the end of March. In contrast, during The Hundred Days from 8 August 1918 until the 
Armistice, 43 were killed. Thus in roughly comparable periods of time, almost twice as 
many were killed in defensive actions than offensive actions. 
 
3.3.6 Wounding and invalidity 
As noted previously, some COs were simply unfit physically for active service. In 10 
Brigade in August 1914, derided by Tim Travers,141 Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. 
Mainwaring,142 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, who arrived exhausted at St Quentin on 27 
August and became involved in the town’s surrender, should probably never have gone on 
active service. He was “subject to bouts of debilitating illness. During manoeuvres in 
September 1913 he suffered so severely from colitis that he was forced to return to 
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Gravesend ahead of his battalion”.143 Similarly, Lieutenant-Colonel T.O. Lloyd, CO 9th 
Black Watch and a sciatica sufferer, found the winter of 1915 too much for his condition 
and was replaced on 18 November 1915 after 133 days on active service.144 In contrast, 
Lieutenant-Colonel C.R.C. de Crespigny, 2nd Grenadier Guards: “Although suffering much 
pain from internal ulcers … refused to go sick”, thereby winning the respect of his 
battalion.145 
 
The conditions of trench warfare were conducive to sickness, and falling ill in the front line 
could be both inconvenient and dangerous.146 Lieutenant-Colonel G.S. Guyon, CO 2nd 
Royal Fusiliers, developed appendicitis on Gallipoli, and lay in his dugout for a week 
before he could be evacuated.147 Gallipoli was a harsh environment, and 54 year old 
Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Harvey, 1/4th Norfolk, joined his battalion on 10 September 1915 
to be invalided with dysentery 15 days later, never to see active service again.148 The sixty 
year old Lieutenant-Colonel G.S. Ormerod, 9th Royal Irish Rifles, went into the front line 
with pneumonia in March 1916, and had to be evacuated, but refused to be stretchered: 
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“Me on a stretcher and the battalion walking out! If I am wounded it’s different – I walk 
back to my horse and ride the rest!”149 
 
Some injuries could seem quite trivial, yet prove handicapping in a trench environment. 
Lieutenant-Colonel C.H.D. Lyon-Campbell, 4th Royal Fusiliers, sprained his knee after 12 
days active service and was invalided, taking over the home service 2/4th Norfolk  in 
September 1916.150 He was one of a number of COs replaced suffering knee problems. 
Lieutenant-Colonel W.T.M. Reeve, 2nd Leinster, had his hand shot off by a sniper in 
November 1914, rejoining his battalion on 3 June 1915. By 1 July he was remarking that 
“his arm gave him hell and he could not sleep”.151 He visibly deteriorated and left finally 
19 days later. He took 1st Garrison Battalion Essex Regiment to Gallipoli, but lasted only a 
matter of weeks before replacement. 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel R.A. Smyth, 10th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, was one of several COs 
injured in riding accidents. After 259 days on active service he fell from his horse on 30 
June 1916 never to return to active service as a result of further ill-luck with transport, 
being killed in a motor accident in the UK.152 Lieutenant-Colonel R. Mander, 7th Duke of 
Cornwall’s Light Infantry, similarly had to surrender command on 13 June 1918, breaking 
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his thigh when his horse fell.153 1/1st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire no doubt regarded 
themselves as particularly unlucky losing two successive COs to horse falls, Lieutenant-
Colonel C.P. Doig on 27 January 1916,154 and his successor Lieutenant-Colonel L.C. 
Hawkins on 2 June 1916, both of whom never returned to active service.155 Equally 
uncomfortably, but not from a horse, Lieutenant-Colonel E.S. Weldon, 6th Dorsetshire, fell 
on a screw picket in the dark on 24 August 1918, but was able to return to duty on 20 
October and served until the Armistice without further mishap.156 
 
Sports behind the front-line also proved dangerous. Lieutenant-Colonel C.S. Nairne, 10th 
Black Watch, fractured his collarbone running in a staff relay race on 15 September 
1918.157 Lieutenant-Colonel A. Stone, 16th Lancashire Fusiliers, broke the same bone 
playing left full back for the battalion officers’ football team, a statement having to be 
provided by Captain A.N. Watts, the goalkeeper, to the effect that this was not a self-
inflicted injury.158 Training might also be dangerous. Lieutenant-Colonel W. Keyworth, 9th 
South Lancashire, fell victim to his own men whilst watching instruction in bomb-
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throwing in Salonika, 6 October 1915. He returned on 1 April 1916, but his wounds got the 
better of him and he was invalided on 28 September.159 
 
Some COs struggled back to service after wounding but were beaten by their limitations. 
Lieutenant-Colonel A.V. Ussher, 10th Scottish Rifles, had been wounded at Loos in 
September 1915, and resuming command of his battalion on 23 March 1916 lasted until 19 
November before the effects of his previous injuries proved too severe.160 Lieutenant-
Colonel O.B. Pritchard commanded 2nd Welsh from 15 November 1915 to 25 September 
1916.161 Described as “rather beyond middle age” (he was in fact 47) he suffered from 
“serious wounds which he got during the retreat in 1914”.162 In July 1916 the battalion was 
involved in the fighting for Munster Alley, near Pozieres, and Pritchard and his Adjutant 
were buried in their dugout by a shell. Soon after, in the fighting for High Wood, Major 
C.P. Clayton, second-in-command noted: “The recent fighting has affected his old wounds, 
and his one leg and foot are all swollen up so badly that I wonder he can walk at all”.163 
After the fighting he was described as “very deeply grieved by his losses”. His leg 
worsened, and he was invalided, Clayton noting: “His going is pathetic … it seems that he 
feels he will not return”.164 On 27 November 1916 Pritchard shot himself. Clayton, his 
replacement, wrote: “He has done it in despair because he cannot come out and join us, but 
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I cannot help fearing that High Wood, and its consequences, preyed upon his sensitive 
mind”.165 
 
As Clayton intimated, COs were not immune from the psychological reactions that became 
known as ‘neurasthenia’ and ‘shellshock’. Lieutenant-Colonel H. Delme-Radcliffe was 
invalided from command of the 2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers in October 1914 with a “nervous 
breakdown” according to Private Frank Richards, whose diagnosis was confirmed by the 
Medical Officer of 19th Field Ambulance with the words “a bit of a nervous wreck”.166 
Lieutenant-Colonel B.H.S. Romilly, 1st Scots Guards, was invalided with “shellshock” in 
July 1917 after a shell hit his HQ dugout, and never saw active service again.167 Similarly, 
Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Parish, 8th North Staffordshire, commanded his battalion from 16 
July 1916 to be invalided with “shellshock” on 1 November. After rehabilitation in a 
Brigade-Major post from 1 April to 6 July 1917, he served twice again as a CO, with 1/15th 
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London from 6 July to 23 September 1917 (when he was invalided again, quite possibly 
with the same problem), and 1/17th London from 11 March to 15 July 1918.168 
 
Others, however, managed to continue in command despite significant handicap. 
Lieutenant-Colonel G.F. Trotter had lost an arm during the Boer War but was promoted 
CO of 1st Grenadier Guards serving from 14 July 1915 to 17 March 1916.169 When J.E.B. 
Seeley encountered him in the trenches he noted: “We were relieved by a Guards battalion, 
commanded by the one-armed Colonel Trotter. I never saw a man so cheerful under such 
distressing circumstances”.170 Lieutenant-Colonel V.V. Pope, 1st North Staffordshire, had 
his elbow shattered by a bullet on 21 March 1918 and lost his arm, but later served in the 
Tank Corps.171 The precise nature of the injury was an issue. Lieutenant-Colonel A.A. 
Kennedy, 5/6th Scottish Rifles, lost an eye on 20 July 1916 at High Wood. He returned to 
command on 3 December 1917, but could not cope in the front-line with monocular vision 
and was replaced in February 1918, thereafter serving as Lieutenant-Colonel in the Labour 
Corps.172 Lieutenant-Colonel A. Carton de Wiart, however, commanded lacking both eye 
and hand.173 
 
                                                      
168
 Francis Woodbine ‘Gasper’ Parish was a 30 year-old retired Special Reserve Captain of the Sussex 
Regiment in August 1914. 
169
 Gerald Frederic Trotter was a 43 year-old retired Major of the Grenadier Guards in August 1914. On 17 
March 1916 he was promoted Brigadier General with 27 and subsequently 51 Brigades. 
170
 J.E.B. Seeley, Adventure (London: Heinemann, 1930), p. 223. John Edward Bernard Seeley was a Liberal 
MP who had been Secretary of State for War 1912-14. Resigning after the Curragh incident, he became a 
Major-General commanding the Canadian Cavalry Brigade. 
171
 Vyvyan Vavasour Pope, a 22 year-old Regular 2nd Lieutenant of 1st North Staffordshire in August 1914, 
commanded the battalion from 18 June 1917 to 1 January 1918, and was wounded three times. 
172
 Archibald Arrol Kennedy, a Territorial Captain of 5th Scottish Rifles in August 1914 commanded the 
battalion from 29 May 1915. He commanded the 2/6th Seaforth Highlanders at home during his recovery 
from 3 April to 20 September 1917. 
173
 Adrian “Nelson” Carton de Wiart, a 34 year-old Captain of 4th Dragoon Guards in August 1914, was 
wounded eight times during the Great War. He commanded 8th Gloucestershire from 15 June to 26 October 
1916, and 8th North Staffordshire from 31 December 1916 to 11 January 1917. 
139 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel E.A. Wood, 6th King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, was redoubtable in 
the face of injury, invalided from command after 705 days active service having been 
wounded five times, gassed twice and buried once, later to be promoted Temporary-
Brigadier General on 5 November 1917.174 Another officer wounded five times was 
Lieutenant-Colonel E.T.F. Sandys, who took command of 2nd Middlesex on 16 February 
1916. He was severely wounded for the final time in front of La Boisselle on 1 July 1916. 
He committed suicide in the Cavendish Hotel, London on 13 September 1916. The inquest 
noted: “Very much distressed because in the attack on July 1 his battalion had suffered 
severely … he wished he had been killed with his men”, Sandys himself stating: “I have 
never had a moment’s peace since July 1”.175 
 
Of active infantry Lieutenant-Colonels, 389 commands are known to have been terminated 
by invalidity. Of these, 250 were permanent, in that the individual never returned to active 
service command.176 This constitutes six per cent of the active infantry COs, but the figure 
is likely an underestimate, as these matters were not always recorded in unit diaries. 
Similarly, 635 commands are known to have been terminated by wounding. Of these 286 
were permanent, a figure which constitutes seven per cent of the active infantry COs, but 
again, this figure is likely an underestimate. Patrick Brennan notes that just over one-
quarter of Canadian COs were wounded at least once, with 8 per cent never resuming 
command.177 Five per cent were removed for psychological reasons, with seven per cent 
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invalided for physical illness,178 a figure of 20 per cent overall, against 13 per cent known 
in this study for British COs. 
 
3.3.7 Promotion 
Some COs had the experience of brigade command during the brief normal absences of the 
incumbent,179 just as their Majors/Captains had experience of battalion command during 
their own absence.  The expansion of the army and hence number of brigades, coupled 
with the turnover of commanders at that level, however, created an ongoing demand for 
Brigadier-Generals. 
Status August 1914 % 
Regular 82 
Retired Regular 8 
Indian Army 3 
Retired Indian Army 0.5 
Special Reserve 1 
Retired Special Reserve 0.5 
Territorial Force 3.5 
Retired Territorial 0.5 
Empire <1 
Retired Empire <1 
Citizen 1 
 
Table 3.14: August 1914 status of Brigadier-Generals promoted from battalion 
command 
 
As noted earlier, ten per cent (398 of 4055) active infantry COs were promoted to brigade 
command. As Table 3.14 shows, 93.5 per cent of these were professional soldiers in 
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August 1914,180 with 82 per cent active Regulars. Forty were further promoted to 
divisional command. All were Regulars and all bar one were serving in August 1914,181 
twenty-six having been Lieutenant-Colonels in August 1914, 10 Majors, and three 
Captains. Three Regular Lieutenant-Colonels of August 1914 were promoted to Corps 
command.182 
  
With respect to promotion to Brigadier-General, eight per cent of such promotions were 
within the same brigade as the battalion the individual commanded, and nine per cent 
within the same division but not the same brigade, giving a within-division appointment 
rate of 17 per cent.183 This indicates a trajectory of promotion for the majority beyond the 
‘local’ level. As John Bourne has noted, the Military Secretary’s office kept lists of those 
flagged for promotion to brigade and division command.184 Little is known about the 
operation of the Military Secretaries, the records having been destroyed.185 However it 
seems that a senior Assistant Military Secretary (AMS) was attached to each army, their 
brief being ‘talent-spotting’ from battalion level upwards.186 
 
                                                      
180
 Active or retired. 
181
 C. A. Blacklock, a retired Lieutenant of the Kings Royal Rifle Corps was commissioned Captain in the 
10th KRRC on 4 November 1914, promoted Major 11 December 1914, and Lieutenant-Colonel 28 December 
1915. Wounded at Guillemont on 4 September 1916, he was promoted Brigadier-General from 18 January 
1917 with 182 and subsequently 97 Brigades, and Major-General from 20 March 1918 to the Armistice with 
9th, 39th and 63rd Divisions. 
182
 See Chapter One, section 1.4.1. 
183
 These figures are so low that it raises the question as to whether there was a ‘policy’ against local 
promotion e.g. to avoid favouritism. 
184
 The Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War was responsible for personnel management. 
185
 In the bombing of the War Office repository, Walworth, in September 1940. 
186
 J. Bourne, ‘Hiring and Firing on the Western Front’, talk given at Cheshire Branch Western Front 
Association, 14 January 2011. 
142 
 
H.E. Trevor began the war as the second senior Major of 2nd King’s Own Yorkshire Light 
Infantry, and on 26 November 1914 he became a Brigade-Major for the third time. 187 On 1 
November 1915 was promoted CO of 8th KOYLI, 70 Brigade, 8th Division, III Corps, First 
Army. On 7 May 1916 he wrote to his wife: "I gather I am one of the next on the list of 
promotion to Brig-Genl and that the orders might come any day”;188 and on 9 June: "As 
regards the brigade it is largely a matter of how long a man has commanded a Bn and how 
much fighting the Bn has seen.  These things also go in Corps. As a matter of fact I 
couldn't be in a better corps for this purpose probably, as my Brigadier189 and Div 
Commander190 have backed me up nobly." He was promoted Brigadier-General 103 
Brigade, 34th Division, III Corps, on 3 July 1916. 
 
His promotion from Staff Officer to CO was across Corps but within Army, his promotion 
to Brigadier-General was across Division but within Corps. His observations on promotion 
from CO to Brigadier are valuable, as “how long a man has commanded a Bn and how 
much fighting the Bn has seen” speaks to promotion according to experience-based merit 
principles. 
 
His statement: “These things also go in Corps” may, however, merely be a reflection of his 
own experience, and not necessarily an accurate reflection of the wider picture. A sample 
of 50 first promotions of COs to Brigadier-General (spanning 1914-1918) shows that only 
28 per cent were ‘within corps’ appointments, with 66 per cent ‘within army’ 
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appointments. In a separate sample of 50 first promotions covering the period 1917-
1918,191 20 per cent were within corps, and 48 per cent within army.  
 
Lieutenant-Colonel A.C. Johnston,192 10th Cheshire, 7 Brigade, 25th Division, II Corps, 
Fifth Army, was told on 12 September 1917 he would be given command of 33 Brigade, 
11th Division, XVIII Corps, Fifth Army, but the next day was told it would in fact be 126 
Brigade  42nd Division, XIII Corps, Fourth Army, a swift and dramatic change. A picture 
therefore emerges of a talent spotting system on the Western Front for promotable COs 
which, if Army-based, was capable (presumably via the AMS at GHQ) of swiftly 
projecting those promoted across the five armies. 
 
3.3.8 Replacement 
John Bourne lists the reason for replacement of senior commanders during the war as: 193 
(i) Age (especially of ‘dug-outs’ early in the war); (ii) Scapegoating (especially during the 
first two to two-and-a-half years of the war); (iii) The ‘new broom’ phenomenon;194 (iv) 
Rest and recuperation;195 and (v) General reordering after specific campaigns. 
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went on to command 81 Brigade on 21 March 1915. Robbins similarly notes Sir Henry Wilson, GOC IV 
Corps in 1916, claiming that 68 Brigade in March 1916 had “3 bad COs out of 4”. (Robbins, Generalship, 
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Given that 18 per cent of the 4055 active COs were still in post either at the end of the war 
or the end of their battalion’s life, when the other causes for leaving command already 
considered in this chapter (11 per cent killed in action, 13 per cent invalided through 
sickness or wounds, and 10 per cent promoted to General Officer) are removed, (as well as 
the one per cent who ended their careers as prisoners of war), the figure of 47 per cent of 
COs leaving command through apparently being simply ‘replaced’ is arrived at. 
 
Fate after replacement % 
Transferred to staff post 19 
Used later as CO to a non-active battalion 15 
Not used again as a CO 61 
Retired 5 
 
Table 3.15: COs’ fate after replacement196 
Table 3.15 shows the fate of those replaced. Nineteen per cent were subsequently 
transferred to a staff post, and 15 per cent were later used again as a CO in a non-active 
battalion. Sixty-one per cent were never used again as CO, and five per cent retired. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
p.55, quoting IWM Docs 2040-2, Private papers, Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson).Lieutenant-Colonel D.S 
Stewart, the first CO 10th Northumberland Fusiliers, was replaced on 11 June 1916; Lieutenant-Colonel 
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wounded. What Wilson was describing was three dugouts, not officers who were the product of any merit-
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196
 In the case of COs who had multiple commands, fate after final command is indicated. 
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Considering post-CO employment, Table 3.16 shows the distribution of subsequent staff 
posts. Twenty-two per cent were training posts (Patrick Brennan notes “a pattern during 
1917-18 in the Canadian Corps to send able officers who were ‘worn out’ to command 
training units in England”);197 33 per cent were G, A or Q posts; but 45 per cent were such 
as Special Appointments or Staff Lieutenant posts, roles which were in the most part not 
substantial. With respect to non-active battalions, such employment could either represent 
a competent CO who had been invalided or rested, or a less than competent CO ‘slotted 
in’. 









Staff Captain 2 
Staff Lieutenant 5 
Other/Special Appointment 38 
Training/School/Officer Company 22 
 
Table 3.16: Staff posts of replaced COs 
 
The factors which undermine the accuracy of determining how many COs were replaced 
because they were not ‘up to the job’ are the twin issues of:  (i) knowing which staff 
postings represent ‘side-lining’, and (ii) unremarked invalidity through sickness or 
wounding. Let us assume firstly that that half of the staff posts do not represent side-lining 
(Brennan, noting a three per cent transfer to staff rate, concludes “it is likely that some 
                                                      
197
 Brennan, Good Men, p.18 
146 
 
effective battalion commanders were slotted into this work”);198 and secondly that the rate 
of unknown invalidity is 7 per cent, correcting the total in line with that of Canadian COs. 
By this method, a total of 38 per cent of COs either removed or side-lined into 
insubstantial posts is arrived at. The comparable figure for the Canadian Corps, 
(extrapolated from Brennan’s data) is the same, 38 per cent.199 
 
Brennan observes that “it is simply not possible to identify precise numbers of 
incompetents or exactly how they were proved to be incompetent”.200 Noting that “Arthur 
Currie had a reputation for being ruthless in replacing commanding officers who made 
mistakes”; he examined the fate of the 102 officers who served as a CO for more than a 
month under his Corps command. Twelve per cent of replacements were identified as 
possible incompetence sackings, Brennan seeing even this as a likely overestimation.201 He 
concluded: “One is struck that so few were removed from their posts”.202 
 
To give examples of clear scapegoating, both Lieutenant-Colonels H. M. Williams and W. 
H. Ames of the 2/1st and 2/4th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire were removed within 
days of their battalions’ performances in front of the Sugar Loaf at Fromelles on 19 July 
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1916.203 Williams, his battalion already smashed, struggled to persuade Brigadier-General 
C.H.P. Carter, 184 Brigade (also sacked), that his unit could not attack a second time; and 
Ames, “another plain speaker”,204 had found that he could not make the attack instead of 
Williams because of insufficient stores, destroyed trenches, and volume of wounded from 
the previous attack.205 Both were victimised for failures they could not have avoided. 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel H.E. Tizard was originally in command of 1st Munster at the 
catastrophic landing at V Beach, Gallipoli, on 25 April 1915,206 and later that day assumed 
command of 86 Brigade. On 27 April, Major-General A. Hunter-West, GOC 29th Division 
relieved him of command for failure to achieve quicker success. His replacement, Captain 
G.W. Geddes, noted on 1 May: “The Colonel went off for home stellenbosched”,207 and he 
was clear it was unfair “as he couldn’t have done anything but what he did & it’s a case of 
someone being made the scape goat of it all”.208 On the day, however, Commander Edward 
Unwin of the River Clyde, who had been intimately involved attempting to get men ashore, 
recorded: 
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I soon saw he was not the man for the awful position he found himself in. 
It does not inspire men who don't know what is going to happen to see a 
little man running around with a papier-mâché megaphone in his hands 
all day - doing nothing - and he never landed till the show was over. He 
was no coward, but simply was not the man for the part.209 
 
It was of course the redoubtable Lieutenant-Colonel C.H.M. Doughty-Wylie, a 29th 
Division staff officer,210 who took charge of the men ashore and personally led the uphill 
charge into Sedd-el-Bahr, recklessly exposing himself contrary to warning and being shot 
dead. Doughty-Wylie received a VC for acting like many other senior officers that day “as 
if they were lowly subalterns and taking unnecessary risks”.211 He was of course acting in 
the tradition of leading from the front. Tizard, performing the dull task of simply trying to 
be a manager, was sent home. 
 
A typical inefficiency dismissal is probably that of Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Turner, CO 
1/4th Suffolk.212 The regimental history notes: 
In view of an expected push in June, the brigade commander decided to 
recommend Lieut.-Colonel F.W. Turner – who owing to his wound had 
had little actual war experience – for the command of a training battalion 
at home.213 
 
Reference to the unit war diary, however, shows that Turner was removed within days of 
an unsuccessful trench raid on 13/14 May, his departure unremarked in the diary.214 
Lieutenant-Colonel G.A. Lewis, 1/5th Sherwood Foresters, was similarly sacked on 26 
                                                      
209
 IWM Docs 13473 E. Unwin, ‘The Landing from the River Clyde’ p.10 
210
 Charles Hotham Montagu Doughty-Wylie was an officer of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, who had pre-war 
staff service and had served in consular posts in Turkey and Abyssinia. 
211
 P. Hart, Gallipoli (London: Profile, 2011) p.158. 
212
 He commanded between 17 and 22 May 1916. Aged 44 in August 1914, Frederick William Turner was 
senior Major of 4th Suffolk in August 1914. He had been wounded on 26 April 1915 at 2nd Ypres, having 
been in France & Flanders since November 1914. He returned on18 March 1916 and assumed command of 
the battalion. 
213
 C.C.R. Murphy, The History of the Suffolk Regiment 1914-1927 (London: Hutchinson, 1928), p.145 
214
 TNA WO/95/2427 War Diary 1/4th Suffolk Regiment 
149 
 
March 1916 the day after the enemy sprung a mine and successfully occupied the resulting 
crater.215 Major B.H. Checkland took over, but the war diary notes: “Lt.-Col Goodman 
cmdg 6th Sher For brought up 2 companies and took charge of subsequent operations”.216 
 
Possibly the most undignified dismissal was that of Lieutenant-Colonel H.J. des Voeux, 
13th Royal Fusiliers, on 6 August 1916. Guy Chapman described his departure: 
We received news of … (his) … final withdrawal from the battalion with 
diarrhoea. He was last seen running down the road past Mametz Wood, 
his belt in one hand, his stick agitated in the other, calling on his batman 
to follow him, while the battalion ensconced in the angle of a quarry 
jeered … Our brigadier had declared in writing his wish never to see the 
fugitive’s face again. 217 
 
The unit war diary shows that on the day of his flight, the battalion was heavily shelled in 
Mametz Wood.218 
 
These examples reflect removal resulting from a lack of organisational and leadership 
abilities. A competent CO could, however, be removed if his face spelled trouble. 
Lieutenant-Colonel H.J.M. Grisewood, 11th Sussex, was described by 2nd Lieutenant E.C. 
Blunden as “grave and conscientious”,219 and by Major the Hon. N.S. Lytton as having a 
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“positive genius for soldiering”, the latter naming two defects, the second of which was “a 
complete intolerance of fools in high places”.220 Under a new Brigadier,221 and with a 
reputation as “troublesome goods”,222 Grisewood was asked to plan a raid, and after 
personal reconnaissance advised that 3 or 4 days preparation would be required to ensure 
success. Instantly, as Grisewood wrote, an order came from Brigade “that I am to clear off 
at once”.223 On return he confronted his divisional HQ with the ultimatum that “if he were 
not posted to another battalion within one week, he would demand a Court of Inquiry”. He 
was duly transferred to a battalion of the Manchester Regiment.224 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel E. Monteagle-Browne was possibly something of an eccentric.225 
When Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Clayton met him on the Somme in 1916, he described him 
as “somewhat out of place here, with his big beds and costly coats”.226 Monteagle-Browne 
commanded successively the 9th, 8th and 2nd Munster between 12 February 1916 and 10 
June 1917, when he was sacked, being “removed from the army” on 14 November 1917.227 
His sacking led to questions in Parliament between November 1917 and February 1918.228 
 
Parliamentary discussion revealed that on divisional transfer in February 1916, Brigadier-
General G.E. Pereira wrote: “I consider him my best commanding officer and my right-
hand man … with great powers of command and discipline … he was very popular with 
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officers and men, who always had absolute confidence in him”. Brigadier-General G.S.G. 
Craufurd, in recommending him for brigade command, wrote that he “showed the greatest 
energy and zeal, and worked up the smartness of the battalion to a great extent. He has 
wide experience of men, and I think he will make a good brigadier”. Yet in 1917 
Monteagle-Browne was removed for “inefficiency” (with reports that he was not in fact 
popular with officers, a claim hotly denied), and when asked to resign from the army, 
refused, and was removed. Monteagle-Browne claimed it was “because of a conflict he had 
with a superior officer”, this being “one General who only knew Colonel Monteagle-
Browne for six weeks” (Brigadier-General R.C.A. McCalmont had taken over 3rd Brigade 
on 21 March 1917). However, the Under-Secretary of State for War, Sir James 
MacPherson, noted: 
The Army Commander signed a report of inefficiency, and not only did 
he sign it, but it was signed by the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief. 
It was signed by the brigadier-general, by the divisional general, and by 
the corps commander, and when the Army Council get a report … by 
those distinguished superior officers … they are bound to regard it as 
being a just and true estimate of … character and efficiency.229 
 
MacPherson added: “All inefficiency questions are a matter of opinion”. If Monteagle-
Browne had not gone from efficiency to inefficiency in a short space of time, he had been 
well and truly stitched-up, the “six weeks” remark giving the impression of the “new 
broom” phenomenon. 
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Brigade GOC From To 1st month 2nd month 3rd month
13 R. Wanless O'Gowan 08/02/1915 21/08/1915 0 1 0
I.O.W. Jones 02/11/1915 08/09/1918 0 0 0
14/95 F.S. Maude 23/10/1914 04/05/1915 0 0 0
C.R.Ballard 26/12/1915 20/07/1916 0 0 0
E.C. Gordon-Lennox 21/07/1916 14/04/1918 0 0 0
C.B. Norton 15/04/1918 11/11/1918 0 0 0
15 Count Gleichen 04/08/1914 02/03/1915 0 0 0
E. Northey 02/03/1915 22/06/1915 0 0 0
M.N. Turner 28/06/1915 06/11/1917 0 0 1
R.D.F. Oldman 06/11/1917 11/11/1918 0 1 0
Brigade GOC From To 1st month 2nd month 3rd month
26 E.G. Grogan 16/11/1914 31/05/1915 0 0 0
A.B. Ritchie 31/05/1915 05/12/1915 0 0 0
J. Kennedy 05/12/1915 27/07/1918 0 0 0
A.G.A. Hore-Ruthven 27/07/1918 05/11/1918 0 1 0
27 W.E. Scott-Moncrieff 27/08/1914 07/01/1915 0 0 0
C.D. Bruce 07/01/1915 26/09/1915 0 0 0
H.E. Walshe 14/10/1915 17/03/1916 0 1 1
S.W. Scrase-Dickens 06/05/1916 21/10/1916 1 0 0
F.A. Maxwell 21/10/1916 21/09/1917 0 0 0
W.D. Croft 23/09/1917 11/11/1918 1 0 0
28 S.W. Scrase-Dickens 09/09/1914 06/05/1916 0 0 0
South African F.S. Dawson 02/12/1916 24/03/1918 2 0 0
W.E.C. Tanner 01/04/1918 13/09/1918 0 0 0
Brigade GOC From To 1st month 2nd month 3rd month
125 H.C. Frith 04/08/1914 10/01/1916 0 0 0
H. Fargus 23/06/1917 11/11/1918 1 0 1
126 D.G. Prendergast 04/08/1914 13/07/1915 0 0 0
Viscount Hampden 13/07/1915 27/12/1915 1 0 0
A.W. Tufnell 10/01/1916 13/09/1917 0 0 0
W.W. Seymour 19/09/1917 25/05/1918 1 0 0
G.H. Wedgwood 25/05/1918 01/09/1918 0 0 0
127 N. Lee 04/08/1914 04/06/1915 0 1 0
G.S. McD. Elliot 25/09/1915 17/02/1916 0 0 0
V.A. Ormsby 01/03/1916 02/05/1917 0 1 0











Replacements were examined in three of the ‘best’ performing divisions of The Hundred 
Days;230 the 5th (Regular),231 9th (New Army),232 and 42nd (Territorial).233 The 14 
replacements in 5th Division comprised 19 per cent of all COs; the 21 replacements in 9th 
Division comprised 43 per cent; and the 36 replacements in 42nd Division comprised 54 per 
cent. The overall replacement rate was 39 per cent, indicating that together these three 
divisions are likely representative. The number of replacements, however, was double in 
the New Army division and treble in the Territorial division in comparison with the 
Regular division. The indication that the overall 38 per cent replacement rate hides 
variation, being lower in Regular than New Army and Territorial divisions, is 
unsurprising.234 
 
To estimate the potential “new broom effect”, Brigadier-Generals in these three divisions 
who served for over three months were identified,235 and the number of replacements per 
month (no other reason for departure having been identified) for their first three months in 
post are noted in Table 3.17. Similarly, the Major-Generals who served for over three 
months,236 and the number of replacements per month for their first three months are noted 
in Table 3.18. There was no overlap between the replacements in any case. 
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Division GOC From To 1st month 2nd month 3rd month
5th T.L.N Morland 18/10/1914 15/07/1915 0 0 0
C.T. McM Kavanagh 15/07/1915 01/04/1916 0 0 0
R.B. Stephens 01/04/1916 04/07/1918 0 0 0
J Ponsonby 04/07/1918 11/11/1918 0 1 0
9th H.J.S. Landon 21/01/1915 09/09/1915 0 0 0
H.T. Lukin 02/12/1916 04/03/1918 0 0 0
H.H. Tudor 28/03/1918 11/11/1918 0 0 1
42nd W Douglas 08/08/1915 02/03/1917 1 1 1
B.R. Mitford 10/03/1917 01/10/1917 0 4 2
A. Solly-Flood 15/10/1917 11/11/1918 1 1 0
 
Table 3.18: Number of “new broom” replacements by Major-Generals in 5th, 9th & 42nd 
Divisions 
 
In the (Regular) 5th Division three replacements (21 per cent of the Division’s 
replacements) occurred within 3 months of a Brigadier’s appointment, and one (seven per 
cent) occurred within three months of a Major-General’s appointment, giving a possible 
“new broom” rate of 28 per cent. In the (New Army) 9th Division five replacements (24 per 
cent) occurred within 3 months of a Brigadier’s appointment, and one (five per cent) 
occurred within three months of a Major-General’s appointment, giving a possible “new 
broom” rate of 29 per cent. In the (Territorial) 42nd Division seven replacements (19 per 
cent) occurred within 3 months of a Brigadier’s appointment, and eleven (30 per cent) 
occurred within three months of a Major-General’s appointment, giving a possible “new 
broom” rate of 49 per cent. Overall the maximum likely “new broom” rate is 35 per cent. 
 
Amongst the Brigadiers, there are none who stand out as marked wielders of the scythe, 
but in 42nd Division, the arrival of Major-General B.R. Mitford237 on 10 March 1917 was 
followed within three months by six CO replacements, 50 per cent of the division’s COs. 
As discussed further in Chapter Four, however, this followed the division’s transfer from 
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Egypt to France, and likely reflected ‘stiffening’ appointments of (Regular) officers 
familiar with the conditions there. 
 
Brigadier-General F.P. Crozier, who commanded 119 Brigade, 40th Division from 20 
November 1916 to the Armistice wrote (apparently concerning the first six months of 
1917):238 
Four obviously unsuitable, yet recommended as suitable, colonels had to 
be sent away in four months on account of their psychological 
unsuitability to take part in the great and ghastly struggle, and their 
inability to lead men or to hold the line with confidence.239 
 
 
Simon Robbins notes that “by 1917 and 1918 one of the main attributes of a commander, 
whether at battalion, brigade, divisional or corps level was his ability to train his command 
and to pick subordinates who were also able to train their formations”.240 He refers to 
Major-General Sir R.J. Pinney (33rd Division) who was “constantly looking for better 
officers to fill posts in his units, particularly as battalion commanders, where necessary 
removing battalion commanders where they proved incompetent, and recommending those 
suitable to command brigades”.241 The references to removing COs relate to diary entries 
of 8 August 1917,242 and 3 October and 8 November 1918,243 it being notable that Pinney 
was still detecting supposed inadequates on the brink of victory. 
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 F.P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land (London: Jonathan Cape, 1930),  p.149 
239
 The two Lieutenant-Colonels can be identified as replaced; C.B. Hore (17th Welsh, replaced 8 January 
1917) and H.R. Wood (18th Welsh, replaced 8 May 1917), with two described as ‘invalided’ who never 
commanded an active battalion again; Lieutenant-Colonels E.A. Pope (12th South Wales Borderers, invalided 
15 April 1917) and J.R. Heelis (18th Welsh, invalided 9 July 1917). There were a further three replacements 
in the first half of 1918. 
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 S. Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18: Defeat into Victory (Abingdon: Frank 
Cass, 2005), p.60 
241
 Robbins, British Generalship, p.60; citing diary, Pinney Papers, IWM (no reference). 
242
 The removed officer appears to have been Lieutenant-Colonel E.R. Clayton of the 1/5th Scottish Rifles. 
243
 The officer referred to on 3 October was likely Lieutenant-Colonel P.C. Esdaile who had commanded 1st 




As the war progressed, the average age of active infantry battalion COs decreased by 
nearly 13 years, as the Lieutenants and Captains of August 1914 stepped up to command in 
the climactic battles of The Hundred Days. Arthur Newth, who already had three years 
fighting experience, commanded a Territorial battalion in 1918 aged 21, an age at which 
his country deemed him only just suitable to vote. 
 
Regimental particularism loosened its grip on battalion command, within-regiment 
appointments dropping to an average 50 per cent, yet remained more pronounced in units 
with a pre-war identity, notably in the Regular battalions. 
 
The Regular officers of 1914 in particular, and professional soldiers in general, contributed 
disproportionately to battalion command, especially multiple appointments. In terms of 
career progress, they had a near monopoly on promotion to brigade command and a 
complete monopoly on divisional command. In contrast, the Territorial Force made a 
contribution much smaller than its size would have predicted, indicating discrimination 
against the amateur soldier. 
 
The disproportionate advancement of the Regular to battalion command represents the 
acknowledgement of the all-round skills granted by military training, yet also reinforces 
the view that the quality of the younger Regular officer of the pre-war years has been 
underestimated. Given the existence of only a small overlap between the combat and staff 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Stoney who had commanded 2nd Worcestershire since 11 January 1918, and who was sent to a garrison 
battalion in England. 
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groups, and the evident different skill sub-sets, the ‘good fighting CO’ may have been a 
man whose specific skills restricted advancement beyond battalion command. 
 
Keith Simpson calculates that “an officer stood approximately a one in six chance of being 
killed and a one in three chance of being wounded”.244 The fact that one in ten COs were 
killed at the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel indicates that battalion command was a far from 
safe billet. In the brutal environment of trench warfare, wounding and invalidity may have 
accounted for a fifth of CO replacements.  
 
The most pervasive threat to a CO’s average eight-and-a-half month career was, however, 
simple replacement, four in ten meeting such a fate. This replacement rate does not 
necessarily indicate incompetence, as the reasons for removal were multiple. A third of 
replacements may have reflected the ‘new broom’ phenomenon. The British army clearly 
suffered no complacency concerning battalion command - it was an organisation 
committed to quality control, and its Military Secretary’s organisation was capable of 
projecting suitable COs beyond ‘local’ interests across armies to fill gaps appropriately. 
 
By The Hundred Days, however, 1918 having been a year of marked turnover in battalion 
command, those who had been citizens without military experience in 1914 comprised just 
under a quarter of COs. On one hand it is unsurprising that the citizen should prove an able 
commander, on the other, it speaks to the practical, malleable attitude of an organisation 
supposedly so hidebound in the pre-war period.245 
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We had seen much of Regular officers, and we believed in them. Our own 
Colonel, a Regular, was stern and unbending, for it was better so, but he 
was also just, efficient, and proud of the battalion. 
 
Private W.L. Andrews, 1/4th Black Watch1 
 
 
Evolution of command in the Regular, Service and Territorial battalions took different 
paths. In this chapter development is examined both overall and in detail within the 5th 
(Regular), 9th (New Army) and 42nd (Territorial) divisions. A case study of each type of 
unit, namely 1st Hampshire, 13th Essex and 1/4th Royal Berkshire is presented to 
understand the precise circumstances of evolution in each. 
 
4.1 The Regular Battalions 
Table 4.1 identifies the origins of the COs of all active Regular battalions. Including Indian 
Army officers, whose contribution was small at half a per cent,2 and active/retired Special 
Reserve/Territorial officers who were retired Regulars, 93 per cent of the COs of the 
Regular battalions of the BEF were professional soldiers. The professional therefore kept a 
firm grip on command. 
 
                                                      
1
 W.L. Andrews, Haunting Years (London: Hutchinson, 1930), p. 182. The CO in question was Lieutenant-
Colonel George Adinston McLaren Sceales, a Regular Captain of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in 
August 1914, who commanded from 1 December 1915 to 28 October 1917, moving to command a battalion 
of the Tank Corps. 
2
 Having contributed four per cent to battalion command overall - see Chapter Three, section 3.1.1. 
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It is notable that apart from professionals, citizens of August 1914 form the largest other 
single group (three per cent), comprising 29 individuals.3 Perhaps unsurprisingly, only two 
per cent of Territorials were appointed COs of Regular battalions. 
 
Active/retired Regulars 92% 
Active/retired Indian Army 0.5% 
Active/retired Special Reserve 2% 
Active/retired Territorial 2% 
Active/retired Empire 0.5% 
Citizens 3% 
 
Table 4.1: Origins of COs of Regular battalions 
 
Given the purpose of the Special Reserve as the reinforcement of Regular units,4 the 
number of officers appointed to command Regular battalions is surprisingly low at two per 
cent. The number of Special Reserve officers in August 1914 (2,557)5 was, of course, 
small. Three other factors may also have contributed to this low representation. Firstly, 
whilst there were 30,376 commissions granted into the Special Reserve during the war,6 
those commissioned at the start of the war may have got to the Western Front quicker, 
thereby risking death earlier. Secondly, they were competing with Regular officers in 
Regular battalions; and, thirdly, they were in a promotion pool in respect of other units in 
which they bore much the same stamp as those who had volunteered into the Service 
battalions and TF.7 
                                                      
3
 These individuals are considered further in Chapter Six. 
4
 The Special/Extra Reserve contributed nine per cent to battalion command overall - see Chapter Three, 
section 3.1.1. 
5
 Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire During the Great War (London: HMSO, 1922), pp. 
234-6 
6
 Statistics, p.234, paragraph 3 
7
 See also Chapter Six, section 6.1.4. 
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4.1.1 5th Division 
Seventy-two Lieutenant-Colonels commanded the 15 Regular battalions during their time 
spent with 5th Division during the war.8 
 
Nearly all COs (96 per cent) were active or retired professional soldiers in August 1914, 
and 90 per cent were active Regulars. One was a retired Special Reserve Captain 
(Lieutenant-Colonel P.H. Stevenson, who commanded 2nd King’s Own Scottish Borderers 
from 22 July 1916 to 4 November 1916);9 two were Territorials, and one a citizen of 
August 1914. One, Lieutenant-Colonel W.H.G. Baker (CO 1st Cheshire from 28 July 1916 
to 4 July 1917), was from the Indian Army.10 Two were retired Regulars: Lieutenant-
Colonel C.B. Norton (CO 1st Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry from 3 July 1917 to 15 
April 1918),11 who was a retired Major of that battalion; and Lieutenant-Colonel E.G. 
Harrison (CO 2nd Duke of Wellington’s from 18 October to 11 December 1914), a retired 
Captain of that battalion.12 
 
The one citizen CO was the extraordinary Lieutenant-Colonel C.F.G Humphries, a New 
Zealander, who enlisted in August 1914 and rose from Army Service Corps clerk to 
                                                      
8
 The battalions were: 13 Brigade - 2nd King’s Own Scottish Borderers, 2nd Duke of Wellington’s West 
Riding Regiment, 1st Queen’s Own Royal West Kent Regiment, 2nd King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry  (to 
28 December 1915); 14 into 95 Brigade - 2nd Suffolk Regiment (to 30 September 1914), 1st East Surrey 
Regiment, 1st Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, 2nd Manchester Regiment (to 30 September 1914), 1st 
Devonshire Regiment; 15 Brigade - 1st Norfolk Regiment, 1st Bedfordshire Regiment, 1st Cheshire Regiment, 
1st Dorsetshire Regiment (to 31 December 1915). 
9
 Percival Henry Stevenson, born in 1881, had retired from 3rd West Yorkshire. He was transferred out of 5th 
Division to command 12th Northumberland Fusiliers from 31 January 1917 to 14 November 1917 and 13th 
Duke of Wellington’s West Riding Regiment (a re-designated Garrison Guard battalion) from 23 July 1918 
to 1 October 1918. 
10
 William Henry Godney Baker, born in 1888, was a Lieutenant of 31st Lancers in August 1914. 
11
 Cecil Barrington Norton, aged 46 in August 1914, served from April 1918 as GOC 95 Brigade until the 
Armistice. 
12
 Edgar Garston Harrison, aged 51 in August 1914, later commanded 12th Manchester from 9 January 1915 
to 8 August 1916.  
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command 1st Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry from 17 April to 30 May 1918, and 1st 
Norfolk from 1 June 1918 to 22 August 1918, when he was killed in action.13 
 
Both the Territorial officers commanded the same battalion, 1st Bedfordshire, and were 
from the same TF battalion, 5th Bedfordshire. The first was Lieutenant-Colonel Francis 
Noel Butler. Born in 1876, Butler was a solicitor.14 He joined the Huntingdonshire 
Volunteer Force as a Captain in 1900 and in January 1909 was promoted Major in 5th 
Bedfordshire. He commanded the battalion from 20 January 1912 to 25 January 1915, 
resigning his commission on 2 May owing to a serious bout of influenza before the unit 
went to Gallipoli in August 1915. Recovering, he was reappointed Lieutenant-Colonel with 
the battalion on 17 August 1916, and posted to 1st East Surrey as second-in-command on 
20 November 1916, commanding in the absence of Lieutenant-Colonel E.M. Woulfe-
Flanagan from 3 December.15 He was transferred to command 1st Bedfordshire on 18 
December following the wounding of Lieutenant-Colonel W. Allason,16 interestingly being 
preferred over a Regular Major, J.J. Moyse, who had assumed command.17 He commanded 
until 3 May 1917.18 
 
                                                      
13
 The career of Cecil Frederick George Humphries is discussed in depth in Chapter Six, section 6.2. 
14
 Butler joined the firm of Wilkinson & Butler, of St. Neots, Huntingdonshire. 
15
 On leave. Edward Martyn Woulfe-Flanagan was a 44 year-old Regular Captain of the East Surrey 
Regiment in August 1914. He commanded 1st East Surrey between 26 June 1916 and 17 July 1917, and 2/4th 
Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire between 8 August 1918 and the Armistice. 
16
 Walter Allason, a 39 year-old Major of 1st Bedfordshire, commanded from 16 July 1916 until he sustained 
severe accidental wounds from a revolver on 3 December 1916. He served as GOC 52 Brigade from 14 April 
1918 to the Armistice. 
17
 TNA WO/95/1570 War Diary 1st Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment.  John James Moyse, a Lieutenant in 
August 1914, had served with 6th Bedfordshire. He never had the chance to command, dying of wounds on 8 
February 1917. 
18
 He was then attached to the 11th Essex, although he never commanded, being retired to the TF Reserve on 
23 October 1917. 
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The second, Lieutenant-Colonel William Stuart Chirnside, an insurance clerk, was 
commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in the 5th Bedfordshire on 28 March 1914, and commanded 
from 23 August to 14 October 1918.19 
 
Three of the Regular Lieutenant-Colonels commanded two or more different battalions 
within the division. Lieutenant-Colonel M.W. Halford commanded three, namely 1st 
Cheshire (15 Brigade) from 27 October to 28 December 1917, 1st Bedfordshire from 16 
April to 15 June 1918 (15 Brigade), and 1st Devonshire (95 Brigade) from 15 June to 26 
October 1918.20 Lieutenant-Colonel J.K. Kay commanded two, namely 2nd King’s Own 
Scottish Borderers (13 Brigade) from 27 August to 9 October 1918, and 1st Queen’s Own 
Royal West Kent (13 Brigade) from 9 October 1918 to the Armistice;21 and Lieutenant-
Colonel P.R. Worrall also commanded two, namely 1st Bedfordshire (15 Brigade) from 1 
April 1917 to 5 February 1918 and 1st Devonshire  (95 Brigade) from 5 February to 15 
June 1918.22 
 
Of the 67 regulars, once the 15 COs who were in post at the outbreak of war are removed 
from the analysis, 83 per cent of the 52 wartime appointments were internal appointments 
in terms of regiment; and of this group, 65 per cent were within-battalion appointments. 
Regimental particularism was to a great extent maintained in these Regular units. 
 
To illustrate some of these individuals, Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Courtenay, 1st 
Bedfordshire, was both a within-battalion appointment and an example of one of the 14 per 
                                                      
19
 See Chapter Seven, section 7.3 
20
 Montague Walter Halford was the fourth senior Lieutenant of 1st Gloucestershire in August 1914, aged 21. 
21
 Jack Kilbourne Kay was the fifth senior Lieutenant of 2nd Queen’s Own Royal West Kent in August 1914 
aged 26. 
22
 Percy Reginald Worrall was the most senior Lieutenant of 1st Devonshire in August 1914, aged 34. 
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cent of Regular COs who had staff posts prior to appointment as CO. He was 
commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in 1st Bedfordshire on 19 September 1908, aged 20.23 
Promoted Lieutenant on 1 April 1910, he landed in France with the battalion on 16 August 
1914, and was wounded at Missy by shellfire on 15 September. Evacuated to England he 
was promoted Captain on 31 October, and after posting to the 5th Battalion as Adjutant (9 
December 1914 to 19 April 1915), returned to France taking over the duties of Adjutant 
with the 1st Battalion at Ypres. He remained with this unit until 15 November 1915 whence 
he transferred to staff posts within 5th Division, serving as a Staff Captain until 9 June 
1916, and as a DAQMG until 18 June 1918, when he replaced Lieutenant-Colonel M.W. 
Halford.24 He died of wounds when the battalion was subject to severe machine-gun fire 
assaulting Achiet-le-Petit on 23 August 1918. 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel Rupert Henry Anderson-Morshead followed a different and varied 
path. Born in 1886,25 he was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in 2nd Devonshire on 20 March 
1907 and promoted Lieutenant on 30 April 1910. Advanced to company command as a 
Captain (15 March 1915) he was transferred firstly to the 1st Battalion and then to the 1/5th 
Royal Lancaster as second-in-command on 2 June 1916. He assumed command when 
Lieutenant-Colonel C.A.W. Anderson was killed at Flers on 18 September 1916, a post he 
held until 13 June 1917,26 when he returned to 1st Devonshire. He continued the pattern of 
stepping into a dead man’s shoes, taking over when Lieutenant-Colonel D.H. Blunt was 
                                                      
23
 Courtenay was the son of a home and foreign produce agent, and was educated at Hurstleigh School, 
Tunbridge Wells, and RMC. 
24
 Halford had transferred to the 1st Devonshire Regiment. 
25
 Anderson-Morshead was the son of a barrister, and attended Wellington College and RMC. 
26
 Charles Alfred Walker Anderson, born in 1882, was a Regular Captain of the North Staffordshire 
Regiment in August 1914. He commanded 1/5th Royal Lancaster for exactly three months. 
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killed at Sanctuary Wood on 3 October 1917.27 He left the 1st Battalion on 5 February 1918 
in Italy, returning to the 2nd Battalion in France, commanding from 15 April to 27 May 
1918 when the dead man’s shoes became his own – he was killed at Roucy on the opening 
day of the German Chemin des Dames offensive. R.A. Colwill, who regarded Anderson-
Morshead as “something of a tartar on parade”,28 noted his sangfroid that day: "The 
Commanding Officer himself was calmly writing his notes with a perfect hail of … high 
explosive falling round him. His magnificent courage, dauntless bearing and determination 








Transferred as CO to another division 18% 
Replaced not used as CO again 15% 
 
Table 4.2: Reasons for turnover of COs in 5th Division 
 
As Table 4.2 shows, the main reason for turnover of COs in 5th Division was promotion to 
Brigadier-General (31 per cent being a much higher rate than the 10 per cent overall 
average,30 an indication both of the quality of the COs and that promotion of the most able 
did not dent the division’s effectiveness). The second most frequent reason was transfer to 
another active battalion command outside 5th Division. The replacements who did not 
                                                      
27
 Duncan Hamilton Blunt, born in 1878, was a Regular Captain of 2nd Devonshire in August 1914. He 
commanded the 1st Battalion from 14 March 1916 to 3 October 1917, when he was killed with his Adjutant 
advancing to the assembly position at the Battle of Broodseinde. 
28
 R.A. Colwill, Through Hell to Victory (privately published, 1927), p.134 
29
 Colwill, Through Hell,  p.216 
30
 See Chapter Three, section 3.3.7. 
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serve in an active command again should be treated with caution, for, as stated previously, 
it may be that some of these represent unrecorded wounding/invalidity.31 The figure is, 
however, much lower than the overall replacement average of 38 per cent. 
 
4.1.2 Case study - 1st Battalion Hampshire Regiment32 
 
As noted in Chapter Three, Regular battalions had an average of seven COs at the rank of 
Lieutenant-Colonel. 1st Hampshire had eight during the war.33 
 
In August 1914 the battalion was commanded by Brevet Colonel Sydney Charles Fishburn 
Jackson.34 Fifty-one years old in August 1914, Jackson had been commissioned Lieutenant 
in the Royal Irish Rifles on 9 September 1882, transferring to the Hampshire Regiment a 
month later.  Without attending Staff College he had filled an impressive series of staff 
posts,35 and had served in the Burmese Expedition of 1885-9 and with the Zhob Field 
Force, where he was awarded the DSO; and in East Africa 1903-4, being awarded a brevet 
Lieutenant-Colonelcy. He had commanded since 24 March 1911. 
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 The figure is however comparable to that of younger Regular soldiers of August 1914 during the war. 
(Chapter Six, section 6.1.5). 
32
 TNA WO/95/1495 War Diary 1st Battalion Hampshire Regiment. The battalion served in 11 Brigade, 4th 
Division in France and Flanders throughout the war. 
33
 With either substantive, Temporary, or Acting rank. 
34
 His brevet Colonelcy had been granted on 7 September 1910, between his last staff post as DAA&QMG, 
6th Division, Irish Command (ending 28 February 1910) and his taking command of 1st Hampshire on 24 
March 1911).  
35
 He had served as ADC to GOC, Upper Burma Field Force (4 September 1886 to 31 March 1889); ADC to 
Major-General, Bengal (1 April 1889 to 7 April 1893); ADC to C-in-C, East Indies (8 April 1893 to 12 April 
1894); Station Staff Officer 1st Class, India (21 April 1897 to 9 July 1897); DAAG, HQ Bombay (10 July 




The battalion arrived in France on 23 August 1914 and was in action from Le Cateau 
onwards.36 Jackson was wounded, shot in the left ankle at Nauroy on 27 August and 
subsequently taken prisoner.37 The second-in-command, Major Frederick Richard Hicks, 
took over, but the wound he had sustained the previous day led to Major Nelson William 
Barlow taking over on the 31st. Taken prisoner in the Forest of Compiegne, Barlow was 
succeeded by Captain L. C. W. Palk the following day.38 On 7 September Palk fell ill with 
fever, and Captain Francis Cecil Moore took over, and being sick himself was almost 
immediately replaced by Captain Peter Martin Connellan, promoted Major.39 On 23 
September, Lieutenant-Colonel George Hastings Parker, a 1st Battalion Major who had 
been attached to the 3rd Battalion as Depot Commander in August 1914, and who had been 
commanding the newly-raised 10th Hampshire in England, arrived and took over. In a 
period of four weeks, the battalion had been commanded by seven different officers, all 
from the 1st Battalion. Two were prisoners of war, one was wounded, two were invalided 
and one superseded by a senior officer. 
 
On 29 November, the forty-two year old Hicks (who had been commissioned 2nd 
Lieutenant on 8 October 1890 and was psc)40 returned to the battalion as Lieutenant-
                                                      
36
 At the Battle of Le Cateau, 26 August 1914, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, commanding II Corps which had 
become separated from I Corps under Sir Douglas Haig during the retreat from Mons, decided to stand and 
fight the pursuing German Army. 
37
 Repatriated, he was made a substantive Colonel on 15 December 1914. 
38
 Barlow consequently finished the war as he began it, as a Major. He became a Commandant of a Prisoner 
of War camp in January 1919, was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel, and retired in March 1920. 
39
 Promoted Major on 4 May 1915, Moore was moved into staff posts in October 1916. Connellan was killed 
on 20 October 1918 in command of his company, entrenching East of Armentieres. 
40
 He had been employed in Uganda, 9 January 1898 to 27 May 1900, as a Captain; and as a Special Service 
Officer in South Africa, 9 May 1900 to 26 July 1900, after which he was employed with the Rand Rifles, 10 
October 1909 to 8 March 1912. After being awarded a brevet Majority on 22 August 1902 and being 
promoted Major within the regiment on 8 August 1908, he served as Brigade-Major, 16th Brigade, Irish 
Command and GSO2, Coastal Defence, Southern Command, 9 March 1912 to 9 October 1913 
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Colonel, and Parker, junior in seniority, became second-in-command.41 Parker was killed 
on 19 December in the attack on the Birdcage at Le Gheer, the regimental history noting: 
“The regiment thus losing another valued officer of much experience, ‘a born leader’ who 
had commanded the battalion most successfully”.42 
 
Major Palk appears to have been in command during the first two weeks of March, the 
reason for the CO’s absence not being clear, but on 28 April, after Brigadier-General J. 
Hasler had been killed, Hicks assumed command of 11 Brigade for two days and Palk 
again took over. On 8 May, after distinguishing himself on 25 April plugging a gap in the 
line at St Julien with “imperturbable coolness”,43 Hicks was on his way to brigade HQ 
when he was hit by shellfire. His right leg had to be amputated and he succumbed to 
enteric fever on 12 June. Palk assumed command. 
 
The Hon. Lawrence Charles Walter Palk was the second son of Baron Haldon. Nearly 44 
and a Captain in August 1914, he had been commissioned from Sergeant in the 8th Hussars 
as 2nd Lieutenant in the Hampshire Regiment in July 1894, and had seen service in South 
Africa 1901-2, acting briefly as a Station Commandant. He achieved the rank of Captain 
on 11 November 1900, but had already spent two periods on half-pay and was unlikely to 
receive further promotion. The war created new opportunities, and he was promoted Major 
on 29 November 1914 and Lieutenant-Colonel on 8 June 1915. During a period of 
stability, Palk commanded until 28 January 1916, when he was invalided. During that time 
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 Hicks’ Majority was dated 8 August 1908, Parker’s was dated 14 February 1910. 
42
 C.T. Atkinson, The Royal Hampshire Regiment, Volume Two 1914-1918 (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1952), 
p.37 
43
 Atkinson, Hampshire Regiment, p. 58 
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he had had two periods of leave44 and one of sickness45 during which Major George Forder 
Perkins, (who would go on to be GSO3, GSO2 and GSO1 then command 2/5th Hampshire 
from 1 October 1917 to 15 August 1918) and, latterly, Captain Robert Douglas Johnston 
(who would soon leave to spend the rest of the war on the staff) commanded. Both had 
been Captains with the 1st Battalion in August 1914. 
 
Temporary Lieutenant-Colonel William Henry Middleton, who had been Captain and 
Adjutant of the 3rd Hampshire in August 1914 (but who originated from the 1st Battalion) 
took over in January until Palk returned on 18 May 1916. (He went on to command 2nd 
Hampshire from 21 May to 1 December 1916, and 10th Northumberland Fusiliers from 19 
July 1917 to 26 October 1918).46 
 
On 1 July 1916 the battalion attacked the Hawthorn Ridge. Casualties in officers were 100 
per cent.47 Palk, going forward carrying only a stick, was hit, brought back, and died that 
morning.48 Brigadier H.C. Rees noted: 
He … dressed himself in his best clothes, put on white gloves and led the 
whole of his battalion headquarters across No Man’s Land, when he 
himself and most of those with him became casualties. Whilst lying 
mortally wounded in a shell hole, he turned to another man lying near 
him and said ‘If you know of a better ‘ole, go to it.’49 
 
His chosen armament in battle gives credence to the statement of one of his officers: “He 
was a great character.”50 An erudite man who “used to read Gibbon to his junior officers 
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 10-18 August and 8-16 November 1915. 
45
 31 August to 11 September 1915. 
46
 W.H. Middleton, 35 in 1914, had been commissioned 2nd Lieutenant on 24 January 1900, immediately 
acting as a Special Service Officer in South Africa. 
47
 TNA WO/95/1495, War Diary 1st Battalion Hampshire Regiment. 
48
 Atkinson, Hampshire Regiment, p. 171, quoting a fellow officer. 
49
 IWM Docs 7166 H.C. Rees, ‘A Personal Record of the First 7 Months of the War’. 
50
 Rees, ‘Personal Record’. 
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and spoke French and German fluently”, he did not hold his tongue: “He was often a thorn 
in the side of the Division and the Senior Staff officers did not like him. He was utterly 
outspoken and feared nobody”.51 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Arthur William Armitage of 1st West Yorkshire Regiment took 
over command on 28 July. Armitage was a Captain on the outbreak of war and at the age 
of nearly 33 was serving as Adjutant in 1916.52 An outsider in terms of regiment, brigade 
and division, Armitage would lead the battalion for nearly two years until his death in 
action on 22 April 1918 at Pacaut Wood in the German offensive on the Lys, at which 
point it was said of him: “He had completely identified himself with the battalion from the 
moment of taking over”.53 His appointment as an outsider reflects the destruction of the 1st 
                                                      
51
 Palk was one of a number of officers wielding only a stick in battle. Lieutenant-Colonel M.N. Kennard of 
18th West Yorkshire was also killed on 1 July 1916. Private F Burn described how: “It was hell on earth. 
Everyone dropped flat on their stomachs. Colonel Kennard was standing and carrying only a walking stick. 
He called out, ‘Come on boys, up you get,’ and began to walk towards the enemy (and) walked forward into 
a hail of machine gun, rifle and artillery fire and was killed almost immediately”. [D. Raw, Bradford Pals 
(Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2005) pp.186-7]. The Hood Battalion (Royal Naval Division) CO on Gallipoli, 
Lieutenant-Colonel J.A.C. Quilter was killed on 6 May 1915, Seaman Murray noting: “He went forward 
carrying an oversize walking stick”. [J. Murray, Gallipoli 1915 (Bristol: Cerberus, 2004), p.67)]. Lieutenant-
Colonel B. Best-Dunkley peregrinated towards both death and the Victoria Cross on 31 July 1917 at Wieltje, 
Ypres: “Complacently advancing, with a walking stick in his hand, as calmly as if he were walking across a 
parade ground”. [T.H. Floyd, At Ypres with Best-Dunkley (Boston: Indypublish, n.d.), p. 103]. Lieutenant-
Colonel R.R.Willis was always known as “Walking Stick Willis” although this soubriquet was earned from 
landing on Gallipoli with C Company, 1st Lancashire Fusiliers on 25 April 1915, when he won the VC. He 
later commanded three battalions (2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, 13 August to 18 October 1916; 1st Inniskilling 
Fusiliers 18 January to 29 March 1917); and 8th West Riding (1 October 1917 to 3 November 1917). 
Working later as a teacher, the Great Depression of the 1930’s found him selling matches on the streets of 
Manchester, having sold his VC. Lieutenant-Colonel C. Doughty-Wylie, a staff officer, rallied disorganised 
units and led a bayonet charge uphill at Sedd-el-Bahr after the V beach landing on 26 April 1915 armed only 
with a stick, but was shot and killed for his pains. Lieutenant-Colonel E. A. Wood, 6th King’s Shropshire 
Light Infantry assisted locomotion in the front line with an alpenstock [G. Dugdale, Langemarck and 
Cambrai (Uckfield: Naval & Military, 2005), p.25]. Although no aid to locomotion, Lieutenant-Colonel D.S. 
Branson of 1/4th York and Lancaster always carried “a bright scarlet horsehair fly whisk, which he always 
carried on his visits. This whisk was a perfect godsend, as he could be spotted 1000 yards away, and, of 
course, by the time he reached us, we had set our house in order”. [D.P. Grant, The 1/4th (Hallamshire) 
Battalion, York & Lancaster Regiment 1914-1919 (London: Arden, 1927), p.125]. 
52
 He had been commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in the West Yorkshire Regiment on 22 October 1902, had seen 
service on the North-West Frontier in 1908, and was promoted Captain on 4 February 1911. 
53
 Atkinson, Hampshire Regiment, p. 343 
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Hampshire officer cadre on 1 July, and illustrates the cross-division promotion of an 
officer seen as good CO material. 
 
Armitage won the DSO on 9 April 1917 when the battalion was in action at the Oppy-
Mericourt Line just north of Fampoux: 
He commanded his battalion with the utmost skill and determination. 
Subjected to heavy shellfire throughout, he remained in close touch with 
the enemy, gaining his objective the first day. He successfully beat off an 
enemy counter-attack, and held on until relieved.54 
 
The list of officers in the War Diary dated 1 November 1916 lists two Majors. Frederick 
Henry Wickham Guard, (a civilian of August 1914 who was never to command a 
Hampshire battalion, but who would serve as CO of 15th Royal Scots from 8 July 1917 to 5 
April 1918);55and Philip Herbert Hudson, who was at that point attending Senior Officer 
School, Aldershot, (and hence earmarked for possible command).56 Guard was replaced by 
Major Francis William Earle.57 Armitage’s periods of leave are not given in the war diary, 
but Earle was commanding on 1 March 1917, and again in action at Roeux on 11 May 
1917 when Armitage was with the ‘battle nucleus’.58 
 
Following Earle’s departure to command 1st East Lancashire,59 Hudson got the chance to 
fulfil the role for which he had been prepared, from 28 August to 8 September 1917, when 
Armitage assumed command of 11 Brigade, and in November when Armitage had to visit 
a new sector. It was Hudson who took over on Armitage’s death in April 1918, but he 
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 London Gazette, 18 July 1917, p. 7211 
55
 Guard was an interesting character - see Chapter Six, section 6.1.3. 
56
 Hudson was a 2nd Lieutenant of 1st Hampshire in August 1914. 
57
 Earle was a Captain in the 1st Hampshire in August 1914, having seen service in South Africa 1900-2. 
58
 The 10 per cent of the battalion left out of action for purposes of reconstitution in event of disaster. 
59
 From 4 June to 22 October 1917. 
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stood aside when Lieutenant-Colonel John Francis Cumberlege Mordaunt of 1st Somerset 
Light Infantry took over on 12 May 1918. This second importation of an outsider suggests 
that despite his course and experience, Hudson did not enjoy the full confidence of 11 
Brigade to command permanently. He acted-up again when Mordaunt was gassed on 20 
May and succumbed to fever on 16 June, holding command until 29 July. Mordaunt may 
well have been suffering combat fatigue, as he left “suddenly” on 14 October 1918 “to go 
to England for a rest”. Hudson took over again until 18 October, when Lieutenant-Colonel 
Earle returned, commanding until the Armistice. Hudson never achieved even the acting 
rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. 
 
1st Hampshire, despite its decimation on 1 July 1916, was blessed with an extraordinary 
group of senior officers with talent for command, even if not with the unit itself. It was 
particularly ‘traditional’ in terms of command, demonstrating the grip of the professional 
soldier on leadership of the Regular battalion. Of eight COs at the rank of Lieutenant-
Colonel, all were Regulars. Two were outsiders to the regiment, the 75 per cent of insiders 
being not only within regiment, but all from the original 1st Battalion of August 1914. The 
causes of turnover in the seven departing COs included one instance of being taken 
prisoner, three of death in action, one of invalidity, and two of replacement due to the 
return of a more senior officer. 1st Hampshire had an unfortunately high death rate of COs, 
and none was promoted Brigadier-General, matters undoubtedly linked. 
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4.2 Service Battalions 
 
In Chapter Two, command in the Service Battalions up to the point of their going on active 
service was reviewed. Table 4.3 identifies the origins of the COs who commanded on 
active service.  
  Active Retired   
Regular 580 151 55% 
Indian Army 38 28 5% 
Special Reserve 79 57 10% 
Territorial 79 52 10% 
Empire 17 13 2% 
Royal Navy 0 3 >1% 
Royal Marines 0 1 >1% 
Citizens 241 n/a 18% 
 
Table 4.3: Origins of active COs of Service Battalions 
Regular officers provided just over half of commands (55 per cent), with 66 per cent of all 
COs being active or retired professional soldiers. The Special Reserve and Territorials 
made a bigger contribution (ten per cent each) than to the Regular battalions, but the 







Reserve Retired Empire Civilian 
34% 11% 6% 13.5% 1.5% 34% 
 
Table 4.4: August 1914 origins of New Army COs in France & Flanders on 29 
September 1918 
 
The changing balance between Regulars and citizens is demonstrated in Table 4.4, for on 




If only one officer who was a Regular on the outbreak of war was to be taken who might 
serve as an exemplar of the aggressively effective New Army CO, then that individual 
might well be Lieutenant-Colonel William Robert Aufrère Dawson. Born in 1891, Dawson 
was commissioned from Oxford University OTC into the Special Reserve of the Royal 
Field Artillery.60 Bound elsewhere than the family law firm, he obtained a Regular 
commission in 1st Royal West Kent on 10 June 1914. He was transferred to 6th Royal West 
Kent as a 2nd Lieutenant on 3 September 1914, when the battalion was 15 days old, and 
accompanied it to France on 1 June 1915 as a Captain. 
 
Wounded twice in 1916, Dawson was promoted Major on 12 August, taking over 
command when Lieutenant-Colonel C.S. Owen was given command of 36 Brigade on 28 
November 1916.61 He rose from 2nd Lieutenant to Lieutenant-Colonel in the same battalion 
in a period of 26 months, commanding until his fatal wounding on 23 October 1918.62 One 
of his officers-to-be, Alan Thomas, was warned at Etaples63 en route to the battalion that 
Dawson was known as “The Fire-Eater”.64 Thomas leaves us a rare analytic pen-picture: 
“No man I have ever met was more suited by nature to be a commanding officer: no man 
succeeded in his job more magnificently than he did … (being) endowed with peculiar 
qualities of leadership”.65 He continued: “A man secure in his authority, one whose stature 
was heightened by adversity … men would follow him to hell”.66 In all he was wounded 
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 Dawson had a military background, his grandfather Henry Hill Dawson having been a Captain of the 19th 
Foot. He attended Oriel College, his father William also being an Oxford law graduate. His mother was also 
a solicitor, as was his brother Colin who served in the Royal Army Service Corps during the war. 
61
 Charles Samuel Owen, a 35 year-old Regular Captain of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers in August 1914, 
commanded from 29 November 1915. 
62
 Dawson spotted celery in the garden of an empty house and was picking it when a shell shattered his leg, 
amongst other wounds. He died in hospital at Camiers on 3 December 1918 at the age of 27. 
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 Etaples was the BEF’s base camp. 
64
 A. Thomas, A Life Apart (London: Gollancz, 1968), p.45 
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 Thomas, Life Apart, p.57-8. See also Chapter Five section 5.3.5. 
66
 Thomas, Life Apart, p.100. 
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six times, and having won the DSO as a Captain, added three bars as CO,67 awards which 
demonstrate Dawson’s courage and aggression, his initiative, and his ability to inspire.68 
 
Extraordinary individuals came from outside the Regular fold. An example of a Territorial 
officer who commanded a Service Battalion, and one who also ‘led from the front’, was 
Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Henry Leathes Prior, a 37 year-old solicitor,69 who was 
commanding 6th Norfolk (Cyclist) at the outbreak of war. The battalion remained in the 
UK, being virtually denuded of its personnel in July 1916, and Prior was transferred on 8 
August to the 7th Battalion in France, and then on 27 September to command 9th Norfolk, a 
post he held until 22 August 1918. He was wounded on four occasions. Firstly, in October 
and December 1916, (on the latter occasion shot through the right forearm by a sniper in 
no-man’s land whilst returning from a reconnaissance for a raid), again in January 1918 
(gassed), and finally on 22 March during the German Spring Offensive. In August, 
“shattered by wounds and gas”, he was finally invalided.70 He was seven times mentioned 
                                                      
67
 Being one of only seven officers to be awarded three bars, five of whom served as battalion commanders 
(the others being W.D. Croft, B. Freyberg, A.N.S. Jackson and E.A. Wood). 
68
 The citation for his first bar reads: “When the situation was somewhat critical he displayed conspicuous 
bravery in organizing the defence. Although his troops were exhausted from prolonged exposure, he 
completely reorganized the line under heavy shell fire. His total disregard for personal danger was most 
marked.” London Gazette, 18 July 1917, page unknown.  
The citation for his second bar, earned during the German spring offensive of 1918, reads: “When a party of 
the enemy had broken through the brigade front, he led the personnel of his headquarters as a fighting 
formation, and, co-operating with the counter-attacking battalion, inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and 
captured two machine guns and some prisoners. On the following day, when the enemy attacked in force, he 
organized and led a counter-attack with two companies. He repulsed the enemy and re-established and 
advanced the line. Later, when the enemy attacked some advanced posts, he counter-attacked and drove the 
enemy off with loss. By his capable leadership, promptness of action and courageous example, he was 
largely responsible for the position held by his battalion being maintained intact.” London Gazette, 22 June 
1918, page unknown. 
The citation for the final bar, awarded during The Hundred Days advance, reads: “For conspicuous gallantry 
and good leadership of his battalion from 18 to 29 Sept. 1918, near Epehy and Vendhuille. During the period 
they took part in three assaults successfully.  On the 21st-22nd and 28th-29th he was continually in the front 
line, superintending operations and encouraging his men. The success of his battalion was largely due to his 
fine leadership and personal example.” London Gazette, 4 October 1919, page unknown. 
69
 Admitted in 1902 to Pickering & Co. of Lincolns Inn. He served in South Africa 1900-1. 
70
 F.L. Petre, The History of the Norfolk Regiment 1914-1918 (Norwich: Jarrold, 1919), p.292 
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in dispatches, and awarded the DSO and bar as CO. The citation for his bar, related to 21-2 
March 1918, reads: 
Throughout two days of an enemy advance, and until wounded, he set a 
splendid example of coolness and courage under the most trying 
conditions, personally supervising the readjustments which had to be 
made to meet the enemy attacks, and the gallant resistance offered by his 
battalion was largely due to his magnificent example of fearless 
determination.71 
 
Another example of a Territorial who had further to rise to command was Lieutenant-
Colonel Morgan Maddox Morgan-Owen, a 34 year-old Captain of 4th Essex who in August 
1914 was attached to the OTC of Repton School where he was a teacher. He appears to 
have served with 2/4th Essex, but was transferred to 15th Cheshire, and on 12 December 
1916 joined 11th Rifle Brigade as second-in-command. He commanded from 5 September 
to 31 October 1917 after Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. Cotton was gassed,72 moved on 5 
December to command the 10th Battalion until its disbandment in February 1918, returning 
to the 11th, where he was wounded in the German spring offensive. He won the DSO 
whilst commanding the 10th Battalion at Cambrai on 30 November 1917 on the occasion to 
the German counterattack: 
When his battalion was in reserve, he moved it up to resist the attack, and 
held on to the position for two days … His steadfast determination to hold 
his ground against repeated attacks and under heavy fire largely 
contributed to restoring and keeping in hand the critical situation which 
had arisen.73 
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 London Gazette, 26 July 1918, p.8739 
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 Arthur Egerton Cotton, born in 1876, had previously served in India in a mounted unit, enlisting as a 
Rifleman in the 7th Rifle Brigade, commissioned 2nd Lieutenant on 19 September 1914. He commanded 11th 
Rifle Brigade from 26 August 1916 until his gassing. He returned to duty and was in command of the 
battalion at the Armistice. His bother Ronald Egerton Cotton commanded 10th Lancashire Fusiliers in 1918. 
73
 London Gazette, 16 August 1918, p.9561. His brother Lieutenant-Colonel Ll.I.G. Morgan-Owen was a 
staff officer, becoming GSO1 of 13th Division in Mesoptamia, and a further brother Lt. J.G Morgan-Owen, 
South Wales Borderers, was killed in action in Mesopotamia in April 1916. 
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Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Bushell, a Special Reserve officer, was yet another 
extraordinary individual who commanded a Service Battalion. Born in 1888 and educated 
at Rugby and Corpus Christi College, Oxford, he was called to the Bar in 1912 and in the 
same year was commissioned into the Special Reserve of the West Surrey Regiment.74 
Bushell went to France with the 1st Battalion and on 14 September 1914 was severely 
wounded on the Chemin des Dames.75 He returned to France in November 1915 as an 
Aide-de-Camp in 33rd Division until June 1916, and was a Staff Captain with 100 Brigade 
on the Somme from 10 August to 15 December 1916 when he was transferred to 7th West 
Surrey as CO. He served until 18 April 1917, when he was superseded, serving as second-
in-command, then again as CO from 21 September 1917 to 23 March 1918 when he was 
wounded, winning the Victoria Cross; and finally from 23 May 1918 to 8 August 1918, 
when he was killed. His VC citation reads: 
Lieut-Colonel Bushell personally led C Company of his battalion … in 
face of very heavy machine-gun fire. In the course of this attack he was 
severely wounded in the head, but continued to carry on, walking about 
in front of both English and Allied troops, encouraging and reorganising 
them. He refused even to have his wound attended to until he had placed 
the whole line in a sound position, and formed a defensive flank to meet a 
turning movement by the enemy. He then went to Brigade Headquarters 
and reported the situation, had his wound dressed, and returned to the 
firing line ... He visited every portion of the line, both English and Allied, 
in the face of terrific machine-gun and rifle fire, exhorting the troops to 
remain where they were and to kill the enemy. In spite of the wounds, this 
gallant officer refused to go to the rear, and had eventually to be removed 
to the dressing station in a fainting condition.76 
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 http://www.queensroyalsurreys.org.uk/vc/vc14.html (accessed 23 March 2012). 
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 The war diary noted his wounding that day and that “no officers now remain” of the companies engaged. 
TNA WO/95/1280 War Diary 1st Battalion Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment. 
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‘Quex’ left a picture of the “youthful Lieutenant-Colonel” four days before the events of 
23 March, when he dined with the artillery:77 
Tall, properly handsome, with his crisp curling hair and his chin that was 
firm but not markedly so; the eyes that were reflective rather than 
compelling; earnest to the point of an absorbed seriousness – we did 
right to note him well … My chief recollection of him that night was of his 
careful attentiveness to everything said by our own colonel on the science 
of present-day war – the understanding deference paid by a splendid 
young leader to … a very complete gunner.78 
 
 
Lastly, the extraordinary contribution that a family who produced a Service Battalion CO 
could make to the war is exemplified by that of Edward and Emily Stone. Edward, a 
solicitor, had 10 children, all five of the males seeing service. His eldest son, Edward, 
joined the 2nd Dragoon Guards in 1902, and as a Major served as a Staff Captain and 
Brigade-Major in 1917-18. His third eldest son, Reginald Guy, had joined the navy in 1896 
and as a Lieutenant-Commander was awarded the DSO for service in the Mediterranean in 
1917.79 His fourth eldest son, Walter Napleton, emigrated to Canada and became a land 
surveyor, returning to England to enlist, commissioned into 3rd Royal Fusiliers in 1915. He 
was awarded a posthumous VC for his actions on 30 November 1917 at Cambrai, serving 
with the 17th Battalion.80 His youngest son, Francis Le Strange, who had played one rugby 
union match for England, was gazetted 2nd Lieutenant in 3rd Hussars on 15 August 1914, 
winning the MC in 1917.81  
 
Arthur Stone, the second eldest son, is an example of a citizen of August 1914, retired 
from the ranks of the Territorial Force, who rose to command. He was born in 1877 and 
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graduated with a BA in Law from King’s College Cambridge in 1899. A “well known rifle 
shot” who played football both for Cambridge University and Kent, he was articled to his 
father’s firm. He had served with the Gloucestershire Engineers Volunteer Battalion, 
Clifton College Contingent (1894-6), the Cambridge University Rifle Volunteers (1896-9), 
and the Inns of Court Rifle Volunteers (1899 to 1908).82 Attesting as a Private on 11 
September 1914 in the Corps of School of Musketry, he was immediately appointed 
Company Sergeant Major, Instructor at Bisley until 2 October.83 Having applied for a 
commission, he was gazetted to 15th Lancashire Fusiliers, where he appears to have known 
the CO, Lieutenant-Colonel H.B. Moss,84 being promoted Major on 6 December 1914. 
Proceeding to France with the battalion in November 1915, he was awarded the DSO for 
actions in command of a raiding party.85 He took over as CO when Lieutenant-Colonel 
J.H. Lloyd was given command of 90 Brigade from 28 September to 26 December 1916,86 
reverting to second-in-command before being promoted to command 16th Lancashire 
Fusiliers from 5 April to 2 October 1918 when he was killed.87 
 
4.2.1 9th Division 
Fifty Lieutenant-Colonels commanded the 12 Service Battalions during their time spent on 
active service with 9th Division during the war.88 
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 When the Rifle Volunteers became the 27th Battalion London Regiment in 1908, Stone resigned. 
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 TNA WO 339/21909 Officers’ Services, Arthur Stone. 
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 Henry Benjamin Moss was a retired Lieutenant-Colonel of the Lancashire Fusiliers. He commanded the 
15th Battalion from 1 September 1914 to 6 August 1915, and 21st Lancashire Fusiliers from that point until 8 
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 John Henry Lloyd was a retired Special Reserve Major of the Royal Lancaster Regiment in August 1914, 
and commanded the battalion from 7 August 1917, taking over from Moss, to 28 September 1916. He later 
commanded 3rd Royal Lancaster from 1 January 1918 to 7 August 1918. 
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 The battalion suffered heavily from enfilade machine-gun fire in its attack that day on Ramicourt. 
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 The battalions were: 26 Brigade – 8th Black Watch, 7th Seaforth Highlanders, 8th Gordon Highlanders (to 6 
May 1915), 5th Cameron Highlanders, 10th Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders (from 6 May 1916 to 15 
February 1918); 27 Brigade – 11th and 12th Royal Scots, 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers (to 6 May 1916), 10th 
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Thirty-six (72 per cent) were active/retired Regulars; four were Special Reserve (three of 
whom were retired Regulars); one was from the South African Defence Force;89 three were 
Territorials, and six (12 per cent) were civilians of August 1914. Overall 78 per cent had 
been professional soldiers in August 1914, in contrast to 66 per cent for the Service 
battalions overall. It might be thought that the later success of this division was related to 
the higher level of professional soldiers commanding battalions, but, as is argued in 
Chapter Seven, the quality of COs of whatever source during The Hundred Days makes 
this unlikely. 
 
On arrival in France in May 1915, 11 of the 12 battalions were commanded by COs who 
had been with them from the start, and the remaining CO had been with his battalion for all 
but six weeks since it was raised. They were all K1 battalions, but as noted in Chapter 
Two, only 65 per cent of K1 units were taken overseas by their first COs. The division’s 
battalions had therefore enjoyed a remarkable degree of consistency. Three of the COs 
commanded two units within the division.90 
 
How typical was the case of W.R.A. Dawson, rising from junior officership to command 
within the same battalion? Twenty-two per cent of subsequent CO appointments in 9th 
Division on active service were from within the officers that had originally gone overseas 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders (to 6 May 1916), 6th King’s Own Scottish Borderers (from 6 May 1916), 9th 
Scottish Rifles (from 6 May 1916); 28 Brigade (to 6 May 1916), 6th King’s Own Scottish Borderers (to 6 
May 1916), 9th Scottish Rifles (to 6 May 1916),  10th & 11 Highland Light Infantry (to 6 May 1916). 
89
 The South African Brigade replaced 28 Brigade in 9th Division. Lieutenant-Colonel Ambrose Robin Innes-
Browne, a Captain of the South African Defence Force in August 1914, (appropriately enough from the 
Transvaal Scottish), commanded 6th Scottish Borderers from 9 April 1917 to 8 August 1917. He was killed in 
action on 18 April 1918. 
90
 Lieutenant-Colonel H.P. Burn commanded 10th Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders from 10 December 1915 
to 8 April 1916 and 8th Gordon Highlanders from 11 May to 16 July 1916; Lieutenant-Colonel G.B. Duff 
commanded 8th Black Watch from 30 October 1915 to 4 March 1916 and 5th Cameron Highlanders from 9 
May to 6 July 1916; and Lieutenant-Colonel J. Kennedy commanded 7th Seaforth Highlanders 2 May to 29 
July 1916 and 10 Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders from 29 July to 4 December 1916. 
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with the battalion in question, in contrast to the 65 per cent of the Regular 5th Division.91 
Five of these nine individuals were officers who had been Majors in May 1915, and only 
one of these was appointed post mid-1916. They were, therefore, established senior 
officers who moved up to command as a matter of course in terms of their seniority early 
in the battalion’s evolution.  
 
Apart from suitability, the simple matter of casualties amongst company and platoon 
commanders would have limited the number of such officers who could have worked their 
way up to command. There were, however, four such individuals within 9th Division. Sir 
G.W. Abercromby, a retired Lieutenant of the Scots Guards and Gordon Highlanders, went 
to France with 8th Black Watch as a Captain in May 1915, and commanded between 8 
March 1916 and 21 May 1917.92  P.C Anderson, a 2nd Lieutenant of 2nd Seaforth 
Highlanders, was transferred to the 7th Battalion as a Lieutenant on 25 September 1914, 
served as Adjutant between September 1915 and April 1917, and commanded between 15 
October 1918 and the Armistice.93 R.W. Campbell, a retired Major of the Special Reserve 
of the Scottish Rifles, went to France with 11th Royal Scots as a Captain, and commanded 
between 26 September and 3 December 1915.94 Finally, A.G.M.M. Crichton, the sole 
civilian of August 1914, went to France as a Lieutenant with the 5th Cameron Highlanders, 
and commanded between 26 September 1917 and 6 March 1918.95 
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Transferred as CO to another division 7% 
Replaced, not used as CO again 40% 
 
Table 4.5: Reasons for turnover of COs of Service Battalions in 9th Division 
 
As Table 4.5 shows, the main reason for turnover was replacement, not to serve in an 
active command again. At 40 per cent this rate is virtually identical to the overall 38 per 
cent average turnover for the BEF during the war, a figure which includes replacements 
prior to active service. Given the marked early stability in the division, this indicates a 
higher rate of replacement on active service. Promotion to Brigadier-General at 17 per cent 
(all were Regulars) is again higher than the 10 per cent average, and was jointly, with 
wounding, the second most common reason for turnover. 
 
 
4.2.2 Case study - 13th Battalion (West Ham) Essex Regiment96 
As noted in Chapter Three, Service Battalions had an average of five COs at the rank of 
Lieutenant-Colonel, and 13th Essex had five substantive, Temporary or Acting COs of such 
rank during the war. The battalion was raised locally by the Mayor and Borough, recruiting 
at West Ham from 27 December 1914.  
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 TNA WO/95/1358 War Diary 13th Battalion Essex Regiment. Originally in 100 Brigade 33rd Division, 
landing in France on 17 November 1915, the battalion transferred to 6 Brigade 2nd Division on 22 December 
1915, and served in France and Flanders until disbandment on 10 February 1918. 
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The unit’s first CO was Lieutenant-Colonel Pelham Rawsthorn Papillon, a retired Militia 
Captain. Born in 1864, he grew up at Lexden Manor, Colchester, in a wealthy and 
influential landowning family whose principal seat was Crowhurst Park, Sussex. He was 
educated at Winchester School and obtained a BA in Law in 1887 from University 
College, Oxford. A keen cricketer and amateur archaeologist,97 he was appointed a Sussex 
Magistrate in 1888,98 and was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in 3rd Sussex on 3 April 1889, 
seeing service in South Africa as a Captain 1899-1901. He retired as an Honorary Major in 
1904. On the outbreak of war, Papillon was commissioned Captain in 9th Sussex on 21 
September 1914 and Lieutenant-Colonel in 13th Essex on 2 February 1915. The two 
regiments spanned both his county of residence and that in which he grew up, and his 
circumstances reflect the observations of Peter Simkins concerning convenient 
relationships between the raising Mayor and local notables with military connections in the 
appointment of COs.99 
 
The battalion disembarked at Boulogne on 17 November 1915. Between 5 and 16 February 
1916 Papillon went on the first of three spells of leave to England of his ten and a half 
months on active service. His second-in-command, Major A.L. Brown, acted up. Brown 
was an ex-Regular, a 40 year-old retired Captain of the 12th Lancers with service in South 
Africa 1899-1902, who had been on active service since November 1914, transferred to 
13th Essex as second-in-command on 9 November 1915. This was Brown’s only taste of 
command, as when Papillon took over command of 6 Brigade from 28 March to 9 April 
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1916, Major W.H. Winthrop, the original commander of B Company took over.100 
Winthrop again took over from 14 to 30 May 1916 when Papillon went on his second 
leave, but this was for the last time.101  
 
In late July 1916 the battalion was transferred to the Somme and went into action at 
Delville Wood, 28 to 31 July 1916.102 Papillon was wounded in the German counter-attack 
of the 30th but remained at duty. The nature of his wound is set out in his DSO citation:  
A shell burst in front of him, knocked him down and cut his eye, but he 
carried on with the greatest coolness. Next morning another shell 
severely bruised him and broke the drum of his ear, but he refused to 
leave his post.103 
 
On 8 August 1916 the battalion was in action again, ordered to attack Guillemont from 
Trones Wood, an attack that had failed earlier in the day. Two companies were annihilated 
by machine-gun fire in front of uncut wire. Papillon, taking the risk of the ‘man on the 
spot’, defied his orders and held back his other companies, referring his dilemma to 6 
Brigade. The attack was cancelled.104  
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 Winthrop was a 41 year old citizen in August 1914. Brown’s departure went unrecorded, but he assumed 
the duties of Assistant Provost-Marshal on 23rd June 1916. 
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Diary 13th Battalion Essex Regiment. 
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Twenty days later, on 28 August 1916, Papillon returned to England on “special leave”. 
Captain S.E. Collier took over until his return on 5 September.105 On 1 October 1916, on 
route to trenches in the Hebuterne sector Papillon returned to the transport lines “sick”. 
The same diary entry noted that Major W.H. Carter “took over command of the battalion 
and assumed the rank of Lieut. Colonel”. 
 
Papillon was suffering a psychological breakdown. Brigade clearly recognised this and had 
granted him special leave for rest.106 “After several Medical Boards, opinion held that he 
was clearly suffering 'Shell Shock' … he was stone deaf in traffic, but could hear a watch 
at two inches away. He had 'exaggerated knee jerks' as well as suffering 'great restlessness' 
overall”.107 His replacement had clearly been identified as it was fully effective within 
hours.108 
 
William Henry Carter was a marked contrast to Papillon. A Signals Sergeant of 2nd South 
Staffordshire on the outbreak of war,109 he was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant on 4 January 
1915. He demonstrates not only the rapid rise of the talented Regular OR, 21 months from 
2nd Lieutenant to Lieutenant-Colonel (thereby moving faster than Dawson), but also the 
talent spotting of a promising Major, Carter having already commanded 17th Middlesex at 
that rank between 27 July and 13 September 1916. 
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acting Major two days after assuming command. He never commanded again, finishing the war as Brigade 
Transport Officer. 
106
 His leg twitches were noticeable on return from this leave. 
107
 TNA WO/339/21480, Officers’ Services, Pelham Rawsthorn Papillon. He joined Eastern Command, 
Home Service on 17th February 1917, but relinquished his commission on 22nd March 1917. 
108
 The bestowal of temporary Lieutenant-Colonel rank usually following 28 days after appointment. 
109
 Born on 1 April 18979, Carter’s father was a gas tube maker. He had enlisted in 1899 into the 2nd South 
Staffordshire, and saw service in South Africa, 1900-2 with the 1st Battalion. 
http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/great-war-people/brothers-arms/2721-lieutenant-colonel-william-
henry-carter-dso-and-bar-mc-and-bar.html (accessed 14 March 2013). 
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Carter was to command the battalion in 6 Brigade’s unsuccessful attack on the 
Quadrilateral on 13 November 1916 during the Battle of the Ancre.110 His report copied 
into the war diary on 12/13 November 1916 shows a CO in conflict with his company 
commanders, deferring, and carefully covering himself against come-back from brigade, 
from which direction he may have felt particularly vulnerable,111 due to his origins in the 
ranks: 
On the night of the 12th I sent for the Company Commanders who were in 
command of the 1st wave and told them that I thought it was impossible 
to take the QUADRILATERAL with a frontal attack, and gave orders that 
it should be taken from the flanks. Both of the officers disagreed with this 
and on account of the points they raised … I decided to let my orders for 
the attack stand as before, although I was still in doubt as to whether I 
had done right. This consultation took place in the presence of the 
Adjutant, who heard everything that was said.112 
 
In the event, no particular infantry tactics would have taken the Quadrilateral that day, and 
Carter’s reputation did not suffer. 
 
On 16 December 1916 Carter went on leave to England, and Major A.G. Hayward, second-
in-command, took over until his return on 31 December. Hayward acted-up again when 
Carter attended a Commanding Officers Conference at Fifth Army Infantry School from 6 
to 9 February 1917. Arthur Gracie Hayward had been commissioned Lieutenant in the 
battalion on 15 May 1915. He was earmarked for future command being sent to Senior 
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 The Quadrilateral was a redoubt forming a salient in the German front line between Beaumont Hamel and 
Serre. 
111
 Not to mention showing a distrust of his company commanders to report events truthfully at a later date. 
112
 TNA WO/95/1358 War Diary 13th Battalion Essex Regiment. 
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Officers School at Aldershot on 27 April 1917,113 commanding 4th Bedfordshire on active 
service 22 July to 22 September 1918.114 
 
Carter himself was sent to Senior Officer School on 6 April 1917,115 and was replaced by a 
Regular officer, 38 year-old Lieutenant-Colonel C.T. Martin, who was CO 2nd Highland 
Light Infantry.116 Martin commanded during the battalion’s unsuccessful attack on Oppy, 
28 April 1917, but on the following day assumed temporary command of 6 Brigade until 4 
May, at which point he returned to his original battalion.117 Major A.D. Derviche-Jones, 
second-in-command, took over. 
  
Lieutenant-Colonel A.E.F Harris took over command of both the battalion (formally) and 6 
Brigade (actively) on 4 May, returning on the 16th, Derviche-Jones proceeding the 
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 Where his performance was rated “very good”. http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/great-war-
people/brothers-arms/2721-lieutenant-colonel-william-henry-carter-dso-and-bar-mc-and-bar.html (accessed 
14 March 2013). 
http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/great-war-people/brothers-arms/2721-lieutenant-colonel-william-
henry-carter-dso-and-bar-mc-and-bar.html (accessed 14 March 2013). 
114
 Hayward had gone on active service with the battalion as Officer Commanding the Machine Gun Section. 
He was a 31 year old citizen in August 1914, Assistant Secretary of a Social Welfare Association. He 
returned on 2nd December 1917 as second-in-command, and took over when Lieutenant-Colonel Walsh went 
on leave from 10 to 30 January 1918. After replacement in September 1918 he later commanded 51st 
Devonshire. 
115
 Carter returned on 6 July 1917 and took up duties as second-in-command as a Major, a short-lived 
appointment as he was transferred on 18 July and commanded the 7th South Staffordshire until the Armistice. 
He was awarded the DSO and bar and MC and bar. His DSO (20 October 1916) was awarded for his actions 
in taking command of the 17th Middlesex after the CO was wounded, the bar being awarded (10 December 
1919) for “skilful leading” of his battalion 8-9 November 1918. He became a Brigadier-General in the Army 
of Occupation, and retired as a substantive Captain in 1922. His post-war career, for a man for whom his 
home town, Wolverhampton, gave a civic reception on 21 March 1918, naming a street after him, was 
unsuccessful as his poultry farm failed, as did a taxi business, and he worked subsequently as a motorcycle 
mechanic and a steel erector. He died in 1951, his health having broken down during World War Two after 
his foot was amputated due to a 1915 wound. Interviewed by a reporter from the Birmingham Post in 1934 
he stated: “Some of the old chaps who used to know me in the army - chaps the same as myself, you know - 
come and see me, because even when I was an officer, I hadn't any bounce”. 
http://www.westernfrontassociation.com/great-war-people/brothers-arms/2721-lieutenant-colonel-william-
henry-carter-dso-and-bar-mc-and-bar.html (accessed 20 February 2013). 
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 Cuthbert Thomas Martin was a 36 year-old Captain of the battalion in August 1914. 
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following day to the temporary command of 1st Liverpool.118 Arthur Ellis Fowke Harris 
had been a 39 year-old Captain of 1st Berkshire in August 1914, commanding this battalion 
from 28 May 1916 to 3 May 1917. Three months after taking over he again assumed 
command of 6 Brigade on 13 August for 12 days, Major A.A. Mcfarlane-Grieve, second-
in-command deputising. On 1 October Harris went again to Brigade, and Mcfarlane-Grieve 
took over until the following day when he was sent to Senior Officer School.119 
 
Major J. Walsh, the new second-in-command, commanded until Harris returned on 8 
October. This was repeated from 12 to 23 October. On 21 November Harris “proceeded to 
England”. The reason for his removal is unclear,120 but he subsequently served as a Major 
with the 2/19th London on active service in Palestine commanding from 7 to 29 June 1918 
as a Major, and was lastly appointed CO of a battalion of the Manchester Regiment in 
October 1918. 
 
Walsh was now given command. A 33 year-old Regular NCO on the outbreak of war, 
James Walsh was commissioned from Warrant Officer Class II as 2nd Lieutenant in the 
Liverpool Regiment on 30 January 1916.121 He was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel on 13 
December 1917, his 22 month journey from 2nd Lieutenant to CO being one month longer 
than Carter’s. The battalion was in action on 30 November, nine days after Walsh assumed 
command, in the German counterattack at Cambrai. Walsh’s resulting DSO citation reads: 
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 Derviche-Jones is a fine example of the successful citizen CO – see Chapter Six section 6.2. 
119
 Angus Alexander Macfarlane-Grieve was a 23 year-old Territorial unattached 2nd Lieutenant of Durham 
University Officer Training Corps in August 1914, subsequently attached to the 1/4th Highland Light 
Infantry. He commanded 2nd Seaforth Highlanders from 31 August to 14 October 1918, achieving the 
distinction of being a Territorial officer commanding a Regular unit. 
120
 Given his previous acting-up roles in 6 Brigade, and the absence of change in brigade command at the 
time of his removal, coupled with his later service as a CO, it is more likely that he was rested rather than 
sacked. 
121
 He was made an acting Captain on 10 August 1916 when a company commander; and an acting Major, 
second-in-command 17th Middlesex on 6 October 1916. 
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During continual and heavy hostile attacks he visited all portions of 
his line, regardless of personal danger, and it was owing to his 
courage and ability in dealing with critical and constantly changing 
situations, that his line was held.122 
 
The 13th Essex was disbanded on 10 February 1918 but Walsh later served as Lieutenant-
Colonel from 17 to 29 May 1918 with 6th Northamptonshire,123 and again with the 2/2nd 
London from 10 August to the Armistice. 
 
In summary, 13th Essex showcases evolving merit-based promotion in the BEF. It was 
commanded by five Lieutenant-Colonels, (none of whom had any connection with the 
Essex Regiment); and of the last four, two had been Regular ORs, a Private and an NCO 
on the outbreak of war, both of whom who were still commanding battalions at the 
Armistice. The other two were Regular Captains in August 1914; one promoted to 
Brigadier, the other still commanding a battalion in November 1918. All these four 
appointments came from within 2nd Division, and three of the four from within 6 Brigade, 
demonstrating a local nature that was not universal.124 The reasons for these first four 
Lieutenant-Colonels leaving command was one case of invalidity, one of replacement, 
with two being replaced but transferred to other commands. 
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 London Gazette 18 July 1918, p. 8443. Walsh produced both a “Narrative” of the Cambrai operation and a 
separate “Notes on Recent Operations” (7 December 1917) with provides a succinct analysis of 9 points: 
Supply of Small Arms Ammunition (necessity for dumps behind the lines in case of fall-back); Lewis Guns 
(problem of rapidly emptying magazines); Musketry (beneficial effects of recent practice); Signalling 
(especially the importance of communication with Brigade Forward Station); Runners and Relay Posts 
(importance of having an officer commanding); Bombs and Grenades (more training required); Medical 
Arrangements (no comment); S.O.S. Signal (weak artillery response); Defensive Barrage (wrongly placed). 
In 4 of 8 points he identified a problem and proposed a solution; in 3 out of 8 points he identified a problem 
but had no solution; and in one case he identified a previous strategy that had demonstrated its utility. This 
was a man with a keen analytic mind and the ability to communicate clearly. 
123
 From which appointment he was invalided. 
124
 Martin’s battalion, 2nd Highland Light Infantry, was in 5 Brigade. 
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At least three of these individuals are known to have gone to Senior Officer School, 
Aldershot; one already a Lieutenant-Colonel and two Majors. Those who acted-up during 
absences, amongst whom are these two Majors, are no less interesting. There were nine 
such periods, filled by six Majors. The first two early contenders, Brown and Winthrop, 
were unable to sustain the pace of war. The third, Collier, acted-up only once and was 
likely unsuitable for command. The last three, all ‘talent spotted’ and sent to Senior Officer 
School, namely Hayward, Derviche-Jones and Macfarlane-Grieve, were all commanding 
battalions at the Armistice, two on active service. Hayward and Derviche-Jones were 
civilians at the outbreak of war, Macfarlane-Grieve being a TF 2nd Lieutenant who went on 
to command a Regular battalion. 
 
 
4.3 Territorial Battalions 
 
Table 4.6 identifies the origins of those who commanded first and second-line Territorial 
battalions on active service. 
  First-Line Second-Line 
Territorial 416 52% 67 27% 
Retired Territorial 35 4% 37 14% 
Regular 193 24% 83 33% 
Retired Regular 46 6% 25 10% 
Indian Army/Retired Indian Army 14 2% 2 1% 
Special Reserve/Retired Special Reserve 28 4% 15 6% 
Empire/Retired Empire 8 1% 2 1% 
Citizen 57 7% 19 8% 
 
Table 4.6: Origins of active COs of first and second-line TF battalions 
Of the first-line Territorial battalions, 56 per cent of COs were active/retired Territorials. 
Thirty per cent were active/retired Regulars, with the next largest group, citizens of August 
1914, comprising 7 per cent of COs, a figure a little over a third of the contribution made 
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to Service Battalions. The Special Reserve again made a low contribution at three per cent. 
Overall, including the Indian Army and Territorial/Special Reserve officers who were 
previously Regulars, 36 per cent of COs were professional soldiers, just over half the 
percentage for Service Battalions. 
 
As noted in Chapter One, 39 per cent of first-line TF COs did not accompany their 
battalions on active service. It might be thought that given the circumstances, a younger, 
militarily-active individual would have succeeded, in particular the senior Major. In fact, 
25 per cent of second COs were senior officer ‘dugouts’ (24 Regular, one Indian Army, 18 
Territorial, and 3 Special Reserve). Forty-three per cent of second appointments were, 
however, active TF Majors, and 13 per cent active Captains. Only 13 per cent were 
Regulars (5 Majors, 16 Captains and one Lieutenant in terms of August 1914 ranks). Of 
the third COs, 51 per cent were active TF officers of August 1914, 32 per cent active 
Regulars, with only 7 per cent ‘dugouts’. The position on 29 September 1918 on the 
Western Front is shown in Table 4.7. At this point the number of active TF officers of 
1914 had dropped, largely in favour of appointees who were civilians in August 1914. Of 







Reserve Retired Civilian 
29% 36% 3% 12% 20% 
 
Table 4.7: August 1914 origins of first-line TF COs in France & Flanders on 29 
September 1918 
 
The logic behind appointing ‘dugouts’ to first-line battalions is difficult to fathom. It does 
of course reflect the ‘retired senior officer’ principle in vogue at that point for provision of 
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command initially for the later newly-raised Service/TF battalions.125 It may reflect lack of 
confidence in the senior officers of many of these battalions, a lack which may have had 
some foundation. Alternatively, local politics may have been at work. The lack of 
confidence persisted, however, for as the dugouts fell by the wayside, the number of active 
professional soldiers increased, this stiffening of battalions with Regular COs increasing 
from 13 to 32 per cent between the second and third appointments. This point was, 
however, the peak of saturation of first-line units with professionals as COs, remaining 
thereafter at just under a third of appointees. On 29 September 1918, including those who 
had been commissioned into the TF after August 1914, those with a pure Territorial 
background comprised just under half (46 per cent) of appointees. 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel F.B. Follett, a Regular Captain of the Warwickshire Regiment was 
given command of 1/9th London on 25 January 1917.126 His appointment drew bitter words 
from the battalion’s historian: 
Hitherto regiments of the Territorial Force had been commanded by 
one of their own officers, but dating from about the end of 1916 
commands given to members of that Force were very few and far 
between, no matter how long they had served or how efficient they 
were in their duties.  In practically every case a ‘Regular’ officer was 
appointed to the command of a regiment directly a vacancy occurred, 
and in some instances officers actually commanding a battalion in the 
field were on one pretext or another posted to a reserve battalion at 
home or found a job elsewhere.  We have nothing to say against the 
new officers commanding, but the change caused considerable 
bitterness among those immediately concerned.  No matter how 
brilliant their fighting record the professional soldier was ignorant of 
the traditions on which many Territorial regiments set great store, and 
never felt in full sympathy with the amateur, while the latter naturally 
resented his being passed over.127 
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 See Chapter Two. 
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 Francis Bere Follett, born in 1876, commanded 1/9th London from 25 January to 13 November 1917, and 
10th Warwickshire from 22 July 1918 to the Armistice. 
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This picture, as is evident, is not entirely accurate, but it indicates clearly the resentment 
felt about the undoubted difficulties that TF officers faced in achieving promotion to 
CO.128 
 
The Territorial battalions did of course have a Regular officer within their ranks in August 
1914 in the form of the Adjutant. Fifty-one per cent of these became COs. A romantic 
image might be conjured of the CO falling, his senior officers around him, the Adjutant 
taking control and being rewarded with permanent command. Whilst Adjutants did find 
them themselves left in command in battle, only 12 of 207 actually succeeded to command 
(as Lieutenant-Colonel) of the TF battalion to which they were Adjutant in August 1914, a 
figure representing only six per cent of the Regulars who commanded TF battalions.129 
Thirty-six became COs of Service Battalions, 31 of other Territorial units and 27 of 
Regular battalions. The route Adjutant to CO in the August 1914 battalion of attachment 
was the least likely journey to command. 
 
In the second-line Territorial battalions, 41 per cent of COs were active/retired Territorials 
and 41 per cent were active/retired Regulars, the other contributors being in similar 
proportions to the first-line battalions. Overall, 47 per cent were professional soldiers. The 
TF therefore proved to have limited resources for command of its second-line battalions, 
only half as many active Territorials of August 1914 commanding such battalions in 
comparison with first-line units. There was no strong impetus to denude first-line 
battalions to command second-line units, the input of professionals being more heavily 
relied upon than for first-line battalions. 
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 See also Chapters Three and Six. 
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 The first to do so was G.B.G. Wood, Adjutant of 1/5th Lancashire Fusiliers in August 1914, who assumed 
command from 7 August 24 September 1915 on Gallipoli. 
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4.3.1 42nd Division 
In 42nd Division, a first-line Territorial division, 70 Lieutenant-Colonels commanded the 
12 TF battalions during their time spent on active service with the division during the 
war.130 
 
Forty-seven per cent were Territorials in August 1914, 36 per cent were active or retired 
Regulars, four per cent were Special Reserve, six per cent Indian Army, and seven per cent 
citizens. Forty-four per cent were professional soldiers, a slightly higher proportion in 
comparison with the 36 per cent commanding first-line TF battalions overall during the 
war. 
 
Nine of the 12 COs of August 1914 of these battalions landed on Gallipoli on 10 May 
1915,131 a figure higher than average, 75 per cent in comparison with the overall figure of 
61 per cent taking their units on active service. Service there took a savage toll. Lieutenant-
Colonel D.H. Wade was CO 1/9th Manchester at the outbreak of war, and his career will 
stand as illustration. Born in 1865, he had left Oldham for a civil service appointment in 
Singapore, where he served as a Private in the Volunteer Artillery. Returning to the UK he 
served as an NCO in the Cheshire and Caernarvonshire Artillery Volunteers, being 
commissioned in the Manchester Regiment in 1900, working for the local authority as 
Education Secretary, and becoming CO of the 9th Battalion on 17 July 1913.132 Twelve 
days after arrival on Gallipoli Wade was shot by a sniper “stepping across some men who 
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 The battalions were: 125 Brigade - 1/5th, 1/6th, 1/7th and 1/8th Lancashire Fusiliers; 126 Brigade -1/9th and 
1/10th Manchester, 1/4th and 1/5th East Lancashire; 127 Brigade -  1/5th, 1/6th, 1/7th and 1/8th Manchester. 
131
 Of the other three, Lieutenant-Colonel W.S France (1/5th Manchester) was removed from command before 
the battalion went to Egypt; and Lieutenant-Colonels G.G.P. Heywood (1/6th Manchester), J.C. Hoyle (1/5th 
East Lancashire) made the voyage, but did not accompany their battalions to Gallipoli. Heywood was 
invalided with eye trouble. 
132
 Manchester Reporter, 8 August 1914, cited at www.ashtonpals.webs.com (accessed 9 May 2012). 
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were sleeping in order not to disturb them”.133 After recuperation, Wade returned on 8 
February 1916 to command the battalion in Egypt, including the Sinai fighting, a task he 
continued until 27 April 1917, just after the battalion’s return to France. He was transferred 
to the TF Reserve in June 1917, undoubtedly not up to the Western Front, although he had 
seen nearly two years of active service. 
 
Of the other eight, Lieutenant-Colonel W.G. Heys, CO 1/8th Manchester, was killed in the 
Third Battle of Krithia, 4 June 1915.134 He had been commanding 125 Brigade 
temporarily, and returned to his battalion as nearly all his officers were casualties. 
Lieutenant-Colonel H.E. Gresham, CO 1/7th Manchester,135 was invalided on 28 May 
1915.136 Lieutenant-Colonel J.A. Fallows, CO 1/8th Lancashire Fusiliers, was killed on 7 
June,137 Lieutenant-Colonel A.F. Maclure, CO 1/7th Lancashire Fusiliers, having been 
wounded two days earlier.138 Lieutenant-Colonel F.D Robinson,139 CO 1/4th East 
Lancashire, had to be replaced on 15 July; Lieutenant-Colonel J. Isherwood, CO 1/5th 
Lancashire Fusiliers, similarly on 18 July.140 Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Rochdale, CO 1/6th 
Lancashire Fusiliers,141 had a period in command of 126 Brigade in June, but was 
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 Manchester Reporter, 7 August 1915, cited at www.ashtonpals.webs.com (accessed 9 May 2012). In 
hospital in Alexandria he learnt that his son J.M. Wade, a Lieutenant with the battalion, had been killed. 
134
 William George Heys was a 47 year-old chartered patent agent, and had served in South Africa 1901-2. 
135
 Harry Edward Gresham was a 50 year-old mechanical engineer and co-proprietor of the Craven Iron 
Works, Salford. 
136
 His successor, Major J.H. Staveacre, was also killed on 4 June alongside Heys. 
137
 James Albert Fallows was a 50 year-old India rubber company manager. 
138
 Alan Francis Maclure was a 40 year-old solicitor, of Crofton Craven & Co., Manchester. 
139
 Frederick Dixon Robinson was a 53 year-old solicitor in the family firm of Robinson & Sons, Blackburn 
and Clitheroe. 
140
 James Isherwood was a 52 year-old solicitor practising at Heywood and Bury. 
141
 George Kemp, 1st Baron Rochdale, born in 1883, was a flannel manufacture who had played first-class 
cricket for Lancashire, and had been MP for Heywood and Manchester North-West. He had commanded 32nd 
Battalion Imperial Yeomanry in the Second Boer War. 
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invalided on 29 September. Only Lieutenant-Colonel J.B. Rye, CO 1/10th Manchester, had 
a command, like Wade’s, that survived Gallipoli, serving until 14 May 1916.142 
 
The division was transferred to the Western Front in March 1917. In its first major action 
in Belgium during Third Ypres on 6 September 1917, when the division attacked Iberian, 
Borry and Beck House Farms near Frezenberg, a dramatic evolution of command from 
Gallipoli was evident. Seventy-five per cent of the battalions were now commanded by 
Regulars, a figure twice the overall percentage. Two-thirds of these appointments dated 
from mid-1917, indicating an attempt to stiffen the division with professional soldiers after 
arrival on the Western Front. What role this influx of Regulars may have had on the 
division’s later success, if any, is a matter for speculation. 
 
All four Lancashire Fusilier battalions of 125 Brigade were commanded on 6 September 
by Regulars of August 1914. The CO of 1/5th Lancashire Fusiliers was Lieutenant-Colonel 
Phillip Vaughan Holberton, a Captain of the Manchester Regiment in August 1914, who 
had served as Adjutant to 1/6th Manchester (127 Brigade), GSO3, GSO2 and Brigade-
Major (126 Brigade) between December 1915 and 17 October 1916, at which point he took 
over the battalion at the age of 37, having contributed to all three brigades of the division. 
Holberton commanded between 17 October 1916 and 25 March 1918, when he was killed 
near Gomiecourt during the German spring offensive. The divisional history notes: “With 
his habitual disregard of personal safety” he “walked along the line encouraging and 
heartening his men and was shot through the head”.143 
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 John Buckley Rye was a 56 year-old yarn merchant from Oldham. 
143
 F.P. Gibbon, The 42nd (East Lancashire) Division 1914-1918 (London: George Newnes, 1920), p.134 
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1/6th Lancashire Fusiliers were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald Freer 
Hammond-Smith, a Lieutenant of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in August 1914, who had 
been DAQMG with the division from January 1916 until his appointment as CO on 25 July 
1917 at the age of 33. He was wounded on 12 September 1917. 1/7th Lancashire Fusiliers 
were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel William Edward Maskell, an NCO of August 
1914 who was commissioned Lieutenant in the Devonshire Regiment  on 8 December 
1914, and served with 1/6th Manchester before moving to the Lancashire Fusiliers, 
becoming CO on 29 August 1916, aged 43. Maskell was also wounded on 12 September, 
and neither he nor Hammond-Smith were able to return to command. Lastly, 1/8th 
Lancashire Fusiliers were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel George Everard Hope, a 
Lieutenant of the Grenadier Guards in August 1914, who had variously served as ADC, 
Staff-Captain, DAAQMG and GSO3 between April 1915 and 1 June 1917 when he took 
over command aged 31 (being the only one of the quartet not to have a previous 
connection with 42nd Division). Hope was killed on 10 October 1917, stumbling into an 
enemy post at Nieuport in the dark.144 
 
In 126 Brigade,145 three battalions were commanded on 6 September by Regulars of 
August 1914. 1/9th Manchester were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Evan Colclough 
Lloyd,  a Captain of the Royal Irish Regiment in August 1914, who held four battalion 
                                                      
144
 Hope’s widow plunged into notoriety after his death. She accused her mother-in-law of kidnapping her 
two orphaned children, an action she believed motivated by her behaviour whilst contesting Herbert 
Asquith’s seat of East Fifeshire, when she “delivered a series of speeches which were characterized by coarse 
personalities at the expense of the one-time Premier”. The Sun, 9 March 1919 p.6.  It was sadly noted that 
George Hope’s mother at this point “will not believe that her only son is dead. She is convinced in her own 
mind that he will appear”. 
145
 126 Brigade, the Manchester Infantry Brigade, had a very particular local Territorial character on the 
outbreak of war as the GOC, Brigadier-General Noel Lee, originated from 6th Manchester which he 
commanded until 1911. It was Lee’s wounding in the throat and jaw on 4 June that led to Lieutenant-Colonel 
W.G. Heys assuming command of the brigade. Lee died on 21 June at Malta. 
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commands during the war.146 1/10th Manchester were commanded from 27 May 1917 by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Percy Lewis, killed by shellfire on 8 September 1917, aged 
40. A Captain of the Devonshire Regiment at the outbreak of war, he had served as a 
Brigade-Major during 1916.147 1/4th East Lancashire were commanded from 29 June 1917 
by Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Henry Seton Hart-Synnot, a Major of the East Surrey 
Regiment in August 1914.148 He had served as a GSO2 from February to June 1917 and 
commanded until 19 September 1917,149 when he was transferred to command 1st 
Lancashire Fusiliers, aged 47.150 In contrast, the CO of 1/5th East Lancashire was 
Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest William Lennard, a 29 year-old Territorial Lieutenant of 1/6th 
Gloucestershire in August 1914,151 who commanded until 20 September 1917. 
 
In 127 Brigade, two battalions were commanded by Regulars on 6 September. 1/5th 
Manchester were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Clayton Darlington, a 37 year-
old solicitor, who was senior Major of the battalion in August 1914, replacing Lieutenant-
Colonel W.S. France on 12 September 1914.152 Darlington showed considerable 
endurance, serving in Egypt, Gallipoli, Sinai and France before leaving command on 25 
                                                      
146
 He commanded 1st Royal Irish Regiment from 25 June 1915 to 4 November 1915, 1st Royal Irish Rifles 
from 17 July 1916 to 28 April 1917, 1/9th Manchester from 27 May 1917 to 6 April 1918, and 1st Munster 
from 10 October 1918 to the Armistice, spending 762 days in command in total. 
147
 Lloyd was awarded a bar to his DSO commanding during the German spring offensive of 1918: “For 
conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in command of his battalion in action. In spite of very heavy 
enemy attacks, preceded by gas and accompanied by a dense bombardment, he succeeded in maintaining his 
position, although nearly surrounded. A subsequent counter-attack enabled him to withdraw the battalion, 
inflicting casualties on the enemy in doing so. His courage and tenacity gained valuable time to reorganise 
the defence in the rear of the battle zone. Later he was severely wounded”. London Gazette, 26 July 1918, 
p.8738 
148
 Hart-Synnot, being psc, had a good deal of pre-war staff service, having been a Staff Officer, Brigade-
Major and DAAG in South Africa, ADC to the GOC UK, GSO2 China, and GSO2 India. 
149
 Not with 42nd Division. 
150
 He served briefly as GOC 6 Brigade in 1918. 
151
 His father was William Lennard, a boot retailer, who founded the chain Lennards Ltd, Ernest rising to be 
managing director in the 1930s. He had commanded 1/7th East Lancashire as a Major briefly in August 1916. 
He achieved command in 1925 of 6th Gloucestershire. 
152
 France served as AAQG from November 1914, and DAQMG from February 1917 until the Armistice. 
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May 1918.153 1/7th Manchester were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Edward 
Cronshaw, a 42 year-old brassfinisher and Captain of the 1/5th Battalion in August 1914. 
He commanded from 22 April 1916 to 20 September 1917, at which point he was 
invalided. Of the two Regulars, 1/6th Manchester were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Gilbert Henry Wedgwood. A 38 year-old Captain of the York and Lancaster Regiment in 
August 1914, 1/6th Manchester was his third battalion command before being promoted to 
command 126 Brigade on 25 May 1918.154 Lastly, 1/8th Manchester was commanded from 
26 July 1917 until 23 May 1918 by 33 year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Guy Kynaston 
Cross, a retired Regular and Captain in the Special Reserve of the 7th Hussars in August 
1914.155 
 
By 29 September 1918, however, the balance had shifted, with (in the reduced battalion 
composition of the division),156 four battalions (45 per cent) being commanded by 
Regulars, two (22 per cent) by Territorials and three by civilians (33 per cent), a position 
which reflected more Regulars/civilians and fewer Territorials than the overall average. 
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 He was invalided from Gallipoli on 30 September 1915, returning to command on 1 January 1916. 
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 He was the great-great-grandson of potter Josiah Wedgwood. He commanded 6th York and Lancaster from 
6 February to 5 November 1916, 8th West Riding from 10 May to 31 August 1917, and 1/6th Manchester from 
1 September 1917. He was another CO awarded a DSO for actions during the German spring offensive in 
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important locality to the enemy by the promptitude and rapidity of his movements. For three days he beat off 
heavy attacks, without losing a yard of ground, and the fighting spirit shown by him was a fine example to 
his men”. 
London Gazette, 26 July 1918, p.8751 
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 He commanded 4th Reserve Battalion, Leicestershire Regiment, in the UK from 1 July 1918 until the 
Armistice. 
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 In response to manpower issues, the Cabinet Committee proposed a reduction in the number of battalions 
per brigade from 4 to 3 in December 1917, although resisted by the Army Council this solution was forced 
upon the BEF, enacted in February 1918. 147 units were affected (none Regular or first-line Territorial). 










Transferred as CO to another division 10% 
Replaced, not used as CO again 50% 
 
Table 4.8: Reasons for turnover of COs of battalions in 42nd Division 
 
As Table 4.7 shows, the main reason for CO turnover in 42nd Division was replacement, 
not to serve in an active command again. At 50 per cent this is above the 38 per cent 
overall average for the BEF during the war, and the highest of the three division types. 
This indicates a highly active approach to assessment of CO suitability in the division. 
Death in action was the second highest cause of turnover. 
 
4.3.2 Case Study - 1/4th Royal Berkshire157 
As noted in Chapter Three, first-line Territorial battalions had an average of between five 
and six COs with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. The 1/4th Royal Berkshire had four 
substantive, Temporary or Acting COs of that rank during the war. 
 
At the outbreak of war the battalion was led by 49 year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Oswald 
Pearce-Serocold. He represented the growing presence of the mercantile class in the upper 
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ranks of the TF. The son of a brewer,158 he became director and chairman of Watney 
Combe & Reid. Educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, he had been 
commissioned Lieutenant in the 1st Volunteer Battalion Berkshire Regiment on 7 January 
1885, and became Lieutenant-Colonel 27 June 1900. He vacated command on 12 March 
1907, and became Supply and Transport Officer of the South Midland Volunteer Infantry 
Brigade, returning as CO on 31 October 1909.159 He had no war service.160 
 
The 1/4th Royal Berkshire disembarked at Boulogne on 31 March 1915. From May 7th to 
the end of the month Pearce-Serocold took command of 145 Brigade, and Major R. J. 
Clarke, the second-in-command, took over, as he did subsequently.161 On 14 February 
1916, Pearce-Serocold was recalled to England, playing no further part in the war.162 The 
war diary recorded the “great loss to the battalion for he had put in 32 years in the 
Regiment, 9 years as Commanding Officer”.163 
 
His departure may have simply reflected the replacement of an older commander, but 
followed the appointment of Brigadier-General H. R. Done on 15 December 1915, when 
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 His father was Charles Pearce-Serocold, the son of a clergyman; his mother was Marie St. Leger Grenfell 
daughter of Colonel George St Leger Grenfell, a British soldier of fortune, who claimed to have fought in 
Algeria, Morocco, South America, the Crimea and the Indian Mutiny. Grenfell joined the Confederate Army 
during the American Civil War, and was part of the ‘Chicago Conspiracy,’ a plot to establish a North-
Western Confederacy. He was believed drowned escaping from subsequent imprisonment. 
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 He was awarded a brevet Colonelcy on 30 April 1910. 
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 His brother Eric was CO 2nd King’s Royal Rifle Corps in August 1914, and achieved the rank of 
Brigadier-General commanding 68 Brigade, 23rd Division. 
161
 When Pearce-Serocold went on leave from 15 to 21 August 1915. Clarke took over command of the 
brigade from 21 August to 1 September 1915 and from 2 to 10 November 1915. Ford Madox Ford, who 
served as an officer in the Welsh Regiment, put the following words into the mouth of ‘General Campion’: 
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to be killed.” [No More Parades (VRE Publishing: 2012, originally published 1925), Kindle edition  p.514 
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their role. 
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 He was transferred to the TF Reserve on 19 April 1916. Subsequently made a CMG, Pearce-Serocold 
served as Honorary Colonel of the Battalion between 1920 and 1946, and became Deputy Lieutenant and 
Justice of the Peace for Berkshire, dying in 1951. 
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 TNA WO/95/2762 War Diary 1/4th Battalion Royal Berkshire Regiment 
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Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Schofield (1/4th Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire) was also 
removed (17 December 1915). Clarke took over formally as CO from 14 March.164 
 
Aged 40 at the outbreak of war, Robert Joyce Clarke was a Charterhouse-educated 
Abingdon clothing manufacturer. He was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in the 1st Volunteer 
Battalion Berkshire Regiment on 5 February 1896. He served in South Africa 1900-1, 
briefly as a Railway Staff Officer. He was promoted Major on 18 March 1913, serving 
again as Railway Transport Officer in August 1914. Clarke was to prove an able and 
resilient CO. He was awarded the DSO on 1 October 1916 in relation to his battalion’s 
various actions on the Somme: “He has handled his battalion with great skill and 
determination. On three separate occasions his fine leading has achieved important 
success”.165 On 11 January 1918 whilst with the battalion in Italy he was honoured with a 
CMG.166 On 13 April 1918 he was transferred to the command of the newly formed 
divisional (48th) Battalion Machine Gun Corps. Captain C.R.M.F. Cruttwell wrote of him: 
His departure was deeply regretted. He had led the Battalion through all 
its serious fighting, and had gained the complete confidence of all. He 
had kept a strict discipline without worrying the men about trifles; they 
could all appreciate his administrative ability, his grasp of detail and 
practical concern for their comfort. 167 
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 He was mentioned in despatches on 5 occasions and given the French decoration Order of Merit, 
Agriculture, 4th Class. 
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 C.R.M.F. Cruttwell, The War Service of the 1/4th  Royal Berkshire Regiment (T.F.) (London: Blackwell, 




Dates Reason Replacement 
23 March - 1 April 1916 Leave Capt. G.A. Battock 
11-12 May 1916 Acting Brigadier Capt. J.N. Aldworth 
11-17 June 1916 CO Conference Capt. G.A. Battock 
20-23 November 1916 Acting Brigadier Maj. G.A. Battock 
3 December 1916 - 4 January 1917 Leave Maj. G.A. Battock/ Capt. J.H. Goulden 
15-27 January 1917 Acting Brigadier Maj. J.N. Aldworth 
9-20 April 1917 Acting Brigadier Maj. J.N. Aldworth 
9-14 May 1917 Acting Brigadier Maj. J.N. Aldworth 
24 May - 5 June 1917 Leave Maj. J.N. Aldworth 
2-15 September 1917 Acting Brigadier Maj. J.N. Aldworth 
17 September - 13 October 1917 Leave Capt. O.B. Challenor/Maj. J.N. Aldworth 
21-28 October 1917 CO Conference Maj. J.N. Aldworth 
25 January - 25 February 1918 Leave Maj. J.N. Aldworth 
23-26 March 1918 Acting Brigadier ? 
 
Table 4.9: Officers acting as CO during absences of Lieutenant-Colonel R.J.Clarke 
 
Clarke had fourteen absences from the battalion (see Table 4.4) during his two year tenure. 
On all occasions the replacement was an original officer of the battalion. Two Captains, 
promoted Major, feature prominently in this list. Firstly, Grenville Arthur Battock, a 
solicitor, who was a Captain at the outbreak of war and ended it a Major.168 Secondly, John 
Newton Aldworth, the son of a farmer, also a Captain in August 1914. Aldworth became 
the principal choice as replacement, and on 12 October 1916 was sent to Senior Officer 
School. He was, however, never given a battalion command, Clarke’s replacement being 
Arthur Barwick Lloyd-Baker, a Major who had commanded 1/4th Oxfordshire & 
Buckinghamshire Light Infantry between 1 February 1918 and 27 March 1918 within the 
same brigade. 
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Born in 1873, second-eldest son of a landowning family of Hardwicke Court, 
Gloucestershire, Lloyd-Baker had been commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in 1st 
Buckinghamshire Volunteers on 27 September 1902, and was a Captain in August 1914.169 
Educated at Eton and New College, Oxford, he had taken up a teaching post at Cheltenham 
College. He served as a Staff Captain from August 1914 to February 1916 with 145 
Brigade, and had attended the Senior Officer Course in January 1917. Cruttwell noted “his 
characteristic kindness and tact”.170 After one spell of leave (6-27 July 1918, when Major 
Aldworth again took over), and a further attendance at a CO’s course in Padua in June, he 
remained CO until, as his diary notes on 16 August: “Brigadier round line: proposes 6 
months at home for me. Rather attractive but almost no hope of coming back to same Bn or 
even Division”.  In four months, Lloyd-Baker had clearly built a bond with his new 
battalion. He noted further on 30 August: “GOC Div talked about my going & said he 
couldn’t spare me. Apparently Watt put me in without further consultation after 16th”.171 
He was, however, given his rest and transferred to the command of a Cyclist Battalion, 
2/1st Essex Yeomanry in Ireland on 27 October 1918. 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel Hector Fraser Whitehead, a 40 year-old Scot, who arrived on 29 
August 1918 and served as CO until the armistice, was a retired OR of 1st Volunteer 
Battalion Cameron Highlanders (1896-1906), who had risen to the rank of Sergeant in the 
2nd Motorcycle Section, Lovat’s Scouts, and who had been both a writer and National 
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 His brother Michael Granville Lloyd-Baker followed his example by joining the Royal Gloucestershire 
Hussars three year later, to be killed in action 23 April 1916 in Palestine, at the Battle of Quatia. 
170
 Cruttwell, War Service,  location 1517 
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 J. Popplewell, ed., A Gloucestershire Diarist – Lt. Col. A.B. Lloyd-Baker of Hardwicke Court 
(Gloucestershire: Thornhill, 1993), p.140. Brigadier General D.M. Watt, GOC 145 Brigade, was replaced on 
27 August. Lloyd-Baker’s departure was therefore not a side-lining by a new Brigadier, rather, perhaps, the 
result of a benign gesture from a Brigade HQ that knew him well. 
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Health Insurance Commission Assistant Inspector in August 1914.172 He was 
commissioned Lieutenant in 23rd Northumberland Fusiliers on 22 December 1914, 
transferring to 2/5th East Lancashire as a Major on 19 February 1917, assuming command 
between 28 April 1917 and the disbandment of the battalion on 7 August 1918. Prior to 
this he was involved in the training of the 131st U.S. Infantry Battalion where he was 
described as “a hard-headed fighting old Scotchman (who) believed in the extermination of 
the Hun from the start”.173 Captain Cruttwell described him as “a brave man, but of a 
narrow and unsympathetic school, staled by continuous service throughout the war”.174  
 
These two contrasting assessments should, perhaps, be seen in the light of 1/4th Berkshire 
having been commanded by three career Territorials, two of whom were original officers 
of the battalion in 1914, comprising 50 per cent of COs. Helen McCartney has commented 
on the very particular nature of social exchange and command in TF battalions.175 
Whitehead’s career, despite having an OR Volunteer background, suggests a competent 
officer who established his credentials as CO in the New Armies and a second-line TF 
Battalion, and who, in his aggressive and business-like way, probably had no time for the 
gentlemanly Territorial ethos that had persisted in 1/4th Berkshire. 
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 He was Secretary of the Cairn Terrier Club and published handbooks on both the Cairn and Yorkshire 
Terriers. 
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 J.B. Sanbourn and G.N. Malstrom, The 131st U.S. Infantry in the World War (Chicago: Unknown 
publisher, 1919), p.36 
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 Cruttwell, War Service, location 1607 
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 H. B. McCartney, Citizen Soldiers: The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp.121-161. She notes that the pre-war “social homogeneity … 
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paternalistic-deferential exchange was directly threatened”. As the social composition of the battalions 
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1/4th Berkshire therefore went against the trend of increasing influx of Regulars from 
second to third appointment, the senior Major of 1914 proving a more than capable soldier, 
the need for stiffening with a Regular never arising. Two of the three Lieutenant-Colonels 
were replaced, one retired, the other rested, the other being transferred to another 
command. 
 
4.4 Senior Officer School 
 
The three battalion case studies indicate that potential COs did not evolve solely though 
practical experience, but also through Senior Officer School, where an attempt was made 
to impart a coherent body of knowledge and assess suitability. 
 
In March 1916, Lieutenant-Colonel R.J. Kentish,176 who had been running Third Army 
School at Flixécourt, initiated CO conferences “for a week at a time, where 20 or 30 COs 
and senior officers met for discussions”.177 Lieutenant-Colonel A.C. Johnston, 10th 
Cheshire,178 attended such a conference, albeit with a larger number of attendees (150 
officers) at 2nd Army Central School, Wisques, 24-30 December 1916. It comprised a 
                                                      
176
 Reginald John Kentish was born in 1876, entering the army rather than the family publishing business, 
W.H. Hayden. He attended Malvern College, and scraped into RMC with the help of a crammer. He was 
commissioned in the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers in 1897, and had been a Staff Captain in South Africa 
in 1901; regimental Adjutant; ADC to GOC 2nd Division at Aldershot 1910-11 (where he began actively 
upon his interest in facilities for physical recreation, which culminated in the setting up of the National 
Playing Fields Association in 1924); and Brigade Major, 6th London Infantry Brigade 1913-14, in which post 
he served until 6 September 1914, when he allegedly smuggled himself to his battalion in France. He was 
promoted to command 1st East Lancashire from 20 June 1915 to 24 September 1915, thence to Third Army 
School, transferred on 14 April 1916 to command 76 Infantry Brigade, which office he held until transferred 
as Commandant (Brigadier-General) of Senior Officer School. Opinionated and a thorn in the side of his 
superiors, it is possible that a critical 16 page report sent to Fourth Army HQ was the trigger for this. He 
returned after 14 months to the command of 166 Brigade on 4 December 1917, in which post he remained 
until the Armistice. [B. Kentish, This Foul Thing Called War (Lewes: Book Guild, 1997)]. 
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 Kentish, Foul, p.63. He never actually directed these, being promoted to brigade command. 
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 Alexander Colin Johnston, a Regular Lieutenant of the Worcestershire Regiment in August 1914, served 
as a GSO3 from January to February 1916 and as a Brigade-Major from March to August 1916. He 
commanded 10th Cheshire from 28 August 1916 to 13 September 1917, at which date he was appointed to 
command 126 Brigade until 16 September 1917. 
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mixture of lectures,179 visits to facilities,180 and “war games”. Johnston placed most 
emphasis on the conference dialogue at Army HQ: “Where the authorities who are only too 
anxious to help were able to learn a lot of our troubles and difficulties at first hand, with 
the result that a lot of useful and helpful things are going to be done at once”.181 
 
In October 1916 Kentish was sent to Aldershot to establish these conferences in an 
extended form as Senior Officer School. He recorded that Sir Douglas Haig directly tasked 
him with this, allegedly stating: 
I am sending you back to Aldershot to organise this new School because, 
judging from reports from my Army Commanders, I learn that Majors 
and Senior Captains have little knowledge of the duties of a Commanding 
Officer. To give them this knowledge I am sending them to you, so that 
when they return they will not only know how to lead their men in the 
attack but how to get them in the right mood to follow them. I want you to 
concentrate on leadership and morale and leave the tactical side to your 
staff.182 
 
In late 1917, C.P. Clayton attended the School.183 He described the process of selection as 
follows: “The Colonel says that he has been asked whether he could spare me to go to the 
senior officers’ course”. The recommendation therefore came from brigade at least. A 
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 Including map reading, bayonet fighting, and intelligence, and an unspecified but “good lecture by Tim 
Harrington from 2nd Army Staff”. 
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 Including 2nd Army Sniping School at Steenvoorde, the Trench Mortar School at Berthen, the Signal 
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 Charles Pritchard Clayton was a 29 year-old teacher who had joined the Special Reserve of the Welsh 




friend was also “offered a vacancy” and “finally we decide that we will both accept”,184 
implying that there was no compulsion.185 
 
At Aldershot, Clayton found a “merry company”: 
The tutors are for the most part colonels who have just recovered or are 
recovering from wounds. The “pupils” are an odd mixture. There are a 
few colonels and majors who, like ourselves, have had a long spell in 
France and are here really for a rest. There are senior Territorial officers 
who have been on home jobs and are here to get the hang of work on the 
Western Front, so that they may take their rank out there despite their 
inexperience.186 
 
H. Lloyd-Williams,187 who commanded 9th Royal Welsh Fusiliers between 25 April and 27 
July 1918, attended the School between 8 October and 12 December 1918. He described 
the teaching format:188 
The school was divided into three groups, each group forming a mess, 
and in its turn divided into five or six syndicates, each syndicate 
comprising about sixteen senior officers under a syndicate 
Commander. 
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 Lieutenant-Colonel J.L. Jack, 2nd West Yorkshire, declined to attend in January 1917, viewing it as an 
“infernal nuisance” and was never invited again. [J. Terraine, General Jack’s Diary (London: Cassell, 2000), 
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 Clayton, Hungry, p.200 
187
 Hugh Lloyd-Williams, a 25 year-old barrister in August 1914, was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in the 9th 
Royal Welsh Fusiliers on 12 September 1914, the battalion he would command in 1918. 
188
 IWM Docs 13838 H. Lloyd-Williams, ‘Personal Experiences of the Years of the European War’, pp. 97-
100. Major D. Reitz described how: “We started as privates, gradually working our way through the ranks, 
from section commander to corporal, thence to sergeant, platoon and company commander, and ultimately to 
O.C. Battalion, in order to acquaint ourselves in in tabloid form with the whole field of infantry work”. D. 
Reitz, Trekking On (London: Faber & Faber, 1933), p.123 
208 
 
Clayton scorned the subject matter: 
 
The exercise in drill is what I did in the O.T.C. before this was thought of, 
and on the methods of attack and defence I am afraid that Baxter and I 
frequently disagree with Kentish and his instructors. We frequently 
challenge their principles from our experience and have hot 
discussions.189  
 
Lloyd-Williams, in contrast, found that: 
The course was thorough and comprehensive and although we were 
obliged to carry out the smallest degree and detail of work, drill, and 
so on there was great liberty of action and opinion. The day’s work 




Lloyd-Williams, who described how “everyone worked, everyone played 
wholeheartedly”,190  continued that all participants had to pass riding school, drill, bayonet 
fighting, and climbing high walls; and participated in “flagged attacks and extended order 
practice, and graduated tactical schemes”. These were carried out on the “Hog’s Back near 
Wellington Memorial, around the Royal Pavilion, on Laffan’s Plain, the Basingstoke 
Canal, Crondall Village, where we employed Canadian troops, Ivelety Farm … Norris’ 
Bridge, and Foresters’ Inn, Caesar’s Camp, Twezeldown, and Beacon Hill and Longmoor”. 
This speaks to an active and practical training.191 
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 On exercises, Lloyd-Williams noted: “Sumptuous lunches … so sumptuous on occasions the instructors 
themselves were unable to maintain an interest in the conferences”. 
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 The French army had a similar school system for COs. Lieutenant-Colonel R. Feilding, 6th Connaught 
Rangers was attached for three weeks in February 1918 to the ‘Court Supérieure d’Infanterie’, at Vadenay, 
near Chalons-sur-Marne. [R. Feilding, War letters to a Wife, ed. J. Walker (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2001), 
p.154-6]. He described lectures for three hours or more each morning, and visits “to see different Army 
Schools etc.” in the afternoons. Feilding had not attended Senior Officer School at Aldershot, but had 
attended a five day COs course at Wisques in February 1917. Whether or not he was contrasting the two 
experiences he wrote: “I am much struck with the thoroughness and efficiency of these Frenchmen, and the 
serious way – in contrast to ours – that they go about the war. I wonder if they overdo it. But it is an 
interesting and valuable experience”. 
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Clayton and his compatriot were “not indiscreet and we both finish up with reports which 
affirm that we are ‘recommended for immediate command of a battalion in the field’”.192 




Whilst no records of Senior Officer School survive, it was the practice to publish the 
lectures as Notes for Commanding Officers. The fourth course, held in the first half of 
1917, can be examined in terms of its tutors and participants, details of which are included 
in the volume.193  
 
There were six Instructional Staff,194 three Group Commanders,195 and 19 Syndicate 
Commanders,196 as well as one Royal Engineer Instructor. They were rich in battle 
experience. There were 227 attendees, with ranks from Lieutenant to Lieutenant-Colonel, 
20 per cent being Dominion officers.197 Eight per cent already had experience of 
command, and clearly part of the School’s purpose was to enhance the knowledge/skills of 
those already in post. All bar four were infantry.198 
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 Twenty-five Canadians, 14 Australians, four South Africans and three New Zealanders. 
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 Three were cavalry, and the most junior participant, a Lieutenant, was from a Light Trench Mortar 
Battery. Fourteen per cent of those in attendance were from a Regular battalion, 10 per cent from a Special 
Reserve battalion, and 38 per cent each from Service and TF battalions. 
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Of the British infantry regiments, 146 officers who had no previous experience of 
command can be followed in terms of whether they subsequently commanded battalions 
prior to the Armistice, a timespan of a year and a half following completing the course, a 
period likely long enough for these officers to achieve command if they were going to. 
Removing those who were subsequently killed,199  40 per cent achieved a CO post as 
Lieutenant-Colonel. Whilst we do not know how many of these men were approved, as 
was Clayton, the evidence of this course suggests that there was no foregone conclusion 
from attendance, to the point that an attendee was less rather than more likely to achieve 
command. The army at this point in the war evidently possessed clear notions as to who 
should progress to CO status and was judicious as to who was appointed. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
When the different patterns of command in Regular, New Army and Territorial units are 
examined, it is revealed that the professional soldier kept a strong grip on the command of 
Regular battalions, making up 93 per cent of commands. Further, there are strong 
indications that despite the opportunities opening up for more merit-based promotion, 
regimental and, to a lesser extent, battalion ‘particularity’ in promotion continued to a 
considerable degree in Regular units. Patterns of turnover varied from division to division 
and battalion to battalion; thus 5th Division had a rate of promotion to Brigadier-General 
three times the average rate, whilst 2nd Hampshire’s CO fatality rate scythed through 
possible promotion candidates. 
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Professional soldiers similarly made up exactly two-thirds of Service Battalion commands, 
yet these units also showcased the developing merit-based promotion. This is not only 
exemplified by the two other ranks who rose to command 13th Essex, but also the rising 
stars of the citizen CO group, who on 29 September 1918 comprised a third of 
commands.200  
 
Battalions with a pre-war identity kept a stronger grip on ownership of command. 
Professional soldiers made their lowest contribution to command in first-line TF units, just 
under a third (rising to a half of second-line units), despite the noted inadequacy of a 
number of TF senior officers of August 1914. There was a less than wholehearted initial 
commitment to the appointment of younger, active internal replacements in first-line units. 
Although the TF officer would struggle to achieve senior command, in the first-line 
Territorial units, half of commands were retained by TF officers of August 1914, although 
this had dropped to a third by late 1918. The growing contribution of the citizen of August 
1914, however, proceeded more slowly and to a lesser extent in the TF, never matching the 
contribution to Service Battalions. 
 
What proves equally interesting is the examination of those who took temporary command 
as Majors. These individuals demonstrate evidence of the grooming of promising 
individuals for command, and the preparation of many of them for this role by Senior 
Officer School, providing strong evidence of the growing merit-based approach, and the 
perceived importance of a skills-based approach to battalion command. 
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There is indeed a great art in knowing how to command. 
 
Major-General T.D Pilcher2 
 
Watch me and follow my lead. 




The duties of a Commanding Officer were set out in King’s Regulations. He was 
responsible for the maintenance of discipline, efficiency, and “proper system”, and the 
health of his troops. He was accountable for stores and arms, issue of supplies, 
promulgation of orders, and proper application of regimental funds. He was to prevent 
disputes, was responsible for “the systematic and efficient instruction of officers under his 
command”, and was to bring to the attention of the inspecting general officer those officers 
“distinguished for proficiency” as well as those who from “incapacity or apathy” were 
unsupportive of him or “deficient in knowledge of their duties”. 3 
 
                                                      
1
 C.E. Montague, Disenchantment (London: Chatto & Windus, 1922), p.219. 
2
 T.D. Pilcher, A General's Letters to His Son on Obtaining His Commission (London: Cassell, 1917), p.55 
3
 War Office, The King’s Regulations and Orders for the Army, 1912. Reprinted with Amendments Published 
in Army Orders up to 1 August 1914 (London: HMSO, 1914), p.20-1. First published in 1731, King's 
Regulations are a collection of orders and regulations in force in the armed services, forming guidance for 
officers of these armed services in all matters of discipline and personal conduct. 
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Colonel W.A.B. Dennys (CO 31st Punjabis) noted: “Till I took up my duties … I had no 
conception of the many difficulties, responsibilities, and power (for good or bad) that the 
command of some 1,100 men carries with it”.4 He described his peacetime duties: 
The system of training all the officers, N.C.O.s and men, the issue of all 
orders to that end (often for a whole year in advance), the supervising of 
all work undertaken for training in the field, and in the lines, the 
maintenance of discipline, and a true “esprit de corps”, the 
responsibility of all the finance, the payment of the men, their food and 
clothing, the annual confidential reports on British and Indian Officers, 
in fact the proper organisation of the whole machine … All orders have 
to issue from the CO; little can be done without them. 
 
Dennys was putting into practice the precepts of Colonel M. Gosset:5 
The commanding officer of a Battalion is the life and soul of it – he must 
have his eye on everything, know everyone’s wants, and never imagine, 
because he has established a good system, that it will keep going 
without a perpetual greasing of the wheels.6 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel J.L. Jack, 2nd West Yorkshire, listed the administration-driven daily 
schedule for a CO in the trenches of the Western Front. After being woken by his servant 
at dawn with tea and biscuit: 
6 a.m.:- Breakfast; receive the companies’ written reports and send my 
battalion report by orderly to Brigade Headquarters … 8-1 o’c:- Walk 
round the companies’ trenches accompanied by the adjutant, medical 
officer, our three orderlies and one bugler.7 1 p.m.:- Lunch and two 
hours’ rest. 3 o’c:- Write and despatch to Brigade Headquarters the 
Situation Report for the day. 4 p.m.:- Tea, after which, except for dinner, 
there are papers, organisation and other matters to be dealt with till 
midnight – often later – when I lie down on my bed.8 
 
                                                      
4
 W.A.B. Dennys, Some Reminiscences of my Life (Privately printed, 1935), p.22. Born in 1859, William 
Annesley Burton Dennys had been commissioned into the Wiltshire Regiment but had transferred to the 
Bengal Staff Corps in 1880, and had been CO 1903-7. 
5
 Gossett had commanded 1st Battalion, Dorsetshire Regiment, 1884-1888. 
6
 M. Gossett, ‘Battalion Command’, Royal United Service Institution Journal, 35 (1891), p.475 
7
 James Lochead Jack was a Captain of 1st Scottish Rifles in August 1914, and commanded 2nd West 
Yorkshire from 22 August 1916 to 31 July 1917. He was evidently fond of the sound of wind instruments, 
sending his battalion ‘over the top’ at Villers-Guislain on 18 April 1917 with a ‘Tally-ho’ on his hunting 
horn. [J. Terraine, General Jack’s Diary  (London: Cassell, 2000, originally published 1964), p.214].  
8
 Terraine, Jack’s Diary, p.164  
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Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Horsfall, 2nd Duke of Wellington’s, echoed this, writing: “‘Curse 
all paper’ is the fervent cry of every CO out here”, and again: “the Bumf blizzard has 
commenced to blow in earnest. I have about 5 hours work in front of me answering 
papers”.9 Lieutenant-Colonel W. Fraser, 1/6th Gordon Highlanders, found that battle 
increased his administrative tasks: “The worst part of battle is the amount of writing 
connected with it. Before, orders and instructions by the thousand; afterwards account of 
the battle, recommendations, etc”.10 In respect of the competing demands, “sometimes one 
thinks the job is almost beyond one”.11 
 
These were the duties, mostly without glory. This chapter examines how the CO 
commanded and led, and how this was experienced. 
 
5.1 Leadership and command 
Leadership and command are not the same concept. The relationship between the two is 
unidirectional - effective leadership makes for more effective command.12 In his study of 
Second World War Australian battalion commanders, Garth Pratten defines command as 
                                                      
9
 IWM Docs 14929 ‘A gentleman at war – Alfred Horsfall through his letters to his wife October 1916-
October 1917’, letters dated 26 December 1916 and 22 February 1917. Alfred Garnett Horsfall, a Regular 
Captain of the Duke of Wellington’s West Riding Regiment in August 1914 commanded 2nd West Riding 
between 6 December 1916 and 9 October 1917 when he was killed in action at Third Ypres. 
10
 D. Fraser (ed.), In Good Company – The First World War Letters and Diaries of the Hon. William Fraser, 
Gordon Highlanders (Salisbury: Michael Russell, 1990), p.140. William Fraser, a Regular Lieutenant of the 
Gordon Highlanders in August 1914 commanded 1/6th Gordon Highlanders between 8 May 1917 and 1 
March 1918, and 1st Gordon Highlanders from 5 September 1918 to the Armistice. 
11
 Fraser, Good Company, p.188 
12
 Nor does either guarantee successful outcome – many things influence outcome on the battlefield that are 
not within the commander’s control. 
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consisting of “four basic functions: decision-making, control, leadership and resource 
management”.13 
 
The era lacked a science of leadership,14 yet John Bourne remarks: “‘Leadership was a 
concept which the Army was confident it understood”, namely: “Courage, Duty and 
Discipline”.15 Leadership skills were not taught. Brigadier-General H.W.M. Watson noted: 
“Before the war the leader obtained leadership by the light of nature … no help was given 
… it was up to the individual”.16 It was assumed that such skills had been acquired by 
osmosis, officer candidates developing within the ethos of the public school.17 
 
Leadership is “a process of influence to achieve coordination between individuals for the 
pursuit of mutual goals”,18 coordination self-evidently being one of the key ‘control’ issues 
                                                      
13
 G. Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War (Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), p.17. All the functions described in King’s Regulations were ‘resource management’ 
issues under this classification. 
14
 Gosset’s Royal United Services Institution lecture, delivered on 13 March 1891, although perhaps 
remarkable in that the subject was addressed at all, did not kickstart the science. He advocated discipline 
(“you cannot rule 800 men with rose-water”) balanced with praise. He advocated lashings of regimental 
history, but also good training. Lastly, he recommended devolution of responsibility down the chain of 
command. 
15
 J.M. Bourne, ‘British Generals in the First World War’ in G.D. Sheffield, ed. Leadership and Command – 
The Anglo-American Military Experience Since 1861 (London: Brassey’s, 2002), pp. 94-6. An ideal of 
military leadership was woven into literature and myth. The officer’s code as exemplified in the works of 
Rudyard Kipling emphasised: “Stoicism, self-denial, obedience, loyalty to Regiment and to their men, and 
adventurousness”. [M. Edwardes, ‘Oh to Meet an Army Man’, in J. Gross ed., Rudyard Kipling: The Man, 
His Work and his World (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972), p.40; cited in G.D. Sheffield, Leadership 
in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First 
World War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000).] 
16
 Notes for Commanding Officers (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, November 1918). Watson, a Regular 
Captain of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps in August 1914, commanded 2/4th West Surrey from 21 August 
1916 to 2 December 1916, and 1st King’s Royal Rifle Corps from 23 July 1917 to 23 February 1918. 
17
 Which to define requires simply the substitution of the word ‘School’ for ‘Regiment’ in the Kipling quote 
in footnote 15. Even if the Battle of Waterloo was not won on the playing fields of Eton (a remark attributed 
to the Duke of Wellington, but probably apocryphal), it was assumed that team sports played an important 
part in the development of this ethos. For a discussion of these ideas, and a review of criticism, see Sheffield, 
Leadership, pp.43-8; also C. Moore-Bick, Playing the Game – The British Junior Infantry Officer on the 
Western Front 1914-18 (Solihull: Helion, 2011); and J. Lewis-Stempel, Six Weeks – The Short and Gallant 
Life of the British Officer in the First World War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010). 
18
 M. Van Vugt, The Nature in Leadership, p.142 
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of a unit in combat. A search for the ideal characteristics of leadership is likely a fruitless 
quest.19 Modern psychology rejects the “heroic myth” of the individual with special 
qualities, noting: “There is no evidence that any particular quality (or combination of 
qualities) can guarantee success”.20 
 
In terms of the anatomy of command, a CO had legal authority granted to him by King’s 
Regulations.21 In terms of its physiology, it was the influence that stemmed from his 
relationships with his subordinates that created the possibility for most effective command 
outcomes. Garth Pratten, following John French and Bertram Raven, describes the two 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 http://www.professormarkvanvugt.com/files/Ch5_VanVugt.pdf (accessed 3 October 2012). Van Vugt is a 
proponent of “evolutionary leadership theory”, suggesting that the leadership and followership psychology is 
shaped as much as any other characteristic by natural selection. He suggests further that warfare is one of “at 
least six crucial fitness problems in ancestral environments selecting for leadership: (1) finding resources, (2) 
conflict management, (3) warfare, (4) building alliances, (5) resource distribution, and (6) teaching”; i.e. 
humans have evolved to accept leadership in certain activities key to survival (p.147). 
19
 Gary Sheffield’s discussion of officer-man relations and the paternalism-deference exchange reviews 
leadership characteristics and styles, (Sheffield, Leadership, p. 41), citing the 1927 work of F.C. Bartlett. Van 
Vugt, (Nature in Leadership, p.142) outlines four major social science theories of leadership: personality 
(which focusses on particular personality or behavioural characteristics shared by leaders); cognitive (which 
focusses on the leader’s intelligence and experience); situational (which focusses on leadership styles adapted 
to the maturity of the group); and contingency (which focusses on optimal adaptation to internal/external 
events). 
20
 S.A. Haslam, S.D. Reicher & M.J. Platow, The New Psychology of Leadership – Identity, Influence and 
Power (Hove: Psychology Press, 2011), p.199. Italics in original. Sheffield emphasises the paternalism-
deference exchange, the officer’s first duty being to look after the needs of his men before his own.  
Paternalism was the basis of the officer’s “battle … for the hearts of his men”; an OR who felt looked-after 
would “follow him anywhere”.  Officers had also: “To be both militarily efficient and … protective of their 
men”; courageous under fire yet not foolhardy; and their men expected them “to behave in a fitting, 
gentlemanly manner when out of action”.  Sheffield quotes an anonymous OR’s composite officer which 
reflects the required contradictions of balancing something akin to a family atmosphere within 
platoon/company/battalion and the necessity for discipline: “Boyish and middle-aged, cool and reckless, 
grave and humorous, aloof and intimate; a martinet lapsing into an indulgent father; a thwarter becoming an 
aider and abetter; an enemy melting into a friend”. (Sheffield, Leadership, p.109). 
21
 Garth Pratten, (Australian Battalion Commanders, pp.23-4), refers to John French and Bertram Raven’s 
model of leadership “Founded on the exchange of ‘social power’ – power being defined as the potential to 
influence others”, which describes five bases of social power, the first three of which are: (i) ‘legitimate 
power’ – the potential for influence derived from being the incumbent office; (ii) ‘reward power’ – influence 
from having the capacity to give/withhold reward; (iii) ‘coercive power’ – influence derived from having the 




most important aspects of this influence as ‘expert’ power, influence deriving from skill; 
and ‘referent’ power, influence deriving from being ‘personally liked and respected’.22 
 
Both legal authority and the influence granted by expert and referent power are central to 
‘contingency leadership’ theory, which concerns the relationship between leadership and 
situation favourableness.23 Contingency leadership is described in terms of three 
decreasingly important dimensions: (i) leader-follower relationship; (ii) degree of task 
structure; and (iii) the leader's power obtained through formal authority. Situations are 
favourable if all three of these dimensions are high, i.e. if: (i) the leader is accepted and 
respected by followers; (ii) the task is very structured; and (iii) a great deal of authority and 
power are formally attributed to the leader.  
 
This model is a good fit to the nature of battalion command, where a high degree of task 
structure and formal authority are guaranteed. The key to effective leadership therefore lies 
in developing dimension (i), the key to which is ‘referent power’; and enhancing technical 
skill, i.e. ‘expert power’, in the execution of dimension (ii), the structured task. 
 
The army put much emphasis on identity,24 and the modern psychology of ‘identity 
leadership’ happily concurs. Four matters can be distinguished within the leader-follower 
relationship which are critical to referent power, all concerning the creation of a shared 
identity or sense of “we-ness”. Firstly, “being one of us”, being representative of the group. 
Secondly, “doing it for us”, championing the interests of the group. Thirdly, crafting a 
                                                      
22
 ‘Expert power’ and ‘referent power’ are the remaining two bases of social power in the French and Raven 
model – see footnote 21. (Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders, p.24) 
23
 F.E. Fiedler, Leadership (New York: General Learning Press, 1971). 
24
 See Chapter Three section 3.1.2. for a discussion of ‘cap badge’ issues. 
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“sense of us”, shaping group identity; and fourthly, “making us matter”, defining specific 
‘good things’ that the group stands for.25 
 
Senior Officer School began to teach battalion leadership formally in late 1916.26 The key 
question to be addressed by a CO, participants were informed, was: “How am I going to 
make the most of them, and how are they going to make the most of me?”27 It was 
emphasised that men needed to be “commanded by a man”, the italics in the original 
conveying the notion of an individual with presence.28 Six key factors were identified. (i) 
Courage, which was “essential” (particularly to the sense of “being one of us”). (ii) 
Knowledge, “combined with imagination, forethought, and common sense”. (iii) 
Demeanour, being “even-tempered throughout – not rattled on a sudden situation”.29 (iv) 
Fairness and justice, (paternalism being the cornerstone of “doing it for us”). (v) Civility; 
and (vi) “Hard work combined with imagination”. Senior Officer School was therefore 
concentrating closely on the first dimension of “contingency leadership”. The second and 
sixth factors, knowledge, hard work and imagination refer to ‘expert power’, the rest to 
‘referent power’. 
 
                                                      
25
 Haslam et al, Leadership, Chapters 4 to 7. 
26
 A lecture on leadership is absent from Notes for Commanding Officers dated early 1917 (see Chapter Four 
section 4.4), but one was delivered by Kentish on the October-December 1917 course (IWM Docs 13838 H. 
Lloyd-Williams) and the full version of such delivered by Brigadier-General H.W.M. Watson is included in 
the November 1918 edition of Notes. 
27
 Notes, November 1918, p.2 
28
 Notes, November 1918, p.2. Watson was fascinated by having found a Private who could not remember his 
CO’s name. He was absolutely right to be alarmed about this in terms of the importance of ‘we-ness’. 
29
 With the CO thinking: “This is a matter of course, which I expect as a common occurrence. I’ll just think 
about it, refrain from trying to do everyone’s job – apply my knowledge, and the whole thing will go well”. 
Notes, November 1918, p.4 
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A CO could not ‘know’ all the men in his battalion.30 The leader-follower relationship had 
therefore to be managed through others, and Senior Officer School propounded the view 
that “one of the most important things is to get a strong side of officers”.31 The interactive 
nature of command in both transmitting knowledge and values in crafting a “sense of us” 
was clearly acknowledged: 
It is a good plan to consult your section commanders when you have any 
scheme on foot. Sometimes you get valuable ideas from them, and when 
they know that they have, so to speak, a share in the business, they will 
go all out to make your plans successful.32 
 
 
Finally, it was recognised that identity, a “sense of us”, was created and skill within task 
structure was enhanced through activity. Lieutenant-General Sir Ivor Maxse,33 lecturing at 
the School, was clear as to what developing this unified purpose entailed: “There is only 
one known method of creating leaders of men and commanders whom men will follow. It 
consists in giving the leader his own men to train”.34 Lieutenant-Colonel H.M.B. de Sales 
la Terrière, CO 9th Essex, claimed ownership of this and the responsibility it entailed, 
expressing his “pride and anxiety, anxiety for the actual lives of the men whom you have 
personally trained for the sole purpose of beating the enemy”.35 
 
                                                      
30
 From neuropsychological data, the maximum social network size for humans is approximately 150 
individuals, also known as ‘Dunbar’s number’. (Van Vugt, Nature in Leadership, p.147). 
31
 Notes, November 1918, pp.4-6 
32
 Notes, November 1918, ‘The Battalion Commander’s Conference’, pp.41-9 
33
 Inspector General of Training from June 1918. 
34
 It is interesting to compare these ideas with more modern concepts of battalion leadership. Appendix Four 
sets out a resumé from The Battalion Commander’s Handbook, (Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 
1996). The overlap is clear. 
35
 IWM Docs 14737 H.M.B. de Sales la Terrière, p. 367-8. Howard Montague Bulmer de Sales la Terriere 
was a Special Reserve Lieutenant of 5th King’s Royal Rifle Corps in August 1914.  He commanded 9th Essex 
between 15 October 1917 and 28 April 1918, resuming command just prior to the Armistice. 
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Brigadier-General R.B. Bradford left rough notes on his view of the science of battalion 
command:36 
Army same as any business concern … Leadership – ability to make 
comrades follow you. Within power of everyone to become a Leader. 
Ability to appreciate requirements of human nature … Power & ability 
to set example to subordinates. Knowledge. Determination & intensity 
of purpose. Optimistic and enthusiastic. Look after men’s comfort & 
welfare … Justice. Friend as well as leader. Fitness & Endurance. 
Courage. Cheerfulness.37 
 
Bradford, his words astonishingly ‘modern’, understood leadership very well. He could not 
have demonstrated a better grasp of the ‘leader-follower’ relationship, ‘crafting a sense of 
us’, and ‘making us matter’, than in his welcome speech to men newly arrived from 
England: 
Most of you will have heard something of our Battalion. It has a great 
reputation. That reputation is not built up by one or two flash-in-the-pan 
incidents. It has been built up by the hard, honest and soldierly conduct 
of the men at all times, and by their skill and pluck in action … Our 
battalion is universally respected and envied, so you see a great 
responsibility rests with you. You have got to help us maintain, and even 
increase, our present efficiency … We are all working for the same 
purpose, the defeat of the enemy, and we must work together, each for 
each, and all for each. 
 
Bradford did not need to appeal to a regimental history few might care to make any 
identification with.38 He knew that binding men to the identity and shared purpose of the 
unit in the present was all that was necessary.39 
                                                      
36
 Roland Boys Bradford was a 2nd Lieutenant of 2nd Durham Light Infantry in August 1914. He commanded 
1/9th Durham Light Infantry between 15 September 1916 and 5 November 1917. 
37
 Anonymous, Brigadier-General R.B. Bradford, V.C., M.C. and His Brothers (Newport: Ray Westlake, 
n.d.), pp.95-6 
38
 The Senior Officer School leadership lecture specifically encouraged COs to do exactly this at this point. 
Lieutenant-Colonel S.E. Norris, a Regular Captain of the Liverpool Regiment in August 1914, took over the 
severely depleted 1st Liverpool on 20 August 1918: “I was told that a draft of 20 officers and 750 other ranks 
was on its way to bring the battalion up to strength, and that I should be given four days to reconstruct and 
get ready to go into the line.  The draft, which arrived a few hours after I had taken over command, consisted 
of Manchester Territorials, all thoroughly disconcerted at being sent to a strange unit instead of their own. I 
remembered my regimental history, and this gave some hint of the best thing to do in the big task of pulling 
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The remainder of this chapter examines the experience of command and hence the key 
aspects of the ‘leader-follower relationship’. 
 
5.2 The experience of command – the perspective of the other ranks 
Other ranks (ORs) wrote infrequently about their COs, predictably writing more about 
their company and platoon commanders. Sergeant J.F. Lucy, 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, the 
author of a well-regarded memoir, hardly mentions his COs, even though he served with 
battalion HQ.40 A simple comment is sometimes proffered. Private R.H. Sims, 1/4th Royal 
Sussex wrote: “I would do anything for our colonel as he is a real gentleman & leader of 
men & is liked by all ranks”.41 Private G.R. Husbands, 16th, 17th and 1/8th Sherwood 
Foresters, in one of the most detailed and extensive OR memoirs, makes scant reference to 
his COs, and only two analytic comments. He viewed, at least initially, battalion HQ as 
comprising “the Olympians”, and although this remark is undoubtedly ironic, it effectively 
conveys distance.42 Even in September 1917, when he joined 1/8th Sherwood Foresters, he 
wrote of Lieutenant-Colonel J.E. Blackwall: “So little did I see of the CO … that I am not 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the battalion together again.  I assembled the whole of the new officers and men and told them how closely 
the King’s and Manchester were related, in addition to their recruiting areas being neighbours in South 
Lancashire.  How, in 1758, the 2nd King’s was constituted a separate regiment and became the 63rd Foot, the 
63rd Foot now being the 1st Battalion, The Manchester Regiment.  Instead of being drafted, as they imagine 
to a strange regiment, they were simply coming back home again, and the old 8th Foot welcomed them back 
as the descendants of its 2nd Battalion which went away so many years before. Before I had spoken many 
minutes I could see the men were thoroughly interested.  The impression my remarks made was profound, 
and company commanders told me later that when censoring letters home they noticed that nearly every man 
mentioned the incident.  The new officers and men settled down quietened contentedly, and in a very short 
time the 1st King’s was again an effective fighting battalion”. E. Wyrall, The History of the King's Regiment 
(Liverpool) 1914-19 (London: Arnold, 1928-1935), p.347 
39
 Note his use of the words ‘our’, ‘us’ and ‘we’. Lieutenant-Colonel H.F.W. Bircham, 2nd King’s Royal Rifle 
Corps, also used the ‘we’ word in his address to new arrivals: “We are a very happy crowd. Good soldierly 
qualities are essential, however, and I shall expect all of you to help keep our reputation up”.  [G.E.M. Eyre, 
Somme Harvest (London: London Stamp Exchange, 1991), p.17]. Not only was he creating a sense of shared 
identity, he was ‘making us matter’, defining the good things the battalion stood for.  
40
 J. Lucy, There’s a Devil in the Drum  (Uckfield: Naval and Military, 1992 - originally published 1938). 
41
 IWM Docs 7118 R.H. Sims papers, 16 August 1917, quoted in Sheffield, Leadership, p.95 
42
 G.R. Husbands (J.M. Bourne and  B. Bushaway, eds),  Joffrey’s War: A Sherwood Forester in the Great 
War (Nottingham: Salient Books, 2011), p.60 
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even positive now that I have the name correctly”,43 and although he described him as 
“competent and well-liked”, he thought he was not “a ‘character’”.44 
 
The distance between Private and CO could be a long one. Private R. Latham of 1/5th 
London Regiment, noted of his first CO, the Earl of Cairns, that he “knew him vaguely as 
the old man, the omnipotent one, who lived quite comfortably somewhere in the rear”.45 
Private F. Lindley, 14th York and Lancaster, described Lieutenant-Colonel W.B. Hulke as 
“a very unapproachable man. You couldn’t get near him”.46 Degree of distance was, 
however, up to the CO concerned. Lieutenant-Colonel G.S. Hutchinson believed in getting 
to know key ORs “individually, just for what (they were) worth. I tested them – a walk 
here, ten minutes and a cigarette there; the lad by himself, not in the artificiality of the 
presence of a corporal, or their comrades – I heeded them to do my will: I needed them to 
do my will”.47 
 
Private F. Richards, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, refers to three COs in his pre-war memoirs. 
The issue of the enforcement of discipline figures largely in his accounts. Early in his 
                                                      
43
 He was in fact correct. 
44
 Husbands, Joffrey’s War, p.463. John Eaton Blackwall was a Territorial Major of 1/6th Sherwood Foresters 
in August 1914, and commanded the 1/8th Battalion between 15 October 1915 and 14 March 1918, when he 
was sent home to the UK where he later commanded 51st Graduated Battalion of the Royal Warwickshire 
Regiment. 
45
 Quoted in K.W. Mitchinson, Gentlemen and Officers (London: Imperial War Museum, 1995), p.59. 
Wilfrid Dallas Cairns, 4th Earl Cairns, was commanding 1/5th London at the outbreak of war and continued 
until invalided on 16 March 1915 after 136 days on active service. 
46
 J. Cooksey, Barnsley Pals (London: Leo Cooper, 1986), p.88. Walter Backhouse Hulke was a retired 
Regular Major in August 1914. He commanded 14th York and Lancaster between 9 July 1915 and 16 
February 1918, being promoted to command of 115 Brigade on 16 April 1918. His brother, Lewis Iggleden 
Backhouse Hulke, (a Regular Major of 2nd Buffs in August 1914), commanded 3rd Yorkshire Light Infantry 
between 29 January 1917 and the Armistice. 
47
 G. Seton, Footslogger (London: Hutchinson, 1933), p.220. Graham Seton Hutchinson had retired from the 
King’s Own Scottish Borderers in 1913, re-joining 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders before being 
posted to the Machine Gun Corps, where he rose to battalion command. 
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career he fell foul of his CO, Lord Mostyn.48 He described being dealt with “coldly” and 
feeling a sense of “injustice”.49 His second CO, the Hon. R.H. Bertie, was “too much of a 
martinet to be greatly beloved by the rank and file”, a CO who punished men “to the 
extreme limits of King’s Regulations”.50 Of his third CO, Lieutenant-Colonel H.T. Lyle, he 
states in contrast: “Even the hard cases, who could not keep out of trouble if they tried, 
admitted it was impossible to have a better commanding officer”.51 A sense of fair play 
was important. Back with his old battalion at the outbreak of war, the same themes 
emerged. “Our Colonel was very strict but a good soldier”,52 Richards noted of his first 
wartime CO, Lieutenant-Colonel H. Delme-Radcliffe.53 Being a “strict disciplinarian” was 
not only accepted from a well-respected CO, it was seen as important – it crafted identity. 
 
What constituted a ‘good soldier’ is clarified in Richards’ discussion of Lieutenant-Colonel 
C.H.R. Crawshay, his CO throughout the Somme battle, who: 
Proved to be the best we ever had. He was universally liked by everyone, a 
stickler for discipline, and when in the line, no matter what conditions 
were, was always visiting the front-line trenches and seeing things for 
himself. He had a cheery word for everyone and was as brave as they make 
them.54 
 
                                                      
48
 F. Richards, Old Soldier Sahib (Uckfield: Naval and Military Press, 2003, originally published 1936), p.50. 
The CO was the Hon R. H. Lloyd-Mostyn, a Major of the 4th Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and a retired 2nd 
Lieutenant from the 23rd Foot. 
49
 Richards, Sahib, pp.58-9 
50
 Richards, Sahib, p.149. Reginald Henry Bertie retired in 1904 and played no part in the Great War. 
51
 Richards, Sahib, p.273. Hugh Thomas Lyle retired in 1907, but commanded 8th Royal Irish Rifles from 29 
September 1914 to 19 September 1915, surrendering command before the battalion went on active service, 
and 17th Royal Irish Rifles, a reserve battalion, from 12 November 1915 until its absorption within the 3rd 
Battalion in May 1918.  
52
 F. Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die (London: Faber, 1965, originally published 1933), p.31 
53
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Private G. Eyre, 2nd King’s Royal Rifle Corps, valued Lieutenant-Colonel H.F.W. 
Bircham’s paternalism, lack of distance and courage, and linked these characteristics 
directly to effectiveness: 
A great chap. No wonder every man in the Battalion thinks such a lot of 
him. Ever careful of the men’s comforts, thoughtful for their well-being, 
foremost in action, always accessible. The ideal C.O. … able to call on 
his men for any effort required of them, firing them with his example. 
The Battalion under his command had become a first-class fighting 
machine.55 
  
Richards regarded his last CO, Lieutenant-Colonel C.C. Norman, as “a very efficient 
man”.56 Similarly, Private W.L. Andrews, 1/4th Black Watch, wrote of Lieutenant-Colonel 
G.A.McL. Sceales: 
We saw at once Colonel Sceales was a real soldier. He had not been with 
the battalion a day before every man knew it. His quiet efficiency was felt 
in every section, and under his leadership our poor battered old battalion 
was once more made fit to fight. He was big in every way, a little ragged, 
and deliberate in speech. He made sure of things. Above all, he was 
just.57 
 
He later commented: “We had seen much of Regular officers, and we believed in them. 
Our own Colonel, a regular, was stern and unbending, for it was better so, but he was also 
just, efficient, and proud of the battalion”.58 
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 Eyre, Somme Harvest, pp.120-1 
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Sceales’ efficiency was achieved through being a “master of method”.59 Leading Seaman J. 
Murray of Hood Battalion also appreciated Lieutenant-Commander A. Asquith’s mastery 
of method in the attack on Gavrelle, 23 April 1917: 
The instruction was that we were not to move until the barrage had lifted 
off the German front line. Anyone knows to wait until the barrage lifts 
and walk 400 yards would be murder. Asquith, instead of waiting till the 
barrage lifted, took us forward to about within 50 yards of the barrage, 
and we were on top of his line before Jerry knew anything about it. We 
men of the Hood who survived the battle owe our survival to Asquith.60 
 
Private W.L. Andrews had been convinced early on by his first CO Lieutenant-Colonel H. 
Walker “that to run the battalion on strict military lines would be first-class business 
efficiency, as indeed it would”.61 He meant practical efficiency, however, and some aspects 
of efficiency were viewed as entirely unnecessary. Thus Private A. Lambert, 1st 
Honourable Artillery Company, noted with disgust the martinet CO: "Every conceivable 
kind of ‘posh’ must happen, and some battalion commanders would have ordered their 
men's memories to be thoroughly scoured if it had been possible".62 Private G.R. Husbands 
noted of the formerly respected Lieutenant-Colonel N. Houghton that he had “fallen into 
the favourite notion of the military mandarins’ mind – that ‘spit and polish’ was the prime 
military virtue”.63 
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Private H.S. Clapham, 1st Honourable Artillery Company, valued Lieutenant-Colonel E. 
Treffry’s ability in ‘doing it for us’, demonstrated in his facility to ‘play’ Brigade in both a 
protective and acquisitive sense: "The ‘Old Man’ came round the first evening to see how 
we were getting on. He's a jolly good sort and quite capable of keeping up our end, as well 
as his own, with the powers that be".64 
 
The protection of the soldier from unfair demands was another demonstration of 
paternalism.65 Gary Sheffield highlights one CO putting his career in jeopardy in the 
service of protecting his battalion. On the Somme in September 1916, Lieutenant-Colonel 
H. Fargus, 1st Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, “reported his nominally Regular 
battalion as ‘unfit to go into action’. Two hundred men were sick, largely because of the 
poor conditions of their trenches and a logistic breakdown”.66 Fargus was a substantive 
Lieutenant-Colonel, and may have feared the consequences less than a man of acting or 
temporary rank, but to take such a stand was, as Lieutenant-Colonel E.M. Woulfe-
Flanagan, 1st East Surrey, a fellow 5th Division CO noted, an act of “great moral 
courage”.67 
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Other ranks, where they wrote about their CO therefore seemed to value much the same 
things that Senior Officer School was teaching: courage, knowledge and skill which 
protected lives, fairness, paternalistic care, and discipline fairly applied. 
 
5.3 The experience of command – the battalion officer’s perspective 
2nd Lieutenant Arthur Behrend defined the essence of the CO: “The Colonel is of course 
the mainspring of the battalion, the man who above all others has the power to set its 
standards, mould it to his shape, and make or unmake its happiness”.68 
 
5.3.1 Paternalism 
There was no less need for the CO to demonstrate paternalism than any other officer. 
Lieutenant-Colonel H.M.B de Sales la Terriere, 9th Essex, wrote: “An officer must at all 
times see to the comfort of the very least of his men before he looks after his own”.69 
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Fraser, 1/6th Gordon Highlanders viewed his men as: “Such 
children … one feels a sort of personal responsibility for every one of them”.70 Officers 
recognised and valued this attitude in a CO.  The 13th Royal Fusiliers, commanded by 
Lieutenant-Colonel R.A. Smith, found themselves struggling with trench foot and a dearth 
of dry socks in the aftermath of Third Ypres. Lieutenant G. Chapman recorded: 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Patterson, who had commanded the Zion Mule Corps on Gallipoli, demonstrated his 
“we-ness” with his Jewish 38th Battalion London Regiment by offering his resignation in the UK when the 
battalion was denied kosher food, and then on active service in Palestine when his Jewish soldiers were 
discriminated against in hospital. [J.H. Patterson, With the Judeans in the Palestine Campaign (London: 
Hutchinson, 1922), p.40 and p.169]. Others proved too fearful to do this. Simon Robbins notes how 
Lieutenant-Colonel H.H.S. Morant (a Depot Major 10th Durham Light Infantry) “admitted frankly after the 
war that he ‘only renewed the attack’ on Geudecourt in September 1916 ‘to save my reputation’ and because 
he was ‘more frightened of my superiors than even of the Germans”. 67 [S. Robbins, British Generalship on 
the Western Front 1914-18: Defeat Into Victory (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 2005), p.9, quoting Brigadier H.H.S. 
Morant to Edmonds 2 April (1930), TNA PRO CAB45/136]. 
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1961), p. 26. Behrend was a TF officer. 
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Now, thanks to salvage, we acquired some thousands of pairs of 
unauthorized socks. The colonel himself took the lead. Pipe in mouth he 
might be seen, hopping carrion-crow-wise from body to body … 
returning home towards lunch time with his runner, their arms full of 
necessaries for the battalion.71 
 
Looking after others’ needs before one’s own could be dangerous. Lieutenant-Colonel 
G.L.B. Du Maurier, 3rd Royal Fusiliers, was killed at the doorway of the house that was his 
battalion HQ on 9 March 1915: “He had just ordered everyone out and into dug-outs 
outside and was waiting … for his Sergeant-Major to report that everyone was in safety 
before he took cover himself”.72 
 
5.3.2 Popularity 
Gary Sheffield has noted that: “Popular, paternal commanding officers were not 
necessarily efficient soldiers”.73 He cited the example of Sir G. McCrae, 16th Royal Scots, 
who, despite being “personally gallant and always efficient, and his men were devoted to 
him”, (high referent power), showed poor leadership in action, (low expert power), and 
was sacked.74 Lieutenant-Colonel E.W. Hermon, 27th Northumberland Fusiliers,75 noted 
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necessarily viewed as a bad CO. (Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders, p.116). 
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 Sir George McCrae was a retired Territorial Colonel of the Royal Scots in August 1914, and the 16th 




that Lieutenant-Colonel J.M. Prior of the 24th “has a very strong ‘hail-fellow-well-met’ sort 
of personality (and) an unlimited capacity for whisky”, which no doubt made for a certain 
popularity but was not “altogether an asset in a Battalion”.76 Popularity itself did not 
equate with referent power. 
 
Some officers, notably youthful subalterns, experienced the same sort of remoteness from 
their CO as did ORs. In 1/4th East Lancashire, 2nd Lieutenant A. Behrend observed of his 
CO: “To most of us subalterns he seemed remote and unbending”.77 Similarly 2nd 
Lieutenant E C. Blunden noted of Lieutenant-Colonel H.J.M. Grisewood, 11th Sussex: “I 
seldom rose to the eminence of conversation with him”.78  
 
Captain G.A. Burgoyne, serving with the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles in Flanders, 1914-1915,79 
found Lieutenant-Colonel J.W. Alston less remote.80 He described him as “a charming 
gentleman”,81 but it was Major A.H. Festing, second-in-command, whom he identified as 
possessing ‘referent’ power: 
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Festing all the men love; he’s so cheery and hearty, but he can damn 
‘em too, as they know; but they all understand he’d never leave them in 
the lurch, and that’s the sort of officer men like to follow, and will 
always follow.82 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel C.B. Benson took over 1/6th London in January 1918 and made the 
most of personal charm. He disguised his badges of rank and visited his new battalion and 
“without disclosing his identity, chatted and joked freely with officers and men, in such a 
manner that when, later, it was learned that he was to command them all felt instinctively 
that it had a friend”. In post: 
Every day by some act or decision it became clearer that the new 
Commanding Officer was someone who was watching their every 
interest, their comfort, their leisure, and their training.  He expected and 
received immediate and implicit obedience to his commands, not 
because of the military discipline that required it, but because he knew, 
and his officers learned, that he never gave an unnecessary order.  In a 
short time he became unquestionably the most popular man in the 
battalion, and his closest companions soon came to love him.  Gay, but 
never irresponsible, strict, but rarely stern, he led as much as 
commanded, and by his human sympathy won a place in everybody's 
heart.83 
 
At rest, Lieutenant Sydney Rogerson wrote of Lieutenant-Colonel J.L. Jack, 2nd West 
Yorkshire: “The Colonel was able to set an example both of relaxation in play and of 
concentration in battle”.84 2nd Lieutenant E.C. Vaughan valued the same in Lieutenant-
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Colonel H.T. Dobbin, 1/8th Warwickshire, who, when the battalion was having “a cheery 
time sliding and playing the fool” by the Ypres canal in January 1917, “was one of the 
cheeriest of the crowd”. Vaughan thought him “a thorough sport”.85 Lieutenant-Colonel 
W.D. Croft was game enough to take the stage in a concert party in pierrot kit and noted: “I 
think the unusual exhibition of a battalion commander making an ass of himself had 
something to do with some of the full houses”.86 Lieutenant-Colonel C.R.C. de Crespigny, 
2nd Grenadier Guards, “maintained a strict discipline on duty”, but had a “subversive 
spirit” that “gave great pleasure to all his battalion”. When asked for a “return of rats” in 
his trenches, ‘Crawley’ organised a rat shoot, and left sandbags full of rotting rodents piled 
up outside brigade HQ at night to the joy of all.87 
 
Captain F.C. Hitchcock described both being on the receiving end of a CO’s sharp tongue, 
a misfortune universally referred to as “strafing”,88 followed soon after by convivial 
lunches and dinners at battalion HQ.89 Something approaching friendship between officer 
and CO could indeed form. Captain G. Greenwell, 1/4th Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire 
                                                                                                                                                                 
one is surrounded by filth, you know,’ he would say, and he never did. No matter what the circumstances, he 
was always spick and span, and it was typical of him that before any big attack he would be careful to see 
that his boots and batons were polished, explaining with a slow smile that one could ‘always die like a 
gentleman - clean and properly dressed’”. [S. Rogerson, Twelve Days on the Somme (London: Greenhill 
Books, 2006, originally published 1933), p.22]. 
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Light Infantry, wrote in June 1918 whilst in Italy of dining with his CO, Lieutenant-
Colonel A.J.N. Bartlett, with the Medical Officer and Adjutant, playing “bridge till 
midnight”,90 and later going on leave with him to Venice.91 
 
When Lieutenant-Colonel E.A. Wood was promoted to command 55 Brigade in October 
1916, Captain G. Dugdale, his Intelligence Officer, noted: “It suddenly dawned on me 
what a wonderful friend he had been, and how I should miss him”.92 Lieutenant E.C. 
Blunden described Lieutenant-Colonel G.H. Harrison, 11th Sussex, as having a “gift of 
being friend and commander alike”.93 Blunden, (whom Harrison called ‘Rabbit’), to put no 
finer point on it, loved him:94 “His likeness cannot come again in this life, nor can man be 
more beloved”.95 In “On the Portrait of a Colonel”, (dedicated to “G.H.H.”), Blunden 
constructed what may be the only paean to a CO, describing Harrison’s “honoured face”,  
and: “The eye’s shrewd humour, the lip’s generous grace, the stirring zest, the power to 
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make and give”, with Harrison held as a beacon in life’s turmoil: “This man’s commanding 
trust will be my sight”.96 
 
It could thus hit hard when a CO was killed.  Major J.M. Findlay of 8th Scottish Rifles 
wrote of the death of Lieutenant-Colonel H.M. Hannan on Gallipoli:97 “The awful feeling 
of loss … of a real friend”.98 Loss could affect the whole battalion. Captain F.C. 
Hitchcock, 2nd Leinster, noted that on 6 November 1918: “It was the anniversary of 
Colonel Murphy’s death; the men had not forgotten him; all day long on the march, and 
later in billets, I heard them talking about him”.99 When Lieutenant-Colonel C.H.R. 
Crawshay, 2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, was wounded in January 1917, never to return to 
command: “The Battalion was in low spirits because the Colonel had been so popular that 
everyone regarded him as irreplaceable”.100 
 
5.3.3 Expert power 
Officers recognised that the intelligence, knowledge and conscientious application that 
signified ‘expert power’ were central attributes in a CO. When Lieutenant C.P. Clayton 
met Lieutenant-Colonel T.O. Marden, 1st Welsh, he noted: “His face is an arresting one. It 
is of an intellectual type, and his eyes, incisive yet quick to twinkle, give the impression 
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that they miss nothing”.101 Lieutenant J.B. Hoyle, 7th South Lancashire, wrote of 
Lieutenant-Colonel C.R.P. Winser: “If there was ever a conscientious and knowledgeable 
Colonel he is the man”.102 When Captain F.C. Hitchcock was tasked with a day-time raid 
on The Triangle, Loos, on 10 January 1917, his CO watched the training, made personal 
reconnaissance of the objective, and superintended jumping-off. Hitchcock recognised: 
“Nothing had been left to chance by the CO”, and concluded: “The Triangle was deemed 
an impregnable position, and I doubt if its prestige would have been lowered but for the 
skill of Lieut.-Colonel A.D. Murphy”.103  
 
Lieutenant Siegfried Sassoon, writing of “Colonel Winchell”, (Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. 
Minshull-Ford), suspected an ulterior motive in his emphasis on efficiency in training, 
believing he "was … intent on impressing the Brigadier with his keenness and 
efficiency".104 He saw in his successor, “Kinjack”, (Lieutenant-Colonel C.I. Stockwell), a 
man who:  
Exceeded all our expectations.  He was the personification of military 
efficiency.  Personal charm was not his strong point, and he made no 
pretension to it. He was aggressive and blatant, but he knew his job, and 
for that we respected him and were grateful.105 
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5.3.4 Consultative style 
 
Lieutenant Max Plowman, 10th West Yorkshire, approved of the consultative style that 
Senior Officer School came to recommend, in Lieutenant-Colonel P.R.O.A. Simner, a 
civilian barrister of August 1914, noting: 
If his manner is conceited, that is a minor weakness. He is keen and 
takes an intelligent interest in the battalion. He has instituted weekly 
round-table talks with officers at which old indiscriminate cursing is 
omitted. He has wit and good humour, and at present is the object of 
much hero worship.106 
 
 
Captain R.B. Ross, 1/7th Gordon Highlanders, described the issuing of final orders on 12 
November 1916, before the Battle of the Ancre, noting that “suggestions were invited” by 
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Bruce to “provide for a more complete victory by the assurance of 
individual initiative if it would be required”. He continued: 
The Colonel gave each suggestion its just consideration, amplifying here, 
rejecting there, applying that sound and sympathetic judgement of his 
which endeared him no less than it commanded admiration.107 
 
5.3.5 Courage, personal example and modelling 
Captain A.O. Pollard depicted the well-respected Lieutenant-Colonel E.C.P. Boyle, 1/1st 
Honourable Artillery Company, as a man who “never knew fear and who inspired all with 
whom he came into contact with his own enthusiasm”.108 How much of such behaviour 
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was deliberate modelling is unclear. Captain F.C. Hitchcock observed Lieutenant-Colonel 
A.D. Murphy modelling endurance, soaked through and going into action: “The C.O. was 
in great form. He always showed his 100 per cent soldiering qualities under discomfiture, 
and would appear to revel in it, which I well knew was not the case”.109 
 
2nd Lieutenant A. Thomas viewed Lieutenant-Colonel W.R.A. Dawson, 6th Royal West 
Kent, as a ‘natural’ commanding officer.110 He was a “man of moods and uncertain 
temper”, but his positives far outweighed his negatives. Firstly, his ‘referent power’ was 
seemingly immense: “His personality overpowered me.” Secondly, he had courage. When 
Thomas found him clinging to the side of a trench, Dawson acknowledged his fear of the 
shelling, but stated: “I don’t show the fear I feel”. Dawson clearly understood the 
importance of modelling coping.  
 
Dawson understood the power of ‘hands on’ leadership, which maintained the sense of 
‘we-ness’. Thomas noted: “A Colonel has no business to go out on patrol in no-man’s 
land”, thinking Dawson sometimes “reckless and foolhardy”. The ‘all tasks shared’ style of 
leadership was, however, the keystone of Thomas’s statement: “He expected as much as he 
gave, which was everything”.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
death. He was killed on 7 February 1917. The unit war diary describes that day how he was returning from a 
conference at brigade HQ and was hit by a shell splinter, noting: “He welcomed death in the field – and died 
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Thirdly, Dawson’s ‘expert power’ was evident in his ultimate competence on the 
battlefield: “He knew his job … an instinctive grasp of soldiering”.111 In addition, Dawson 
had a deeply protective nature towards his battalion. At Monchy-le-Preux in April 1917, 
Dawson showed his man-management skills. He prepared Thomas for his exhausted 
company to attack in the morning. He engaged Thomas’s determination first, and only at 
the end told him that he had requested relief, which in fact arrived.112 
 
Leadership from the front was a valued characteristic. Captain C.P. Clayton noted that 
Lieutenant-Colonel A.W. Pagan, 1st Gloucestershire, was “always with his first line” in 
battle.113 Lieutenant C.E. Carrington, 1/5th Royal Warwickshire, whose CO, Lieutenant-
Colonel G.C. Sladen, was “my hero”,114 was isolated and under counter-attack beyond 
Ovillers in late July 1916, when suddenly his CO dropped into his trench. “I feel ten times 
more confident that the Colonel should merely be in the trench with us … where Colonels 
have no business to be”, he wrote.115 When the Adjutant of 2nd King’s Royal Rifle Corps 
attempted to prevent Lieutenant-Colonel H.W.F. Bircham from being “right up with” the 
attack, Bircham responded: “You know very well … where a Colonel of the Rifles should 
be on such occasions”.116 The cost of this attitude is reflected, for instance, in the death of 
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Lieutenant-Colonel J.G. Mignon, 8th Leicestershire on 14 July 1916 on the Bazentin Ridge, 
“leading a bombing party like a subaltern”.117 
 
Captain D.V. Kelly, in describing Mignon’s death, noted: “In the later stages of the War 
commanders of … battalions were constantly being enjoined to stay at their headquarters 
while a battle was in progress”.118 Lieutenant-Colonel F.P. Crozier thought “this whole 
idea repulsive. It cut right across the foundations of mutual trust, emphasized in training, 
between private soldier and officer”.119 Lieutenant-Colonel A. Carton de Wiart, similarly 
believed “an invisible commander in a dug-out cannot be a great source of inspiration”, but 
paid the price, being wounded twice during his 133 days in command of 8th 
Gloucestershire.120 In contrast, Lieutenant-Colonel E.W. Hermon, 27th Northumberland 
Fusiliers, wrote: “If a C.O. goes messing about up in front … he is quite out of touch with 
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his command & the result is chaos”.121 On 27 September 1918 on the Flesquières ridge, 
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Fraser, 1/6th Gordon Highlanders, who had gone with his battalion 
to the Red Line, where they passed through the leading battalion, returned to Battalion HQ 
and noted: “It’s no good being too far away … one can do nothing”.  
 
The balance had to be struck between inspiration and communication.122 The model of 
battalion command present in the British army prior to and during the First World War was 
one of leadership integrated within the unit, leading, particularly in the mobile warfare of 
1914 and 1918, from the front. In a war fought without the benefit of effective voice 
control, this served the battalion commander well, fulfilling the two key functions specified 
by Doron Almog: (i) Getting the “best possible information in the shortest time possible” 
to make the best possible tactical decisions; and (ii) providing an “inspiring personal 
example”.123 
 
5.3.6 The unpopular CO 
Simply replacing a popular CO could render his successor unpopular. On 5 May 1917 
Lieutenant-Colonel C.F. Osmond of the 1/1st Honourable Artillery Company was invalided 
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and replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel P.C. Cooper.124 His appointment was described by 
Captain A.O. Pollard as a “cloud” settling on the battalion and “a most unfortunate 
happening”, but that: 
I do not see how any blame can be attached to P.C. He was merely a 
very senior officer, who … was invalided … and was kept at home right 
up to May 1917. That he was senior to our beloved Ossy was a matter of 
chance and the fault of the system which insists on promotion in time of 
war by seniority instead of merit. Not that I am questioning P.C.’s merit. 
He was very capable in some directions … His fault was that he arrived 
to supersede Ossy. Had he been any other man … the result would have 
been the same.125 
 
 
Simple personal ineptitude could rapidly alienate a CO. 2nd Lieutenant D.W.J. Cuddeford, 
12th Highland Light Infantry, noted than when the Earl of Rothes was wounded on 3 
October 1916, an officer whom he tactfully did not name, (Lieutenant-Colonel W.E. St 
John),126 was appointed who: “I am afraid … was never very popular with officers or 
men”.127 St John, “a man who never seemed to get on with anyone”, was “one of those 
people who seem to have the unfortunate knack of always doing the wrong thing and of 
getting up against everyone they come into contact with”. Cuddeford, his Adjutant, noted 
that he had some insight: “Once in private he somewhat regretfully remarked to me that 
whenever he tried to do anyone a good turn his action always seemed to have the opposite 
result”. He was “fully aware of his unpopularity” and “no one regretted it more than 
himself”, but “he was deficient in ordinary tact and he would impatiently resent any 
advice, however respectfully offered”. Cuddeford was in no doubt that there was an 
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“adverse influence” on the battalion.128 Whilst personal charm was not essential, there was 
a fine balance. Major-General T.D. Pilcher writing to his son on 1 November 1916 
identified this exact issue: “Some Commanding Officers obtain cheerful obedience to their 
commands, whereas others find it difficult to get any orders carried out, and are generally 
unpopular into the bargain”. An unwelcome order, he suggested, “will be rendered less 
unpalatable if it be tactfully conveyed”.129 
 
9th King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry suffered from an unpopular CO. Lieutenant-
Colonel C.W.D. Lynch was a pedantic disciplinarian and rapidly became unpopular.130 
Immediately prior to the 1 July 1916 attack on the Somme, Lynch gathered his officers 
together, and the Adjutant suggested to Captain G. Haswell, the senior officer present, that 
he propose a toast to the CO’s health. The degree of Lynch’s alienation was such that 
Haswell replied: “I’m damned if I will, I don’t wish him good health and am not prepared 
to be insincere”. Pressed, his proposed toast was to the battalion: “When the barrage 
lifts”.131  
 
Guy Chapman described the humiliating departure of Lieutenant-Colonel H.J. des Voeux, 
13th Royal Fusiliers, on 6 August 1916.132 He blamed not only his lack of robustness: “He 
had been a wash-out from the first; he had succumbed without any effort to the first 
strain”,133 but also his “arrogant stupidity” which “had alienated the sympathy of every 
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person who might have brought him to a counselled leadership”. Des Voeux had become 
so alienated, however, that his failure had resulted in “a curiously democratic control, 
which had effected a more complete harmony, confidence, and loyalty than was often to be 
found in units more capably led”. This was likely down to the character of the second-in-
command, Major G.H. Ardagh, who succeeded as CO.134 A popular, “charming” man: “He 
was always to be found in the front line at night … or wandering round the bays guided by 
friendly privates”.135 Ardagh’s ‘referent power’ created the necessary ‘we-ness’.136 
 
Captain R.L. Mackay, 11th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, had two spells under 
Lieutenant-Colonel H.A. Duncan, who he referred to as the “Conscientious Obstructor”.137 
He had no doubt as to his courage, but it was his inability to identify, thereby alienating his 
officers, that was fatal. When the officers enjoyed a hearty meal in an estaminet, Duncan 
“sat aside and watched us”,138 Mackay later noting: “He lacks that most necessary of all 
things – common sense, ‘savoir faire’”.139  When Major G.L. Wilson took over on 
Duncan’s going sick, Mackay noted: “Hurrah! What a difference”.140  Wilson was replaced 
by Major J. Mitchell, 13th Royal Scots, and Mackay celebrated ‘we-ness’:  
He was an original ‘sub’ of ours, and is tremendously popular, and is 
acting as a general tonic. We feel it a pleasure to work for such a man. 
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His efficiency, his sense of duty, combined with common sense and his 
good humour are making us a new lot of men – for the late CO 
undoubtedly lowered our spirits.141 
 
Lieutenant T.H. Floyd described Lieutenant-Colonel B. Best-Dunkley post-war as: “A 
brilliant young man, endowed with a remarkable personality”,142 but at the time, Floyd’s 
assessment was that he: 
Suffers from a badly swelled head; … fancies himself a budding 
Napoleon … with a very bad temper and a most vile tongue … is 
inconsiderate of his inferiors wherever his personal whims and 
ambitions are concerned; and … is engrossed with an inordinate desire 
to be in the good graces of the Brigadier-General.143 
 
 
These were all behaviours unlikely to generate ‘we-ness’, yet his bravery on the day (31 
July 1917 at Wieltje), the last officer standing, beating off a German counter-attack and 
winning the VC only to be fatally wounded by the British counter-barrage he had called 
up, undoubtedly screwed his men’s courage to the sticking-place when it counted.144 
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In 1915 a crisis occurred in 1/4th Norfolk concerning the command of Lieutenant-Colonel 
J.R. Harvey,145 who was subject to a revolt by his senior officers. Captains H.R. Fletcher 
and C.P. Hines were promoted Majors in October 1914.146 These two officers sought to 
withdraw their Imperial Service Obligation on account of Harvey’s behaviour.147 Their 
complaints were brought to Brigadier-General C.M. Brunker, GOC 163 Brigade, and this 
led to a Court of Inquiry on 9 July 1915.148 Brunker noted a “very serious feeling of 
discontent”, which “had reached the rank and file”. He noted that Harvey had a different 
concept of discipline to his officers, and was “aloof and so is not in sympathy with them”. 
Whilst viewing Harvey “a useful officer in the field”, he recommended his removal.  
 
Major-General F.S. Inglefield, GOC 54th Division, noted that he had been aware:  
That Colonel Harvey was unpopular and out of sympathy with his 
officers and on one occasion that the officers were aggrieved at the way 
he spoke to the btn. but the late Brigadier who was a great personal 
friend of Colonel Harvey … assured me that there was no real 
disagreement in the Regiment. 
 
He continued that he was “brusque in manner, quick of temper and unsympathetic in his 
bearing towards subordinates. He has however, determination, possesses power of 
command and I have always considered him a good fighting officer”. He recommended, 
however, that Harvey should not take his battalion on active service. 
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At the Court of Inquiry, Major Fletcher stated: “The officers have lost confidence in the 
ability of Colonel Harvey to efficiently lead or direct the Battalion in the field”, and that he 
had failed to “acquire knowledge with a view to imparting it to his juniors”, and that he 
appeared to have “lost interest in the doings of the Regiment”.149 Major Hines referred to 
the “CO’s lack of control over the Battalion in field operations”, failing to issue written 
orders.150 
 
For his part, Harvey denied knowledge of everything, proclaiming a “pre-arranged 
conspiracy”, suggesting that the battalion was merely “fed up” on account of not going 
overseas. He asserted Fletcher to be a “truculent character”, and produced importuning 
letters from Hines asking for command of the 2/4th Battalion. The Court found in his 
favour, ignoring the evidence and recommendations of the brigade and divisional 
commanders, on the basis that his officers had contravened King’s Regulations.151 Junior 
officers were never to succeed in getting rid of an unpopular CO in this fashion. 
 
Two weeks after the inquiry Harvey was found “medically unfit for a period of one 
month”. The battalion embarked for Gallipoli on 29 July under the command of the 
Adjutant, Captain E.W. Montgomerie,152 with no Majors.153 Harvey joined the battalion on 
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9 September but “fell a victim to dysentery almost immediately”.154 He never commanded 
on the battlefield again.155 
 
Timothy Bowman describes the South African Major D. Reitz as “incompetent”, using 
“supposed Sinn Fein infiltration” of his unit to explain his own “shortcomings” as CO.156 
In 1916 Reitz, a former Boer commando leader, “graduated from Private to Second 
Lieutenant, to Major, in the course of a week”.157 After a spell at Senior Officer School, he 
found himself, without battlefield experience, as second-in-command of 7th Irish Rifles, 
and culturally out of his depth. Within several months he was temporarily in command of a 
Catholic battalion suddenly out of control in a pitched battle with a Protestant Ulster 
Division unit. Reitz was clearly catapulted too rapidly into his position, and had the wrong 
cultural background for his task. That he was not seen as incompetent with another year’s 
experience under his belt is indicated by the fact that he commanded both 7th King’s 
Shropshire Light Infantry and 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers during The Hundred Days in 1918. 
 
Officers therefore valued the characteristics of cheerfulness, humour and tact that indicated 
referent power in a CO. Courage, balanced by the expert power characteristics of 
intelligence and knowledge, were essential. Where a consensual management style was 
present, it was valued, as was sheer hard work and diligence. The absence of such could 
damage the morale and efficiency of a unit. 
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5.4 The experience of command – the CO’s perspective 
5.4.1 Taking over 
Lieutenant-Colonel G.S. Hutchison described “that peculiar disadvantage, sustained by 
most regular battalions, namely constant change in its command and leadership”. Probably 
overestimating the rate of turnover into staff/brigade posts, he suggested: “Many of them 
cared little for the battalions which they were privileged to lead, and expended themselves 
to the utmost in wangling jobs away from the line”.158 True for some, this was certainly an 
overly harsh view. Hutchison was judging against his own seemingly inexhaustible energy 
– stability was a virtue only under a competent CO. 
 
For the professional soldier, promotion to battalion command was a natural goal, yet one 
that could provoke anxiety. Major R.G.B. Jeffreys, who spent the war to March 1916 with 
the 3rd Royal Dublin Fusiliers at home, wrote from the Officers’ Club at Boulogne on the 
day he arrived in France: “I am so pleased to be going to the 2nd Battalion and I hope 
before long I may get the command”.159 R.B. Bradford envisaged the route to command 
via a staff posting, but “either felt or had been told that he looked too young”. He acquired 
a monocle “to add to the air of years and dignity that were lacking. He intended to be 
Brigade-Major, then a Battalion Commander, finally Brigade Commander”.160 
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Captain R. Feilding, 3rd Coldstream Guards, was asked on 29 August 1916 by Brigadier-
General J. Ponsonby,161 “to come round this morning to talk … over” the matter that “I 
ought to get command of one of the New Army battalions”.162 By the following day, 
Major-General G.P.T. Feilding (his cousin) had “approved” the proposal “and thought it 
would be much to my advantage”.163 On 4 September came news of his appointment to 6th 
Connaught Rangers. Feilding wrote, however: “I feel very diffident as to whether I can 
command a battalion efficiently … It will be a strange feeling, jumping up to find myself a 
Colonel”.164 Major A.F.A.N. Thorne wrote to his wife on 18 September 1916 following his 
appointment as CO 3rd Grenadier Guards, sharing Hermon and Feilding’s diffidence: “I am 
too excited and proud to realise for the moment how ‘much’ I shall have to be fit for its 
responsibilities. I do pray that I may not let the battalion down”.165 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel E.W. Hermon was a Major of King Edward’s Horse and bored of 
inaction,166 when in July 1916 he found himself with an embarrassment of riches. First, 
Major-General Sir C. St L. Barter offered him command of a battalion: “I am to go and do 
a fortnight in the trenches first just to get in touch with the work a bit and then, if I am a 
success, I am to get a Battalion”. This, he wrote to his wife, was “an awful problem & (I) 
don’t in the least know what to do”, as “it’s not exactly what I wanted but it’s a start.167 He 
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added: “The idea of going is not appealing … but I do want a job of work”.168 Three weeks 
later, he wrote: “I met a pal who is a Brigadier. He was horrified to find that I wasn’t a 
Brigadier too … he at once offered me a Battalion in his Brigade”. Hermon found himself 
“fairly up a gumtree. His Brigade is a New Army one & his Div. Commander is in a very 
much better position than C.B. … I personally would far rather have this than the former 
one”.169 Barter was commanding 47th Division, a Territorial formation – Hermon was 
demonstrating Regular snobbery, his eye being clearly on greater prestige and further 
promotion. He tried to put Barter off, a ruse which paid off, as 13 days later he wrote that 
he was to be CO of 27th Northumberland Fusiliers: “As you will have already gathered I 
want this Battalion most”.170 Hermon did not, however, go without qualms, writing: “I 
expect one will be alright … everyone has got to make a start”.171 
 
Major H.E. Trevor, in contrast, seemed bewildered when he became CO of the 8th Kings 
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry on 1 November 1915.172 He wrote to his wife on 13 
November: "I haven't the slightest idea why I was pitchforked into this job - except that the 
last CO was booted and the former second-in-command has gone home sick and I don't 
know how long I'm expected to remain".173 
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5.4.2 Making a mark 
The arrival of a new CO to replace even a perfectly adequate CO could raise morale. The 
advent of Lieutenant-Colonel E.P.A. Riddell to 1/1st Cambridgeshire was such an event for 
Captain A.I. Adam, who noted: “We are living in really interesting times; the outstanding 
feature is the extraordinary power and competence of the CO”.174 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel J.L. Jack left 2nd Scottish Rifles “reluctantly” to command 2nd West 
Yorkshire. Of the view that “no regiment likes being commanded by a stranger”, he 
realised “my first business is to gain their confidence”.175 Major A. Johnston, aware of the 
necessity of a “strong side of officers”, noted on 14 August 1916: “Am possibly going to 
command a battalion, a magnificent job but one of a great difficulty and responsibility in 
these days of few and inexperienced officers, semi-trained N.C.O.s, and raw recruits 
sometimes of not too good material”.176 
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A CO would wish to stamp his own type of ‘we-ness’ on his unit.177 Lieutenant-Colonel 
E.W. Hermon replaced Lieutenant-Colonel G.R.V. Steward as CO of 27th Northumberland 
Fusiliers.178 Initially, however, despite describing the unit as having the reputation as “the 
best in the brigade”, and himself as having “to follow a man whom they all 
worshipped”,179 Hermon believed it required improvement: “I expect in a week or so that 
things will have assumed an entirely different aspect”.180 He continued: “There begins to 
show some sign of organization & tho’ things are still very far from being what I want you 
can simply see them growing every day”.181 He was delighted when after a matter of two 
weeks his Adjutant “came & said that he thought it would make my work easier if I was to 
know that all the officers were absolutely satisfied & ready to back one to the last drop of 
blood.”182 Brigadier-General F.P. Crozier would have approved, writing: “When objectives 
are not taken; usually the fault is with the Colonel, who is not prepared to push on because 
he has not taught his men or come to an understanding with them”.183 
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Starting training 18 days after taking command, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Johnston took the 
task personally, noting: “Lectured once to the officers and twice to the N.C.O.s” in one 
day.184 Similarly, to make his mark Lieutenant-Colonel A.F.A.N. Thorne was with his men 
in every training task, writing to his wife in July 1918: “I had an excellent forty minutes 
physical and bayonet fighting from 6.30 until 7.10 … I dug between 3.40 and 4.30 p.m. 
and from 5.30 to 7.30 p.m.”.185 Lieutenant-Colonel W. Fraser, 1/6th Gordon Highlanders, 
met his company commanders first on taking over, dined with two of them one evening, 
two the next, and like Johnston, began training immediately, setting up a rifle range.186 
 
F.P. Crozier, commanding 9th Royal Irish Rifles, came out of the line to “rest, train and 
renovate” his unit prior to the Somme and to create ‘we-ness’ decided “to have a battalion 
mess once more” to “regain the grip which is inevitably lost in the system of decentralized 
messing of the line, and without which war cannot be successfully waged”.187 Similarly, 
Lieutenant-Colonel A.C.H. Kearsey took over 5th Dorset in December 1915 and 
“determined to get it thoroughly efficient again he started by at once having men detailed 
for training as specialists”. He very successfully succeeded in ‘making us matter’ as 
“before long the Battalion’s specialists had carried off several brigade contests”.188 
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Lieutenant-Colonel R.G.B. Jeffreys took over command of 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers on 
13 July 1916, but it was April 1917 before he got three weeks of training with his battalion. 
He entered it with vigour: 
I am very busy training all day and in the evenings till late at night. I am 
making up schemes etc. We start work here at 6.30am and don’t finish 
till 7 pm. My earliest start is 8.30 am till 1 pm, 2.30 pm – 4.30 pm and 
then a lecture to all officers from 5.30 pm … 7 pm to 7.30 pm training 
programmes etc. and again after dinner … I am kept fairly busy.189 
 
The training created a specific bond, for when he was hospitalised four months later with 
the sciatica which would end his career in 1918, he wrote: “I want to get back to my 
battalion … it is just the time I want to be with them and it will be hard luck if I miss it 
now at the last moment when I have been doing all the training”.190  
 
Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Croft was absent, sick, when his battalion took heavy casualties 
at Fampoux on 12 April 1917, writing:  
How shamed I felt to meet those who had gone into action without me; it 
was indeed the bitterest day of my life … I was ill and depressed, and for 




Taking over command of 1/6th Durham Light Infantry in December 1915, Lieutenant-
Colonel G.A. Stevens took a robust approach to achieving a ‘strong side of officers’: “I 
believe half the battle has been I have been very very particular with my officers & I have 
                                                      
189
 Dodd,  Jeffreys, p.39, letter dated 5 April 1917. 
190
 Dodd, Jeffreys, p.39, letter dated 6 August 1917. On 16-17 August 1917 the 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 48 
Brigade, 16th Division, in the Battle of Langemarck, assaulted Vampire Farm, north of St Julien, losing 50 
per cent of the officers and men engaged. George Archibald Stevens, a Regular Captain of the Royal 
Fusiliers in August 1914, commanded 1/6th Durham Light Infantry from 19 December 1915 to 27 April 1916, 
and 2nd Royal Fusiliers from 20 July 1916 to 12 November 1917, commanding 90 Brigade in 1918. 
191
 Croft, Three Years, pp.121-2. Lieutenant-Colonel A. Johnston, 10th Cheshire, preparing for the Battle of 
Messines in June 1917, was “told that I am not to go into the show, which is an awful disappointment”. He 
wanted to see the fruits of his training in action, and, “besides one feels an awful shirker staying out behind”. 
(Astill, Johnston, p.212). 
254 
 
a splendid set, I have ‘fired’ four to England & persuaded two to go ‘sick’”.192 Similarly, 
Lieutenant-Colonel E.K. Cordeaux, who had served with 10th Lincolnshire for a year and a 
half before taking over from the invalided Lieutenant-Colonel G.E. Heneage, took the 
sword to his brother officers.193 He wrote some two and a half weeks on: “I have to make 
one or two rather sweeping changes”,194 and “I have had to recommend that one of my 
majors be removed from the battalion … a very unpleasant task … I shall have to weed out 
some other officers”.195 
 
Making a mark created a reciprocal sense of ownership. Captain A.I. Adam noted how “the 
C.O. becomes more and more a delightful man as the battalion grows more to his 
liking”.196 Major F.A. Maxwell took over 12th Middlesex unwillingly on 31 May 1916 as 
the battalion “had not been doing well, owing, it is said, to C.O. who has mishandled 
them.197 However, I fancy the battalion is not too good … has had two failures at least – its 
morale therefore not too good … I loathe the whole business”.198 Yet when he left it on 20 
October 1916 he wrote publicly to the battalion: “I have spent nearly six months in this 
happy family, & these have been amongst the happiest, saddest & proudest of my life”.199 
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Lieutenant-Colonel G.S. Hutchison was missing for three days in Spring 1918 and reported 
dead. His resurrection revealed that “already a new Commanding Officer … had arrived to 
take over command of my beloved battalion. He did not wait long after he had seen me in 
person”.200 Shot in the face on 15 September 1918, after eight days in hospital, protesting 
“my battalion was more than a wife”, he got a friend to fly him back to the front line 
where: “The new Commanding Officer was returned to store”.201 
 
As a Brigadier-General,202 W.D. Croft described a CO who “implored me to let him stay 
with his lads, with whom he had only been a few days”. He continued: “Such is the way of 
British officers, who, whatever they may be commanding, consider that they stand in loco 
parentis when they have had charge of their men for five minutes!”203 He had already 
demonstrated this paternalism himself, as when he was briefly sent from 11th Royal Scots 
to command the divisional tactical school in early 1917 he noted: “It is perfectly beastly 
leaving one’s own family – and we were a very happy family”.204 Similarly, five weeks 
after taking over command of 6th Connaught Rangers, Lieutenant-Colonel R. Feilding 
wrote to his wife of his battalion that “I have got to know it and be proud of it … I find 
both officers men magnificent”.205 
 
After action, when a battalion had suffered significant casualties, a CO could grieve. W.L. 
Andrews wrote of Lieutenant-Colonel G.A.McL. Sceales:  “I, who was much with him, 
knew that he suffered intensely when he lost men, though he would have scorned to show 
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it”.206 After the attack at Roeux on 3 May 1917, Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Horsfall wrote of 
his battalion casualties: “I simply can’t bear to think about it”.207 When 7th 
Northumberland Fusiliers were smashed at Ypres on 26 October 1917, Lieutenant-Colonel 
G.S. Jackson came out of action: “And the tears trickled down his weather-beaten face as 
he said ‘… this has fairly done me’”.208 He spoke true, for having commanded the battalion 
since 18 April 1915 he was sent at the end of December to the RAMC to command a base 
hospital.209 
 
5.4.3 Stress and strain 
Sir Douglas Haig himself noted: “The strain of commanding a battalion in this kind of 
warfare”, continuing, “only young and strong men can stand it”.210 
 
Specific incidents could induce stress in the ablest commander. Lieutenant E.C. Blunden 
described Lieutenant-Colonel G.H. Harrison, 6th Sussex, lost during a relief near Thiepval 
in 1916, “trembling with overstrain”.211 The summation of a series of such incidents over a 
long period in command could generate terminal exhaustion. Lieutenant-Colonel A.F.A.N. 
Thorne wrote to his wife in July 1918,212 when he had been in command of 3rd Grenadier 
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Guards virtually without a break for 22 months: “My head is fed up and stale!”,213 and 
some days later: “I am afraid that I am always doing things wrong and only take 
precautions when boldness should be the policy”. He was clearly suffering from low mood, 
largely from simple war-weariness, and this caused him to think negatively about his 
abilities. He continued: “Evidently other people think the same, otherwise I should have 
been promoted some time ago”, feeling that he now had ceased “to be considered any good 
and everyone else goes by me”.214 Others clearly did see him as exhausted, as he was 
transferred as Commandant IX Corps School in August before being promoted Brigadier-
General 184 Brigade on 14 October 1918. However, before he left, he led his battalion in 
the fighting on the old Somme battlefield of 21-3 August 1918, action which reinvigorated 
him as he wrote: “I have never enjoyed battle fighting so much”.215 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel H.P.F. Bicknell, who commanded 4th Middlesex from 27 October 1915 
to 12 March 1917, wrote:  
My Divisional General has recommended that I should be sent home for 
two or three months for ‘training duty’ on account of ‘war weariness’ 
due to prolonged service in the field. I am very sick about it as although 
the report of course contains no reflection on me in it and I admit that I 
am not capable of the energy that I possessed two years ago.216 
 
 
As 1918 ground on, Lieutenant-Colonel H.M.B. de Sales la Terriere, 9th Essex, recorded 
how the strain began to tell and he began to drink: “I was so utterly worn out both 
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physically and nervously that without some form of dope I could not possibly have carried 
on”.217 He complained: “I was getting absolutely exhausted … most divisions had arranged 
for their COs to have an official rest of six months commanding a home battalion: ours 
apparently had not”.218 His exhaustion was visible to others: “My MO told me as forcibly 
as possible to go sick or I should break down completely”.219 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel E.K. Cordeaux had only been in command for just over a month when 
on 1 July 1916, 10th Lincolnshire assaulted ‘The Bloater’, La Boisselle, suffering casualties 
to the tune of 15 officers and 487 other ranks. By 13 July the battalion was up to strength 
again, but, clearly suffering post-traumatic symptoms, Cordeaux wrote: “I think my brain 
& mind need a rest. I don’t seem to be able to concentrate on any one thing for more than a 
few moments”.220 He continued: “To form a new battalion with all the best of our officers 
& NCOs gone is I feel beyond my powers. I feel so lost at times”.221 He added, “I have 
never sought my present position & would very gladly take one of less responsibility & 
more within my capacity”.222 With the decimation of his battalion, the heart had 
temporarily gone of him – he doubted his own ‘expert power’. By January 1917 he was 
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referring to himself as “a rather stiff weary sort of old thing. I asked my general if he 
thought I was the man for it”.223 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel G.A. Stevens, 2nd Royal Fusiliers, also thought that rest would have 
saved him from collapse, writing on 25 April 1917: 
My dear father, I am deeply sorry to say I have had a nervous 
breakdown and am now in the VI Corps Rest Station (officers). I never 
thought this would happen to me but I cracked up all of a sudden … I 
have had more service in the field than all the CO’s in the Division, but 
just because I wasn't an original 29th Division officer I couldn't get the 
month’s leave that they all got … I got finished up at Monchy after 
going through four days heavy bombardment in which we twice had to 
change dugouts and had two blown in on top of us. On top of the strain 
was the horror of walking out through the village on the bodies of dead 
men and horses. I know you will know that I have done my best.224 
 
Others seemed oblivious of the strain. After five months in France commanding 9th Rifle 
Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Villiers-Stuart was surprised to be told in October 1915 
by his Brigadier that "he considered I was tired and must have a rest, so he had decided to 
replace me by a much younger officer of the Rifle Brigade and that I must go home on a 
medical certificate for a rest".225 
 
5.4.4 Promotion 
In December 1916 Lieutenant-Colonel A. Horsfall, taking up post as CO of 2nd Duke of 
Wellington’s West Riding Regiment, wrote: “Everyone who is worth their salt is ambitious 
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… there are any number of people waiting for commands”.226 Similarly, there were many 
COs who keenly awaited the call to command a brigade.227 
 
Although Lieutenant-Colonel F.A. Maxwell’s written sentiment on leaving 12th Middlesex 
was most likely genuine (and if it was not, it was a masterstroke of “identity 
leadership”),228 his eye had always been on promotion. In August he had written to General 
W.E. Peyton asking to be “allowed to join 18th L.” i.e. the 18th Lancers, his regiment of 
origin, “command of which was vacant”. Peyton replied that he should remain with 12th 
Middlesex: “In your own interests in the way of advancement I think it is better also”. 
Maxwell noted that staying should not affect his possibility of getting the command 
eventually, but noted a little wistfully that “the pay … is about double what I draw as O.C. 
12th Middlesex”.229 He appeared to be more concerned with regimental progression (with 
eye towards, perhaps, the post-war period), rather than brigade promotion. 230 
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Lieutenant-Colonel G.A. Stevens wrote in April 1916: “I have been recommended for the 
command of a Brigade – what HO”,231  but after his breakdown following the attack on 
Monchy in April 1917 noted: “I suppose all my prospects in the Army are gone”.232 He 
was relieved to learn that “I have heard from my general & they bear me no ill will & he is 
going to keep my Battalion for me and wants me back”.233 At the start of October he wrote: 
“I have just heard that the man in front of me has just got his Brigade today”,234 and finally 
on 14 November 1917, “I am now a real live Brigadier”.235 It had taken 19 months to work 
his way up ‘the list’. 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel W. Fraser, 1/6th Gordon Highlanders, was sent to command XVIII 
Corps training school in January 1918: “A safe job and supposed to be a leg up towards a 
Brigade”,236 but the school fell into abeyance after the German Spring offensive, and 
Fraser hung hopefully and fretfully about Corps HQ. When finally on 3 September he was 
sent to command 1st Gordon Highlanders, something that pre-war would have been the 
pinnacle of his career, he was “a bit disappointed at being sent back to a battalion at first”. 
He noted optimistically: “I’m still on the list for a brigade”, calculating himself as “about 3 
months off” promotion, but concluding in consolation: “What can one want better then to 
command one’s own battalion?” 237 
 
In contrast, Lieutenant-Colonel W.D. Croft of the 11th Royal Scots woke up in September 
1917: “To find Frank Maxwell in the tent with the astounding intelligence that I had got a 
                                                      
231
 IWM Docs 12339 G.A. Stevens, letter dated 29 April 1916. 
232
 IWM Docs 12339 G.A. Stevens, letter dated 25 April 1917. 
233
 IWM Docs 12339 G.A. Stevens, letter dated 10 May 1917. 
234
 IWM Docs 12339 G.A. Stevens, letter dated 2 October 1917. 
235
 IWM Docs 12339 G.A. Stevens, letter dated 14 November 1917. 
236
 Fraser, Good Company, p.208 
237
 Fraser, Good Company, p.283 
262 
 
brigade”. He seems only to have been depressed by the idea: “So I was to leave the dear 
old division, and all my old friends in the battalion; it didn’t sound a very cheering 
prospect, especially as they were just about to go into action”.238 Similarly, even 
Lieutenant-Colonel H.P. Croft, whose memoirs betray little personal reaction, stated: “I 
was naturally pleased at promotion, but it is with a heavy heart that you leave men with 
whom you have lived in the palace of death for sixteen months”.239 
 
Lieutenant S. Sassoon implied that promotion-seeking could be over-aggressively pursued 
in battalion eyes, writing of “Colonel Winchell” (Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Minshull-Ford) 
that: “Everyone knew that he was booked for a brigade, and some said that he'd bought the 
Brigadier's gold-peaked cap last time he was on leave".240 On his elevation Sassoon noted: 
"He'd had Brigadier on the brain ever since he came back off a leave, and now he'd never 
be satisfied till he'd got division and another decoration to go with it".241 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Johnston, 10th Cheshire, was told on 12 September 1917 that he 
would be given command of 33 Brigade, but the next day that it would in fact be 126 
Brigade.242 On the 12th he wrote: “I have had wonderful luck indeed to run from subaltern 
to brigadier general in under 3 years”, but the next day wrote of the change as: “A bad 
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exchange I fear”, as he now reckoned on having to train a “very inexperienced” brigade 
rather than a “pretty good” one.243 
 
Others found the change of command skill-set frustrating. Lieutenant-Colonel A.F.A.N. 
Thorne immediately appreciated the quality of the men of 184 Brigade in October 1918, 
but, as he wrote to his wife, longed “to command them as a Battalion Commander instead 
of as a Brigadier-General. One cannot get at them except through their COs and I feel I 
could run their show so much better than they could!”244 
 
5.5.5 Demotion 
Thirty-eight per cent of COs were removed from command or sidelined into inactive 
posts.245 Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Horsfall noted in November 1916: “COs have no very 
safe tenure out here; the slightest thing may cause one’s removal”.246 His anxiety about this 
was manifest: “I suppose when one has commanded out here for some months you get 
used to the strain of never knowing when you may not put your foot in it with some 
General”.247 Even the redoubtable Lieutenant-Colonel E.A. Wood, 6th King’s Shropshire 
Light Infantry, who, on losing contact with Battalion HQ at the Battle of Langemarck and 
falling asleep with tiredness, remarked to his battalion Intelligence Officer: “I shall 
probably get sent home for this”.248 
 
                                                      
243
 Astill, Johnston, p. 227. On his second day, he was noting of one of his units: “The C.O. though quite an 
old soldier is obviously very inexperienced out here, and I do not think he is fit to command a battalion on 
this front”, (p.228). He never had the chance to sack the offending CO being wounded the following day. 
244
 Lindsay, Forgotten, p. 74 
245
 See Chapter Three. 
246
 Horsfall, Letters, letter dated 21 November 1916. 
247
 Horsfall, Letters, letter dated 25 November 1916. 
248




An officer promoted to battalion command temporarily could suddenly be displaced. 
Lieutenant-Colonel G.M. Bullen-Smith had commanded 2nd Leinster since 20 November 
1914 when on 3 June 1915 the wounded Lieutenant-Colonel W.T.M. Reeve unexpectedly 
returned. Lieutenant F.C. Hitchcock noted: “B-S hastily departed to cut off his two stars 
from his cuffs. We were all exceedingly sorry for him”.249 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel E.W. Hermon was displaced from 27th Northumberland Fusiliers by 
the return of the previous incumbent in October 1916. He was, however, confident that 
“they’re not going to lose me. A Battalion Commander nowadays has a price above rubies 
& one can almost dictate one’s own terms”.250 
 
Not all were unhappy to be replaced. Lieutenant-Colonel H.C.L. Lloyd, a Captain in 1914, 
commanded 2nd Welsh from 3 October to 14 November 1915, when he was displaced by 
Lieutenant-Colonel O.B. Pritchard, a Major in August 1914.251 Captain C.P. Clayton noted 
of Pritchard: “He is much senior to Lloyd, and Lloyd has fallen to second-in-command, but 
seems no less happy”.252 Clayton himself would rise to be second-in-command, fall to 
Adjutant, and rise again to CO in November 1916 when Pritchard was invalided. He was 
only too aware on the arrival of The Hon. W.F. Somerset that he would be displaced: “He 
is a Captain in the Regular Army and will therefore, I take it, take precedence”. Several 
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days after showing him around the trenches: “When it comes time for Commanding 
Officer’s Orderly Room I have pulled down my badges and insist upon Somerset taking 
the duties of command”. Clayton was conscious of demotion: “Partly, I suppose, to soften 
my fall … I am given three weeks’ leave to England”.253 By August 1918, when he had 
been Lieutenant-Colonel again for nearly four months, Clayton was actively pleased to 
hand over command in exchange for leave. 
 
In summary, whilst promotion to battalion command was the hope of many officers, when 
it arrived it was often accepted with diffidence. The efficient CO knew, however, that he 
had to stamp his mark, and he did this by both training his battalion and selectively 
weeding his officers. Many COs became conscious of command as a burden, and in 
response to either cumulative strain or the acute stress of a particular action, a CO could 
easily become worn out. Some, particularly Regulars, kept their enthusiasm alive by 
focussing on the possibility of brigade command. For others there was a constant anxiety 
about displacement, a fate which some accepted with relief. 
 
5.6 Decorations 
The award of decorations gives insight into institutional expectations of how a CO should 
behave. List A awards of the Distinguished Service Order or Bar,254 i.e. awards for service 
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in action for which citations were recorded in the London Gazette, have been analysed in 
respect of the reasons for which they were awarded.255  
 
Between 1 January 1918 and 31 December 1918, 703 awards were made to officers of 
infantry battalions of regiments of the line, and a remarkable 307 (42 per cent) of these 
were made to battalion commanders.256 This reflects the focus in the mobile warfare of 
1918 on effective battalion leadership, a focus likely sharpened by the increased presence 
of the brigade commander at the forefront of action.257 
 
Given that citations were nearly always prefaced with the statement: “For conspicuous 
gallantry and devotion to duty”,258 the five key additional features of the behaviour of the 
CO recognised were, in order of importance: (i) Provision of “example” (50 per cent); (ii) 
“Ability” (48 per cent); (iii) Organisational skills (33 per cent); (iv) Quality of leadership 
(26 per cent); and (v) “Initiative” (14 per cent). Both ‘referent’ and ‘expert’ power were 
being rewarded. 
 
The fact that “example” is the most frequently recorded category reflects the importance 
placed on the modelling function of the CO. Words/phrases used most often include: 
“Disregard of danger”, “courage”, “coolness”, “cheerfulness”, “energy”, “enthusiasm”, 
“determination”, “tenacity”, and “confidence”. This is clearly expressed in the citation to 
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Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Levey, 13th Royal Sussex: “He displayed coolness, courage and 
determination, and by his cheerfulness he kept those under him in good heart. His personal 
example was an incentive to all”.259  
 
A close second was the issue of ability, in essence skilful handling of the battalion. Thus, 
Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. Blackwood, 2nd Cheshire, conducting a successful raid on a 
village in the German lines was rewarded for “forethought and skilful handling of his 
command”.260 Third most frequently mentioned was organisational prowess, a sub-division 
of ability. Much of this stemmed from “personal” intervention, often following personal 
reconnaissance leading to some specific direction or reorganisation. Thus Lieutenant-
Colonel G.B. Wauhope, 13th York and Lancaster, was awarded the DSO for a surprise 
night attack: “The successful result of which was due to the skill and resource with which 
this officer supervised every detail of preparation”.261 Fourthly, leadership was cited 
specifically, described variously as “fine”, “able”, or “skilful”. Lieutenant-Colonel G.E. 
King, 7th East Yorkshire, was awarded the DSO following a two battalion raid on German 
trenches when: “His utter disregard of personal danger, skill and cheerfulness throughout, 
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inspired all under his command and proved him to be a leader of a high order”.262 Last was 
initiative. Thus, Lieutenant-Colonel D.E. Prideaux-Brune, 8th Rifle Brigade: 
Commanded his battalion and elements of other units with consummate 
skill … He stubbornly defended positions one after another, then 
skilfully extricated his men and organised fresh ones. He showed great 
presence of mind, initiative, and resource at all times.263 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
On 16 December 1917 Lieutenant-Commander A. Asquith was promoted from his post as 
CO Hood Battalion to the command of 189 Brigade. Brigadier-General J.F.S.D 
Coleridge’s recommendation probably encapsulates what constituted the best CO: 
He has developed military qualities of a high order. Possessed of 
great personal courage, he inspires confidence in his men, and leads 
them successfully in action: he possesses decision, driving power, 
and energy, & has a good capacity for organisation.264 
 
The judgements made by Coleridge map almost exactly onto the five DSO award factors of 
example, ability, organisational skill, quality of leadership, and initiative. That these 
correspond well to the principles taught at Senior Officer School indicates a broadly shared 
view of effective command and leadership. The army moved between 1914 and 1917 from 
having an unspoken concept of battalion leadership to having a taught vision. The 
principles fall broadly within modern concepts of both ‘contingency’ and ‘identity’ 
leadership, and encouraged the development of ‘referent’ and ‘expert power’. 
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Officers and other ranks appear to have a shared view of what they valued in a CO, which 
happily fell in line with what was being taught; namely courage, intelligence, knowledge, 
hard work, diligence and skill which protected lives. Other ranks in particular valued 
fairness, paternalistic care, and discipline fairly applied. Officers, being that much ‘closer’, 
valued cheerfulness, humour and tact in a CO, as well as something approaching friendship 
where possible. Consequently, a consensual management style was valued. Where these 
features were lacking, the morale and efficiency of the unit was invariably affected and the 
removal of 38 per cent of COs from command no doubt reflects these factors to a greater 
or lesser degree. 
 
Promotion to battalion command was the hope of many officers, but the best never took it 
up without diffidence. The most able COs followed the tenets of “identity leadership”, 
stamping their mark through training and shaping their officer cadre. Physical exhaustion 
and war-weariness, however, were never far away. Patrick Brennan notes that COs 
“endured a more solitary existence than those in the lower ranks”, often lacking the 
companionship that “was a critical bulwark against stress”, suffering “exhausting 
workloads and an almost paralyzing responsibility” which were layered on top of the 
stresses they shared with their whole unit.265 For some, displacement was a relief, and for 
others, particularly Regulars, there was the distraction of the hope of brigade command.  
Battalion command and leadership was a weighty charge for all but the very few. 
                                                      
265





“Professional Men of War” - The Citizen COs 
 
General Gater was a product of the new Army; he had never seen or 
thought of soldiering before the war … He was a first-class Brigade 
Commander, very able and quick; indeed it was difficult to imagine him 
in any other capacity. 
       Brigadier-General H.R. Cumming1 
 
 
At the outbreak of war the officer corps numbered 28,060, and at the Armistice it 
numbered 164,255; 229,316 commissions having been granted.2 In all, 257,376 officers 
served. Table 6.1 breaks this figure down into the officers of the Regular, New Army, 
Special Reserve and Territorial units. Whilst the exact number of ‘pure’ citizens of August 
1914 (i.e. men with no previous service) who were commissioned will never be known, the 
figures for commissions granted during the war indicate the massive contribution of the 
citizen to officering. 
 
This chapter examines the citizens who rose to command infantry battalions. The 
definition of ‘citizen’ for these purposes is an individual who had not previously served in 
the Regular army, Special Reserve, or Territorial Force. As Peter Simkins notes: “Once 
war was declared there was no shortage of applicants for temporary commissions at a more 
junior level. The main source of supply was the Officers’ Training Corps”.3 Gary Sheffield 
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describes the “usual insistence that potential officers possess OTC certificates”.4 Some 
citizen COs who originated from the 1914/early 1915 volunteers thus potentially possessed 
experience which made them “familiar with the groundwork of military training” and  
“accustomed to lead”.5 
 
 19146 19187  Total 1914-
1918 
Regular 12,738 74,200 16,544 commissions granted during war8 32,4949 (13%) 
New Army 0 124,022 commissions granted10 124,022 (48%) 
Special Reserve 2,557 28,000 30,376 commissions granted11 32,933 (13%) 
Territorial Force 9,563 60,055 60,044 commissions granted12 67,92713 (26%) 
Reserve of 
Officers 
3,202 2,000   
 
Table 6.1: Officer numbers and commissions granted 1914-1918 
 
6.1 The Citizen COs 
Two hundred and sixty citizens of August 1914 were identified as being appointed 
Lieutenant-Colonels to infantry battalions of regiments of the line during the war. 
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by the addition of the three known ‘Total 1914-1918’ figures and subtraction from the total, hence the figure 
of 124,022. 
11
 Statistics, p.234, paragraph 3 
12
 Statistics, p.235, paragraph 4 
13
 Excluding RAMC. Statistics, p.235, paragraph 4 splits this figure up between the various elements of the 




The citizen COs had an average age of 29 years two months in August 1914. Table 6.2 sets 
out the range of their ages and juxtaposes them with the series of 1,009 officers of the 
Royal Warwickshire Regiment analysed by Changboo Kang.14 The citizen CO cohort 
proves to be skewed towards the older end of the age distribution, containing a third of the 
under-20s and double the over-30s in comparison. Those in post on 29 September 1918 
were on average 35 years three months old in August 1914 and hence nearly four years 







<20 6% 19% 
20-24 23% 40% 
25-29 32% 23% 
>30 39% 18% 
 
Table 6.2: Ages of citizen COs compared with all officers, Warwickshire Regiment 
 
There was a tendency therefore for citizen COs to have had more life experience, a 
possible counterweight to their lack of previous military experience. 
                                                      
14
 C. Kang, ‘The British Regimental Officer on the Western Front in the Great War, with Special Reference 
to the Royal Warwickshire Regiment’, unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, (2007), pp.49-
50. 
15
 See Chapter Three section 3.2.1. The average age of a CO in France and Flanders on 29 September 1918 
was 34 years 11 months. 
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6.1.2 OTC experience 
20,577 members/ex-members of the OTC were commissioned,16 some nine per cent of all 
officer commissions. In a series of 75 officer files of citizen COs,17 over half (55 per cent) 
proved to have had no experience with university or school OTCs or their predecessors.18 
Of those who did, 48 per cent were from university OTCs,19 and 52 per cent from school 
corps. The latter figure, given the average age, indicates that over half of the citizen COs 
had enjoyed this ‘military’ experience in the more distant past. Less than a quarter of the 
whole group had therefore had more recent OTC experience. However, five times the 
number of citizen COs had OTC experience than the overall figure of nine per cent would 
predict. It is interesting to speculate whether this early choice of experience reflected 
personal characteristics which would manifest themselves in war as aptitude for command. 
 
6.1.3 Pre-war occupations and social status 
The occupations of 78 per cent of the citizen COs were identified. Statistics of the Military 
Effort of the British Empire during the Great War provides an analysis of the occupations 
of 140,325 officers demobilised between the Armistice and 12 May 1920,20 with which the 
citizen CO cohort can be compared (Table 6:3). 
 
 
                                                      
16
 Haig-Brown, The O.T.C., pp.99-106 
17
 TNA WO339 and WO374 
18
 In the Royal Warwickshire Regiment, Changboo Kang notes that at least 63.3 per cent of officers 
commissioned during the period 4 August 1914 to 31 December 1914 had experience of the Junior or Senior 
divisions of the OTC. [C. Kang, ‘The British Regimental Officer on the Western Front in the Great War, with 
Special Reference to the Royal Warwickshire Regiment’, unpublished PhD Thesis, University of 
Birmingham (2007), p103]. Ninety-one per cent of the citizen COs who had OTC experience were 
commissioned during this period. 
19
 Three were noted as from Oxford, six from Cambridge, and one each from London, Birmingham, Belfast, 
Manchester, Edinburgh and Durham. 
20





demobilisations Citzen COs 
Agriculture 5% 7495 4% 8 
Seamen/fishermen 0.5% 638 0.5% 1 
Coal mining 1% 1016 1% 2 
Other mining/quarrying >1% 146     
Food/drink/tobacco 1% 1499 1% 2 
Explosives >1% 371     
Indiarubber >1% 159 1% 2 
Paper/printing 1% 880     
Woolen 0.5% 579 0.5% 1 
Cotton 0.5% 701 0.5% 1 
Textile 0.5% 753 0.5% 1 
Bootmakers >1% 213     
Leather trades >1% 313     
Clothing 0.5% 657 0.5% 1 
Sawmill >1% 405     
Furniture >1% 128     
Coachbuilding >1% 157     
Shipbuilding >1% 342     
Iron/steel/tin manufacture >1% 317     
Engineering 8% 11389 11% 23 
Other metal trades 1% 838     
China/glass/pottery >1% 140     
Brick/cement >1% 168     
Building trades 6% 7739 0.5% 1 
Railway 1% 1122 0.5% 1 
Dock/wharf >1% 184     
Carters >1% 148     
Motor drivers >1% 220     
Public employees 4% 5533 6% 13 
General labourers >1% 363     
Commercial/clerical 28% 38572 17% 35 
Warehousing >1% 266     
Domestic/personal >1% 341     
Professional 15% 21740 24% 49 
Students/teachers 18% 25577 23% 47 
Other 7% 9216 8% 16 
 




Gary Sheffield notes that the OTC-biased recruiting practices “suggest that it was hoped 
that officers could be provided for the enlarged wartime army with the minimum 
disturbance to the social status quo”. He suggests that nevertheless “a revolutionary change 
occurred in the social composition of the wartime British army”.21 Using the figures 
provided in Statistics, he notes that 59.5 per cent of officers came from “broadly middle-
class occupations”,22 namely ‘students and teachers’, ‘professional men’ and ‘commercial 
and clerical’. Sheffield further suggests that 40 per cent of commissions represented 
upwards social mobility from the “artisan class”,23 notably engineering (8 per cent of 
officers), men who would previously have been “excluded on educational and social 
grounds”24 from the Regular army and TF. 
 
As Table 6.3 shows, 64 per cent of citizen COs came from Sheffield’s “broadly middle 
class group”, seemingly an overall similarity with the picture for all officers. There are key 
differences, however. The ‘commercial and clerical’ group comprised 28 per cent of the 
total officer group but only 17 per cent of the CO group, whilst conversely the 
‘professional group’ rises from 15 per cent of all officers to 24 per cent of COs, and 
‘students and teachers’ from 18 per cent to 23 per cent. A.D. Harvey’s claim that these 
COs were “of undoubtedly middle-class background”25 is therefore largely substantiated. 
Citizens with enhanced educational and professional status had a greater likelihood of 
achieving battalion command. The only area in which this trend appears reversed is the 
                                                      
21
 Sheffield, Leadership, p.31 
22
 Sheffield, Leadership, p.31 
23
 Sheffield, Leadership, p.32 
24
 Sheffield, Leadership, p.32 
25
 A.D. Harvey, ‘A Good War: Wartime Officers Who Rose to Command Level in the First World War’, 




increase in ‘engineering’ and ‘public employees’ in the CO group, but in both these areas it 






 Officers (%) (%) 
Clerk 14.3 14.5 
Student 10.7 10 
Teacher 7.6 13.5 
Merchant/salesman 6.5 2 
Military 6.1   
Engineer 5.8 11 
Bank clerk 4.7 1.5 
Manager/proprietor 3.8 2.5 
Solicitor/barrister 3.3 12.5 
Civil servant 3.1 6 
Actuary/surveyor/valuer/broker 3.1 4.5 
Manufacturer 3   
None 3   
Accountant 2.8 5 
Independent/gentleman 2.4 3 
Architect/builder 2.2 2 
Agricultural 2.2 4 
Chemist 1.6 1.5 
Apprentice 1.6   
Jeweller/goldsmith/silversmith 1.4   
Textile trades 1.3 2 
Policeman 0.9 >1 
Other   4.5 
 
Table 6.4: Civilian occupations of officers of the Royal Warwickshire Regiment and 
citizen COs 
 
Changboo Kang criticises the use of the War Office demobilisation statistics on the 
grounds that, being based only on survivors, they can only be “usefully employed in 
tracking down the changes in the social composition of officers between pre-war time and 
277 
 
the last part of the war”.26 His own analysis of occupations of Warwickshire Regiment 
officers of suggests that while the middle class dominated, “the true picture is one of 
variation rather than standardization”.27 Some ten per cent of Warwickshire officers were 
‘lower middle-class’ or ‘working class’. 
 
Table 6.4 contrasts the occupations of the Warwickshire officers and the citizen COs. This 
only reinforces the conclusion reached above concerning the middle class professional bias 
evident in COs, where teachers and solicitors/barristers made a major contribution, 26 per 
cent of all known occupations.28  
 
Amongst the teachers were two extraordinary men, both VC winners. Wilfrith Elstob, CO 
16th Manchester from 13 October 1916 to 21 March 1918, had attended Christ’s Hospital, 
where he had achieved the rank of Lance-Corporal in the school OTC. A graduate of 
Manchester University and language master at Merchiston College, Edinburgh, he was 
commissioned in 16th Manchester on 3 October 1914.29 Promoted to Captain commanding 
a company on 3 March 1915 and to Major second-in-command on 1 August 1916, he took 
over command almost exactly two years after his commission as a 2nd Lieutenant. He 
achieved fame defending Manchester Hill on 21 March 1918,30 when he famously declared 
to his men: “There is only one degree of resistance and that is to the last round and to the 
last man. Here we fight and here we die”. Utterly identified with his unit, he had written to 
                                                      
26
 Kang, ‘British Regimental Officer’, p.45 
27
 Kang, ‘British Regimental Officer’, p.73 
28
 Garth Pratten notes of the largely citizen COs of the Australian army in World War Two that “the COs 
represented a command class with a narrow social base”. [G. Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders in 
the Second World War (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.291]. 
29
 TNA WO339/56791 Officers’ Services, Wilfrith Elstob. He had first applied for a commission in 6th 
Manchester (17 August 1914). 
30
 Manchester Hill was a redoubt in the Fifth Army defensive positions facing St Quentin. 
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a friend on the eve of battle: “If I die, do not grieve for me, for it is with the Sixteenth that I 
would gladly lay down my life”. Fighting with revolver, rifle, bayonet and bombs, Elstob 
encouraged his 168 men: “You are doing magnificently boys! Carry on - keep up a steady 
fire and they’ll think there’s a Battalion here”. Wounded twice, he said to his Signalling 
Sergeant: “Arrundale, they can’t damn well kill me”.31 A direct hit with a bomb proved 
him wrong.32 The second VC, Bernard Vann, CO 1/6th Sherwood Foresters from 23 
September 1917 to 3 October 1918, was both teacher and chaplain at Wellingborough 
Grammar School, and will be considered later in this chapter. 
 
Another teacher, Albert Edward Scothern, CO 6th Border from 26 July 1917 to 9 February 
1918, and 9th Sherwood Foresters from 3 April 1918 to the Armistice, was a graduate of St 
John’s, Oxford, and played football for his university, Oxford City from 1903 to 1911, and 
England four times between 1908 and 1910. A science teacher at the outbreak of war, 
                                                      
31
 http://www.themanchesters.org/Manchester%20Hill.htm (accessed 9 February 2013). There is some 
dispute as to how many times Elstob was wounded prior to death. His officers file reveals that Warrant 
Officer J. Franklin (2nd Bedfordshire) who buried both Elstob and his Adjutant found him to have apparently 
been “shot at close quarters” nearby being “a large supply of … Mills hand grenades … ready for use and it 
appeared to me that these officers had been bombing the Huns when they were shot down”. Sergeant S. 
Banks (Manchester Regiment) described him after death as “wounded in the neck, left arm and head”. Private 
W.E. Smith (16th Manchester) noted he was “hit by a bomb and died instantly”. 
32
 His VC citation reads: “For most conspicuous bravery, devotion to duty and self-sacrifice during 
operations at Manchester Redoubt, near St. Quentin, on the 21 March 1918. During the preliminary 
bombardment he encouraged his men in the posts in the Redoubt by frequent visits, and when repeated 
attacks developed controlled the defence at the points threatened, giving personal support with revolver, rifle 
and bombs. Single-handed he repulsed one bombing assault driving back the enemy and inflicting severe 
casualties. Later, when ammunition was required, he made several journeys under severe fire in order to 
replenish the supply. Throughout the day Lieutenant-Colonel Elstob, although twice wounded, showed the 
most fearless disregard of his own safety, and by his encouragement and noble example inspired his 
command to the fullest degree. The Manchester Redoubt was surrounded in the first wave of the enemy 
attack, but by means of the buried cable Lieutenant-Colonel Elstob was able to assure his Brigade 
Commander that ‘The Manchester Regiment will defend Manchester Hill to the last’. Sometime after this 
post was overcome by vastly superior forces, and this very gallant officer was killed in the final assault, 
having maintained to the end the duty which he had impressed on his men - namely, ‘Here we fight, and here 
we die’. He set throughout the highest example of valour, determination, endurance and fine soldierly 
bearing.” London Gazette, 6 June 1919, p.31395 
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during which he was mentioned in despatches six times and awarded both DSO and 
CMG,33 he returned to teaching to become headmaster of Redditch County High School.34 
 
Of the solicitors, Noel Frederick Barwell, a Cambridge graduate who commanded 5th 
Oxford & Buckinghamshire from 29 April to 20 June 1918 and 18th Gloucestershire from 
20 June to 7 September 1918, went on to be the last British barrister of the Calcutta High 
Court. Author of a number of law books, he became the mentor of the Indian author Mani 
Shankar Mukherjee, his clerk, who wrote the novel Kato Anjare based on Barwell.35 
George Stanley Brighten, of Brighten & Lemon, CO 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers from 1 
August 1918 to the Armistice, was awarded the DSO twice as CO, for “ability, coolness 
and grasp”,36 and for “fine example of coolness” and skill.37 His post-war career did not 
follow the same glowing trajectory as Barwell’s. On 18 October 1932 he was convicted of 
fraud and sentenced to three year’s penal servitude. He wrote from Wormwood Scrubs: 
“To lose the rank I have had the honour to bear adds heavily to the existing punishment for 
my offence”.38 
                                                      
33
 The DSO was a New Year honour on 1 January 1918. 
34
 TNA WO339/3483 Officers’ Services, Albert Edward Scothern. He was also President of Redditch British 
Legion, and a Home Guard battalion commander during World War Two. 
35
 Mukherjee, known as Shankar, stated that the book, whose title translates as “The Great Unknown”, was 
an “attempt to express my gratitude and pay my respects to a remarkable man”. The Telegraph India, 26 
April 2011. 
36
 “When his battalion could advance no further owing to intense machine-gun fire, he went forward and 
personally reorganised it and established a strong defensive line. Later, when this hostile fire slackened, he at 
once initiated an advance which gained a considerable amount of ground. Throughout, his admirable reports 
were of the greatest assistance. His ability, coolness, and grasp of the situation had a marked effect on all 
ranks”. London Gazette, 6 April 1918, p.4196 
37
 “During an enemy attack … he was commanding the battalion in reserve, and employed it with such 
advantage that the attack was held up and the enemy repulsed with heavy loss, many prisoners being taken. 
His clever disposal of his forces and his fine example of coolness did much to restore the position”. London 
Gazette, 16 September 1918, page not known. 
38
 The 24 year-old Brighten had joined the 20th Public Schools Battalion of the Royal Fusiliers as a Private on 
2 September 1914, being commissioned on 17 November into the Liverpool Regiment where he served as 
Adjutant, an Assistant Postmaster General, no less, vouching for his good character. Bankrupt, he embezzled 
a cheque for £202 2s. 5d. from La Societe Anonyme des Hotels et Casino de Deauville. He had also 
presented a number of dud cheques at Les Etablissements Gaston Duperay in Brussels, passing himself off as 
an active serving officer. (TNA WO374/9054 Officers’ Services, George Stanley Brighten). 
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Maurice Rhynd Dickson, of McKenzie & Kermack of Edinburgh, commanded three 
battalions: 8th Royal Scots Fusiliers from 15 January 1917 to 15 October 1917; 8th Duke of 
Cornwall’s Light Infantry from 6 May to 28 October 1918; and 12th Argyll & Sutherland 
Highlanders from 29 October 1918 to the Armistice. A law graduate of Merton College, 
Oxford, he represented Scotland at both cricket and rugby union.39 
 
Another fine solicitor-athlete was Arnold Nugent Strode-Jackson, CO 13th King’s Royal 
Rifle Corps from 7 October 1917 to 23 August 1918. “Jackers” had been head of athletics 
at Malvern and rowed, played football, and captained at hockey for Brasenose College, 
winning the mile race for Oxford against Cambridge three times as President of the Oxford 
University Athletic Club. A private entry, he was gold medallist at 1500 metres at the 1912 
Stockholm Olympics.40 He was awarded the DSO with two bars,41 the final award as CO 
for “powers of command”.42 
                                                      
39
 Born in 1882, a right-handed bat with a highest international score of 98, he represented Scotland 13 times, 
captaining in 11 games. In rugby, he was capped for Scotland once as a forward, but he had played for 
Marlborough College, Oxford and Edinburgh universities, and the Barbarians. 
40
 http://www.passportland.com/images/jackson-arnold-1947/jackson-arnold-1947.html (accessed 9 February 
2013). In 1913 he visited America with the combined Oxford and Cambridge team. During his time serving 
with 13th KRRC a: “‘Grand Athletic Meeting’ was organised. Strode-Jackson ran in the mile handicap, and 
according to the record, ‘did not appear to take the race seriously until the bell sounded for the last lap, when 
he got into a raking stride and gave us an idea of his record performance in the Olympic Games’. He won, 
‘but like the good sport he was, he allowed the first prize to go to a small Welshman with plenty of pluck, but 
much shorter legs’”. Letters, The Times, 31 May 2012, p.27 
41
 The first bar to his DSO was awarded prior to his formal elevation but indicates why this took place:  
“During lengthy operations, when he assumed command of the battalion and, although wounded on two 
separate occasions, was able to carry out most valuable work. By his skill and courage he offered a splendid 
example to all ranks with him”. London Gazette, 18 July 1917, page unknown. 
42
 “His battalion was subjected to an intense bombardment throughout a whole day, which caused many 
casualties and cut off all communication by wire with the front-line companies. He handled the situation with 
such skill and initiative that when the enemy attacked towards evening the casualties caused by the 
bombardment had been evacuated and replaced by reinforcements and communication with the front line had 
been re-established. It was entirely due to his powers of command and the splendid spirit with which he 
inspired his men that the attack on the greater part of the front was repulsed, and that the enemy, though they 
had penetrated into parts of the front line, were counter-attacked and held at bay until the arrival of 
reinforcements. By his skilful dispositions he materially assisted the counter-attack which drove the enemy 




Two dental students chose to fight rather than pull teeth,43 and there were at least three 
medical students.44 A further four were students of divinity. Walter Hubert Baddeley, CO 
8th East Surrey from 11 September 1918 to the Armistice, was later Bishop of the diverse 
locations of Melanesia, Whitby and Blackburn.45 Noel Baring Hudson, CO 8th Berkshire 
from 21 April to 8 August and 24 October 1918 to the Armistice, became Bishop to the 
equally exotic locations of Labuan and Sarawak, Newcastle and Ely.46 His personal 
courage and “able leadership” were rewarded with the DSO as CO in 1918.47  
                                                      
43
 Arthur Dixon Bleakley, who commanded 11th Manchester briefly in September 1918, and Aubrey Ernest 
Burt who commanded 8th Oxford & Buckinghamshire for a month between April and May 1917. 
44
 John Henry Crosskey commanded 1/4th Gloucestershire between 5 June 1917 and 15 October 1917. 
Crosskey’s wife Evelyn was a relative of Prime Minster Neville Chamberlain, and the couple were described 
as “two wealthy physicians belonging to Birmingham’s upper crust”. [M. Doerry, My Wounded Heart – The 
Life of Lilli Jahn 1900-1944 (London: Bloomsbury, 2004), p.72]. Hector William Sutherland commanded 7th 
Scottish Borderers from 13 October 1918 to the Armistice, and later specialised in surgery. Ronald Gethen 
commanded 7th Norfolk from 9 October 1917 to 20 May 1918, and later practised as a GP in Surrey. 
45
 A graduate of Keeble College, Oxford, Baddeley was ordained in 1921 and served as Bishop of Melanesia 
from 1932 to 1947. He was known as the “Fighting Bishop”, serving in Melanesia under occupation, having 
won both MC [at Arras in 1917, taking command when his company commander was killed and completing 
an essential digging operation (London Gazette, 16 August 1917, p.8358)] and bar [commanding his 
company with “great skill and determination” having “reorganised and directed his men in a masterly 
manner” with “fine powers of command” (London Gazette, 16 September 1918, p.10880)]; and the DSO (3 
June 1919, no citation). 
46
 A graduate of  Christ’s College, Cambridge, Hudson was ordained in 1921.He had commanded 8th Royal 
Berkshire from 21 April 1918, having won both MC [for organising his company “skilfully in attack” 
(London Gazette, 17 April 1917 p.3682)] and bar [having carried out a “dashing advance under exceptional 
difficulties” showing “great resource and … a fine example” (London Gazette, 7 March 1918, p.2900)]; and 
DSO when: “In the attack by his battalion by night on the enemy positions on Mount Carmel (east of Le 
Cateau), on the 26th October, 1918, the assaulting troops had owing to the darkness become dispersed, and 
no information could be obtained of the progress of the attack. He went forward, and under heavy fire located 
the position of his companies. When his battalion was compelled to withdraw he succeeded in establishing a 
defensive line west of Mt. Carmel. Though wounded in three places by shell fire, he remained at duty until 
the operation was completed. His gallantry and ability to command were most marked”. (London Gazette,  4 
October 1919 p.12216). Of the other two, William John Phythian-Adams, CO 22nd Royal Fusiliers from 18 
November 1917 to 26 February 1918 became Keeper of the Museums in Palestine and was later ordained, 
becoming Cannon of Carlisle, Royal Chaplain, and editor of the Church Quarterly Review, publishing 
extensively on religious topics. William Harley Brindley, CO 10th Warwickshire from 8 May to 22 July 1918, 
was never ordained. 
47
 “For consistent gallantry and able leadership, particularly on 8th August, 1918, south of Morlancourt, 
when he personally led his battalion forward to the attack through heavy fog and intense shell and machine-
gun fire. When they were held up by machine guns he pushed forward alone, knocking out one machine gun 
and getting wounded in doing so. In spite of this, he rushed two other machine guns which were holding up 
the advance, and continued to lead his battalion forward until he was again seriously wounded by machine-




Two notables are found amongst the architects. Thomas Cecil Howitt, CO initially of 9th 
Leicestershire from 15 November 1917, then 7th Leicestershire from February 1918 until 
15 July 1918, showed “conspicuous ability” in command.48 He was responsible for a range 
of municipal architecture, particular in his home town of Nottingham, as well as a range of 
1930’s Odeon cinemas. Secondly, Gerald Unsworth, CO 1/4th York & Lancaster in the last 
eight days of the war, was responsible for a range of Art Deco London flats as well as 
country houses.49 
 
The straitjacket which Statistics forces on occupational classification loses much of the 
varied nature of these individuals. One was titled, namely the Honourable Arthur Michael 
Bertie, son of the 7th Earl of Abingdon, Honorary Attaché at Petrograd 1906-7, who 
commanded 11th Rifle Brigade from 8 March to 23 April 1918. Five did not need to work, 
being reliant on their own means. 
 
Thirty-five men comprised Sheffield’s “broadly middle-class” “commercial and clerical” 
group. Of these, one stands out. Spencer Percy Vaughan Weston was a stock exchange 
clerk. He joined the Public Schools Special Corps as a Private and was commissioned 
Lieutenant in December 1914 in the Royal Berkshire Regiment. Transferred to the 1st 
Battalion he was promoted Captain, company commander, on 14 January 1916, and Major 
on 19 September 1916. He commanded 17th Royal Fusiliers from 21 April 1917 to the date 
he became Brigadier-General, 122 Brigade, on 8 June 1918, a post he held until the 
                                                      
48
 “For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty when in command of his battalion during an enemy 
counter-attack. He displayed conspicuous ability in handling his battalion and in reorganising the defences of 
the front line. He went forward through a very heavy enemy barrage to make a personal reconnaissance, and 
his coolness and decision contributed very largely to the defence of the line”. London Gazette, 22 March 
1918, p.3951 
49
 Cottesmore Court, Kensington & Chelsea is a notable example of the flats. Sparsholt Manor in Hampshire 
(with Sussex his main stamping ground) is a good example of the country houses. 
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Armistice. The first bar to his DSO was awarded as CO for “tactical skill, coolness and 
example”,50 the second for “fine powers of leadership”.51 
 
Sheffield did not judge ‘public employees’ as “broadly middle class”, but again, the 
enforced categorisation of Statistics hides the social status of many of this group. George 
Henry Gater, CO 6th Lincolnshire from 15 August 1916 to 1 November 1917, who led his 
battalion with “brilliant skill and resolution”,52 and who was to be the most notable of the 
citizen promotions to Brigadier-General,53 was assistant Director of Education for 
Nottinghamshire.54 Ronald Semphill Stafford, CO 1st King’s Royal Rifle Corps from 9 to 
23 July 1917 and 23 February to 1 June 1918, as well as 2/7th Liverpool from 2 to 7 
September 1917 and 17th Middlesex from 9 September 1917 to 22 February 1918, was an 
Exhibitioner at Jesus College, Cambridge whence he joined the Egyptian Civil Service. 
                                                      
50
 “When the enemy launched a heavy attack on his position he moved up his reserves and organised the 
defence with such skill that, though the enemy attacked continually for six hours, his battalion withstood all 
the enemy's attempts to break through and inflicted very heavy casualties. His tactical skill, coolness, and 
example were mainly responsible for the successful resistance offered by his battalion”. London Gazette,  18 
July 1918, page unknown 
51
 “During the trying period of a retreat. Despite heavy losses, he withdrew the battalion in good order, 
inflicting severe casualties on the enemy, and it was largely due to his coolness and personal courage that the 
retirement was so well carried out. He invariably displayed fine powers of leadership and his splendid 
example was of the greatest encouragement all ranks". London Gazette, 26 July 1918, page unknown 
52
 The citation for the bar of Gater’s DSO reads: “He led his battalion with brilliant skill and resolution 
during an attack, minimising their casualties during three days' intense shelling by his able dispositions and 
good eye for ground. He directed the consolidation, and remained in command for three days, although 
severely wounded in the face early in the action”. London Gazette, 17 September 1917, p.9555 
53
 With 62 Brigade from 1 November 1917. Another whose career might have rivalled Gater’s was William 
Colsey Millward. Born in 1886, Millward played cricket for the Worcestershire second XI, but was also a 
keen footballer. He was a clerk in August 1914, and enlisted in the 11th (1st South Down) Battalion, Sussex 
Regiment as a Private on 9 September 1914. He was appointed 2nd Lieutenant (from Corporal) on 1st 
November. He was made Captain commanding a company on 18 August 1915, and Major second-in-
command on 25 July 1916, taking command of the battalion he had started in as a Private two and a half 
years earlier on 4 March 1917. He was promoted Brigadier-General in March 1918 with 116 Brigade but on 
29 March suffered gunshot wounds to his leg which resulted in its loss. (TNA WO 339/54848 Officers’ 
Services, William Colsey Millward). 
54
 Born in 1886, the son of a solicitor, he was educated at Winchester College and obtained a BA in Modern 
History and a Diploma in Education at New College, Oxford.  He was appointed Director of Education for 
Lancashire in 1919, and moved in 1924 to be Director of Education for the London County Council, later 
becoming its Clerk, in which role he was knighted. He then joined the Civil Service as Permanent Secretary, 
Head of the Colonial Office from 1942 to 1947. 
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Stafford was awarded the DSO as CO for courage and “quickness of decision”.55 Harold 
Samuel Eaton Stevens, CO 13th Royal Scots from 26 July 1918 until the Armistice, was an 
Indian civil servant who became Secretary to the Government of Bengal in the Agriculture 
and Industries Department post-war.  
 
More grandly, Basil Frederic Bishop, CO 9th South Lancashire from 13 May to 18 
September 1918 was Assistant District Commissioner and Magistrate in Rhodesia. More 
humbly, but no less worthy, Albert Arthur Aldworth, CO 7th Leicestershire from 30 
September to 3 December 1916, 18 May to 15 July 1917 and 15 August 1917 to 15 
February 1918, was the secretary to the Divorce Law Reform Union. Arthur Gracie 
Hayward, CO 4th Bedfordshire from 22 July to 22 September 1918, was similarly Assistant 
Secretary to a Social Welfare Association. 
 
In the creative sphere, Robert Bingham Harkness, CO 19th Welsh from 17 October 1918 to 
the Armistice, was a musician; and Arthur Driver, CO 9th West Riding from 16 September 
1918 to the Armistice, was a textile designer, whose “able leadership” as CO was reflected 
in his DSO award.56 John Jackson Cameron, CO 2/5th Royal Lancaster from 20 September 
1917 to 30 May 1918, an illustrator, was awarded a DSO as CO for “the greatest ability 
                                                      
55
 “During a rearguard action lasting over a period of five days he behaved with consistent coolness and 
courage. On one occasion, the left flank of his battalion having been driven in and the battalion ordered to 
establish a defensive flank, he carried out a personal reconnaissance under direct machine-gun fire, gaining 
valuable information as to the dispositions on his right flank, and personally placed each company in its 
position. During this time the enemy was fast approaching in massed formation, and artillery fire was opened 
on his battalion at point-blank range. His total disregard of danger and quickness of decision said the 
situation on this and other occasions”. London Gazette, 26 July 1918, page unknown 
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 “For conspicuous gallantry and able leadership when in command of his battalion during active operations, 
especially on 12th Oct. 1918, in the attack on Neuvilly, when he very ably led his battalion, and, although 
himself wounded, reorganised it under heavy shell and machine gun fire at a critical stage of the battle. He 




and skill”.57 Two were journalists; Thomas Joseph Kelly, CO 1/7th Lancashire Fusiliers 
from 26 October 1918 to the Armistice; and Louis Henry Dawson, CO 13th Middlesex 
from 16 May to 24 July 1917. Douglas Ainslie Foulis, CO 10th Scottish Rifles from 29 
September to 19 October 1918, was a publisher.58 
 
Several had been working abroad. Herbert Cooper Cannon, CO 3/4th West Surrey from 15 
October to 21 November 1917 was a rubber planter;59 as was Francis John Fielding Crook, 
who commanded 17th Lancashire Fusiliers from 23 July 1916 to 12 August 1918,60 and 
4/5th Lancashire Fusiliers from 3 October 1918 to the Armistice, and who showed 
“conspicuous ability” as CO.61 Similarly, John Ryrie Webster, CO 16th Sherwood Foresters 
from 13 September 1917 to 22 March 1918, was a timber merchant in Ceylon. Henry 
Abrahall Robinson, CO 26th Royal Fusiliers from 24 March to 31 August 1918, was a 
farmer in Canada, having joined the 6th Canadian Battalion as a Private before applying for 
a British commission. 
 
Of the groups whose status was deemed lower than “broadly middle class”, twenty-three 
engineers rose to command battalions. Where this was specified further, five were mining 
engineers, three electrical, two marine, two railway and one each chemical, civil, and 
mechanical. Their demotion to “artisan” status is clearly not entirely warranted. 
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 “He made a thorough reconnaissance of the ground on which his battalion were to assemble and advance in 
support of an attack. He guided his battalion to the position, which he found was being heavily shelled, and 
he assembled them successfully in another position. He showed the greatest ability and skill throughout". 
London Gazette, 25 April 1918, page unknown. 
58
 With the firm of Hunter and Foulis, Edinburgh. 
59
 He returned to Malaya after the war, and was working in oil distribution when World War Two broke out. 
He served again as a Lieutenant-Colonel, and rests in Kandy War Cemetery. 
60
 Another Malayan rubber planter, he was the son of Colonel H.T Crook, a retired Volunteer. 
61
 At Le Falfemont Farm, on 25 August 1916:“For conspicuous gallantry and ability when in command of a 
battalion. Covering the left flank of our Allies in attack he carried out a difficult task with much skill. The 
success of the operation was largely due to his ability”. London Gazette, 20 October 1916, page unknown. 
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Of the two classified under ‘coal mining’, Charles Bertram Charlesworth, CO 12th King’s 
Own Yorkshire Light Infantry from 31 August 1918 to the Armistice, was in fact a colliery 
owner; and Charles Godfrey Jones, CO 9th Border from 23 December 1917 to the 
Armistice, was a colliery manager. 
 
In the areas of manufacturing and retail, James Charles Burdett, CO 6th Leicestershire from 
25 August 1918 to the Armistice, a hosiery manufacturer and former rugby international, 
may have found fighting more engaging than socks. John Clayton Beadle, CO 11th West 
Kent from 20 September 1917 to 8 January 1918, was in the motor trade;62 as was Julius 
Guthlac Birch, CO 7th King’s Royal Rifle Corps from 18 October 1917 to 24 March 
1918.63 
 
Perhaps the most humble occupation was that of Sydney Douglas Rumbold, who 
commanded 9th York and Lancaster from 18 July 1917 to the Armistice, who was a 
draper’s assistant. His courage and skill, reflected in the citations for his DSO and bar 
which note his “able organisation” and “ability to command”, were not in doubt.64 Sadly, 
he was cashiered in 1920 for “acts of indecency”, and stripped of his awards.  
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 His firm, Beadles, has ten retail sites in Kent still. He was also in the timber business. 
63
 Birch served as a GSO3 between 23 August and 5 October 1916. He was wounded and taken prisoner on 
24 March 1918. 
64
 His DSO citation reads:  “For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. His battalion having taken over 
a portion of the captured front, this officer organised the defences, arranging and superintending the digging 
for the protection of his flank. It was in great measure due to the able organisation and gallant leading of Lt.-
Col. Rumbold that a counter-attack was repulsed. Though his battalion had been relieved, he voluntarily 
remained in the front line through another more violent counter-attack, supported by powerful artillery 
concentration. His valuable aid to the new commanding officer as to the terrain, this able leading of the men 
and his skilful handling of the situation resulted in the enemy being again repulsed”. London Gazette, 18 
March 1918, p. 3417. The citation to the bar to his DSO reads: “For conspicuous gallantry and leadership in 
the Piave battle from 29th to 31st October, 1918. When his battalion was in support of other troops who were 
three times held up at the crossing of the Monticano, near Vazzola, Lt.-Col. Rumbold, on his own initiative, 
determined to attack, and led his men over the bridge and gained the objective, taking many prisoners and 
machine guns. On 30th October, by rapid marching, he came to the support of our cavalry, who were held 
upon the River Mescia. On 31st October he again had heavy fighting in the taking of Sacii, and in bridging 
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The seemingly humble profession of railwayman hides an interesting character in 
Frederick Henry Wickham Guard. Born in 1889 and having travelled in Canada where he 
worked variously as a fruit grower and branch manager of a refrigeration company, he 
returned to the UK in 1910, finding employment in London on The Times. Here he fell in 
with “bad company” and was in “very poor shape indeed” by the time his father bailed him 
out. He subsequently found employment on the West African Railways in Sierra Leone, 
and obtained a commission in the West African Frontier Force in August 1914. Invalided, 
he joined the Hampshire Regiment in February 1915, and was promoted to command 15th 
Royal Scots from 8 July 1917 to 5 April 1918. In the summer of 1918, Guard went to 
North Russia, where he served as CO of Force ‘A’ on the Vologda railway, where he was 
described as a “born guerrilla leader”.65 He was a clear example of a man for whom the 
lack of structure of civilian life led to failure and the structure of the military life 
channelled his energies. 
 
These details create the picture of a middle-class, well educated, varied and richly talented 
body of men. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
the River Lwenza. Throughout the operations he showed great coolness and ability to command”. Edinburgh 
Gazette, 5 February 1919, p.619 
65http://www.dnw.co.uk/medals/auctionarchive/viewspecialcollections/itemdetail.lasso?itemid=67027  




6.1.4 Commission routes 
Table 6.5 sets out the original commission routes of the citizen COs. Just over three-
quarters had been commissioned into Service battalions, the rest into the Special Reserve 
and Territorial Force. When compared with the distribution of officers presented in Table 
6.1, it becomes clear that all did not have an equal chance of rising to command. Special 
Reserve and Territorial citizen officers were just over half as likely to rise to battalion 
command as their overall numbers might predict, and New Army officers were over one 
and half times more likely. 
 







First commission N/A 78% 8% 14% 
Distribution of officers 1914-1918 13% 48% 13% 26% 
 
Table 6.5: Entry routes of citizen COs v. distribution of officers 
There is no objective reason to suppose that these men differed in quality simply by virtue 
of their commission route. The disparity mirrors that already discussed in Chapters Three 
and Four,66 namely that Territorials were underrepresented in terms of battalion command, 
particularly in the middle part of the war, with the Special Reserve making a limited 
contribution throughout.67 Given that the main purpose of the Special Reserve was to 
reinforce the Regular units, it is unsurprising that when the 29 commands achieved by such 
officers are analysed, Regular commands were found to comprise 42 per cent of the total 
(Table 6.6). It is an inescapable conclusion, however, that Territorial Officers were always 
at a disadvantage in terms of senior command. 
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 See Section 3.1.1 and 4.3 
67
 John Bourne notes a similar pattern of poor rates of promotion to General Officer of Special Reserve and 
TF officers. [J. Bourne, ‘The BEF’s Generals on 29 September 1918: An Empirical Portrait with Some 
British and Australian Comparisons”, in P. Dennis & J. Grey, eds, 1918 Defining Victory (Canberra: 




First commission Battalion commands 
  Regular 
New 
Army Territorial Special Reserve 
New Army 5% 86% 8% 1% 
Territorial   19% 81%   
Special Reserve 42% 31% 27%   
 
Table 6.6: Type of first commission and battalion command 
 
Eighty-six per cent of the 248 commands of those who were commissioned into New 
Army battalions were in Service battalions; and 81 per cent of the 43 commands of those 
who were commissioned into Territorial battalions were in TF units. Type of commission 
therefore exerted a strong influence over location of later command. 
 
6.1.5 Pace of promotion 
Whatever the differential likelihood of reaching the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel dependant 
on an officer’s type of commission, the speed of promotion to CO was fairly uniform. A 
New Army and a Territorial officer took on average three years one month; and a Special 
Reserve officer three years two months. The promotional impetus of war is evident when it 
is recalled that a Regular officer in 1914 had taken 26 years 11 months to make the same 
professional journey.68 Sixty per cent had been first commissioned in 1914, 36 per cent in 
1915, and four per cent in 1916, only half of the latter being the product of the Officer 
Cadet Battalions created in February 1916.69 
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 See Chapter One section 1.1.2. 
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Figure 6.1 shows the number of citizen CO appointments per month. These begin to 
escalate during the Somme offensive, August to November 1916, and escalated further 
from the Battle of Messines through Third Ypres, June to November 1917, and reached a 
peak during the German Spring offensive March-April 1918. In the run-up to and during 
The Hundred Days, a steadily rising rate of elevation of citizens is observed. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Number of monthly citizen CO appointments 
 
Some citizens had very early appointments, but these tended to be quite particular. George 
Sydney Guy was the first to be appointed,70 to 2/6th Cheshire on 11 February 1916. Guy 
was the manager of a labour exchange in August 1914, and the battalion, like his next 
command, 2/7th Cheshire, never served overseas. It is easy to speculate that he was 
appointed for his management experience. Similarly, Arthur Victor Cowell was appointed 
to command 2/4th Buffs on 2 March 1916. As with his second command, 1/1st Highland 
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 Barring the two early citizen politician appointments of Henry Webb (13th Gloucestershire, 14th 




Cyclists, the battalion never served overseas. Cowell, who lived at Aldershot in August 
1914, was an army schoolmaster. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Length of citizen CO commands 
 
As can be seen from Figure 6.2, 76 per cent of citizen CO appointments lasted less than 
200 days, and 25 per cent less than 50 days. These figures, which on the face of it suggest 
short appointments, have, however, the potential to mislead. The most telling statistic is 
that forty-three per cent of all citizens who rose to command battalions were in post on 11 
November 1918. 
 
Of the whole citizen CO group 13 per cent were killed in action (a figure not dissimilar to 
the 11 per cent overall). Sixteen per cent were wounded/invalided, slightly less than the 
overall figure of 20 per cent.71 Removal from command or sidelining occurred in 25 per 
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 See Chapter Three section 3.3.6. 
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cent of cases, compared with the overall wartime figure of 38 per cent.72 The latter figure, 
of course, contains older active officers and ‘dug-outs’ who were replaced earlier in the 
war. The replacement rate was therefore calculated for comparison purposes for Regular 
officers who were Lieutenants in August 1914,73 on the basis that they had similarities with 
the citizen group, namely: (i) they were being promoted roughly during the same period, 
i.e. later in the war; and (ii) they were younger, fitter etc. Their removal/sidelining rate was 
19 per cent. This reinforces the contention that during the latter part of the war, when CO 
removals were still a regular occurrence, the younger and more rugged and adapted men of 
1918 were giving less cause for removal.74 Further, whilst the removal rate for citizens was 
higher that the group of Regular Lieutenants of August 1914, it was not markedly so, and it 
is likely that a number of such removals were not competence-based but predicated upon 
the return of a more senior officer. 
 
6.2 “Military geniuses”? 
A.D. Harvey suggests that the appointment of citizen officers to: 
Command battalions … does not indicate that they were, or were ever 
considered, military geniuses of a calibre superior to what might be 
found in the regular army: there were career officers of a comparable 




Very few appraisals of citizen COs exist in the weeded officer files in The National 
Archives. Only one in a series of 75 files yielded a confidential report. The hosiery 
manufacturer James Charles Burdett was 30 years old when he enlisted as a Private in 21st 
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 See Chapter Three section 3.3.8. 
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 A total of 228 officers. 
74
 See further in Chapter Seven, section 7.2. 
75
 Harvey, ‘Good War’, p.80 
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Royal Fusiliers in August 1914, rising to Corporal by December at which point the CO of 
6th Leicestershire, Lieutenant-Colonel E.L. Challenor,76 wrote to the War Office 
recommending him for a commission.77 Burdett was gazetted Lieutenant on 19 January 
1915. He went to France in July 1915, and was wounded on 14 July 1916 on the Bazentin 
Ridge,78 a bullet entering his right cheekbone and exiting by his left eye.79 He returned to 
France a Captain on 2 January 1917, was promoted Major on 4 April 1917,80 and was 
made second-in-command on 4 August 1917. He took over command on 25 August 1918, 
when Lieutenant-Colonel M.C. Martyn was captured at Le Sars.81  
 
The confidential report made on him by Brigadier-General, H.R. Cumming describes: 
A born soldier and leader of men. Has great capacity of command; a 
good disciplinarian, and a reliable trainer with knowledge and tact, and 
great determination. He has kept his Battalion in a high state of efficiency 
in difficult circumstances. Powerfully built and very active; a fair rider 
with great powers of endurance; cool and resourceful in action, he has 
proved himself a very efficient Commander. 
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 Edward Lacy Challenor, a Major and Depot Commander of the Leicestershire Regiment in August 1914 
commanded 6th Leicestershire from August 1914 to March 1917, and commanded 63 Brigade from 16 March 
1917 to 26 September 1918. 
77
 Noting that his brother was already an officer in his battalion. John Wilder Burdett, four years junior, never 
rose above Captain in the battalion his brother commanded, and ended the war as a Brigade Transport 
Officer. 
78
 As was Challenor, who had recommended him. 
79
 He was also by this time suffering from sciatica in the right leg with muscle wasting, which left him 
walking with a limp. 
80
 Few examples of ‘Promotion Form Army Form W. 3025’ are extant in civilian COs’ files. The form for 
Burdett’s promotion to Major exists, which shows he was recommended in turn by his CO, Lieutenant-
Colonel W.N. Stewart; his Brigadier, Lord Loch, (27 October 1917); and Lieutenant-Colonel G. J. Acland-
Troyte AA&QMG with 21st Division on behalf of Major-General D.G.M Campbell (undated). The vacancy 
was approved by the department of “Military Secretary to C-in-C” on 10 September 1917,  and ‘approved’ in 
that department by Colonel A. Keene (a 63-year old officer who had retired 23 years earlier) on 16 
November 1917. The process had taken seven months and 12 days. When Burdett was promoted from 
Temporary Major, (having been Acting Lieutenant-Colonel from 25 August 1918), on 10 September 1918 to 
Temporary Lieutenant-Colonel, his form W. 3025 shows the process only took four and a half months. His 
form on this occasion was actually signed by Brigadier-General H.R. Cumming (4 January 1919); Major-
General D.G.M ‘Soarer’ Campbell (5 January 1919); and Lieutenant-General C.D. ‘Tiger’ Shute (11 
February 1919). 
81
 Going forward in the dark with his Intelligence Officer and orderly to locate his forward companies he 
walked into a quarry North-West of Le Sars where he was ambushed, and after a struggle, was captured and 
his orderly killed, the Intelligence Officer escaping. [H.R.Cumming, A Brigadier in France (London: 




Major-General D.G.M. Campbell added: “I entirely agree. A very fine officer who has 
done excellent work. Thoroughly fit for command of a Battn”.82 Coming from such 
luminaries as these two general officers, it must be assumed that Burdett was at the top of 
his game in 1918. Cumming also demonstrates what was being sought in a CO in 1918, 
namely leadership and command ability, physical fitness, knowledge and resourcefulness, 
and ability to train effectively. 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel C.F.G. Humphries provides a fine example of a citizen with no 
military experience of any sort who showed extraordinary qualities, becoming one of the 
select band of citizens who commanded a Regular battalion. Cecil Frederick George 
Humphries was born in Mataura, New Zealand, but he was on holiday in England with his 
mother in August 1914, aged just under 27.83 A keen footballer and golfer, and a clerk by 
occupation, he enlisted on 7 August 1914, and was posted as a clerk to the Army Service 
Corps at Le Havre,84 being promoted Corporal 18 days later. It is a measure of the man that 
he chose to exchange rank for action, obtaining a transfer as a Private to 1st Manchester on 
15 October. Promoted from Lance-Corporal to acting Sergeant over the period 30 October 
to 21 December, he was shot in the left forearm at Givenchy on 20 December, where he 
was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for endeavouring to recover the body of his 
company commander.85 
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 TNA WO374/10838 Officers’ Services, James Charles Burdett. 
83
 Humphries was born on 28 October 1886. His father was 55 at his birth and died when he was 10. His 
mother  remarried two years later, becoming Mrs Ada Rouse, but it is clear that the two remained very close, 
his mother remaining in England during the duration of the war. He wrote in his diary just before going into 
action: “If the fates are against me I hope I will die an honourable death with my heart full of love for my 
darling mother”. http:digital.theensign.co.nz  Soldier’s Deeds Recalled. (Accessed 21 July 2011). 
84
 Humphries has five medal index cards in TNA WO329. Other details come from TNA WO339/4177 
Officers’ Services Cecil Frederick George Humphries. Fascinatingly, but without explanation, his file yields 
the information that his right nipple had been removed. 
85
 http://themanchesters.org/forum/index.php?topic=3388.0;wap2 Accessed 21 July 2011 
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He was wounded again on 12 March 1915, shot in the left buttock, in the failed attack on 
the Bois du Biez, Neuve Chapelle. Convalescing, he applied for a commission, and was 
gazetted 2nd Lieutenant on 11 June 1915 in the 12th Highland Light Infantry, which 
proceeded to France the following month. He was promoted Captain on 26 September 
1915. Wounded again, he was transferred to the Labour Corps in February 1917, being 
awarded his first Military Cross86 when: 
At great personal risk he directed operations at a fire, which resulted in 
saving eight trucks of ammunition from a burning train. Assisted by a 
serjt.-major, he uncoupled the eighth truck himself, whilst the ninth was 
burning fiercely and heavy shells exploding freely around them. 
 
He returned to active service with 1st Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry on 22 October 
1917, where he won a bar to his MC for his handling of his company in action. Taking 
command of the battalion on 17 April 1918 when Lieutenant-Colonel C.B. Norton was 
promoted,87 Humphries was gassed four days later in the Forest of Nieppe, but returned to 
duty to win the DSO: 
For conspicuous gallantry and fine leadership. Having taken his 
objective, he reorganised his battalion, and, on hearing that the attack on 
the final objective was held up, he went forward under heavy fire and 
reconnoitred the whole position, after which he returned and led the 
battalion forward. Later, he personally controlled his men during a very 
determined counter-attack by the enemy under the heaviest machine-gun 
fire. His courage inspired great confidence throughout the operations.88 
 
 
On 30 May 1918 he was posted to take command of 1st Norfolk. Seriously wounded by 
shellfire at Achiet-le-Petit, he died of wounds on 22 August 1918. 
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 Both his two Military Cross awards were gazetted in September 1917: London Gazette, 16 September 
1918, p. 10893 & 17 September 1917, p.9574. 
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 To command 95 Brigade. 
88
 London Gazette, 2 December 1918. 
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Richard Owen Wynne commanded both a Regular and a New Army battalion. Born at 
Moss Vale, New South Wales, on 12 June 1892, he left Australia in 1902, attended 
Marlborough College, and at the outbreak of war was at Clare College, Cambridge. At 
Marlborough he played rugby for the school, and was a member of the school shooting 
eight, competing for the Ashburton Shield at Bisley from 1907 to 1910. He rowed for his 
college in 1913 and 1914. 
 
He was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in 3rd Bedfordshire on 15 August 1914, and went to 
France on 21 March 1915, joining 2nd Bedfordshire as a Lieutenant on 27 June 1915, in 
which battalion he served until May 1918. For much of this early period he commanded C 
Company, and it was whilst commanding both B and C companies on 31 July 1916 that he 
won the DSO.89   
 
He first commanded the battalion from 8 November 1916 to 17 November 1916 when the 
CO, Major J.W.H.T. Douglas, was at Third Army School.90 From 25 November to 5 
December he was in temporary command of 17th Liverpool. All his commands were within 
89 Brigade, and it is clear that he had established a reputation for sound leadership. On 4 
January 1917 he was sent to Senior Officer School, Aldershot, returning on 6th April. He 
did not have to wait long, for on 8th April, Lieutenant-Colonel H.S. Poyntz went sick and 
Wynne took over until 15 June, thus commanding the Battalion during its operations at 
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 For consolidating a trench on the Maltzhorn Ridge. His efforts at Trones Wood on 11-12 July were also 
commended. London Gazette, 1 January 1917, page unknown 
90
 John William Henry Tyler Douglas (1882-1930) was also a citizen CO. A timber importer, he was England 
(1911 & 1920/1) and Essex (1911-28) cricket captain, his defensive style earning him the nickname amongst 
Australians as “Johnny Won’t Hit Today.” He commanded 1/6th North Staffordshire from 19 January 1917 to 
11 March 1917, and  20th Liverpool from 11 March 1917 to 1 February 1918. A man who survived both the 
Western Front and the Australian series 5-0 ‘whitewash”  of 1920-1, he was claimed by the seas seven miles 
south of the Laeso Trindel lightship, Denmark, returning from a trip to the Baltic buying pine, attempting to 
rescue his father when two ships collided in fog. 
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Arras. On 10th July he was sent to command 19th Liverpool for six days. He assumed 
command of his battalion again on 2 & 22 August, and 1 November 1917. On 22 February 
1918, he took command again, this time as Acting Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding 
virtually continuously until 22 May, when he went to train American units.91 He won a bar 
for his DSO as CO for “great skill and bravery”.92 He was given command of 18th 
Liverpool in August 1918 and continued in this role beyond the Armistice, being wounded 
in October 1918 in the offensive around Le Cateau, but remaining at duty. After the war, 
Wynne returned to his home town in Australia, where he described himself as “a worker 
among workers”.93 The citation for the bar to his DSO suggests this was not an empty 
claim.94 
 
John Ryrie Webster, born in 1886, had an unusual start to his career long before 
commanding a New Army battalion, and was one of the few COs to leave a diary.95  A 
Liverpool football player, Webster had worked in timber in India for five years, and his 
firm was asked to raise eight motor cyclists, Webster being made Corporal. He thus 
became part of 32nd Signalling Company, Jullundur Brigade, and arrived in France on 25 
September 1914. His diary suggests he had the most extraordinary freedom, roaming on 
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 TNA WO95/1658 War Diary 2nd Bedfordshire Regiment 
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 “For conspicuous gallantry and leadership in action between March 21st and 28th, 1918, and especially for 
his action on March 27th, at La Folies, when parties of Germans succeeded in working some machine guns 
close up to the front line held by the Battalion. Observing this, Wynne personally led an attack against the 
machine guns, and succeeded in driving them off, and himself killed the Officer commanding the Germans. 
At all times Col. Wynne commanded his men with great skill and bravery, and showed complete disregard 
for his own safety”. London Gazette, 16 September 1918, page unknown. 
93http://www.mtwilson.com.au/mt-wilsonmt-irvine-historical-society/miscellaneous-articles/215-2005-
remembrance-day-transcript.html Accessed 29 July 2011 
94
 For eight years he held the post of Aide-de-Camp to Lord Wakehurst, Governor of New South Wales from 
1937 to 1945. On his departure, Wakehurst wrote: “My dear Owen, I feel I cannot leave NSW without 
expressing my very deep gratitude for your loyal and devoted service, during the eight years of my term of 
office. I should like you to realise how much it has meant to my wife and to myself to know that we could 
always rely on your help. There have been times, especially during the war years, when difficulties and 
inconveniences have been numerous, but you have always accepted them cheerfully, and have always risen 
to the occasion”. 
95
 IWM Docs 13948 Private Papers of Lieutenant-Colonel J.R. Webster 
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his motorcycle behind the front. On 10 January 1915 he “applied to be sent to the Training 
School at Bailleul” and was offered a commission a week later. On January 20th he “met 
Colonel Marshall … of the Sherwood Foresters … (he) asked me why I did not apply for a 
commission and when I told him that I had he promptly asked me to come to his Regiment. 
He there and then applied for me. Most awfully pleased about this”.96  
 
He joined the 1st Battalion on 10 March as 2nd Lieutenant, being wounded at Neuve 
Chapelle the following day. He was only able to return to duty on 3 September 1915. 
Promoted Captain, company commander, he was wounded on 1 June 1916 and again on 5 
July 1916 during the attack on the Tara Line on the Somme. Awarded an MC on 6 August 
1916 and now a Major, he joined 17th Sherwood Foresters in May 1917, and was 
transferred to command the 16th Battalion on 14 September 1917.97 Six days later he was 
leading his new battalion in action, albeit suitably fortified: “After a cup of tea with a stiff 
tot of rum in it, I went out and joined my men”. He wrote of his battalion’s participation in 
the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge: “I shall never forget ‘Sept 20th’– it was the greatest 
day of my life. The dash of the men was simply amazing”. He was awarded the DSO for 
“splendid example and leadership” in taking blockhouses in Bulgar Wood.98 November 22-
                                                      
96
 William Raine Marshall was commanding 1st Sherwood Foresters at the outbreak of war and continued to 
do so until the day after he encountered Webster. He subsequently served as Brigadier-General (24 January 
1915 to 2 June 1915) 87 Brigade; Major-General with 42, 29 and 53 Divisions between 3 June 1915 and 14 
September 1916; and finally Lieutenant-General from 24 September 1916 with III Indian Corps in 
Mesopotamia. 
97
 He recorded: “Poor Houghton of the 16th Bn was killed by a shell and later in the evening I was sent to 
take command of them”. 
98
 “For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty when in command of a battalion in an attack. When a 
strong point, manned by four machine guns, had been passed over by the leading troops in the attack, he 
promptly organised a party and led it to the capture of the strong point. He then led his battalion forward in 
the advance and, in spite of serious opposition, took all his objectives and held them against three enemy 
counter-attacks. The remarkable dash and determination of his battalion during the operations was mainly 
due to his splendid example and leadership”. London Gazette, 6 April 1918, p.4199 
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25 1917 found him commanding 117 Brigade as his Brigadier was on leave.99 On 
Christmas Eve 1917, “all the COs of the Brigade dined with the Brigadier and we had a 
very cheery evening”, a situation which did not last as he was removed to hospital with a 
poisoned toe, writing: “I am awfully sick about it, for I have been so much away from the 
Battalion lately & I want to get back to them”. This bond with his battalion was soon put to 
the test. 
 
On 20 January he was told that either the 16th or 17th Battalions, and probably the 16th, 
would be disbanded and “as I am only an acting Lt.-Colonel I am frightfully worried about 
it, for although I am feeling the strain a bit I do not want to give up the command of the 
Battalion and it would just about break Col. Stepney’s heart”.100 After being told it would 
be the 16th: “I took my courage in my hands and went to the Brigadier and told him he was 
making a mistake … I told him that I knew both Battalions intimately and that I believed 
the spirit de corps in the 16th was deeper than in the 17th.” His unit was reprieved,101  but 
his command was not to last long. On 22 March 1918, as 2nd Lieutenant F.E. Allen, 1st 
Hertfordshire, described:  
Amid a murderous machine gun fire on the right of Solcourt Wood, 
near Villers Faucon, Lt-Col Webster … bravely re-organised remnants 
of scattered units into a line of resistance and held up the enemy on all 
sides for two or three hours … he set a fine example to subordinate 
ranks by his dauntless courage in running to and fro across a front 
swept by machine gun fire, and others were not slow to follow him.  
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 Brigadier-General G.A. Armytage. 
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He was shot dead. Colonel Herbert-Stepney remarked: “I suppose no more gallant soldier 
ever lived”.102 
 
Arthur Daniel Derviche-Jones is another prime, yet unknown, example of the highly 
successful citizen CO.103 Educated at Winchester College, he was a 42 year-old Liverpool 
solicitor on the outbreak of war.104 He enlisted in September 1914 in 10th Liverpool as a 
Private, and was commissioned Lieutenant in 3rd Liverpool on 12th November 1914. He 
was posted to France and Flanders on 4 April 1915 and given command of a company in 
the 1st Battalion a month later.  In May 1915, at Festubert, a bullet grazed his head, and he 
was wounded again in September that year at Loos. During 1916 he spent two months as 6 
Brigade Intelligence Officer, and was attached for 10 days to 2nd Division as Acting GSO3 
Intelligence and finally served as Brigade-Major 142 Brigade from 21 June 1916 to 28 
August 1916.  
 
In January 1917 he attended Senior Officer School where he was “recommended for 
immediate command”. He was sent to 13th Essex on 7 April 1917 as second-in-command, 
and commanded this battalion from 4-16 May when he returned to command 1st Liverpool, 
both as Major. He had three periods of command as a Lieutenant-Colonel. On 27 May 
1917 he took command of 2/8th London which post he held until its amalgamation with 
1/8th London, commanding between 31 July and 17 August 1918, when he was invalided 
with neurasthenia having “lost his memory and could not sleep”. He returned to action at 
his own request, Major-General A.C. Daly, 24th Division, stating: “He is a very fine, 
experienced and exceptionally brave officer” – indeed, Derviche-Jones had been 
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recommended for brigade command in November 1917. He commanded 1/12th London 
from 11 to 14 October and 1/8th London again from that date until the Armistice. 
 
His experience of battle included Festubert, Loos, Vimy Ridge (May 1916), Beaumont 
Hamel, Arras, Bullecourt, Third Ypres [St Julien (September) and Passchendaele 
(October)], St Quentin, Crozat Canal, Tergnier, Viry Noreuil, Chauny (German Spring 
Offensive); Somme (Malard Wood) in August 1918, and Annay-Waudgnies, October to 
Nov 1918. At the end of the war he went to India as a GSO2 where a grateful army 
pursued him for an £11 bootmaker’s bill. 
 
Last, but by no means least, the extraordinary Bernard William Vann was a teacher and 
ordained clergyman who won the VC whilst commanding 1/6th Sherwood Foresters. Born 
in 1887, Vann attended Chichele College105 and Jesus College, Cambridge,106 where he 
served for two years in the OTC achieving the rank of Sergeant. He was a notable 
sportsman.107 He was ordained deacon in 1910, serving as curate of St Barnabas, New 
Humberstone, until he took up post as chaplain and assistant master at Wellingborough 
School (1912). Frustrated by the delay in his application for an army chaplaincy he joined 
the ranks of the Artists Rifles, 31 August to 1 September 1914, gazetted that day 2nd 
Lieutenant in 8th Sherwood Foresters; subsequently being promoted Lieutenant (26 April 
1915), and Captain (6 June 1915). He was transferred to the 1/7th Battalion, promoted 
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Major, on 20 June 1916, and must have been on the first Senior Officers Course at 
Aldershot where he went in September 1916 whilst invalided. Buried by a trench mortar in 
May 1915108 and wounded at the Hohenzollern Redoubt in October 1915,109 after which he 
carried on “an incessant bombing fight”, Vann had succumbed to wound-related neuritis in 
his neck,110 and finally received electrical treatment in February 1917.111  
 
He was promoted Lieutenant-Colonel on 6 October 1917 in the 1/6th Battalion. His 
supreme achievement was in the 46th Division’s crossing of the St Quentin Canal on 29 
September 1918. Attacking the German guns at Lehaucourt, he: 
Led his men straight for the guns, shot down the German gunners as 
they fired, and having emptied his revolver, he gave one man a kick 
which sent him down a dug-out and maimed the last two men who 
showed fight with his riding crop.112  
 
He was awarded the VC,113 posthumously as he was killed five days later on 3 October 
1918 at Ramicourt, shot in the head by a sniper whilst encouraging his men. 
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In his obituary,114 a brother officer, “A.H.”, described him as “a fighter, not merely against 
the enemy in the field, but a fighter against everything and everybody that was not an 
influence for good to his men”. Vann “had no use for ‘slackers’ … but ‘slackers’ in his 
platoon, his company or his battalion were few, for he inspired all by his wonderful 
example of courage and energy”. On his death another officer remarked: “So died a man 
than whom no braver lived, a leader who really led, a fighter who fought to the last ounce, 
an enthusiast who stirred the very soul of his men”.115 
 
Humphries and Wynne would have had to have shown the highest professionalism to have 
been given command of Regular battalions, when, as we have seen,116 Regular officers 
held a virtual monopoly on such positions. Derviche-Jones showed that citizens could 
become rounded soldiers and not just combat leaders in his staff work and post-war role as 
GSO2. Vann and Webster showed both extraordinary courage and leadership, Vann 
demonstrating that essential balance between discipline and paternal care, qualities 
ingrained in the army in the maintenance of morale. These skills were honed on the anvil 
of experience, Derviche-Jones’ career in battle being quite extraordinary. 
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A.D. Harvey suggests that “the rapid promotion of civilians in uniform … demonstrates the 
unusual flexibility of British institutions in this period”.117 He is undoubtedly referring 
largely to flexibility of expectation of social status. Laura Roots’ analysis of personal 
accounts confirms that “temporarily, in the trenches, social class had ceased to be the 
measure of an officer”, and that “an ‘efficient’ officer was highly valued, whatever his 
social background”.118 Whilst this flexibility was creditable it was simply a reflection of 
sheer pragmatism. 
 
Harvey doubts whether the citizen officers were “military geniuses”. He continues that it 
was “perfectly understood that brilliant performance in the specialised conditions of trench 
warfare did not mean that one had acquired a perfect all-round knowledge of soldiering in 
all conditions”.119 Obviously, such officers had not the experience of the range of warfare 
many Regulars had, and had little or no experience of staff work. Brigadier Cumming’s 
appreciation of Burdett acknowledged this aspect of the rounded soldier when he added: 
“He would require training and experience for the staff”. As a senior officer of the 
Australian army in World War Two remarked to citizen soldiers: “You are not professional 
soldiers but you are professional men of war”.120 
 
There have been few “military geniuses” in history. Nor would their genius have tipped the 
balance in the attrition of positional warfare. Harvey is, however, setting up a straw man. 
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The typical experience of warfare of the British officer had outlived its usefulness by 31 
December 1914. By 1918 he faced modern war, with weapons systems unknown four 
years earlier, and the citizen officer knew it as well as the Regular. The citizen soldiers 
were modern men who were quick learners. As Guy Chapman noted: “The New Army 
cared nothing for soldiering as a trade; thought of it only as a job to be done, and the more 
expeditiously the better”.121 Nor after March 1918 were the experienced citizen soldiers 
fighting solely “in the specialised conditions of trench warfare”, and the fact that they had 
cut their teeth in such circumstances did not hold them back. As Cyril Falls noted in The 
Hundred Days: “A couple of days of this open fighting and manoeuvre taught them more 
than a series of trench-to-trench attacks”.122 
 
Sergeant J.F. Lucy, a Regular of 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, suggested that the particular style 
of thinking of the civilian brought new and enviable qualities to soldiering when he wrote: 
The New Army leaders, a large number of whom were practical business 
men with no time for obsolete customs … showing an unexpected flair for 
fighting, brought critical and well-trained minds to bear on every aspect 
of the war, and won not our respect, but our admiration.123 
 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel E.W. Hermon, 27th Northumberland Fusiliers, an ex-Regular, wrote 
disparagingly of the superficial differences that marked out Lieutenant-Colonel J.M. Prior 
of the 24th as different from a pre-war officer: “He wears a diamond ring on the first finger 
& another huge one on his little finger & I asked my adjutant who & what he was in civil 
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life & he told me ‘A commercial traveller’ & very well known in the North”. Hermon had 
genuine reservations about Prior,124 but backed Lucy’s appreciation of civilian COs: 
Sounds so awfully odd after the old soldiering life, but these fellows 
are doing grand work, and after all they can’t be bettered these times 
& to tell you the truth I don’t believe that some of them could have 
been equalled in earlier days.125 
 
Hanway Cumming’s appreciation of George Gater, which opened this chapter, and his 
report on James Burdett leaves no doubt that as a Regular with the psc qualification, and 
with a wealth of experience, he thought that certain citizens could make extraordinary 
commanders. 
 
The citizen COs were older than the average in 1918. They had life experience. For half, 
military interest (the OTC) had featured in their youth; perhaps, as John (later Lord) Reith 
claimed for himself, they “had war in (their) bones”.126 They were well educated and 
mostly professional, and it took them only a fraction over three years to learn and practice 
the craft of command. On 29 September 1918, 22 per cent of active infantry battalions 
were commanded by civilians.127 At the Armistice, 43 per cent of all the citizens who ever 
held commands were in post. Undoubtedly, the era of the civilian infantry battalion 
commander had well and truly arrived. 
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Meritocracy in Battalion Command in the Hundred Days - 
Lions Led by Tigers?1 
 
They are like little lions – these London men. 
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Feilding, CO 1/15th London 
Regiment 26 August 19182 
 
It is a cursed war … yet I love it: it has been the breath of life to me. 
Lieutenant-Colonel R. Feilding, 18 September 19183 
 
In his review of the British officer corps, Gary Sheffield states that “a limited meritocracy 
emerged in the British army during the Great War”.4 Simon Robbins claims that “by 1918 a 
meritocracy based on promotion for able and experienced officers was established within the 
army leadership”.5 Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig asserted in 1919: “Promotion has been 
entirely by merit, and the highest appointments were open to the humblest, provided he had 
the necessary qualifications of character, skill, and knowledge … A mess sergeant, a railway 
signalman, a coal miner, a market gardener, an assistant secretary to a haberdasher's company 
have risen to command battalions”.6  
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In Chapter Five, the core views held from Private to GHQ on what was valued in a CO were 
identified. In Chapter Six the rising military stars of the citizens of August 1914 were 
examined. Did the COs of the victorious armies of The Hundred Days epitomise a distillation 
of these values, and did they represent a meritocracy, i.e. a group selected for excellence.7 If 
not, what were the limitations? 
 
7.1 Rat-Catchers and Fire-Eaters 
Jonathan Boff suggests that: 
By 1918, most field commanders were probably, to use Andrew Gordon’s 
phrase, ‘rat-catchers’, aggressive and self-sure, who had literally fought 
their way to the top, rather than the more institutionally comfortable 
‘regulators’ who tend to populate the higher ranks of a peacetime force.8 
 
Jim Storr equates the ‘rat-catcher’ with the ‘autocrat’9, who exercises “tight control, but only 
when the situation demands it” and who is “forceful” and “driving” but is “thoughtful and 
reflective”, demonstrating “a deep humanity, even if only because they realise that the 
welfare of the people under them is vital to their effectiveness”. He associates the ‘regulator’ 
with the ‘authoritarian’, who is “controlling, highly conformist, status-conscious, anti-
intellectual and punitive”.10  
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Storr emphasises that “tactical decision-making should be very quick” and “naturalistic”, 11 
rather than relying on the over-analysis of information. It is clear, therefore, why the ‘rat-
catcher’ might thrive in The Hundred Days. Boff, however, is indicating more than an 
organisational type, he is referring to the commander who knew that the war would only be 
won with an appetite for killing the enemy. This, in contemporary terms, was the ‘Fire-Eater’, 
and in John Bourne’s words, the ‘tiger’. 
 
The creed of the ‘Fire-Eater’ is best expressed in Lieutenant-Colonel F.A. Maxwell’s 
departing message to 12th Middlesex on 21 October 1916: 
No failure has spoiled our record since real business began nearly four 
months ago, and none is going to. In that period we have begun to learn that 
the only way to treat the German is to kill him, but that lesson is only half-
learned, for we either do not want to kill him enough, or we forget to use 
that best of weapons, our rifles, to down him. We shout for bombs, instead 
of shooting with our guns … Remember that the 12th ‘Die Hards’ do kill, 
don’t get taken prisoner unless wounded, and don’t retire”.12 
 
Brigadier-General F.P. Crozier (119 Brigade) once damned a Lieutenant-Colonel: “A 
charming fellow, a staff college graduate and a one-time instructor … at some military 
establishment”, sent for a month “to qualify for a brigade”, because “he is unable to kick the 
Germans out of his line quickly on his own initiative, and prefers to write orders instead of 
doing things”. Whilst Crozier’s views on officers of the Regular army from which he had 
been forced to resign due to bankruptcy were undoubtedly jaundiced,13 he had an eye for a 
‘tiger’, identifying aggression and initiative. “We all have our métiers and his is neither the 
command of men nor the slaughtering of the enemy”, he concluded.14 
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Whether the British armies of 1918 were composed of ‘lions’ is outside the scope of this 
work. But to what extent were they ‘led by tigers’? Frank Crozier found 12th North 
Staffordshire under his command in 1918, and noted that they were “in trouble; the same old 
cause – colonels”.15 Crozier allegedly found his ‘tiger’ to command them in a shell-hole. 
Thirty-two year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest Robert O’Connor had been in the ranks for 14 
years, rising to Company Sergeant-Major in the 2nd Grenadier Guards, and had been in 
France and Flanders since 13 August 1914. Commissioned into the Manchester Regiment as 
a 2nd Lieutenant in January 1915, he had served as Adjutant with 11th Manchester from 
January 1916 to September 1917, and then briefly as second-in-command with a battalion of 
the Munster Fusiliers. On being appointed CO on 24 October 1918: “He transforms the 
battalion and electrifies the men in under a week”.16 “Follow me”, shouted O’Connor, in the 
vanguard crossing the Scheldt in November 1918.17 
 
Crozier’s memoirs refer specifically to three ‘tigers’, two in particular being “first-class 
colonels”.18 The first, Lieutenant-Colonel James Frederick Plunkett, commanded 19th Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers from 6 August 1917 until he was invalided during the Battle of Cambrai in 
November 1917, the “strain of thirty hours continued and sustained valour” having “upset his 
heart”.19 Forty years-old, he had served in the ranks for 19 years, and was a Warrant Officer 
Class 1 in the 2nd Royal Irish Regiment in August 1914.  Commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in the 
Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in May 1915, he served as a Captain in the Middlesex, and a 
Major in the Sussex regiments.20 He finally served as CO 13th Inniskilling Fusiliers from 10 
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June 1918 to the Armistice. Crozier noted: “If every man behaved as does Plunkett in action, 
every objective would be taken, every point held, provided the wire is cut, or all would die”.21 
The second, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Benzie, commanded 12th South Wales Borderers. A 
merchant and Lieutenant in the Ceylon Planters Rifle Corps,22 he had arrived in Egypt in 
November 1914 and when the unit was transferred to the ANZAC Corps, landed with them 
on Gallipoli. In France, Benzie was commissioned Captain in 2nd Scottish Rifles in June 
1916. Promoted Major he was attached to 12th South Wales Borderers, commanding from 16 
April 1917 to 19 February 1918.23 Transferred on the disbandment of his battalion to 
command 14th Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders, he was wounded in the German spring 
offensive on 25 March 1918 at Gomiecourt,24 “thus losing his brigade-promotion”.25 The 
citation for the bar to his DSO gives a flavour of his ‘tiger’ qualities: 
During lengthy operations ... he constantly forced back the enemy and 
readjusted his line under heavy fire. After nearly all the officers of the 
brigade had become casualties, he organised the remnants into a unit, 
which he personally led, with the greatest courage, in a counter-attack, 
remaining in command of the advanced elements until relieved by another 
division.26 
 
The last of this trio was Lieutenant-Colonel Richard John Andrews. Aged 38 at the outbreak 
of war, Andrews had served in South Africa as a Lance-Sergeant with the Imperial 
Yeomanry,27 and then allegedly as a Captain with the Chilean army.28 (He was certainly an 
engineer working on the Antofagasta and Bolivia Railway). He returned to the UK on 13 
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January 1915 and enlisted in 14th London five days later, reverting from Sergeant to Private 
on transfer to the 1st Battalion in France on 4 July 1915. Promoted Corporal three months 
later, he was commissioned into the Devonshire Regiment as 2nd Lieutenant in March 1916, 
and posted to the 2nd Battalion in France, was commanding a company within 4 months. 
Obviously the object of talent-spotting, he was one of the first attendees of Senior Officer 
School in late 1916, and was sent to 17th Welsh as second-in-command on 18 April 1917, 
leading the battalion at the capture of Welsh Ridge, Cambrai six days later. Crozier noted: 
“There is no holding these intrepid men”.29 He took over full command of the battalion on 1 
July 1917,30 and was wounded at Bourlon Wood, 24 November 1917, shot through the sciatic 
nerve. He commanded 18th York and Lancaster in the UK during June 1918, whereafter, 
again complaining of his COs, Crozier noted: “I am saved, for Andrews, limping, yet still the 
old fire-eating Andrews, has put his foot in France”.31 He finished the war commanding 13th 
East Lancashire, and “thruster, fighter and man of action”,32 was in the vanguard of his 
battalion on 8 November 1918 crossing the Scheldt crying “Allez, Allez”.33 
 
An additional ‘tiger’ was William Ernest Brown, a 32 year-old land surveyor in 1914, who 
was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in 12th South Wales Borderers in May 1915, having served 
as a Private in the Inns of Court OTC since 9 February. He served as Captain and Adjutant 
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from 1 August 1916 to his promotion as Major second-in-command on 24 July 1917.34 
Crozier described him as “a product of Pope and Benzie”, indicating how the promising 
officer learned from the skilled CO.35 He took over command of 18th Welsh on 13 March 
1918, earning Crozier’s admiration in the German Spring Offensive eight days later, and 
remained CO until the Armistice, although he commanded 47 Brigade from 10 to 29 October 
1918. His DSO, awarded as CO, reflects his abilities: 
While commanding his battalion … he held a position successfully with very 
few men. His fine example of courage and cheerfulness under heavy fire was 
mainly responsible for the retention of the ground.36 
 
What model of leadership is Crozier setting out for us in his descriptions of these five COs? 
Given that three were ex-ORs, one a civilian, and one a colonial volunteer it might be thought 
that he was biased against Regular officers, but it will be remembered how highly he rated 
the performance of the somewhat elderly Lieutenant-Colonel H.C. Metcalfe (21st Middlesex), 
a retired Regular Captain, in March 1918.37 Crozier’s template for successful battalion 
command in The Hundred Days clearly included stamina (all of his nominees had fought 
their ways through the entire war), experience, initiative, vanguard leadership, courage, 
example and aggression. Frank Maxwell, had he lived, would likely have agreed.38 
 
How many COs of 1918 lived up to these standards is impossible to know. In 1917, Crozier 
described having seven Lieutenant-Colonels of the ‘right’ type in his brigade, and, to 
extrapolate from his memoirs, he had five in the period following the German Spring 
Offensive in 1918. He was, however, complaining in mid-1918: “My troubles over colonels 
                                                      
34
 TNA WO339/4587 Officers’ Services William Ernest Brown 
35
 Crozier, Brass Hat, p.196 
36
 London Gazette, 16 September 1918, page unknown 
37
 See Chapter Three section 3.2.1. 
38




have been fierce”.39 It was noted in Chapter Three that Major-General Sir R. Pinney (33rd 
Division) was still removing COs as late as October 1918, and Lieutenant-Colonel R. 
Feilding echoed this, writing on 18 September: “A good many Battalion Commanders have 
been un-gummed during the last few weeks”.40 The army of 1918 clearly still had quality 
control issues with battalion command, but remained active in dealing with them. 
 
Whilst the German Spring Offensive of March 1918 was attritional of COs,41 there was no 
shortage of possible replacements due to the battalion disbandments of February and the 
summer of 1918. However, numbers did not necessarily equate with quality, Brigadier-
General W.H.E. Seagrave, 152 Brigade, apparently remarking in September 1918: “Good 
Battalion Commanders are very hard to get”.42 Lieutenant-Colonel R. Fielding returned to 
France following recuperation from injury in August 1918, and, 6th Connaught Rangers 
having been disbanded, found himself in “the Commanding Officers’ pool”, which Crozier 
called the “pot-luck pool”,43 at Etaples. After four days he was ordered to proceed to 
command 1/15th London writing: “This, to say the least of it, was unexpected, since (COs) 
are usually kept waiting for weeks, and sometimes months”.44  
 
7.2 The COs of The Hundred Days 
Seven hundred and thirty one COs with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel were identified as 
serving with the 465 battalions active during The Hundred Days,45 of whom thirty had two 
                                                      
39
 Crozier, Brass Hat, p.228 
40
 Feilding, War Letters, p.186 
41
 See Chapter Three. 
42
 Feilding, War Letters, p.187. Italics not in original. 
43
 Crozier, Brass Hat, p.228 
44
 Feilding, War Letters, p.172 
45
 Including pioneer battalions. 
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commands, and one had three.46 There were thus an average 1.6 COs per battalion during the 
campaign. 
 
In terms of command experience, 58 per cent had been in post before The Hundred Days 
campaign commenced. However, as noted in Table 3.13, they had been in post an average 
185 days at the start of the campaign, in comparison with 277 days for COs at the opening of 
the Somme battle in 1916, and 252 days at the opening of Third Ypres in 1917. They had 
therefore the least average experience of command in terms of tenure as CO, but the longest 
experience of battle as officers of any Great War COs embarking on a major campaign. Six 
had been in command since 1915, although four had only commanded pioneer battalions.47 
Thirty-two had been in command since 1916, of whom five commanded pioneer battalions 
and three battalions which were not front-line troops. Ninety-seven (21 per cent at the 
opening of the campaign) had commanded since 1917. Seventy-one per cent were 1918 
appointees. 
Promoted 3% 




Table 7.1: Reasons for COs leaving command during The Hundred Days 
 
As Figure 3.1 indicated, there was a roughly similar rate of turnover over of COs during The 
Hundred Days in comparison with 1917 overall, although the rate increased as the campaign 
progressed. The reasons for this are set out in Table 7.1. The killed in action total is half the 
                                                      
46
 Albert Grover commanded 3/4th London from 18 June to 12 September 1918, 1/8th London from 24 
September to 14 October 1918, and 1/12th London from 15 October to the Armistice. 
47
 The COs of pioneer battalions often had long tenure. The two long serving infantry COs were Lieutenant-
Colonel James Anderson who had first commanded 1/6th Highland Light Infantry on 27 September 1915 and 
commanded until 24 August 1918 broken by a spell in command of the 8th Battalion; and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Thomas William Parkinson who commanded 15th Welsh between 10 November 1915 and 31 August 1918. 
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average for the war as a whole, indicating greater care being taken of the CO resource. By far 
the most frequent cause of turnover was replacement, which at 17 per cent is less than half 
the overall replacement rate (38 per cent) for the war as a whole.48 This, coupled with a 
wounding/invalidity rate half the average for the war, again implies a fitter and more 
competent group of COs. Conversely, active weeding of battalion command continued even 
at this late stage, indicating that, unsurprisingly, refinement was never complete. 
 
To examine more closely the nature and attributes of these men, 5th, 9th and 42nd Divisions 
will be considered in detail. 
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Regiment Btn CO From To 
August 
1914 2Lt Lt Capt Major Lt-Col 
Royal Warwickshire 14th Wilberforce W. 13/05/1918 11/11/1918 Ret (Reg) N/A 15/08/1905 31/10/1916 09/09/1917 13/05/1918 
Royal Warwickshire 15th Miller G. S. 01/10/1916 29/09/1918 Spec Res 04/06/1904 01/05/1906 05/08/1914 10/09/1916 01/10/1916 
Royal Warwickshire 16th Deakin G. 02/07/1917 11/11/1918 Ret (TF) 02/03/1909 21/08/1910 20/11/1914 09/12/1915 02/07/1917 
Norfolk 1st Humphries C. F. G. 01/06/1918 22/08/1918 Citizen 11/06/1915 N/A 26/09/1915 ? 17/04/1918 
Norfolk 1st de Grey G. 03/09/1918 11/11/1918 Reg 06/01/1904 19/01/1906 01/09/1912 26/11/1916 06/09/1918 
Devonshire 1st Halford M. W. 15/06/1918* 11/11/1918 Reg 05/10/1910 06/03/1912 15/11/1914 05/09/1916 14/11/1917 
Bedfordshire 1st Courtenay H. 18/06/1918 23/08/1918 Reg 19/09/1908 01/04/1910 31/10/1914 03/06/1918 05/07/1918 
Bedfordshire 1st Chirnside W. S. 23/08/1918 14/10/1918 TF 28/03/1914 30/08/1914 16/08/1915 12/11/1917 23/08/1918 
Bedfordshire 1st Shearman C. E. G. 14/10/1918 11/11/1918 Reg 06/11/1909 01/03/1911 15/11/1914 N/A 14/10/1918 
Cheshire 1st Roddy E. L. 28/12/1917* 08/10/1918 
17/09/1918 
31/10/1918 Reg 09/12/1896 24/08/1898 19/02/1902 05/09/1914 08/10/1915 
Cheshire 1st Clarke M. F. 17/09/1918 31/10/1918 
08/10/1918 
11/11/1918 Reg 28/05/1898 17/08/1899 15/04/1905 01/09/1915 14/04/1916 
Scottish Borderers 2nd Furber C. T. 24/07/1917 15/09/1918 
15/08/1918 
11/11/1918 Reg 20/05/1905 03/07/1907 19/02/1914 17/02/1917 08/08/1917 
Scottish Borderers 2nd Kay J. K. 27/08/1918 15/09/1918 Reg 16/12/1908 22/01/1912 10/06/1915 28/05/1918 27/08/1918 




Ret (RN) N/A N/A 28/10/1914 26/10/1916 25/10/1917 
Gloucestershire 12th Chapman W.G. 24/08/1918 11/10/1918 Reg 10/12/1913 08/11/1914 28/04/1916 04/01/1918 07/09/1918 
East Surrey 1st Minogue M. J. 17/07/1917 11/11/1918 Reg 03/09/1902 21/04/1904 01/04/1910 24/07/1916 05/08/1918 
Duke of Cornwall's LI 1st Kirk J. W. C. 01/06/1918* 11/11/1918 Reg 18/10/1899 16/02/1901 04/05/1907 01/09/1915 29/12/1915 
Royal West Kent 1st Johnstone B. 25/08/1917 09/10/1918 Reg 26/06/1901 04/01/1904 28/03/1911 08/05/1916 09/09/1917 
Royal West Kent 1st Kay J. K. 09/10/1918 11/11/1918 See above 
Table 7.2: Career progression of COs of 5th Division who commanded during The Hundred Days 
(*Commanded a battalion previously) 
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7.3  5th Division 
5th Division was a Regular Third Army formation in 1918.1 During The Hundred Days it 
comprised 13 battalions [eight Regular, four New Army (one pioneer), and one Territorial 
(pioneer)],2 and had 18 COs.3 Two COs were killed in action.4 
 
Twelve of the 18 COs were active Regulars in August 1914 (see Table 7.2).5 Their average 
age of 34 years three months was close to the 29 September 1918 average of 34 years 11 
months.6 
 
The one ex-Regular, William Wilberforce, a retired 2nd Lieutenant of the Royal West Kent 
Regiment in August 1914, commanded 14th Royal Warwickshire. Assessments of his abilities 
remain in his personal file.7 He had resigned in November 1908, having had a £70 cheque 
dishonoured,8 and went to work in Russia as court correspondent of the Daily Mail.9 
Reenlisting, and described as “quick, clever and capable, certainly above the average of his 
rank”, he was posted to Collingwood Battalion, Royal Naval Division. He served as a 
company commander during the Antwerp Expedition of October 1914,10 and as Adjutant 
                                                      
1
 During The Hundred Days it took part in the Battle of Albert (21-23 August); the Second Battle of Bapaume 
(31 August to 3 September); the Battle of Epéhy (18 September); the Battle of the Canal du Nord (27-30 
September); the Pursuit to the Selle (9-12 October) and the Battle of the Selle (17-23 October). 
2
 15th Royal Warwickshire was disbanded on 6 October 1918, and 12th Gloucestershire on 19 October 1918. 14th 
Royal Warwickshire became the division’s pioneer battalion on 5 October 1918, taking over from 1/6th Argyll 
and Sutherland Highlanders. This unit was commanded during The Hundred Days by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Stewart Coats, a Captain with the battalion in August 1914. 
3
 Excluding pioneers. 
4
 Lieutenant-Colonel C.F.G Humphries was killed on 22 August 1918 and Lieutenant-Colonel H. Courtenay 
died of wounds on 23 August 1918, both losses occurring during the Battle of Albert. Lieutenant-Colonel H.A. 
Colt was also wounded and relinquished command on 23 August. 
5
 Two more had a professional military background. 
6
 Four were over 40, E.L. Roddy being the oldest, having been born on 19 April 1874, and hence 10 years above 
the average. W.G. Chapman was the youngest at 27 years 11 months. 
7
 TNA WO 339/6297 Officers’ Services, William Wilberforce. 
8
 He subsequently lost his temper and been “insubordinate” to a Captain using “language … of a very offensive 
kind”. 
9
 Where he had learnt to speak Russian and French. 
10
 The newly-formed Royal Naval Division landed in Antwerp on 6 October 1914 to assist in the defence of the 
besieged city. They arrived too late, the city surrendering on the 10th, the division being withdrawn on the 11th. 
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from October until he was appointed Staff Captain to 1st Royal Naval Brigade from 1 
December 1914 to April 1916. He showed “ability, tact and zeal” in the Gallipoli campaign 
26 April to 1 November 1915.11 Transferred as Adjutant to 3rd Royal West Kent in August 
1916, he was recommended for a more senior staff appointment in January 1917, when it was 
noted: “This officer has done well as adjutant under difficult conditions. Is a good 
disciplinarian and capable organiser”.12 He was, however, given an active posting, and on 9 
September 1917 was promoted Major, 1st Royal West Kent, from whence he was transferred 
to command 14th Royal Warwickshire on 13 May 1918, being awarded a DSO for his skills 
as CO, when on 27 September 1918 “he successfully controlled a very difficult advance 
diagonally across three parallel lines of trenches”.13 
 
The four COs of the other three New Army infantry battalions represent an interesting spread. 
One was a Regular.14 First of two representatives of the TF in the division, Grahame Deakin 
commanded 16th Warwickshire. He had served with 8th Worcestershire from 1909 to 1912, 
resigning as a Lieutenant, and was an estate agent in Birmingham in August 1914. He is an 
example of progression within a single unit, being commissioned Captain in 16th 
Warwickshire on 30 November 1914, rising to Major second-in-command on 16 June 1916, 
                                                      
11
 From whence he was invalided with dysentery. 
12
 After interview it was recorded: “Rather an awkward manner but should make a good Staff Officer with his 
experience”. 
13
 “For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty near Gouzeaucourt on 27th September, 1918, in the attack on 
the trench system up to Dunraven Trench, and then the formation of a defensive flank to the right. He 
successfully controlled a very difficult advance diagonally across three parallel lines of trenches. When the 
enemy counterattacked with fresh troops and specially trained bombers, driving back his battalion and another, 
it was largely due to his efforts that a new line of defence was formed and held”. London Gazette, 1 February 
1919, p.1611 
14
 Willoughby George Chapman, a Regular 2nd Lieutenant of 2nd Gloucestershire in August 1914. A Special 
Reserve entrant, Chapman served with the 2nd Battalion before appointment as a Staff Captain Commanding an 
Officer Cadet Company from 1 October 1916 to 9 January 1917. He had served with 12th Gloucestershire as a 
Captain since 11 February 1917. After 12th Gloucestershire were disbanded, Chapman ended the war 
commanding 4th Middlesex. 
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and taking over command on 2 July 1917. Deakin was awarded the DSO for his “good 
leadership” as CO, personally organising scattered companies and leading them forward.15 
 
George Swiney Miller, CO 15th Warwickshire, had been commissioned in the Royal 
Warwickshire Regiment in 1904, promoted Captain in the 4th Battalion on the day war broke 
out, and was the only representative of the Special Reserve. His first active service was in 
March 1916 with 1st Royal Warwickshire, being transferred to 15th Royal Warwickshire in 
August, promoted Major second-in-command on 10 September, and taking over command on 
1 October. He commanded until 29 September 1918, at which point he was wounded. His 
“admirable leadership”, including his skilled planning in an attack, led to the award of a bar 
to his DSO.16 
 
The remaining New Army CO was Henry Archer Colt, who had become a midshipman in 
1898, retiring from the Navy as a Lieutenant-Commander in 1912.17 He is another example of 
progression within a single unit. He was appointed Captain in 12th Gloucestershire on 28 
October 1914, becoming Major second-in-command in March 1917, and taking over 
command on 25 October 1917. His reign was terminated by wounding in the assault on Irles 
                                                      
15
 “For conspicuous gallantry and initiative in an attack. He personally went forward and under heavy machine-
gun fire, organised one of his companies and some other scattered units which had become mixed owing to the 
dense fog. He led them forward and captured his final objective, together with an enemy battery, and later, when 
both his flanks were exposed, he held his ground in spite of heavy counter-attacks until he had organised an 
orderly withdrawal. He set a splendid example of courage and good leadership.” London Gazette, 2 December 
1918, p.14210. Deakin’s courage was certainly not in question; during operations near Achiet-le-Petit on 21 
August 1918 “a Battery of 5.9 howitzers was found firing into the advancing line of the 95th Brigade; Lieut.-Col. 
Deakin, accompanied by a few men, himself shot down the gunners”. A.H. Hussey and D.S. Inman, The Fifth 
Division in the Great War (London: Nibet & Co. Ltd, 1921), p.231 
16
 “For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. The skill with which he made his plans, and his untiring 
devotion to duty in reconnoitring the position and training his men preparatory to an attack largely contributed 
to the success of the operation. When the objective was gained, his gallantry and admirable leadership, which 
had been conspicuous during the engagement, greatly cheered and encouraged his men during the difficult work 
of consolidation under heavy shell and machine-gun fire”. London Gazette, 15 October 1918, p.12052. His DSO 
was gazetted on 3 June 1918. 
17
 See Chapter Three. 
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on 23 August 1918, an attack organised “on his own initiative”,18 when his DSO citation 
notes his “very great ability” as a CO.19 
 
With respect to the Regular units, one citizen commanded, namely C.F.G. Humphries, 1st 
Norfolk, whose extraordinary career was reviewed in Chapter Six. William Stuart Chirnside 
was the second Territorial CO in the division, and his skills must have been considerable to 
be given command of a Regular battalion.20 A 29 year-old insurance clerk and 2nd Lieutenant 
of 5th Bedfordshire at the outbreak of war, he was wounded (for the second time) on Gallipoli 
on 17 November 1915 during bomb throwing training.21 After convalescence he was sent to 
the 1st Battalion on the Western Front, commanding from 23 August to 14 October 1918, 
achieving a reputation as “a superb combat leader”.22 
 
Eleven active Regular officers of August 1914 commanded the Regular battalions. At 92 per 
cent this is virtually identical to the 90 per cent maintained by the Regular units of 5th 
Division throughout the war. In August 1914 (see Table 7.2) four were Lieutenants and seven 
Captains.23 Four had landed in France with the original BEF in August 1914,24 and one in 
November 1914 in Mesopotamia.25 Three arrived in France26 and one in Mesopotamia27 in 
                                                      
18
 Hussey & Inman, Fifth Division, p.233. His action secured a safe flank for the attack on Miraumont. 
19
 “For conspicuous gallantry and fine leadership. He commanded his battalion during three days’ severe 
fighting, including the capture of an important village, with very great ability and courage. In spite of heavy 
casualties he pushed forward to his successive objectives with great determination, being himself severely 
wounded when leading the final assault on the village. His example greatly inspired his men”. London Gazette, 
7 November 1918, page unknown. 
20
 But the second of the war, see Chapter Four section 4.1.1. 
21
 TNA WO 95/4325 War Diary, 5th Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment. He had been previously wounded 
between 15 and 19 August, winning the MC, but remaining at duty. 
22
 http://bedfordregiment.org.uk/5thbn/5thbtnmedalwinners.html (accessed 23 February 2012). 
23
 Of these officers, only Martin Joseph Minogue, 1st East Surrey, had spent just under 6 years in the ranks, 
moving from Sergeant, South Lancashire Regiment to a commission in the Manchester Regiment in 1902, 
transferring as a Lieutenant to the East Surrey Regiment in 1908. 
24
 M.W. Halford (1st Gloucestershire); H. Courtenay (1st Bedfordshire); C.E.G. Shearman (1st Bedfordshire); and 
M.J. Minogue (1st East Surrey). 
25
 The Hon. G. de Grey (2nd Norfolk), eldest son of the 7th Baron Walsingham. He was wounded three times 
during the war. 
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early 1915; another arrived in June 1915.28 Only one could be viewed as having been 
protected from the toll of active service by not having been in a theatre of war. Cecil Tidswell 
Furber, CO 2nd King’s Own Scottish Borderers, served in India as a Brigade-Major until 
December 1916, arriving in France in January 1917.29 Three more could be considered as 
having been protected by periods of staff employment whilst on active service. Hugh 
Courtenay served as a Staff Captain from November 1915 to June 1916 and as DAQMG 
from June 1916 to June 1918;30 Charles Edward Gowran Shearman served as GSO3 from 
February to May 1917 and Brigade-Major (173 Brigade) from May 1917 to October 1918;31 
and Bede Johnstone served as Brigade-Major from February 1916 to September 1917.32 
 
E.L. Roddy, whose first command dates from 7 September 1915, was the earliest 
appointment, closely followed by J.W.C Kirk on 29 December 1915. One CO had achieved 
command in 1916, three in 1917, the remaining five in 1918 (see Table 7.2). 
 
Four had multiple commands. Edwin Louis Roddy commanded 2nd Cheshire from 7 
September to 2 November 1915; 1st Cheshire from 8 to 31 October 1916, 28 December 1917 
to 17 September 1918, and 8 to 31 October 1918; and 2/10th Liverpool from 27 April to 9 
                                                                                                                                                                     
26
 E.L. Roddy (2nd Cheshire); M.F. Clarke (serving as Adjutant to 3rd Cheshire); and B. Johnstone (serving as 
Adjutant with 1/7th Warwickshire). 
27
 J.K. Kay (2nd Royal West Kent). 
28
 J.W.C Kirk, Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, who was in Staff Posts at Sandhurst until going on active 
service. 
29
 A Militia entrant, Furber had served in South Africa 1901-2 and later as Adjutant to his battalion. Furber’s file 
reveals a dispute concerning the period he held the Temporary rank of Lieutenant-Colonel as distinct from 
Acting rank. The matter would be related to pension. (TNA WO339/6190 Officers’ Services, Cecil Tidswell 
Furber). Certainly, in 1915-6 it was common for Temporary rank to be granted for a matter of days. During 
1917, much more use was made of Acting rank for extended periods. It seems likely that a deliberate decision 
was made to reduce the future pension bill. 
30
 Courtenay had no pre-war active service or staff experience. The spell in which he might be viewed as 
protected did him no good as he died of wounds on 23 August 1918. 
31
 Sherman had no pre-war active service or staff experience. 
32
 As noted in Chapter Three section 3.1.2, Johnstone had served as Adjutant to 1/7th Warwickshire. He had 
been commissioned into the Royal West Kent Regiment in 1901 in South Africa from a Corporal in the 
Gloucestershire Regiment where he had served for nearly six years. He had also been attached to the West 
African Frontier Force between 1905 and 1909. 
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December 1917.33 Montague Walter Halford commanded 1st Cheshire from 27 October to 28 
December 1917, 1st Bedfordshire from 16 April to 15 June 1918, and 1st Devonshire from 15 
June to 26 October 1918.34 John William Carnegie Kirk commanded 2nd Duke of Cornwall’s 
Light Infantry from 29 December 1915 to 25 April 1916 and 2 June 1916 to 24 April 1918, 
and the 1st Battalion from 1 June 1918 to the Armistice.35 Lastly, Jack Kilbourne Kay had two 
commands during The Hundred Days; 2nd Scottish Borderers from 27 August to 15 
September 1918, and 1st Royal West Kent from 9 October to the Armistice. 
 
The absence of formal evaluations of these men forces reliance on DSO citations to obtain a 
flavour of their abilities. Eight of the 11 received such an award as CO.36 
 
H. Courtenay was awarded a DSO for his initiative in the attack on Achiet-le-Petit on 23 
August 1918 in which he was fatally wounded: 
While directing the advance of his battalion one company became slightly 
disorganized owing to heavy fire. He rushed forward and led the men on. 
He then went to the left of the attack, where it was held up by wire, and 
encouraged short rushes, himself setting the example. Finally, he led the 
first wave himself until the last objective was reached.37 
 
The circumstances of C.T. Furber’s DSO similarly reflect initiative and courage: 
When his right attacking company was driven back, this officer left his 
battalion headquarters, rallied the company, and he himself led the counter-
                                                      
33
 Roddy had served in four campaigns in West Africa between 1901 and 1903 whilst attached to the West 
African Frontier Force, and had subsequently served as Adjutant with both Volunteers and TF. 
34
 Of the multiple command group, M.W. Halford had served in no pre-war campaigns and had no staff service. 
35
 Kirk was a Captain of the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry serving at the RMC from January 1913 to June 
1915. He had been an Adjutant to his battalion and served in South Africa 1899-1902. He had seen active 
service in East Africa in 1904 whilst attached to the King’s African Rifles between 1902 and 1905. 
36
 Five of the eight were either ‘New Year’ or ‘Birthday’ list DSOs and no citation was given. The Hon G. de 
Grey was not awarded a DSO as a CO, rather “in the performance of his duties as Adjutant” of 2nd Norfolk. 
“He repeatedly crossed fire-swept zones in order to take orders, send up ammunition and direct reinforcements 
until he was severely wounded. His cool bravery had twice previously been brought to notice”. London Gazette, 
14 March 1916, p.2875 
37
 London Gazette, 2 December 1918, page number unknown 
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attack, regaining the ground that had been lost. His dash and personal 
example undoubtedly saved a critical situation.38 
 
In addition, Furber was rewarded for his organisational ability as the citation for the bar to his 
DSO shows: “The untiring efforts and great ability with which this officer made his 
preparations for an attack largely contributed to the success of the operation”.39 
 
J.K. Kay’s citation also reflects both courage and skill:  
He was commanding the battalion previous to and during an important 
attack … and the skill and ability with which he made the preparatory 
arrangements were no less marked than his gallantry and soldierly bearing 
during the engagement.40 
 
Whilst the Regular units of 5th Division showed, with interesting exceptions, the typical 
adherence to Regular COs, the non-Regular battalions demonstrated an eclectic mix in 
command. Whatever their origins, these Commanding Officers clearly possessed both great 
depth of experience and skills of command, which in some had been identified relatively 
early in the war. Where we are allowed glimpses of their qualities, they demonstrated 
courage, organisational skill, and initiative. 
                                                      
38
 London Gazette, 6 April 1918, page number unknown. 
39
 The citation continues: “His gallantry and devotion to duty during the engagement were conspicuous, and 
when the objective had been gained he supervised the difficult work of consolidation, under heavy fire, with 
perfect coolness and disregard of danger, setting a fine example which greatly encouraged all ranks of his 
battalion”. London Gazette, 11 October 1918, p.12052 
40
 The citation continues: “When the objectives had been gained, hearing that the two senior officers and a large 
number of men of his left company had become casualties, he immediately went to the spot, and by his coolness 






Regiment Btn CO From To 
August 
1914 2Lt Lt Capt Major Lt-Col 
Royal Scots 12th Murray J. 15/06/1918 11/11/1918 TF 29/02/1904 01/05/1907 01/08/1911 05/08/1914 15/06/1918 
Royal Scots 11th Campbell J. B. S. 14/09/1917 15/10/1918 Ret (Emp) N/A ? 20/03/1915 14/05/1916 14/09/1917 
Royal Scots 11th Boyd E. R. H. 15/10/1918 11/11/1918 Citizen 15/08/1914 02/02/1915 10/06/1915 18/04/1918 15/10/1918 
Royal Scots Fusiliers 2nd Utterson-Kelso J. E. 11/10/1917 06/10/1918 Reg 04/09/1912 19/10/1914 06/06/1915 28/03/1916 13/10/1917 
Royal Scots Fusiliers 2nd Campbell R. 23/10/1918* 07/11/1918 Reg 08/03/1899 05/03/1900 23/10/1905 01/09/1915 12/07/1916 
Royal Scots Fusiliers 2nd Nairne C. S. 07/11/1918* 11/11/1918 Reg 18/04/1900 22/12/1901 13/08/1910 01/09/1915 14/01/1917 
Scottish Rifles 9th Lumsden W. V. 19/06/1917 11/11/1918 Reg 11/12/1907 20/05/1909 06/10/1914 15/05/1916 19/06/1917 
Scottish Borderers 6th Smyth G. B. F. 01/06/1918 03/10/1918 Reg 29/07/1905 03/02/1908 30/10/1914 03/06/1916 02/12/1916 
Scottish Borderers 6th Ker R. F. 03/10/1918 11/11/1918 Citizen 29/12/1914 ? 01/10/1916 11/05/1918 03/10/1918 
Black Watch 8th Hadow R. W. 02/06/1917 17/08/1918 Ret (Reg) 08/05/1901 16/09/1905 14/02/1914 06/05/1917 02/06/1917 
Black Watch 8th French W. 19/08/1918 11/11/1918 Citizen 23/09/1914 17/05/1915 01/09/1916 30/09/1917 19/08/1918 
Seaforth Highlanders 9th Petty W. 08/04/1917 15/08/1918 TF ? 28/05/1909 20/09/1913 05/01/1916 08/04/1917 
Seaforth Highlanders 9th Sharp S. F. 15/08/1918 11/11/1918 Ret (Vol) 09/11/1914 N/A 02/12/1914 02/06/1916 15/08/1918 
Seaforth Highlanders 7th Bruce D. 18/04/1918 14/10/1918 Reg 10/06/1908 01/09/1911 26/04/1915 N/A 18/04/1918 
Seaforth Highlanders 7th Anderson P. C. 15/10/1918 11/11/1918 Reg 25/02/1914 26/04/1915 25/10/1915 23/03/1917 15/10/1918 
Cameron Highlanders 5th Inglis J. 06/03/1918* 15/09/1918 Reg 08/05/1901 09/06/1906 12/06/1912 08/05/1916 17/07/1917 
Cameron Highlanders 5th Angus A. W. 15/09/1918 11/11/1918 Ret (?) 19/091914 N/A 30/10/1914 05/11/1915 15/09/1918 
Argyll & Sutherland 
Highlanders 10th Sotheby H. G. 04/12/1916 11/11/1918 Spec Res 06/01/1900 ? 04/02/1902 20/02/1916 04/12/1916 
            
      Table 7.3: Career progression of COs of 9th Division who commanded during The Hundred Days 
(*Commanded a battalion previously) 
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7.4 9th (Scottish) Division 
9th Division was a New Army formation in Second Army from April 1918.1 During The 
Hundred Days the ten battalions (nine excluding Pioneers)2 were all New Army except for 
one Regular unit, and had 16 COs,3 hence having moderate stability. No COs died in action.4 
 
At exactly 33 years old, these COs were on average younger than the Regulars of 5th Division 
and nearly two years younger than the 29 September 1918 average of 34 years 11 months.5 
 
Three of the 16 COs were citizens of August 1914 (19 per cent, slightly lower than the 22 per 
cent average for the BEF on 29 September 1918)6 and all were appointed for the first time 
during The Hundred Days. Edward Robert Hugh Boyd, born in 1892, had been a Lance-
Corporal in Charterhouse School OTC (where his “general efficiency” was only rated “fair”). 
He was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in 3rd Royal Scots (Special Reserve) on 15 August 
1914, and was sent to the 1st Battalion in 1915. He served at Fifth Army School as an 
Instructor in late 1917, and was promoted Major second-in-command of the 11th Battalion in 
April 1918. He took over command on 15 October 1918.7 
                                                      
1
 Having taken part in the highly successful capture of Meteren (19 July), during The Hundred Days 9th Division 
took part in the Capture of Hoegnacker Ridge (18 August); the Battle of Ypres (28 September to 2 October); the 
Battle of Courtrai (14-19 October); and Ooteghem (25 October). 
2
 The Pioneer battalion was 9th Seaforth Highlanders. The two COs during The Hundred Days both had a 
Territorial background. Born in 1875, William Petty was a TF Captain attached to Edinburgh Academy OTC in 
August 1914, and commanded from 8 April 1917 to 15 August 1918. He had been a Trooper promoted Corporal 
in the South African Constabulary during the Boer War 1901-2, and had been commissioned in the TF in 1909. 
(TNA WO339/19637 Officers’ Services, William Petty). His replacement was Stuart Forbes Sharp, born in 
1880, who in the Boer War had been a Trooper in 52 Company (Paget's Horse) 19 Battalion Imperial 
Yeomanry. A motor agent in August 1914, he was gazetted Lieutenant in 9th Seaforth Highlanders on 9 
November 1914, taking over command from Petty. http://theauxiliaries.com/men-alphabetical/men-
s/sharp/sharp.html (accessed 21 December 2012). 
3
 Excluding two pioneer COs. 
4
 Two departed wounded; Lieutenant-Colonel J. Inglis when a stray shell hit his battalion HQ; and Lieutenant-
Colonel J.E. Utterson-Kelso, also badly wounded by a shell. J. Ewing, The History of the Ninth (Scottish) 
Division 1914-1919 (London: John Murray, 1921), p.346 
5
 Two were over 40, H.G. Sotheby being the oldest, having been born in 1871, and hence 13 years above the 
average. R.F. Ker was the youngest at 25 years 4 months. 
6
 See Table 3.2 
7
 Boyd had been court-martialled for possessing a camera and posting photographs (date uncertain, sentence 
remitted). His lack of respect for authority post-war included libelling an Englishman as a “German solicitor”; 
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Robert Fordyce Ker, an Edinburgh banker born in 1893, attested Private in 9th Royal Scots 
(Territorial) on 9 September 1914, and was commissioned in 9th King’s Own Scottish 
Borderers on 29 December 1914.8 He went to France in 1915 with 6th Scottish Borderers, and 
became a Captain commanding a company on 1 October 1916.9 He assumed command on 3 
October 1918, his rise to command being within the same unit on active service. 
 
Lastly, William French was commissioned on 28 September 1914 in 10th Argyll and 
Sutherland Highlanders (Service), and landed in France on 11 May 1915. He was made 
Adjutant whilst a Captain on 31 January 1917, but was transferred to be Major second-in-
command 8th Black Watch on 30 September 1917, taking over command on 19 August 1918. 
His organisational and leadership abilities are evident from his two DSO citations, although 
neither was awarded as CO.10 
 
The only active TF officer of August 1914 to command a battalion in the division was 
Captain John Murray of the Scottish Horse.11 He served with this battalion as infantry on 
Gallipoli and in Egypt, and after the Scottish Horse became the 13th Black Watch, he served 
as a GSO3 from 1 December 1916 to 15 September 1917, and again from 10 March 1918 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and never returning a £45 army pay overpayment, a debt for which he was pursued to India post-war, where he 
worked for the Imperial Tobacco Company of India. (TNA WO339/17095 Officers’ Services, Edward Robert 
Hugh Boyd). 
8
 This despite having blotted his copybook on 17 December 1914 “causing a disturbance after ‘lights out’”, for 
which he received the punishment of “three days confined to barracks”. TNA WO 339/5186 Officers’ Services 
Robert Fordyce Ker. 
9
 His DSO was won as a company commander: “For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in an attack. He 
led his company in a flanking attack, which resulted in the capture of a wood. He then reorganised his company 
and led them to a further objective. He displayed the greatest coolness and courage in most difficult 
circumstances”. London Gazette, 18 March 1918, p.3426 
10
 Firstly: “For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty. He displayed great courage and ability in 
maintaining the supply of ammunition and stores during the operations”. London Gazette, 10 January 1917, 
p.458. Secondly: “For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty during a withdrawal, and subsequent fighting 
and retirements. On one occasion he displayed the greatest courage and ability in rallying and commanding a 
part of the battalion, and his invariable coolness and disregard of danger had the most inspiring effect upon all 
ranks with him”. London Gazette, 26 July 1918, p.8757 
11
 Born in 1884 and educated at Eton and Magdalen College, Oxford, he was the son of John Murray, head of 
the John Murray publishing house. 
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until taking over command of 12th Royal Scots on 15 June 1918. His DSO was won on 1 
October 1918 during the attack on Ledeghem, showing courage and attention to detail: 
The flanks of the battalion under his command became exposed and very 
heavy casualties were suffered by enfilade machine gun fire. Col. Murray 
realising that the dispositions of his battalion needed immediate alteration, 
went forward and carried this out under close range-rifle and machine-gun 
fire. His fearless disregard for danger which was evident to all ranks and 
the splendid example which he showed undoubtedly renewed the confidence 
of his men during a very critical period.12 
 
Similarly, on 15 October, at Laaga Cappelle Wood, Murray showed his initiative when “after 
passing the wood, (he) swung south and ejected the enemy from Steenbeek village and Hill 
40”.13 
 
The one active representative of the Special Reserve of August 1914 was Herbert George 
Sotheby.14 Born in 1871 and of independent means,15 he was posted as Captain from 4th 
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders to the 2nd Battalion in October 1914 (where he served as 
Adjutant) and the 10th Battalion in 1916, serving as CO from December 1916 until the 
Armistice.16 
 
The one retired Regular, Ronald Walter Hadow, late Captain of the Black Watch,17 served as 
a DAAG from September 1914 into 1917, and then commanded 8th Black Watch from 2 June 
1917 to 17 August 1918, being awarded the DSO as CO for his skilful handling of his unit in 
attack.18 Another with a military past, Sir John Bruce Stuart Campbell, who had been 
                                                      
12
 London Gazette, 30 July 1919, p.9682. His bar was a Birthday List honour on 3 June 1919. 
13
 Ewing, History of the Ninth, p.364 
14
 He was commissioned in 1900. His grandfather was Admiral Thomas Sotheby and his father was Admiral Sir 
Edward Southwell Sotheby, another relative being Major-General Frederick Edward Sotheby. He served as a 
railway Staff Officer and a Station Staff Officer in South Africa. 
15
 He took over the Ecton estate, Northamptonshire, in 1921. 
16
 His DSO was a New Year’s List honour, 1 January 1918. 
17
 He had fought in South Africa 1900-1 and in Sudan 1910, and had only retired in 1914. 
18
 “For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty in personally reconnoitring the ground and forming up his 
battalion in the correct alignment after the taping party and guides had become casualties. He handled his 
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working in mining in Malaya, had served with the Australian forces in the Second Boer War. 
Commissioned in 14th Royal Scots, he was posted to the 11th Battalion, where he became CO 
on 14 September 1917. He was awarded the DSO with two bars, all as CO. Firstly, on 12 
April 1917 at Roeux: “He brought his battalion into action under very difficult circumstances 
and commanded it with conspicuous courage”.19 His first bar garnered no citation,20 but his 
second, awarded for actions on 28 September 1918 at Becelaere, indicates both courage and 
initiative: 
While reconnoitring the line … he was fired at from 200 yards by an enemy 
field gun. He immediately got a machine gun into action, and with a few 
men, under machine gun fire and the direct fire of the gun, surrounded the 
field gun, the battery teams running away. It was entirely due to his 




Lastly, Alexander William Angus, a chartered accountant,22  may possibly have had pre-war 
service,23 being commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in the 10th Gordon Highlanders on 19 
September 1914, and promoted Major in the battalion on 9 November 1915. Detached from 
his regiment in mid-1916 he served as Commandant of a Musketry and Reinforcement Camp 
from July 1917, but was sent to command 5th Cameron Highlanders on 15 September 1918. 
He was awarded the DSO during his period of command for “initiative”, “prompt action”, 
“skilful leading” and “excellent work” during a 16 day period of action.24 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
battalion skilfully in the attack and rendered most useful reports on the situation”. London Gazette, 23 April 
1918, p.4854 
19
 London Gazette, 26 July 1917, page unknown. Campbell was commanding the battalion as a Major. 
20
 London Gazette, 15 February 1919, page unknown. 
21
 London Gazette, 30 July 1919, page unknown. 
22
 An Australian by birth he came to Scotland aged 11, and was a double international for that country at rugby 
and cricket. 
23
 Judging by the rapidity of his promotion. 
24
 “For marked gallantry and initiative, from 28 Sept. to 14 Oct. 1918, and for skilful leading near Rolleghem 
Capelle on the latter date. He took one of his own companies and led it through troops who had been held up. 
His prompt action enabled the whole line to advance. Throughout the operations he did excellent work”.  
London Gazette, 15 February 1919, page unknown. 
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Fifty per cent (eight) of the infantry COs of the division were Regulars. Two had arrived in 
France in August 1914,25 one in October,26 and two in December 1914.27 The remaining three 
had arrived in 1915, two in May,28 and the last in July.29 They were thus highly experienced 
on the Western Front. In terms of being sheltered in a staff post, as will be seen below, R. 
Campbell had a three month training school stint in 1918, and C.S. Nairne spent the first 
seven months of 1917 as the Commandant of a School of Instruction. Similarly, W.V. 
Lumsden spent five weeks as a Staff Captain from September to November 1915. The only 
officer who was truly sheltered for a long period was J. Inglis, who spent the period from July 
1915 to April 1917 training officer cadets at RMC. 
 
Two had assumed command in 1916, four in 1917, and two in 1918. Three commanded two 
battalions. Charles Sylvester Nairne commanded 10th Black Watch from 3 January 1918 to 15 
September when his reign would have continued if it were not for his breaking his collar-
bone running in a relay race, but he returned to command 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers from 7 
November to the Armistice. John Inglis commanded 17th Highland Light Infantry from 20 
July 1917 until its disbandment on 10 February 1918, and was transferred to command 5th 
Cameron Highlanders from 6 March to 15 September 1918. Lastly, Robert Campbell was a 
Captain of 2nd Cameron Highlanders in August 1914, and he commanded for the longest 
period. After service in France, Campbell did not transfer to Salonika with his battalion in 
December 1915, taking over as CO of 1/8th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders from 12 July 
1916 to 12 July 1918. After a period as Commandant of the School of Musketry from 13 July 
to 17 October, which must have represented rest, he finally served as CO 2nd Royal Scots 
                                                      
25
 D. Bruce (wounded three times) and G.B.F Smyth (wounded five times). 
26
 J.E. Utterson-Kelso, (wounded four times). 
27
 R. Campbell and J. Inglis. 
28
 W.V. Lumsden (who had been serving with the 3rd Battalion of his regiment) and P.C. Anderson. 
29
 C.S. Nairne, who had been Adjutant to the 3rd Battalion of his regiment. 
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Fusiliers from 23 October to 7 November 1918. The divisional history gives us a glimpse of 
him in the attack on the Oooteghem ridge two days after taking command: 
Lieut.-Colonel Campbell … was ubiquitous; clad in his jerkin, since the day 
was warm though the night had been cold, he was perspiring profusely from 
the kit he carried, his rapid pace, the distance he had covered, and the 
discomfort of one or two nasty crawls, but he seemed to be absolutely 
tireless.30 
 
In terms of DSO citations, six of the eight received such an award as CO. The bar to Robert 
Campbell’s DSO reflects his skill and understanding of battle: 
At a critical moment, when the enemy had pierced our line and were 
consolidating a position to our rear, he skilfully and energetically counter-
attacked, forcing the enemy to surrender with heavy loss. He subsequently 
rendered valuable assistance to another unit by bringing enfilade fire to 
bear upon the enemy. His promptness and energy saved a very awkward 
situation.31 
 
The DSO awarded to the CO of 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, John Edward Utterson-Kelso, 
reflected leadership and example when he: 
Organised counter-attacks, leading his men with great skill and daring 
throughout prolonged fighting. Though twice buried by shell bursts and 
badly concussed, he remained at duty, setting a fine example, until his 
battalion was relieved.32 
 
The bar to his DSO was awarded for similar example and initiative between 28 September 
and 5 October in the final advance on the Passchendaele Ridge when: 
Although he was knocked down by a shell and severely shaken, he continued 
in command, refusing to leave. The battalion captured several guns and 200 
prisoners. The next day, at a critical period when the front line was held up, 
he pushed forward his battalion, which was then in support, and relieved 
the situation.33 
 
                                                      
30
 Ewing, History of the Ninth,  p.379 
31
 London Gazette, 24 July 1917, pp.7615-6. His DSO was a New Year List honour gazetted 1 January 1917. 
32
 London Gazette, 23 July 1918, p.8750 
33
 London Gazette, 1 February 1919, pp.1603-4 
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William Vernon Lumsden was awarded the DSO and two bars as CO of 9th Scottish Rifles. 
With respect of the original award he “handled his battalion with great skill. His personal 
example and coolness under heavy fire contributed largely to the stout defence put up by his 
battalion.”34 Whilst no citation exists for the first bar,35 the second was awarded for his 
leadership in the final advance on the Passchendaele ridge when, suffering from malaria,36 
“he was in the thick of the fighting”, and demonstrated initiative “when he found that 
Dadizeele could not be reached by troops on his right, he deflected his advance and … 
captured it”.37 
 
The DSO awarded to Patrick Campbell Anderson, CO 7th Seaforth Highlanders reflects 
similar example and initiative when: 
During seven critical days of a withdrawal … he commanded his battalion 
with the greatest courage and skill under most trying conditions. Again and 
again he rallied his men, and, on his own initiative, held on to vital points, 
keeping his men steady by his magnificent example. When relieved, noticing 
that some of the troops then in the line were slightly unsteady, he remained 
with them for several hours, helping to keep the situation in hand. His able 
leadership and constant courage were of inestimable value during these 
critical days.38 
                                                      
34
 London Gazette, 26 July 1918, page unknown 
35
 London Gazette, 3 June 1918, page unknown 
36
 The divisional history notes that he “was ill and had a very high temperature on the eve of the battle, but this 
officer, who had never missed an action since he crossed to France with the division in 1915, refused to go 
sick”. Ewing, History of the Ninth, p.337 
37
 London Gazette, 1 February 1919, page unknown. Lumsden was, however, not afraid to decline to attack 
when necessary. During the First Battle of Passchendaele, 12 October 1917: “Of battalion commanders Lieut.-
Colonel Lumsden alone, seeing that the attack of the 26th Brigade had been checked, kept his men back, and the 
net result of over-zealous leading was that General Lukin, instead of a brigade, had one battalion intact”. Ewing, 
History of the Ninth, p.244 
38
 London Gazette, 26 July 1918, p.8741 
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The award of the DSO to John Inglis reflects identical abilities: 
He ably handled his battalion at a very critical moment. Under heavy fire he 
made many personal reconnaissances, and was always thoroughly in touch 
with the situation, sending back most valuable information. His leadership 
enabled difficult rearguard actions to be fought successfully for seven 
days.39 
 
Lastly, Gerald Brice Ferguson Smyth, CO 6th Scottish Borderers, was awarded a bar to his 
DSO as CO. The citation gives some flavour of the man: 
Although seriously wounded, he remained at the telephone in an ill-
protected trench for many hours during a critical time to report the course 
of events to Brigade Headquarters. He realized that there was no officer of 
experience to replace him, and his sense of duty may cost him his remaining 
arm, the other having been amputated as the result of a previous wound. He 
was five times wounded.40 
 
Smyth’s career is interesting. He was commissioned into the Royal Engineers in 1905, and 
was a Lieutenant at the outbreak of war, serving with noted ability until transferred to the 
infantry, taking over command in December 1916. Wounded several times as CO, the “one 
armed Irish warrior of dauntless courage” was promoted to the command of 93 Brigade on 3 
October 1918. 41 
 
                                                      
39
 London Gazette, 26 July 1918, p.8746 
40
 London Gazette, 18 July 1917, page unknown. The wound which resulted in the loss of his arm was sustained 
in 1914 and is reflected in his DSO citation: “For consistent skill, daring and hard work in  reconnaissance and 
defensive preparations by night and day throughout the Campaign, and especially during the battle of the Aisne, 
and in the trenches at Givenchy, until wounded on the 25th of October by a shell entailing the loss of his left 
arm”. London Gazette, 11 November 1914, p.9229 
41
 He was born in 1885, son of the British High Commissioner of the Punjab. Whilst stationed at Gibraltar he 
was nearly killed by a falling boulder in the Sierra Nevada whilst on an expedition to photograph the 
Lammergeyer vulture. He was offered a Professorship of Mathematics at Chatham in 1914, but opted to stay 
with his unit, 17th Field Company RE. After his wounding in October 1914 he returned to active duty with 90th 
Field Company but was injured in an explosion at the bomb factory, Nieppe Station, but was able to take over 
from the CO who had also been wounded. On 13 July 1916 he was shot through the neck at Trones Wood on the 
Somme. On recovery he was sent to 6th King’s Own Scottish Borderers as a company commander in November 
1916, taking over as CO the following month. He was wounded at Arras on 3 May 1917, returning to command 
in October 1917. He was wounded yet again in the German Spring Offensive on 23 March 1918 on the Somme, 
returning to command on 1 June 1918. He commanded 93 Infantry Brigade into 1919, and after attending Staff 
College was posted to the Royal Irish Constabulary, being murdered by Sinn Fein activists in the smoking room 
of the Cork and County Club on 21 July 1920, after making controversial comments. His brother, Major George 
Osbert Stirling Smyth (Royal Field Artillery) was shot in Ireland in October of the same year. 
http://www.countydown.x10.mx/html/banbridge_g.1.htm  accessed 29 December 2012. See also J. & J. 
Murland, Departed Warriors: The Story of a Family in War (Leicester: Matador, 2008). 
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At first glance, the COs of 9th Division present as an even more stellar cast than 5th Division, 
but this may simply be a vagary of the information available. Again, they had great depth of 
experience built up since 1914/15, and clearly shared the command and leadership skills 






Regiment Btn CO From To August 1914 2Lt Lt Capt Major Lt-Col 
Northumberland Fusiliers 1/7th Liddell H. 29/12/1917 11/11/1918 Citizen 22/08/1914 26/09/1914 18/04/1915 N/A 29/12/1917 
Lancashire Fusiliers 1/5th Castle G. S. 06/04/1918 11/11/1918 TF 14/07/1911 19/12/1912 01/05/1915 22/03/1917 06/04/1918 
Lancashire Fusiliers 1/7th Brewis G. S. 13/09/1917 25/10/1918 Regular 05/10/1910 01/04/1912 26/04/1915 13/07/1916 28/09/1917 
Lancashire Fusiliers 1/7th Kelly T. J. 26/10/1918 11/11/1918 Citizen 25/10/1914 26/03/1915 31/07/1916 23/11/1916 26/10/1918 
Lancashire Fusiliers 1/8th MacLeod J. S. 10/04/1918 11/11/1918 Retired (Vol) N/A N/A 24/10/1914 11/07/1915 20/04/1918 
East Lancashire 1/5th Clare O. C. 02/06/1918* 11/11/1918 Retired (Emp) 24/03/1915 N/A 09/04/1915 08/06/1916 24/05/1917 
Manchester 1/5th Panton W. F. 10/06/1918 21/10/1918 Regular 04/06/1904 30/12/1906 19/02/1913 21/01/1918 10/06/1918 
Manchester 1/5th Tickler W. M. 21/10/1918 11/11/1918 Citizen 06/01/1916 27/04/1916 25/07/1916 11/04/1918 21/10/1918 
Manchester 1/6th Blatherwick T. 26/05/1918 11/11/1918 TF 02/07/1909 07/06/1912 01/05/1915 04/05/1917 26/05/1918 
Manchester 1/7th Manger E. V. 30/04/1918* 11/11/1918 Regular 03/08/1901 14/07/1904 05/08/1914 03/08/1916 14/08/1917 
Manchester 1/8th Tetley F. E. 26/05/1918* 01/09/1918 TF 16/01/1904 01/08/1905 30/12/1907 04/06/1916 07/11/1916 
Manchester 1/8th Hodge A. 02/09/1918 23/10/1918 
06/10/1918 
11/11/1918 TF 07/12/1915 ? 11/05/1916 04/07/1918 02/09/1918 
Manchester 1/10th Peel W. R. 09/09/1917 11/11/1918 Citizen 19/09/1914 ? 13/03/1915 29/10/1916 09/09/1917 
                        
Table 7.4: Career progression of COs of 42nd Division who commanded during The Hundred Days 
(*Commanded a battalion previously) 
336 
 
7.5 42nd (East Lancashire) Division 
42nd Division was a Territorial formation of Third Army in 1918.1 During The Hundred 
Days the ten battalions (nine excluding Pioneers)2 had 12 COs,3 and hence had good 
stability. No COs died in action. 
 
Three of the 12 infantry COs were active Regulars in August 1914 (see Table 7.4). At 23 
per cent this is lower than the average for the BEF on 29 September 1918, and lower than 
the 31 per cent for 42nd Division overall (as we have seen,4 42nd Division had had a 
particular stiffening of Regulars in 1917), yet is comparable with the overall picture for 
first-line TF units.  
 
Firstly, Walter Forbes Panton was a Regular Captain of the Leicestershire Regiment in 
August 1914, serving as Adjutant to 1/4th Dorsetshire. He appears to have gone to India 
with the battalion and then to Mesopotamia in February 1916, probably being posted to 
France in July 1917 and promoted Major second-in-command 1/5th Manchester on 21 
January 1918, assuming command in May 1918.5 
 
Geoffrey Sydney Brewis was a Lieutenant of 1st Welsh in August 1914, and had landed in 
France on 16 January 1915. He spent a period with the 3rd Battalion in the UK during 1916 
before being posted as Major second-in-command to 13th Welsh on 13 July 1916. He was 
                                                      
1
 During The Hundred Days it took part in the Battle of Albert (21-23 August); the Second Battle of 
Bapaume (31 August to 3 September); the Battle of the Canal du Nord (27-29 September); the Pursuit to the 
Selle (9-12 October) and the Battle of the Selle (17-23 October). 
2
 The Pioneer battalion was 1/7th Northumberland Fusiliers (North Eastern Railway Pioneers). Their CO was 
Hugh Liddell, a citizen of August 1914, by profession a Consulting Engineer. He had joined the battalion as 
2nd Lieutenant in August 1914, commanded B company as a Captain, and served as Adjutant in 1917. 
3
 Excluding the pioneer battalion. 
4
 See Chapter Four, section 4.3.1. 
5
 At this point the long-serving Lieutenant-Colonel H.C. Darlington finally relinquished command. Panton 
had however commanded 1/8th Manchester as a Major from 23 to 26 May 1918. 
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transferred to command 1/7th Lancashire Fusiliers on 13 September 1917. He won a bar to 
his DSO “when commanding a battalion during a withdrawal he inspired great confidence 
by his skilfulness and contempt for personal danger”.6 
 
Finally, Edward Vincent Manger, promoted Captain in 2nd Durham Light Infantry on the 
day war broke out and Major on 3 August 1916, commanded 11th Essex from 11 
November to 9 December 1916, and 2/9th Liverpool from 4 August 1917 to 29 April 1918, 
whence he was transferred to command 1/7th Manchester. 
 
Territorials comprised 42 per cent of COs, (four active in August 1914 and one a retired 
Volunteer), a level similar to other first-line TF units on 29 September 1918. Gilbert 
Stacey Castle, a lead shot maker, was a Lieutenant of 4th Gloucestershire in August 1914 
and landed in France on 31 March 1915.7 On 22 March 1917 he was transferred to a 
battalion of the North Lancashire Regiment as Major, and again on 17 February 1918 to 
1/5th Lancashire Fusiliers as second-in-command, assuming command on 6 April 1918. 
 
Thomas Blatherwick is an example of steady progression within a single unit. A cotton 
worker, he was a Lieutenant of 6th Manchester in August 1914. Promoted company 
commander just prior to his arrival in France on 6 May 1915, he was appointed Adjutant in 
mid-1916, and Major second-in-command on 19 October 1917, taking command on 26 
May 1918. He won a DSO crossing the Selle in October 1918, displaying “the greatest 
                                                      
6
 London Gazette, 26 July 1918, page unknown 
7
 He won a DSO on the Somme taking command of another company as well as his own and resisting a 
bombing attack on a captured trench. London Gazette, 22 September 1916, p.9272 
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courage and skill when personally supervising” the crossing “in face of a position strongly 
held by the enemy”, leading his battalion on after “personal reconnaissance”.8 
 
Francis Eric Tetley, a tanner, was a Captain of 4th Lincolnshire in August 1914.9 Landing 
in France on 1 March 1915 he was promoted Major on 4 June 1915. He commanded his 
battalion between November and December 1916, and in April 1917 went to command 
1/4th Leicestershire until the end of July. There followed a period as second-in-command 
of 1/5th Manchester until on 26 May 1918 he assumed command of 1/8th Manchester. His 
successor, when he left command on 1 September 1918 was Arthur Hodge. Hodge had 
been a TF Company Sergeant-Major in the Liverpool Regiment, commissioned 2nd 
Lieutenant in December 1915 in 7th Manchester. He had won an MC as a platoon 
commander showing “the most skilful and determined leadership”,10 and the DSO as a 
company commander, showing “gallantry and example”.11 He was promoted Major 
second-in-command of one of the Lancashire Fusilier battalions in the division on 4 July 
1918, assuming command of 1/8th Manchester on 1 September 1918. 
 
Lastly, James Strachan MacLeod had been a Sergeant promoted Lieutenant in the 17th 
Imperial Yeomanry during the Boer War. He was commissioned into the 10th Black Watch 
                                                      
8
 “He displayed the greatest courage and skill when personally supervising the crossing of a river in face of a 
position strongly held by the enemy. Later, his battalion was ordered to relieve another battalion at short 
notice in an attack on positions which had not previously been reconnoitred. He went forward and made a 
personal reconnaissance, amidst heavy shell bursts and machine-gun fire, and returning led the battalion 
successfully forward under extremely difficult circumstances”. London Gazette, 11 January 1919, p.581 
9
 His brother Charles Harold Tetley, a Major of 7th West Yorkshire in August 1914 commanded that battalion 
from 28 September 1915 to 30 April 1918. Both were scions of the Tetley brewing family. Francis Eric 
Tetley had been awarded a DSO in 1917 (no citation). He later became Lord Mayor of Leeds. 
10
 London Gazette, 14 September 1917 p. 9573. Hodge led his platoon against an enemy working party. 
11
 London Gazette, 26 July 1918 p.8746. Hodge was commanding his company when all companies about his 
withdrew, Hodge holding the line for some 12 hours. 
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as a Captain in October 1914, and promoted Major in July 1915 in the 8th Durham Light 
Infantry. He took command of 1/8th Lancashire Fusiliers on 10 April 1918. 
 
Oliver Cecil Clare, a foreign banker, had served as a Sergeant in colonial forces, namely 
the Border Horse and the South African Light Horse during the Second Boer War.12 He 
attested as a Private in the 10th Royal Fusiliers on 29 August 1914, and progressed up the 
ranks, being promoted Corporal on 19 October, and Lance-Sergeant on 30 November. He 
was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in 8th East Surrey on 24 March 1915, promoted Captain 
on 9 April. The battalion landed in France on 28 May, Clare serving as Adjutant. He was 
appointed Major on 8 June 1916, and, wounded at Trones Wood on 14 July, returned as 
second-in-command on 5 September. From November 1916 to April 1917 he was 
invalided to England suffering from influenza, returning to command 7th West Kent on 24 
May 1917 until the Armistice.13 He won a bar to his DSO as CO: 
During an enemy attack … he promptly counter-attacked with his 
battalion and caused a position to be held. Throughout he showed fine 
leadership and coolness under heavy machine-gun and shell fire.14 
 
Finally, there were three COs who had been citizens in August 1914, none commissioned 
into the TF. Thomas Joseph Kelly, a journalist, was commissioned in 18th Manchester, and 
rose from 2nd Lieutenant (25 October 1914) to Major (23 November 1916) serving with 
one of the Regular battalions of his regiment before commanding 1/7th Lancashire Fusiliers 
from 26 October 1918 to the Armistice. 
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 Clare must have been working in South Africa as the Border Horse was raised in the East Cape in February 
1900. He transferred to the South African Light Horse as soon as it was formed in November 1900, and 
served with it for a year. 
13
 TNA WO339/37181 Officers’ Services, Oliver Cecil Clare. Clare left the Western Front on 17 November 
1918 suffering from severe varicose veins and was discharged. 
14
 London Gazette, 16 September 1918, p.10855. His DSO was gazetted 4 June 1917. 
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William Marshall Tickler, a commercial traveller in fruit preserves,15 attested Private in 
10th Royal Fusiliers on 29 August 1914, and was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant on 10 
October 1914 in the Cheshire Regiment, serving for some period with the Garrison Guard 
Battalion to whom he was Adjutant in 1916, later commanding 1/5th Manchester from 27 
October 1918 to the Armistice. 
 
William Ralph Peel, a land agent, was commissioned 2nd Lieutenant in 9th East Yorkshire 
on 19 September 1914, promoted Lieutenant on 10 December 1914, Captain on 13 March 
1915, and Major on 29 October 1916. He commanded 1/10th Manchester from 9 September 
1917 to the Armistice. Peel won two bars to his DSO in quick succession in 1918 as CO, 
the citations for which demonstrate his qualities: 
Throughout two days’ very hard fighting he displayed great courage and 
marked ability in dealing with situations of considerable difficulty … his 
cheerful disregard of all considerations of personal safety was an 
example to his men, which inspired them with confidence and 
resolution.16 
 
He led his battalion for four days in continuous rain without shelter, and 
captured the town of Hautmont. To accomplish, this he had to supervise 
the construction of a hasty bridge over the Sambre river and cross it 
while the enemy troops were still in the town.17 
 
In composition, 42nd Division was broadly similar to most first-line TF units during The 
Hundred Days in respect of its COs. They were youthful, having an average age of 32 
years 3 months, some three years below the BEF average of 34 years 11 months on 29 
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 A partner in J.E. Tickler Ltd, he had served five years in his school cadet corps. TNA WO339/24778 
Officers’ Services, William Marshall Tickler. 
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 London Gazette, 16 September 1918, p.10859. His DSO had been gazetted 4 June 1917. 
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September 1918, demonstrating the youngest average of the three divisions studied.18 None 
had multiple commands; only one had been in command since late 1916; and none 
appointed in 1917 had been elevated earlier than May that year. They were therefore 
slightly less experienced in command than their counterparts in 5th and 9th Divisions. They 
had not, however, been sheltered by any staff positions, having earned their considerable 
experience from the early months of 1915 in constant exposure to warfare. Where we are 
allowed glimpses of their qualities, there is no reason to believe their abilities to be less 
diverse than their Regular or New Army division counterparts. 
 
7.6  Initiative and Devolved Command in The Hundred Days 
Did The Hundred Days present a canvas on which these men were free to paint with their 
talents? Jonathan Boff reminds us that this was not a period of “manoeuvre warfare, but … 
a form of mobile attrition”.19 It was a period of set-piece attacks, ‘semi-open’ warfare, and 
pursuit,20 the latter two allowing increasing degrees of improvisation. To the competent 
CO, the first should have been meat and drink; to the skilled CO the latter were 
opportunities to show initiative. Having four years’ experience of the tactics of positional 
warfare, The Hundred Days tested both what COs had learnt and their ability to go beyond. 
 
Organisationally, however, how far was a CO’s initiative allowed to show itself? Jonathan 
Boff identifies that in Third Army during this period “decentralisation was not consistently 
achieved. It is not possible to establish a coherent pattern of either top-down devolution, or 
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 Two were aged 40 or over, E.V. Manger being the oldest at 42 years 11 months, whilst G.S. Castle was the 
youngest at 25 years five months. 
19
 Boff, Winning, Kindle location 1178 
20
 Boff, Winning, Kindle location 1186. Boff calculates Third Army spent 11 days in set-piece attacks, 17 
days in ‘improvised’ warfare, and 15 days in pursuit. 
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bottom-up assumption, of responsibility”.21 The reasons for this were manifold, including 
“a combination of circumstance, subordinates’ skill and published guidance”.22 
 
Peter Simkins, whilst accepting that decentralisation/devolution of command to brigade 
and battalion level was not uniform, argues that because of the higher operational tempo of 
The Hundred Days, with some battalions 'at the sharp end' every three days or so, and with 
little time to issue detailed written orders, decentralisation inevitably happened, formally 
recognised or not. He further suggests that whilst examples of 'sticky' or inefficient 
battalion COs can be found, average standards of leadership and initiative at this level were 
generally at their highest. This, Simkins suggests, was a necessity given the great variety of 
tactical challenges that many battalions faced during this period, and the lack of time that 
COs had to refer to higher authorities when conducting attacks and responding to counter-
attacks.23 Simon Robbins states that in 1918: “The emphasis was on flexibility and 
elasticity and much depended on the initiative of junior officers and battalion 
commanders”.24 
 
Whilst the November edition of SS135,25 which presumably reflected thinking current 
during The Hundred Days stated: “Nothing should be done to hamper the initiative and 
freedom of manoeuvre of subordinate commanders”, hampering occasionally occurred. 
Personality was one issue, as was mutual trust, both in Brigadier/CO relationships, and 
CO/CO relationships. A Brigadier had to be confident in both himself and his relationships 
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 Peter Simkins, personal communication, 17 March 2013. 
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Cass, 2005), p.113 
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with both his divisional and battalion commanders to allow “the decision threshold to sink 
down the chain of command”.26 
 
In terms of differing peer attitudes, Boff gives the example of one battalion commander, 
apparently Lieutenant-Colonel C.A. Howard, 1st King’s Royal Rifle Corps, losing the 
opportunity for exploitation as the neighbouring battalion’s CO would not move beyond 
the objective without orders. Howard viewed this as the “habit” of acquiring limited 
objectives having been laid down in a period when exploitation was not encouraged.27 
 
Conversely, a good example of two COs using their initiative alone and jointly furthering 
progress is given in 9th Division on 29 September 1918 in front of the Flanders I Stellung 
position at Ypres, when: 
Finding that the leading troops had been brought to a standstill, Lieut.-
Colonel Smyth, who had been reconnoitring well ahead of the brigade, 
consulted with Lieut-Colonel Sir J. Campbell, and they sent forward two 
companies each of the K.O.S.B and the 11th Royal Scots. The additional 
momentum thus thrown into the onset carried the whole line forward.28 
 
Brigadier-General H.R. Cumming gave an example of his approval of a CO in whom he 
had confidence using his initiative in the advance across the old Somme battlefield on 24 
August 1918: 
The night assembly was carried out without any undue hitch; but as the 
6th Leicesters (the leading battalion) approached Battery Valley, they 
found that the Southern end, and the trench line south of it, was still held 
by the enemy in some force. Lieutenant-Colonel Martyn … at once 
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 Boff, Winning, Kindle location 6476 
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 TNA CAB 45/185 Letter, Charles Howard, 23 June 1938, Official History Correspondence. Charles Alfred 
Howard was a Regular Captain of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps who served almost exclusively in a range of 
staff posts (with a short period in command of 16th KRRC in August 1916) until taking command of 1st 
KRRC on 3 July 1918, a post he held until the Armistice. 
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 Ewing, History of the Ninth, p.345 
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realised the situation, and without hesitation or waste of time attacked at 
once and drove them out.29 
 
In his study of the East Kent Regiment,30 Mark Connelly refers frequently to two highly-
regarded New Army COs. The first is Arthur Sidney Smeltzer, an OR in August 1914,31 
who had served with 6th Buffs since his commission. Smeltzer demonstrated verve and 
initiative to a high degree in The Hundred Days. 
 
On 23 October the 6th Buffs took Cubray, and “realising that only a thin screen was in front 
of him, Smeltzer organised a rapid night movement, and smashed through to the village of 
Haute Rive”. Keeping momentum, he sent Lewis gun teams forward early next morning, 
capturing Buridon, and “refusing to rest on his laurels, he dashed on and snatched Bruille 
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 H.R. Cumming, A Brigadier in France, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1922), p.214. Martyn was captured later 
that night going forward to locate his forward companies. Cumming gave further indication that in his 
brigade the spirit of initiative was delegated downwards from COs, describing how in the 7th Leicestershire, 
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel G.H. Sawyer, two support companies under Captains Horne and Vanner 
in the final advance across the old Somme battlefield in late August 1918 deviated to the left due to enfilade 
fire, found themselves on the outskirts of Courcelette which they proceeded to occupy “and made a 
considerable number of prisoners, including a battalion commander”,  then simply handing it over to the 17th 
Division, in whose area it was (p.211). Such confident relationships between CO and junior officers were not 
universal. Jonathan Boff emphasises the importance of the skill of the CO quoting the view that “in these 
days of untrained soldiers, a commanding officer’s presence in the immediate attack is necessary” (TNA WO 
95/2560 War Diary, 115 Brigade, 31 October 1918),  and the fate that befell 7th Border, which became 
“rudderless” (TNA WO 95/1985 War Diary 17 Division 21 August to 11 November 1918) when Lieutenant-
Colonel W.E. Thomas was killed on 20 October 1918, due to the shortage of experienced junior officers. 
Boff, Winning, Kindle location 6476. Lieutenant E.R.M Fryer, 3rd Grenadier Guards clearly valued the 
importance of his very active CO in the attack on Moyenneville on the foggy morning of 21 April 1918: “The 
Commanding Officer, Col. Thorne, had gone on ahead of the reserve company to direct the front wave; he 
was second to none on an occasion of this sort; the fog had no terrors for him, and he always knew exactly 
where he was on the map; we were fortunate indeed to have him leading us, as he converted what looked like 
a ghastly muddle into a brilliant success”. [E.R.M Fryer, Reminiscences of a Grenadier 1914-1919 (London: 
Digby, Long & Co, 1921), p.192]. 
30
 M. Connelly, Steady the Buffs: A Regiment, a Region, and the Great War  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006). 
31
  Born in 1881, Smeltzer (who changed his surname to Keates in 1920) had served in the ranks for 15 years, 
rising to the rank of Sergeant in the 12th Lancers and having active service in South Africa 1902. He landed 
in France on 15 August 1914 and was commissioned in the field on 13 October 1915 as 2nd Lieutenant in the 
East Kent Regiment. Posted to the 6th Buffs, he was promoted Captain and company commander on 18 May 
1916, Major on 21 January 1917 and CO on 9 June 1917, a post he held until the Armistice. 
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… taking the enemy by surprise, the majority of whom were captured while still eating 
their breakfasts”. Major-General A.B. Scott described his actions as a “masterly stroke”.32 
 
Connelly’s second exceptional CO is Algernon Lee Ransome,33 7th Buffs. Ransome had 
acquitted himself well in the German Spring offensive on 23 March 1918 at Frières Wood, 
Brigadier-General E.A. Wood, writing: “The stand made … by Lt-Col Ransome’s force 
was of the greatest value not only to the rest of the brigade, but to the whole line in this 
vicinity … this stand was due … to the skill and foresight of Lt-Col Ransome in 
establishing a line outside the wood on which the withdrawing troops … could be rallied 
and reorganized”.34 Connelly describes Ransome as acquiring “more and more autonomy” 
as the retreat went on, and suggests that this “appears to be a precursor of the devolved 
command systems of the summer and autumn advances”.35 Other historians support this 
view, Chris McCarthy suggesting that “the process of devolution in tactical command in 
the BEF gained extra momentum during the defensive battles of the spring of 1918”,36 
breakdown in command and control in the new mobile defensive warfare necessitating and 
vindicating initiative.37 
 
Whether these opinions on the Spring 1918 origins of devolution are correct as an 
organisational point is currently a matter of conjecture. There was obviously no policy or 
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 Born in 1883 in San Francisco, son of American barrister L.J. Ransome,  he was commissioned into the  
Dorset Regiment in 1903, where he had served as Adjutant. He was appointed Brigade-Major from June 
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34
 Quoted in R.S.H. Moody, Historical Records of the Buffs (East Kent Regiment) 3rd Foot 1914-1919 
(London: Medici Society, 1922) p.346 
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 Connolly, Steady, Kindle edition location 2979 
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 C. McCarthy, ‘Queen of the Battlefield: The Development of Command, Organisation and Tactics in the 
British Infantry Battalion during the Great War’, in G. Sheffield & D. Todman eds. Command and Control 
on the Western Front – The British Army’s Experience 1914-18 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004),  p.162 
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even clear pattern. In practice, as reviewed above, it may have simply reflected local 
opportunity and the quality of local relationships.  
 
It is certainly the case that Ransome and Wood had a close co-operative relationship.38 
Wood was at Ransome’s HQ on 22 August: “Thus, when things began to go wrong on the 
Buffs’ front he was able to talk to Ransome and reassess the situation on the spot. Wood 
stayed forward to reconnoitre the ground with Ransome in order to prepare for the evening 
assault”.39 Connelly describes this modulation of command style as “a hugely experienced 
battalion commander and his brigadier unilaterally (deciding) to revise the plans in the 
light of the situation”.40 Wood and Ransome, in Connelly’s opinion, generally had “the 
chance to exercise their own initiative and authority far more effectively. They improvised 
new plans, countermanded redundant or inoperable orders, and maintained command and 
control”.41 They were able to do this because their higher formation trusted them and 
“rarely interfered in local decision-making”.42 Chris McCarthy supports this view in 
describing the short ‘flash to bang’ planning time of an operation whereby the CO of 1st 
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 Observations on the developing relationship between a Brigadier and his COs are given in Peter Sadler’s 
study of Sir John Gellibrand when he was commanding 6th Infantry Brigade, AIF: “One aspect of 
Gellibrand's command style grated on some of his battalion commanders: his close supervision until they 
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of his contemporaries seemed not to have done - that to make up for lack of experience and formal job 
training, they needed close supervision and fatherly guidance. Gellibrand was also probably influenced by 
what he had seen of Hamilton's disastrous refusal to intervene during the Gallipoli campaign, when his 
subordinates were patently not doing what they had been told to do. In this regard Gellibrand demonstrated 
that he possessed 'that ruthlessness towards his subordinates which is one of the essentials of a great 
commander'”. [P.S. Sadler, The Paladin: The Life of Major-General Sir John Gellibrand (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), p.88]. 
39
 Connelly, Steady, Kindle edition location 3201. 7th Buffs’ advance had been stalled by the artillery not 
having bombarded Tara Hill outside Albert as it had been falsely reported that it had been captured. Ransome 
broke off his attack, and he and Wood planned a night assault supported by tanks.  
40
 Connelly, Steady, Kindle edition location 3144 
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 Connelly, Steady, Kindle edition location 3454 
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Welsh Guards, R.E. Luxmoore-Ball was ordered to take a position around Buvignies 
village on 5 November 1918,43 suggesting that the fact that “the brigade commander felt 
able to issue verbal orders, to be confirmed in writing later, is a sign of the trust that had 
been built up between commanders at different levels”.44 
 
British tactics during The Hundred Days have been the subject of considerable 
discussion.45 Jonathan Boff concludes, at least within Third Army, that there was “an 
impressive level of flexibility at the small unit tactical level” with a “diverse repertoire of 
methods”.46 This diversity was partly due to “improvised ‘bottom-up’ innovation”,47 i.e. 
the inventiveness of COs was a direct contributory factor. Tactical diversity remained 
within the CO’s direct control,48 in both set-piece and semi-open warfare attacks. 
 
Patrick Brennan, in his study of Canadian COs, claims that battalion commanders “were 
central”49 to the process of “tactical learning” that brought battlefield success. He states: 
“Successful battalion commanders shared a few characteristics. They were interested in 
new tactical developments, and in fact were responsible for encouraging innovation from 
below”.50 Their ‘after-battle’ reports went upwards and the distilled wisdom returned 
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 Richard Edmund Coryndon Luxmoore-Ball had served in South Africa 1901-2 and had retired as a 
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downwards in the form of codified learning, which they then implemented in training. 
Peter Simkins says of the BEF’s after-battle reports that: 
This process of rigorous, and sometimes brutal, self-examination not only 
fertilised but also nourished and propagated the shoots of tactical and 
technical improvement which subsequently enabled the BEF to win a 
succession of impressive victories in the second half of 1918.51 
 
This was an ongoing process even in the last month of the war. In October 1918, for 
instance, 13th Liverpool were in action twice. Firstly, on the 8th near Cambrai; and 
secondly, between 23 and 26 October in the approach to the River Selle. On both 
occasions, three and four page after-battle reports were produced.52 The first was 
completed by Lieutenant-Colonel W.J.H Howard,53 and lists six “Lessons”.54 Interestingly, 
the report gives good examples of de facto devolved command in terms of inter-battalion 
cooperation between COs in the absence of brigade orders (and the successes and failures 
thereof),55 supporting the view of Peter Simkins that devolved command operated 
frequently and unnoticed, simply because situations demanded. The second report was by 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Major-General W. A. Griesbach, 1st Canadian Brigade. Brennan continues: “Battalion commanders were the 
last link in the process of ‘universalizing learning,’ for the implementation of learning was training, the great 
bulk of which occurred at the battalion level and under the battalion commander’s supervision”. 
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 P. Simkins, ‘Building Blocks: Aspects of Command and Control at Brigade level in the BEF’s Offensive 
Operations, 1916-1918’, in G. Sheffield and D. Todman, eds, Command and Control on the Western Front – 
The British Army’s Experience 1914-18 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004) p.148 
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 TNA WO/95/1429 War Diary 13th Battalion King’s Liverpool Regiment. 
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 William James Holdsworth Howard, aged 29 in 1918, is an excellent example of a junior officer rising to 
command, having been a Regular Lieutenant of King’s Liverpool Regiment in August 1914. He had 
commanded from 22 September 1918. 
54
 The lessons include:  (i) the importance of supporting battalions “hugging the leading battalions” in attack 
to avoid enemy artillery barrages; (ii) the issue of slow communications; (iii) the usefulness of using 
advanced anti-tank guns when counter-attack involved use of tanks; (iv) the importance of advanced machine 
gun companies; (v) the need for more practice in fire and movement tactics as thin artillery fire could not 
adequately suppress enemy machine guns; (vi) the facility to withdraw without fear of censure to prevent 
needless sacrifice. 
55
 13th King’s attacking “in conjunction with the 2nd Division and in co-operation with the 2ND SUFFOLKS 
on the right”, with 4th Royal Fusiliers. “An officer of the M.G. Corps reported himself to the O.C. 13TH 
KING’S in the RED LINE asking if his guns could assist. His offer was gladly accepted”. Howard then 
approached “the nearest officer of the ROYAL BERKS in the RED LINE … to find out if he had received 
orders to attack in conjunction. He said he had not, but on the request of O.C. KING’S he promised … to 
attack FOREVILLE”. The machine gun barrage occurred, but “the BERKS did not cooperate”, leaving the 
two attacking battalions isolated. 
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Major R.P. Heywood, the acting CO,56 which list three topics for future consideration.57 




As noted in Chapter Three,58 on 29 September 1918, the pivotal moment of The Hundred 
Days, the COs of the British Army comprised 40 per cent professional soldiers,59 31 per 
cent Territorials,60 four per cent Special Reserve, 22 per cent citizens of August 1914, and 
three per cent empire soldiers.  
 
  




Active Regulars 48% 32% 
Retired professional officers 6% 8% 
Territorial 15% 25% 
Special Reserve 4% 2% 
Retired non-professional officers 6% 6% 
Citizens 15% 22% 
Retired empire unit officers 4% 2% 
Unknown 2% >1%  
 
Table 7.5: Comparison of August 1914 status of COS of 5th, 9th & 42nd Divisions with 
COs of entire BEF on 29 September 1918 
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 Howard was wounded in the knee by a machine gun bullet on 23 October. Richard Percival Heywood was 
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In the three successful divisions of The Hundred Days examined, the differential 
contribution is even more marked, as Table 7.5 shows. Professional soldiers made a higher 
contribution at 54 per cent of commands during this period and pre-war amateur soldiers 
and citizens a lower contribution at 25 and 15 per cent respectively.  
 
Given the exploration in this chapter of the non-Regular COs, and their very evident skills, 
it seems unlikely that the higher proportion of Regulars as COs was a significant factor in 
divisional success. What these divisions possessed was a store of talented officers of varied 
backgrounds with a depth of war experience built up over a period of three or four years.61 
As the GSO1 Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Cuthbert Headlam wrote to his wife as early as 14 
November 1916, it was neither the type of unit nor the origin of the CO that counted: 
The value of a battalion depends very largely on its Commanding Officer 
and adjutant.  If they are keen and know their work, they can get anything 
out of their men – be they regulars, territorials, [Kitchener’s] Army, 
Derby recruits or conscripts.  The material is the same to all intents and 
purposes … the Regular Army … does not exist any longer.62 
 
A number of the COs of the three divisions studied had lengthy or multiple commands. 
Their talents had been recognised mid-point in the war, but in terms of further promotion, 
only one, G.B.F. Smyth, was promoted to brigade command during this period from the 
three divisions under study.63 In fact, only three per cent of the whole Hundred Days CO 
cohort, 19 individuals, were promoted.  
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Of the 98 British brigade commanders in post on the Western Front at the Armistice, 58 
had been in post throughout the Hundred Days campaign, indicating a turnover of 40 
individuals.64 Active infantry COs during The Hundred Days therefore only provided half 
of this turnover.65 This raises the question as to how many of them would be ranked 
amongst Patrick Brennan’s “men who obviously performed well, clearly possessing the 
requirements for the job, and yet were never promoted”,66 i.e. ‘good fighting battalion 
commanders’ rather than men suitable for commanding larger formations. Whilst the 
question is impossible to answer, it is certain that both types are represented in the cohort. 
Some simply never got the chance for promotion due to position on ‘the list’; others, who 
had served for a lengthy period as CO, had likely been considered and discounted. 
 
Whether the COs of The Hundred Days were “rat-catchers” is a question to which the 
available evidence does not allow a clear answer. Many were clearly self-assured, as was 
Smeltzer in his triumph of 23 October, but they likely worked within the limits of 
confidence they enjoyed with their commanding Brigadiers. Undoubtedly they possessed 
personal courage, their DSO citations bearing testimony to this. No doubt many were 
‘tigers’, aggressive fighters, but few demonstrated the showy aspects of a Maxwell or a 
Crozier. Undoubtedly, as their DSO citations again indicate, they had command/leadership 
skills in terms of planning, care in execution of plans, and had the facility to inspire others 
with their example. Many were also evidently quick, naturalistic thinkers, who had 
initiative and ability to know what to do when operations went awry. Some, given the 
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evidence of degumming during this period, were found wanting. The reduced frequency of 
degumming, however, indicates that the BEF had achieved a more settled level of ability. 
 
Do they represent a meritocracy? Undoubtedly the promotion of a commercial traveller in 
fruit preserves, William Marshall Tickler, from Private in 1914 to Lieutenant-Colonel in 
1918 was based on merit. The community of COs do not, however, represent a meritocracy 
in terms of a modern definition as a group “selected competitively according to merit”.67 
Selection was not made against explicitly stated and mutually agreed criteria, and was 
always at the mercy of personal recommendation which could be influenced by a variety of 
factors. Not least of all, the understandable bias towards the Regular soldier and away from 
the pre-war amateur meant that promotion to CO was always a weighted process, but one 
in in which the unstructured assessment of merit always played a part, and, in a temporary 
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 Definition of meritocracy as per the Oxford English Reference Dictionary 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford 





In the Introduction, four questions were posed respecting the evolution of infantry battalion 
commanders. The first concerned who these men were, and how and where resources were 
found to cope with the mushrooming requirement for COs. 
 
The body of Regular officers who numbered 12,738 at the outbreak of hostilities 
shouldered a major burden, providing 45 per cent of active infantry battalion commands. 
Professional soldiers overall provided 60 per cent of active COs. It is unsurprising that the 
British army should have sought COs from this stock both out of the habit of institutional 
‘business-as-usual’, and the simple drive of necessity, there being no other place to look 
for candidates. This was particularly the case during the first two years of the war, in 
response to turnover in the field and the demands of the New Armies. In doing so, the 
army dug deep into the stock of retired professionals and young Regular officers. That 
clearly competent COs continued to be found despite the attrition of officers in 1914-15 is 
an indication that the quality of the pre-war Regular was higher than critics have assumed. 
 
Whatever the limitations of the professional development of the pre-war officer, the 
learning environment of the battlefield produced graduates who at the level of battalion 
command met the only criteria that mattered in 1918 – beating the enemy. Even on 29 
September 1918, when the army was less reliant on professional experience, Regular 
officers of August 1914 still comprised 32 per cent of COs overall and professional 




‘Business-as-usual’ is reflected in the professional’s grip on 92.5 per cent of commands of 
Regular units. Necessity is indicated by their contribution to 66 per cent of commands of 
New Army units, and to 36 and 41 per cent of commands of first and second-line 
Territorial units respectively. In the New Armies this contribution was an absolute 
necessity. With respect to first-line TF units it was a matter of perceived necessity related 
to the quality of the existing officer stock. Infusion of Regular command peaked at the 
third appointment in first-line TF units, falling away somewhat as younger officers of 
quality rose on the back of experience, citizens of August 1914 forming 20 per cent of 
commands on 29 September 1918. The same principle operated in the New Armies, 
citizens holding the same number of commands as Regulars, a third each, on that date. 
Professional soldiers of 1914 held the structure of the command of the infantry battalion 
whilst the talent that the army garnered in 1914-15 matured. 
 
Pre-war amateur soldiers faced an uphill struggle in ascending to battalion command. The 
Special Reserve, although not strictly a completely amateur body, made a uniformly low 
contribution; and the TF continually made one less than its size predicted. That this was 
based on prejudice is difficult to dispute. As Ian Beckett notes, at the outset: “Regulars had 
little confidence in the auxiliaries”.1 Lieutenant-Colonel S.C. Peel described a divisional 
conference where battalion command appointments were discussed,2 the only Territorial 
present joking that “no one in his battalion could be a candidate, as they were all 
Territorials. ‘No jest ever fell flatter, for no one in the room regarded the statement as other 
                                                      
1
 I. Beckett, ‘The Territorial Force’, in I. Beckett & K. Simpson (eds), A Nation in Arms: A Social Study of 
the British Army in the First World War (London: Tom Donovan, 1985), p.129. Even as the war progressed, 
Beckett states: Territorials “might hold an increasing number of appointments, but rarely on a long-term 
basis, and rarely those that mattered” (p.141). He notes that Lord Derby “was forced to defend the War 
Office in a speech at the Aldwych Club” in January 1918 in which he claimed that “sixty-one Territorials 
below the rank of Lieutenant in 1914 had achieved (the rank) of Lieutenant-Colonel”. 
2
 The Hon. S.C. Peel was a Major of the Bedfordshire Yeomanry in August 1914. 
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than a perfectly natural statement of fact’”.3 On 29 September 1918 only 36 per cent of 
first-line TF units were commanded by pre-war Territorials compared with 20 per cent by 
civilians, with a citizen commissioned into the TF being less likely to achieve command 
than one commissioned into a Service Battalion. 
 
The second question concerned the quality of commanding officers. As already noted, in 
the absence of data historians have found it easy to ridicule the pre-war officer corps, and 
have done so inaccurately. Quality is, of course, very difficult to assess. There is no 
quantified assessment of officers’ abilities to mine in retrospect for statistical analysis. 
There is no doubt that there were COs in post in August 1914 who lacked ability, and it is 
also the case that a number of those appointed during the war proved to lack the required 
skills. Failure to stand the rigours of this war should not, however, be taken to indicate lack 
of ability, as even competent officers could be undermined by their health in the harsh 
conditions of trench warfare, and could ‘burn-out’ in response to stress.  
 
Given that the British Army showed no reluctance during the war to remove COs, viability 
based on simple endurance in post and further promotion is as good an indication of 
quality as is likely to be achieved. Using these criteria, Tim Travers’ conclusion that in 
1914 the 3:1 “ratio of incompetent (commanding) officers in the 10th Infantry Brigade was 
probably not unique” is shown to be incorrect.4 The Regular COs of August 1914 
demonstrated a viability rate of 64 per cent. Analysis of their experience shows a rich 
texture of staff and active service that other armies, held up by critics as supposedly more 
                                                      
3
 S. Peel, ‘The Territorial Force’, Army Quarterly, 1:1 (1920) pp.26-54; quoted in Beckett, ‘Territorial 
Force’, p.142 
4
 T. Travers, The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern 
Warfare 1900-1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2003), p.14 
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professional, might have envied. Even the ‘dugouts’, unearthed to command the battalions 
of the New Armies, had a viability rate of 75 per cent, with their counterparts in the 
second-line Territorial battalions having a 57 per cent rate.  
 
The same analysis shows, however, that problems initially lay with the first-line 
Territorials. The TF COs of August 1914 showed a viability rate of 31 per cent. This 
demonstrates that there were grounds for the suspicion shown of the quality of the senior 
auxiliary officer. The necessary thinking through of the likely role of the TF in a European 
war, and staffing it accordingly, had been avoided in the face of the vested interests of the 
County Associations. 
 
The matter of quality can be thought of as presenting different issues in the period 1914-16 
compared to 1917-18. In the years up to and including the Somme offensive, the army was 
in the most part relying on the quality of the senior officers it already had. In the latter 
period it was relying on the quality of the senior officers it could create. The army 
demonstrated responsibility for the process of creation by establishing the Senior Officer 
School, itself an example of the fact that whatever the pre-war inattention to professional 
development, a growing commitment to this had evolved.  
 
The 38 per cent rate of removal of COs during the war shows that the army was an 
organisation committed to quality control. This figure, however, reflects a disproportionate 
turnover earlier in the war. An increasing commitment to merit-based appointment 
developed in the New Armies and second-line TF units as they went on service and in the 
first half of 1916, a process accelerating into 1917 and 1918, the early reliance on seniority 
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being shed. In the group who earned command in the last two years of the war by learning, 
demonstrating their qualities, and being trained to lead and command, the replacement rate 
was lower. During The Hundred Days the overall replacement rate was 17 per cent; that of 
citizen COs was 25 per cent, and that of Regular COs who were Lieutenants in August 
1914 was 19 per cent. Whilst removal of COs continued up until the Armistice, the number 
requiring replacement dropped even though the tempo of the war increased. 
 
During the first two years of war, it has been observed that the British Army suffered a 
process of ‘deskilling’. Ian Beckett notes that this was partly due to the rapid expansion 
which had the effect of “diluting experience at all levels”, and partly due to attrition; and 
that “the inexperience of new officers as casualties mounted would take time to correct”. 
One of the most telling statistics that Beckett presents is that “by 1918, there were an 
estimated 12,000 officers in staff appointments, or almost as many as in the entire Regular 
officer corps four years previously”.5 Officers with the psc qualification or a perceived 
ability for staff work were combed out of Regular battalions, particularly in these first two 
years.  
 
This combing process may be causally related to the observation that towards the end of 
the war there were many battalion commanders who had been in post for an extended 
period, but who were never likely to be promoted further. The ‘deskilling’ of units by 
advancement of particular officers may have removed many who had the organisational 
and management abilities for commanding larger formations from potential command at 
battalion level. The process was, however, less likely to remove men who were able and 
                                                      
5
 I. F. W. Beckett, The Great War 1914-1918 (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2007), p.219 
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suitable for command solely at this level, thus potentially allowing them to develop into 
the CO role. This again reflects positively on the quality of the junior Regular officers of 
August 1914, and raises the question as to whether ‘deskilling’ is an entirely appropriate 
description in this respect. Whilst this turnover certainly created some developmental lag, 
because it took time for experience and practice to demonstrate skill, it did allow many 
officers to rise to a level of appropriate ability. 
 
The third question concerned exactly what qualities were perceived as making an effective 
CO. This would have been a question that the pre-war army would have thought it did not 
have to answer, given the belief that leadership ability was assured by social status and 
education, and that the ability to command was generated simply by experience. The 
process of “reskilling”, coupled with the emphasis on quality and merit, gave rise to what 
was a new development for the British Army – the recognition that the practice of battalion 
command needed to be actively fostered. The massive influx of citizens lacking a military 
background and the expanding emphasis on a range of specific training activities in 
response to an increasingly technical war, led the army to codify and communicate what it 
meant by ‘command’ and ‘leadership’. It was thereby becoming increasingly professional 
and modern. Senior Officer School was one of the developments that long outlasted the 
war. 
 
By 1918, in addition to a range of technical skills, potential COs were being taught the 
importance of having presence and being known; the importance of personal 
characteristics of civility, even-temperedness, fairness and justness; the essential nature of 
personal courage; and the importance of the abilities of hard work, common sense and 
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forethought, balanced by imagination. Emphasis was put on the ability to train and 
motivate, partly through personal example. In terms of institutional approval, COs were 
rewarded for quality of leadership through demonstrating ability, organisational skill, and 
initiative; and for providing example. Officers and men had a shared view of what they 
valued in a commander, which happily fell in line with what was being taught and 
rewarded, namely courage, intelligence, knowledge, hard work, diligence and skill that 
protected lives. These precepts have stood the test of time. 
 
By The Hundred Days most of the COs studied were demonstrating the characteristics 
demanded. The fourth question concerned whether they had, in an organisation dominated 
largely by seniority in 1914, risen to battalion command by the virtue of the development 
of a meritocracy. Measured against a strict definition in terms of competitive selection 
against set criteria, there was no true meritocracy. In an organisation where personal 
recommendation had ruled, formalised assessment of such characteristics was a project for 
the distant future. Yet perception of ability clearly sharpened, and the concept of merit 
became a growing consideration in selection, dominating in the last two years of the war. 
The process of promotion to CO was, however, weighted and filtered – weighted, as we 
have seen, in favour of the Regular soldier, and filtered (to some degree) to exclude the 
Territorial. Whilst this filtering allowed the able citizen to rise, particularly in the last year 
or two of war, the army should not be seen as opening itself to ‘all-comers’ in terms of 
senior command. That the social status of the officer group as whole was very different in 
1918 to 1914 is undeniable, yet the great preponderance of professional civilians of 1914 
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achieving battalion command was only a continuation of the growing trend observable in 
1914 for the sons of professional men to enter the army.6 
 
It is important not to confuse trends in appointment that arose out of necessity and see 
them as evidence of merit-based promotion. That the average age of COs had dropped 
from 48 in 1914 to 35 years on the Western Front in 1918 is not evidence of a meritocracy 
of youth – it is a reflection of the winnowing of the officer group of older members 
through retirement, death, the exhaustion of warfare and promotion. Indeed, the citizen 
COs themselves bucked the trend of youth, tending to be a somewhat older group than the 
average.  
 
The real indicants of merit-based promotion are the citizen COs, those survivors from a 
group whittled down by death on the Somme and subsequent actions, rising through a 
three-year incubation on the back of the attrition of professional officers. The fact that a 
third of Service Battalions were commanded by citizens on 29 September 1918 is 
undoubtedly a reflection of the attitude change being forced upon the army not only by 
attrition but also from sheer evidence of suitability. It became clear that the citizens 
brought an appetite and aptitude both for fighting and the organisation of men for war. The 
progressive rise in the number of citizen CO appointments during The Hundred Days 
invites speculation as to how the army would have looked at battalion command level if 
the war had persisted into 1919. The hypothesis that the rise of the citizen CO would have 
continued unabated is likely correct, if untestable. Whether such individuals would have 
risen beyond this level is a different matter. 
                                                      
6
 C.B. Otley records that in 1910, 32.2 per cent of entrants to Sandhurst were the sons of ‘civilian 
professionals’ (23 per cent) and ‘businessmen and managers’ (9.2 per cent). [C.B. Otley, ‘The Social Origins 
of British Army Officers’, Sociological Review, 18 (2) (1970), pp.213-40]. 
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The weighting and filtering became even more apparent in the issue of promotion to 
brigade command, a stage which contained a significant bottleneck. The ‘waiting list’ 
represented a preponderance of potential supply over demand. Whilst 10 per cent of COs 
were promoted Brigadier General, 82 per cent of these were Regulars of August 1914, and 
93.5 per cent professional soldiers. Only 3.5 per cent were Territorials and less than one 
per cent citizens. Simple ingrained prejudice in favour of the professional and against the 
amateur may have played a sizeable part in this pattern of promotion. The leap from 
commanding men to commanding a formation may, however, have been one in which the 
more rounded skills of the professional soldier rather than simply being a ‘professional 
man of war’ really counted. 
 
Brigadier-General W.H.E. Segrave remarked: “Commanding a battalion is four times more 
difficult and ten times more interesting than commanding a brigade”.7 Whatever the 
comparative difficulties, Patrick Brennan’s distinction between a ‘good fighting battalion 
commander’ and an officer suitable for commanding larger formations may be based on 
differential skills.8 The brigadier not only had to have the authority to command 
commanders, he also had to have a broader base of organisational skills, with a more 
developed facility for planning, as well the ability to manage both COs and a range of staff 
officers. He also had to have a wider tactical grasp of integrating combined arms.9 George 
Gater’s organisational abilities as a senior educational administrator must, however, have 
                                                      
7
 In September 1918 [Feilding, R. War Letters to a Wife – France and Flanders, 1915-1919 (London: Medici 
Society, 1929) p. 187]. William Henry Erik Segrave served in a range of staff posts from the outbreak of war 
until taking over command of 1/15th London on 23 September 1917, being promoted Brigadier-General, 152 
Brigade, in August 1918. 
8
 P.H. Brennan, ‘Good Men for a Hard Job: Infantry Battalion Commanders in the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force’, Canadian Army Journal, 9 (1) (2006), pp.9-28 
9
 These points were developed in discussion with Trevor Harvey in connection with his study of brigade 
command at the Battle of Arras. 
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been truly outstanding to have trumped the absence of all-round military experience. The 
fact that only 50 per cent of appointments to brigade command made during The Hundred 
Days were from amongst active infantry COs suggests that ability was only as good as it 
matched the requirements. 
 
What beast had the infantry COs of 1918 evolved into? They were largely young, fit and 
mentally agile. They possessed both training in and accumulated experience of the 
conditions of combined-arms set-piece warfare, and were ready and able to learn swiftly 
the new variation of mobile attrition, in which so many demonstrated their tactical 
competence.  
 
Garth Pratten’s account of the development of infantry battalion command in the 
expanding Australian Army during the Second World War indicates that it went through a 
similar process of evolution. His observations on the average 30 year-old Australian COs 
of 1945 are equally pertinent to the BEF COs of 1918, namely that “they possessed a 
common doctrinal understanding and were fit, determined and earnest in their application 
to their commands”.10  
 
The Australians began by using older officers with experience of the First World War as 
COs, and as a result of learning on the battlefield, developed a body of “up-to-date military 
experience and … a new cohort of battalion commanders. These were officers with 
                                                      
10
 G. Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War (Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), pp.128-9 
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personal experience of this new war, proven in battle, younger, fitter and more thoroughly 
trained than any before them”.11  
 
There seems to be an inevitability to the evolutionary process that as each war in the 20th 
Century threw up a different series of challenges to the last, the ‘Queen of the Battlefield’12 
would go through a learning process. This would involve tactical development coupled 
with a revolution in equipment and weaponry, and a new generation of COs would evolve 
to act upon that learning and develop ‘common doctrinal understanding’.  
 
John Bourne states: “There is little doubt … that the war did bring to the fore young, 
ambitious, ruthless leaders, not least at the battalion and brigade levels”.13 Simon Robbins 
describes “the fit, adaptable, energetic, resourceful men who served as battalion, battery, 
brigade and divisional commanders in 1918”,14 “battle-hardened veterans” who had 
“ruthlessly replaced” the “older commanders unfit for the strenuous life of trench 
warfare”.15 Robbins emphasises that the evolution of battalion command was part of an 
overall evolution of command, and Garth Pratten concurs, stating of the Australian COs in 
the Second World War that their evolution “took place simultaneously with the 
development of the command system of which they were part”.16 He notes that the 
relationships between COs and brigade commanders “if not based on a long period of 
shared experience … were grounded at least on the knowledge of demonstrated 
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 Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders p.235 
12
 A soubriquet for the infantry attributed to Joseph Stalin. 
13
 J.M Bourne, ‘British Generals in the First World War’, in. G.D. Sheffield ed., Leadership & Command: 
The Anglo-American Military Experience Since 1861 (London: Brassey, 2002), pp.93-116 
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 S. Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18: Defeat Into Victory (Abingdon: Frank 
Cass, 2005), p.2 
15
 Robbins, British Generalship, p.57 
16
 Pratten, Australian Battalion Commanders, p.129 
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competence”. This is just as applicable to The Hundred Days as it is to the fighting in the 
Pacific jungles. 
 
It was this command system that was put to the test in 1918. As Peter Simkins has noted, 
even during The Hundred Days, “examples of bad staff work, inadequate co-ordination and 
liaison and faulty command decisions are spread throughout the operations of the BEF”.17 
War being a human process, this was inevitable. It is impossible to typify the BEF’s 
command system as anything other than ‘still evolving’ in 1918, John Bourne describing 
how at least at the teeth end of the organisation, “at battalion, brigade and, to a great 
extent, at divisional level” a group of men had emerged who “understood the relationship 
between leadership and command”. As Bourne states, “experience was the BEF’s greatest 
teacher, not GHQ”.18 The evolution was therefore largely bottom-up, and towards more 
flexible models of command. It was the commanders at the sharp end in The Hundred 
Days, the BEF’s evolved battalion and brigade commanders, working so often hand-in-
hand with mutual trust, who frequently, as Peter Simkins observes, “required, and got, 
effective local control of the battle”.19 
 
If war encourages leaps forward, peacetime can lead to stultification. Jim Storr suggests 
that the environment of force reduction and underfunding between the wars “seems to have 
bred conservatism and rewarded those who appeared to correspond to the prevailing 
stereotype”.20 Any ‘rat-catcher’ ethos in infantry command was dissipated, and “anti-
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 P. Simkins, ‘Building Blocks: Aspects of Command and Control at Brigade level in the BEF’s Offensive 
Operations, 1916-1918’, in G. Sheffield and D. Todman, eds, Command and Control on the Western Front – 
The British Army’s Experience 1914-18 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004), p.165 
18
 Bourne, ‘British Generals’, pp.111-112 
19
 Simkins, ‘Building Blocks’, p.165. 
20
 J. Storr, The Human Face of War (London: Continuum, 2009 ), Kindle edition, locations 3547-3554 
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intellectual” junior officers reasserted themselves as the British Army reverted to its former 
role as ‘policeman of the Empire’.21 The BEF beaten by the Wehrmacht in 1940 suffered 
from commanders, Storr argues, with “little disposition to prepare themselves”.22 
 
The broad scope of this thesis leaves at least four areas of issues worthy of further 
investigation. 
 
The first area concerns exactly what makes a successful battalion commander, a question 
that may never be answered to complete satisfaction. Effective command, at peace and in 
war, will lie at the intersection of several dimensions. The first dimension includes the 
characteristics of the individual, particularly leadership skills and the ability to relate to and 
understand his subordinates (referent power). The second involves training and experience 
(expert power). Understanding of these two dimensions could clearly be refined by further 
research. Length of command and successful battlefield performance, for instance, is an 
interesting issue arising from the data presented here; with the relevance of battle 
experience prior to elevation to CO and experience after that point worthy of more detailed 
analysis.  
 
The third dimension relates solely to performance in battle, concerning the situational 'on 
the day' issues which place differential demands on the first two dimensions. Such issues 
are those partly taken into account in the study of British First World War divisional 
performance, including weather, terrain, unit strength and fitness, and the quality of the 
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 Storr, Human Face, location 3554 
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 Storr, Human Face, location 3587 
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enemy;23 to which one might add communication,  the quality of senior and junior 
commanders, and the simple good and bad luck issues of the ‘fog of war’. This list is not 
exhaustive, and expanding the range of factors may simply mean that an understanding of 
the equation that balances the relative importance of the three dimensions slips beyond our 
grasp. 
 
The second historiographical area concerns the tactical development of the BEF, involving 
more detailed examination of the formal written output of COs, charting the progress of 
‘bottom-up’ change. The role of the infantry battalion commander in tactical refinement 
could be explored through the vehicle of the after-battle reports contained in unit war 
diaries, examining the ways in which unit recommendations were synthesised in brigade 
after-battle reports. Similarly, unit diaries could be examined for schedules of training 
promulgated by COs to examine the role they played in within-battalion skill development. 
The degrees of tactical freedom of the CO, particularly in the latter stages of the war, could 
also be appraised by contrasting the operational orders they issued. Further, the issue of 
devolved command in The Hundred Days could be examined by systematically searching 
for examples within unit war diaries to understand more clearly the balance between 
actions initiated by a CO alone; a CO in cooperation with brigade; and a CO in cooperation 
with a fellow CO, focussing on the ratio of successful and unsuccessful attempts at 
cooperation. 
 
A third area involves a more extensive examination of CO personal files in search of 
additional examples of confidential assessment of abilities associated with promotion, to 
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 J. Lee, ‘The SHLM Project – Assessing the Battle Performance of British Divisions’ in  P. Griffith (ed.) 
British Fighting Methods in the Great War (Abingdon: Frank Cass, 1996)  pp.175-181 
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establish a broader and more evidence-based understanding of the qualities sought for 
elevation to Lieutenant-Colonel, and CO to Brigadier. 
 
Fourthly, the Dominions of Canada and Australia contributed two highly successful corps 
to the BEF, the accomplishments of which have been the subject of much discussion.24 
Given that the units of these formations were comprised almost entirely of amateur 
soldiers, without the stiffening of native Regular battalion commanders, a more detailed 
comparison of the development of command in comparison with British units is warranted 
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 See, for instance, B. Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare – Technology and the Canadian Corps (Buffalo: 
University of Toronto, 1992); and C. Pugsley, The ANZAC Experience – New Zealand, Australia and Empire 
in the First World War (Auckland: Reed, 2004). 
25
 Patrick Brennan’s published research, (notably Brennan, ‘Good Men’) necessarily lacks the required depth. 
A study of Australian First World War Infantry COs is currently underway conducted by William Westerman 
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A sample of Special/Extra Reserve COs had an average age of 48 years two months.1 The 
youngest was 41. Thirty-eight per cent were over 50, the eldest being Lieutenant-Colonel J. 
L. Vaughan, 3rd South Lancashire, who was nearly 63.2 
 
 
A2.1 Ex-Regulars as Special Reserve COs 
Forty-two (40 per cent) of were ex-Regulars, who had an average age of 48 years seven 
months and who had been retired on average exactly seven years. One had retired as a 
Colonel and one as a Lieutenant-Colonel. Fifty-seven per cent had retired as Majors, and 
33 per cent as Captains.3 Fifty-four per cent were COs of SR battalions in the same 
regiment they had retired from as Regulars.  
 
  Ranks Militia RMC/University/Probationer 
Regular COs 1% 28% 71% 
Ex-Regular SR COs 12% 49% 39% 
 
Table A2.1: Comparison of entry routes of ex-Regular SR COs and Regular COs 
 
Table A2.1 shows that the ex-Regular SR COs were much more likely to have been 
commissioned from the ranks or to have come from the Militia in the first place. It was 
                                                      
1
 26 COs, ages accurate to 1.5 months with a quarter midpoint taken from the Registrar General’s quarterly 
registers of births, marriages and deaths. 
2
 John Lewis Vaughan remained in command until January 1917, and then served as a Major in the Labour 
Corps. 
3




exactly these two groups who were less likely to have achieved a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in 
a Regular regiment.4 
  Pre-WW1 Staff Service Pre-WW1 war Staff Service 
Regular COs 82% 91% 
Ex-regular SR COs 59% 44% 
 
Table A2.2: Comparison of peace and wartime staff service of ex-Regular SR COs and 
Regular COs 
 
Table A2.2 shows that ex-Regular SR COs were less likely to have pre-war staff service 
and half as likely to have had wartime staff experience. It is probable that this did not result 
from deficient competence – they were handicapped in gaining this experience because 
men with their entry route into the Regular army were less likely to be groomed to rise to 
battalion command. They probably retired early due to promotional frustration. 
 
A2.2 Former Militia COs 
A sample of SR COs who had never been Regulars had an average age of 48 years two 
months.5 The youngest was 41. Thirty-eight per cent were over 50, the eldest being 
Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. Vaughan, 3rd South Lancashire, who was nearly 63.6 They had 
been in post on average almost exactly three years. 
 
                                                      
4
 Militia officers were generally from the same social class as Regular officers. Six of the 64 former Militia 
COs were, however, titled (as were two of the ex-Regulars), reflecting the greater aristocratic link with part-
time infantry soldiering. These were: Lord Ampthill, CO 3rd Bedfordshire; the Marquis of Salisbury, CO 4th 
Befordshire; Sir A.A. Weldon Bt., CO 4th Leinster; Earl (G.H.) Champion de Crespigny, CO 3rd 
Northamptonshire; Sir A.S.T. Griffith-Boscawen, CO 3rd Royal West Kent; the Earl of Ellesmere, CO 3rd 
Royal Scots; Lord Heytesbury, CO 3rd Wiltshires; and Sir R.B.N. Gunter Bt., CO 3rd Yorkshire. 
5
 26 COs, ages accurate to 1.5 months with a quarter midpoint taken from the Registrar General’s quarterly 
registers of births, marriages and deaths. 
6




The changes in army organisation of 1881 had made it compulsory for a Militia CO to 
retire at the age of 55 (or 60 under “special circumstances”) but had not specified a 
maximum period of tenure.7 There was clear reason for an SR CO to keep hold of his 
command, as relinquishing it was very likely to be the end of his career. Of the 101 
predecessors of the COs of August 1914, only one was active (as a Territorial CO).8 
 
A2.3 War Service 
Three of the ex-Regulars (7 per cent) had no previous war service. Two had served in five 
campaigns, (R. Byron, CO 5th King’s Royal Rifle Corps; and J.O’B. Minogue, CO 3rd 
West Yorkshire;9 nine out of their ten campaigns having been in Asia). Three had served in 
four campaigns; two in three; seven in two, and the remaining 25 in one campaign. 
 
Eighteen of the 63 ex-Militia COs (29 per cent) had no previous war service. With the 
exception of two, the remaining 45 had all acquired their war service in South Africa.10 
 
Table A2.3 shows the spread of active service. Thirteen per cent of the collective war 
experience had been gained against African tribes; 20 per cent had been gained in Asia, 
(primarily India and Burma); and 67 per cent against the Boers. 
                                                      
7
 HMSO, Parliamentary Paper C.2922, Revised Memorandum Showing Principal Changes in Army 
Organization from July 1881 (1881). 
8
 Lieutenant-Colonel John Edward Rhodes had moved from the Special Reserve of the King’s Royal Rifle 
Corps to be CO 8th Hampshire. Two, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Charles Hardinge, late Rifle Brigade; and the 
Earl of Westmorland, late Northamptonshire Regiment, were ADCs to the King. 
9
 Minogue became CO 9th West Yorkshire for a short period from March 1915 but died in October 1916. 
10
 Cecil Hodgson Colvin, CO 3rd Essex in August 1914 had been attached to the 2nd Essex during the 
campaign on the Nile 1884-5; and George Wensley Clotworthy Soden CO 4th Royal Munster Fusiliers had 
been seconded as a Commissioner on the Gold Coast and saw service in the conquest of Ashanti, 1900. 




War service Ex-Militia 
Ex-
Regular 
Egyptian Expedition (1882-4) 
  
2 
First Sudan War 1884-5 1  4 
Third Burma War 1885-9   3 
Kaffir Campaign (South Africa) 1887-8   1 
Zulu War (South Africa) 1888   1 
Chin-Lushai War (Burma) 1889-90   1 
Hazara Expedition (North-West Frontier) 1891   3 
Miranzai Expeditions (North-West Frontier) 1891   1 
Isazai Expedition (North-West Frontier) 1892   2 
Defence and Relief of Chitral (North-West Frontier) 1895   2 
Operations British Central Africa 1895   1 
Third Ashanti War (West Africa) 1895-6   1 
Dongola Expedition (Sudan) 1896   1 
Niger Operations (West Africa) 1897-8   1 
North-West Frontier (including Tirah campaign) 1897-8   8 
Reconquest of Sudan 1896-9   2 
Second Boer War 1899-1902 44 32 
Fourth Ashanti War (West Africa) 1900 1   
Waziristan (North-West Frontier) 1901-2   1 
Tibet Expedition 1903-4   2 
 















Commanding the Infantry Battalions of the Home Army 
 
Of the 1695 infantry battalions of the regiments of the line that either existed at the start of, 
or came into existence during the war, 959 saw active service. Of the 736 that did not, 51 
saw non-active service (or active service unrelated to the war) in various locations 
including eight Regular battalions;1 eleven first-line Territorial battalions;2 eight second-
line and other late-formed Territorial battalions;3 the remainder being Garrison battalions 
fulfilling their designated purpose.  
 
Of the battalions that remained in the United Kingdom, the purpose of 453 was the 
provision of reinforcements to the active battalions, 95 being Special Reserve battalions, 
and 358 Reserve battalions (five being Guards Reserve; the rest being K4/locally-raised 
battalions and third and fourth-line territorial battalions that were designated Reserve 
battalions). Twenty-four were home service Labour battalions. The purpose of the 
remaining 208 was home defence, including Garrison battalions, Territorial cyclist 
battalions, and second-line Territorial battalions. 
 
                                                      
1
 2nd Liverpool; 2nd Somerset; 1st Yorkshire; 1st Duke of Wellington’s; 1st Sussex; 1st South Lancashire; 2nd 
North Staffordshire; and 1st Durham, all in India. 
2
 1/4th West Surrey; 1/4th Buffs; 1/1st South Wales Borderers; 1/6th East Surrey; 1/4th Border; 1/5th and 1/9th 
Hampshire; 1/4th West Kent; 1/10th Middlesex; 1/25th London; and 1/1st Kent Cyclist; all in India (although 
the 1/4th Buffs and 1/6th East Surrey also spent time in Aden). 
3
 Four in India, one in Bermuda. 
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Four areas of Home Army command will be examined, namely, in the three types of 
reserve battalions (Special Reserve, New Army and Territorial) and the second-line 
Territorial battalions. 
 
A3.1 Special Reserve Battalions 
Command in the home-based Special Reserve battalions remained reasonably stable 
throughout the war. Sixteen battalions retained the same CO; 56 had only two COs; and 23 
had three.  Figure A3.1 shows the number of changes of CO during the war per month. The 
pace of replacement, as might be expected, accelerated during the war; and the periods 
 
0 2 4 6 8 10












October 1916 to January 1917 and February to June 1918 demonstrate higher levels of 
turnover, reasons for which are obscure.4 
 
Eighty-two per cent of appointments were within the regiment. Forty-three of all 
replacements represent the simple elevation of a Major serving in the battalion in August 
1914, and eleven an officer who had been a Captain at that point, comprising 54 per cent of 
appointments. Ten appointees were retired Special Reserve/Militia officers;5 and 13 were 
retired Regulars.6 
 
The emphasis on appointees having a within-regiment Special Reserve background 
strongly suggests a traditional regimental ‘business as usual’ seniority approach. Twenty-
one appointees (26 per cent), however, were active Regular officers in August 1914 (one 
Indian Army Colonel, two Lieutenant-Colonels, fourteen Majors and five Captains) all 
who had seen varying degrees of active service. All but four had commanded battalions in 
action.7 Some had had careers cut short by wounding. Lieutenant-Colonel H.M. Biddulph, 
1st Rifle Brigade, was wounded on the Aisne on 15 September 1914, recovering to serve as 
a GSO1 from 15 June 1915 to 18 June 1917, and subsequently as CO of 6th Rifle Brigade 
from 11 November 1917 until the Armistice. Captain F.C. Hitchcock, temporarily attached 
                                                      
4
 These two periods correspond to the 1916 Somme offensive and the 1918 German Spring offensives. There 
is no evidence that the turnover in the two periods was related to turnover in battalion command in France, as 
only three changes in command were of this type. In the Special Reserve, Lieutenant-Colonel Lord Ampthill 
went from 3rd Bedfordshire on 9 November 1916 to the command of 13th Leicestershire, a Labour Battalion; 
and secondly, Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. Digan went from 3rd Connaught Rangers on 19 January 1918 to 
command of 6th Connaught Rangers on 1 April 1918, a command which was brief as the battalion was 
shortly thereafter disbanded. In the Extra Reserve Lieutenant-Colonel A.E. Williams went from 4th 
Warwickshire on 11 October 1916 to command of 1st Wiltshire.  
5
 Two Colonels, one Lieutenant-Colonel, three Majors, and three Captains. 
6
 Two Colonels, two Lieutenant-Colonels, five Majors, three Captains and one Lieutenant. 
7
 Lieutenant-Colonels K.A. Macleod (3rd Duke of Wellington’s West Riding); L.I.B. Hulke (3rd King’s Own 




to 3rd Leinster in early 1917, described: “Training for war … at full swing under the 
directions of Lieut.-Colonel R.G. Currey who had been severely wounded at Gallipoli”.8 
 
A number of later-appointed COs had significant experience of command. Lieutenant-
Colonel H.S. Tew (3rd East Surrey) had commanded the 1st Battalion from 29 May 1915 to 
5 June 1916, at which point he was promoted to command 18 Brigade in 6th Division from 
12 June to 16 August, returning to command 9th East Surrey from 4 September 1916 to 17 
October 1916, when he was invalided.9 He served as CO of a Yeoman Cyclist Regiment 
from 12 October 1916 to February 1918, and then 3rd East Surrey from 13 February to 27 
July 1918. Lieutenant-Colonel H.E. Walshe had four active commands before taking over 
3rd Berkshire, home service being the result of likely ‘burn-out’ on the Western Front.10 
His tenure was brief, 1 March to 13 April 1917, transferred to command 8th Dorsetshire, a 
home service battalion until December 1917. Lastly, Lieutenant-Colonel H. P. Creagh-
Osborne, another Western Front reject, commanded 7th King’s Own Yorkshire Light 
Infantry in the UK until 18 March 1915, at which point he was transferred to command 5th 
Middlesex until 11 December 1916.  
 
Clearly, the Special Reserve was used as a convenient billet for officers mostly of proven 
quality injured, invalided, or possibly simply exhausted by war. It is unclear whether such 
appointments were made for the good of the individual unit, for, as we have seen, there is 
no evidence that merit-based appointment played any great part. Lieutenant-Colonel 
C.C.R. Murphy, historian of the Suffolk Regiment in the Great War, described the Special 
                                                      
8
 Robert Gore Tappenden Currey, a Regular Captain of the Leinster Regiment, had commanded 6th Leinster 
from 10 August to 28 September in Gallipoli. He recovered sufficiently to command 12th Lancashire 
Fusiliers 14 November to 10 December 1917 on the Western Front. 
9
 Harold Stuart Tew, aged 45 in August 1914, was the senior Major of 1st East Surrey at the outbreak of war. 
10
 See Chapter Three. 
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Reserve COs’ duties as “arduous and sometimes disheartening”,11 but they did not demand 
up-to-date experience of trench warfare. Siegfried Sassoon passed through the Litherland 
war station of the 3rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers in 1917 and gave a typically alternative 
picture,  describing Lieutenant-Colonel H.R. Jones-Williams, and his Majors as “convivial 
characters … ostensibly directing the interior economy of the camp”,12 with “the training 
of recruits left to sergeant-instructors”.13 
 
A3.2 New Army Reserve Battalions 
The New Army reserve battalions were of two different types. Firstly, it was decided in 
April 1915 to break up the divisions of the Fourth New Army (K4) and for the battalions to 
become reserve battalions to train recruits and send drafts to the first three new armies.14 
Secondly, the locally-raised battalions formed depot companies which became reserve 
battalions in summer 1915. On 1 September 1916, in response to the casualties of the 
Somme, all 143 reserve battalions were absorbed into 112 battalions of 24 brigades of the 
newly created Training Reserve and their regimental identity was lost. 
 
A3.2.1 K4 Reserve Battalions 
Of the 75 K4 battalions, to whom the first CO was appointed on 21 September 1914;15 25 
had two COs, six had three COs, and one had four during the 23 months of their existence. 
                                                      
11
 C.C.R. Murphy, The History of the Suffolk Regiment 1914-1927 (London: Hutchinson, 1928), p.322. 
‘Disheartening’ due to the instability of constant turnover. 
12
 Italics not in original. 
13
 Sassoon, S. The Complete Memoirs of George Sherston (London: Faber & Faber, 1972), p.382. Howell 
Richard Jones-Williams, born in 1863, was CO 3rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers in August 1914, and served until 16 
March 1918. 
14
 These second reserve battalions were organised in 18 reserve infantry brigades. 
15
 Lieutenant-Colonel B.C. Quill, 11th York & Lancaster. 
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Of these 109 Lieutenant-Colonels, 62 were transferred as COs into the Training Reserve 
and 38 were replaced and never served as COs again, a 35 per cent redundancy rate.16 
  Regular Indian Army SR/Militia TF/Volunteers 
  Ret Active Ret Active Ret Active Ret Active 
Colonel 10 (14%) 0 7 (10%) 1 (1%) 2 (3%)  0  0 0 
Lt-Col 8 (12%) 3 (4%) 5 (7%) 8 (12%) 3 (4%) 1 (1%)  0 0 
Major 14 (19%) 1 (1%)  0  0 0 5 (7%)  0 0 
Captain 1 (1%) 0  0  0 2 (30%) 1 (1%)  0 0 
Lt 1 (1%) 0  0  0  0  0  0 0 
 
Table A3.1: First COs of K4 reserve battalions 
Table A3:1 shows that of the first appointed COs 28 per cent were active in August 1914, 
including one Colonel and eight Lieutenant-Colonels from the Indian Army, and three 
Regular Lieutenant-Colonels.17 Five active Special Reserve Majors were given command. 
The remaining 72 per cent were retired officers, with 10 Regular Colonels, seven Indian 
Army Colonels and two from the Special Reserve/Militia. The retired Lieutenant-Colonels 
were similarly distributed, eight Regulars, five Indian Army, and two from the Special 
Reserve/Militia. Fourteen retired Regular Majors were also given command. The 
Territorial Force was shunned. When compared with Tables 2.1 and 2.2 it can be seen that 
first appointments fell into the same pattern as for K3.18 
 
These reserve battalions, like the Special Reserve provided a home for some of the 
wounded, sick or exhausted Regular battalion commanders. Lieutenant-Colonel E.H. 
Swayne, invalided from command of 1st Somerset in France, took command of 9th 
                                                      
16
 Twenty-two of these were given staff posts, mostly as Staff-Lieutenants. 
17
 Lieutenant-Colonel E.H. Swayne, 9th Somerset Light Infantry, invalided from France; Lieutenant-Colonel 
C. Wanliss, 10th South Lancashire, transferred from the 2nd Battalion in France; and Lieutenant-Colonel G. 
Gunn, 8th Cameron Highlanders, who having been on half-pay until 13 March 1914, had no command on the 
outbreak of war. 
18
 See Chapter Two. 
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Somerset on 20 November 1914.19 Similarly, following his invalidity on psychological 
grounds from command of 2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers in October 1914,20 Lieutenant-
Colonel H. Delme-Radcliffe took command of 12th Royal Fusiliers on 8 April 1915.21 
Lieutenant-Colonel W.M. Campbell 2nd Black Watch, was invalided on 1 December 1914 
and took command of 13th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on 22 January 1916.22 
Lieutenant-Colonel H.M. Ainslie, who had already been invalided from command of 1st 
Northumberland Fusiliers in November 1914, returned to be promoted Brigadier-General 
18 Brigade between 29 May and 5 August 1915, was invalided again, and then took 
command of 13th Worcestershire on 12 April 1916.23 
 
The reserve battalions also provided a home for Regular COs whose careers had fallen 
under a cloud. Lieutenant-Colonel C. Wanliss, 2nd South Lancashire, sent home during the 
                                                      
19
 Edward Hopton Swayne, born 1863, was commanding 1st Somerset at the outbreak of war, and 
commanded 9th (Reserve) Somerset from 20/11/1914 until 31 August 1916, and 13th Somerset, a home 
service battalion from 30 August 1918 until the Armistice, never returning to active duty. 
20
 See Chapter Three. 
21
 Here he became mired in scandal. Mrs Mary Cornwallis-West, mother of the Duchess of Devonshire, 
began to visit one Sergeant Patrick Barrett, 2nd Royal Welsh Fusiliers, who had been nursed in her daughter’s 
hospital in France, and became infatuated with him. She approached Delme-Radcliffe about recommending 
him for a commission, which he duly did, the commission being granted. Expecting reward, Mrs Cornwallis-
West stepped up her amorous advances with letters and visits, and Barrett, sensing he was now out of his 
depth, wrote a rejecting letter to her. Mrs Cornwallis-West, scorned, now complained that Barrett was 
pestering her. The complaint landed back on Delme-Radcliffe’s desk, but he, himself under the lady’s spell, 
declined to investigate it properly and humiliated Barrett in front of fellow officers, refusing to read Mrs 
Cornwallis-West’s letters to Barrett. Barrett promptly responded with a nervous breakdown, and Delme-
Radcliffe attempted to shift him to the 3rd Battalion. Barrett applied for a Court of Enquiry in relation to 
Delme-Radcliffe’s behaviour. This was refused, but, the matter snowballing, even Lord Kitchener now asked 
Delme-Radcliffe to read the letters with a view to revising his actions. Delme-Radcliffe, extraordinarily, 
refused. In 1916, the matter was resurrected, a Court of Enquiry was held, Barrett was vindicated, and 
Delme-Radcliffe was dismissed. [C. Messenger, ‘Scandal in High Places’, (British Commission for Military 
History Newsletter, no date)]. 
22
 William Maclaren Campbell, born in 1864, was commanding 2nd Black Watch at the outbreak of war. A 
soldier of rich experience he had seen active service in Burma 1891-3 and in South Africa in 1902. He had 
been Staff Officer in the Chin Hills expedition; ADC to the Major-General and Governor of Madras; ADC 
and Military Secretary to the Viceroy of India; and Military Secretary to the Governor of Madras. He was 
promoted Temporary Brigadier-General Home Forces 2 November 1916 to 8 March 1918, serving as 
Commander (AAG) thereafter. 
23
 Henry Sandys Ainslie born in 1861, was commanding 1st Northumberland Fusiliers at the outbreak of war. 
His war concluded as a member of a travelling medical board. 
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retreat from Mons,24 took command of 7th South Lancashire on 7 November 1914. 
Lieutenant-Colonel H.E. Tizard, relieved of command of 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers at 
Gallipoli on the night of the 26-27 April 1915, took command of 10th East Lancashire on 4 
September 1915.25 
 
One character demands attention, namely Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Mad Jack’ Hugh de Berdt 
Hovell, a 51 year-old retired Lieutenant-Colonel who had commanded both Regular 
Battalions of the Worcestershire Regiment, the latter in India. Undeniably brave, he had 
won a DSO in South Africa, and also the Royal Humane Society’s medal for rescuing a 
Private from drowning. A fitness enthusiast, he could in his day swim round the island of 
Gozo. He was deeply concerned about the comfort of his men, and as a Captain of 1st 
Worcestershire disguised himself on 2nd Battalion manoeuvres as a Private so that he could 
understand the OR’s experience.26 Intelligent, he claimed in his Who's Who entry to have 
originated the use of telephones on rifle ranges (1886) and the use of field telephones 
(1888), and was most definitely the author of two manuals, Soldiers' Shooting27 and 
Soldiers' Training and Other Notes.28 Appointed to command 13th Worcestershire on 11 
November 1914, he swiftly came to grief. “Early in December 1914, rumours were rife 
that private soldiers were making indecent suggestions about (his) conduct … and these 
rumours continued. A court of inquiry was ordered, and of the two private soldiers who 
gave evidence one tried to commit suicide”. Colonel P. Holland reported: 
The Court having most carefully considered the evidence brought before them 
are of opinion that although they do not consider there is any ground for 
                                                      
24
  See Chapter One. 
25
 See Chapter Three. 
26
 http://www.angloboerwar.com/forum/9-gallery/127-hovell-h-de-b-hugh-de-berdt-dso accessed 4 August 
2011. 
27
 London: Gale & Polden, (1888). 
28
 London: Gale & Polden, (1900). 
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specific charges such as suggested by the allegations made by Privates Fletcher 
and Baugh regarding Colonel Hovell, at the same time they are of opinion that 
Colonel Hovell is undoubtedly eccentric in his manner and methods in dealing 
with his men, and that these peculiarities of his in conjunction with the 
treatment rendered necessary to his back are liable to misconstruction.29 
 
Hovell suffered from acne across the top of his back, and in India the pustules were 
pressed by hand by soldier-servants. It was this requirement of his Worcester servant 
which had started the rumour. Hovell was removed from his command on 14 March 1915. 
Seeking to retrieve his reputation, and demonstrating his old courage, at the age of 52 he 
enlisted secretly under an assumed name as a private soldier in his old (2nd) Battalion and 
served in France for five months until his health broke down. He died of broncho-
pneumonia in 1923, having brought a libel action against Holland in 1920 and lost. 
 
A3.2.2 Locally Raised Reserve Battalions 
Of the 54 locally-raised reserve battalions, 12 per cent had active officers as their first CO 
(see Table A3:2). Three had an active Regular CO,30 one an active Indian Army CO, and 
one each a Special Reserve and Territorial CO. Of the retired officers, 42 per cent were 
Regulars, six per cent Indian Army, 17 per cent Special Reserve, and 24 per cent 
Territorial. When compared to Chapter Two Tables 2.1 and 2.2 it can be seen that first 
appointments fell into roughly the same pattern as for the active locally-raised battalions.31 
                                                      
29
 The Times, Thursday May 6 1920, p. 4, issue 42403. 
30
 Lieutenant-Colonel F.G. Montagu-Douglas-Scott, 28th Royal Fusiliers; Lieutenant-Colonel R.S. Weston, 
12th East Lancashire, who had already briefly commanded 2nd Manchester; and Lieutenant-Colonel E.K. 
Purnell, 19th King’s Royal Rifle Corps. 
31




  Regular Indian Army SR/Militia TF/Volunteers 
  Ret Active Ret Active Ret Active Ret Active 
Colonel 3 (5%)  0 2 (4%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%)  0 4 (6%)  0 
Lt-Col 2 (4%)  0 0  0 3 (5%)  0 2 (4%)  0 
Major 13 (24%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 0  4 (6%)  0 2 (4%) 1 (2%) 
Captain 3 (5%) 2 (4%)  0 0 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 4 (6%)  0 
Lt 2 (4%)  0  0 0 1 (2%)  0 2 (4%)  0 
 
Table A3.2: First COs of locally-raised reserve battalions 
Eleven battalions had one change of command and two had two, a turnover rate lower than 
K4 reserve battalions.32 Four of the replacements were active Regular officers; Lieutenant-
Colonel H.O. Bishop (19th West Yorkshire), wounded commanding the 1st Lancashire 
Fusiliers;33 Lieutenant-Colonel C.H. Young (21st Welsh Regiment), replaced as CO of the 
9th Welsh;34 Lieutenant-Colonel B.R. Roche (28th Middlesex), replaced as CO of the 1st 
Bedfordshire;35 and Lieutenant-Colonel R.D. Keyworth (19th King’s Royal Rifle Corps), 
who had had no previous command.36 
 
A3.3 Territorial Reserve Battalions 
The 190 original TF reserve battalions comprised four second-line battalions,37 ten fourth-
line battalions, with the remainder being third-line. In April 1916 the third-line designation 
was replaced with the title Reserve Battalion; thus, the 3/4th Battalion of a regiment 
                                                      
32
 Because of their shortened existence as regimental units, this analysis will not be carried further. 
33
 Harry Oswald Bishop was a 46 year-old Major of 1st Lancashire Fusiliers in August 1914. He finished the 
war commanding 3/6th Lancashire Fusiliers. 
34
 Charles Henry Young, born in 1866, was a Regular Lieutenant-Colonel of the Welsh Regiment on half-pay 
in August 1914. The remainder of his war was spent with training reserve battalions. 
35
 Benjamin Robert Roche, born in 1865, was a Major of 1st Bedfordshire in August 1914. He commanded 6th 
Worcestershire from 21 September 1916 until the Armistice. 
36
 Robert Denbigh Keyworth, born in 1878, was a Regular Captain of Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire 
Light Infantry in August 1914, attached to the West Africa Regiment. 
37
 2/4th Royal Lancaster, 2/5th Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry, 2/12th Loyal North Lancashire, and 2/9th 
Highland Light Infantry. 
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became the 4th Reserve Battalion. The sheer number of battalions generated a considerable 
demand for COs, reducing when the Training Reserve was created when all the Reserve 
Battalions of a regiment were generally amalgamated into the lowest numbered battalion.38 
 
Many third-line appointments were not made until well into 1915 and even early 1916, and 
battalions remained for some time under a senior Major.39 As Table A3.3 shows, in terms 
of first appointments, only one active Regular officer was available as CO. Lieutenant-
Colonel F.W. Foley, a Depot Major in August 1914, was on active service with the 5th 
Berkshire from 31 May 1915 until 22 December 1915 when he was wounded,40 thereafter 
commanding 3/5th Loyal North Lancashire. Two active Indian Army officers were also 
appointed.41 
 
Of the first appointees, 11 Lieutenant-Colonels from first-line TF battalions passed on to 
the Reserve battalions, three without having seen active service, five after brief active 
service in 1915,42 and one, Lieutenant-Colonel C.C. Moxon, after active service with 1/5th 
                                                      
38
 Exceptions occurred in Regiments with large numbers of reserve battalions. Thus in the King’s Liverpool 
Regiment, the 6th Reserve Battalion was amalgamated with the 5th, the 8th and 9th with the 7th, the 10th 
remaining unamalgamated. 
39
 Only five of 177 third line appointments were made in 1914, and 24 were made between 1 January 1916 
and 1 September 1916. 
40
 Frank Wigram Foley, born in 1865, had commanded from 19 August 1914. His jaw was broken during 
shelling. 
41
 Lieutenant-Colonel H. Lowther, of 96th Russell’s Infantry, was appointed to command 3/5th West Riding 
(and thereafter 2/8th Durham Light Infantry and finally 1st Garrison Battalion Munster Regiment, after which 
he was appointed a Staff-Lieutenant); and Captain W.R. Carey, on half-pay from the 67th Punjabis, was 
appointed to command 3/5th West Yorkshire. 
42
 Lieutenant-Colonel W.F.A. Wadham left 1/4th Royal Lancaster on 10 June 1916 for 3/4th Royal Lancaster  
on 3 November 1915; Lieutenant-Colonel J.B. Butler left 1/4th Gloucestershire on 7 February 1915 for 3/4th 
Goucestershire on 10 April 1915; Lieutenant-Colonel H.C. Woodcock left 1/6th Gloucestershire on 7 March 
1915 immediately to 3/6th Gloucestershire;  Lieutenant-Colonel F.D. Robinson from 1/4th East Lancashire on 
15 July 1915 immediately to 3/4th East Lancashire; Lieutenant-Colonel A. Stockton left 1/4th Oxford & 
Buckinghamshire on 1 January 1915 for 3/4th Oxford & Buckinghamshire on 30 April 1915; Lieutenant-
Colonel W. Garner left  1/8th Middlesex on 11 May 1915 for 4/8th Middlesex on 18 December 1915; 
Lieutenant-Colonel C.C. Moxon left 1/5th Yorkshire Light Infantry on 1 November 1917 immediately to 3/4th 
Wiltshire; Lieutenant-Colonel H.C. Watson left 1/6th Durham Light Infantry on 28 April 1915 for 3/6th 
Durham on 15 June 1915; Lieutenant-Colonel C.C. Murray left 1/9th Highland Light Infantry on 22 
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Yorkshire Light Infantry until 1 November 1917.43 Eighteen retired Colonels and 15 
Lieutenant-Colonels from the TF/Volunteers were appointed. This was a smaller 
percentage (17 per cent) than the 37 per cent of the first appointees to the second-line 
battalions.44 Conversely, 34 active TF Majors and 23 active TF Captains comprised thirty 
per cent of the total appointments, as against 14 per cent for the second-line battalions. 
This is unlikely to represent a commitment to the merit-based appointment of active 
officers, rather the later pigeon-holing of those who proved unsuitable for active service. 
  
  Colonel Lt-Col Major Captain Lt ORs 
  Act Ret Act Ret Act Ret Act Ret Act Ret Ret 
Regular 0 1 0 3 1 8 0 11 0 1 1 
Ind Army 0 2 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
TF/Vols 0 18 12 15 34 14 23 16 2 4 0 
SR/Militia 0 3 0 1 0 7 2 1 0 1 0 
Empire 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 
Table A3.3: First appointments to TF Reserve Battalions 
 
Two individuals require further remark. Firstly, Lieutenant-Colonel G.D. Hale of the 3/5th 
Loyal North Lancashire,45 a citizen (brewer) in August 1914, who was appointed on 5 
November 1915. His elder brother was (and father had been) the Agent for the Earl of 
Derby’s Lancashire estates, a connection which may have accounted for his rapid 
                                                                                                                                                                 
November 1915 immediately to 3/9th Highland Light Infantry; Lieutenant-Colonel R.G. Hayes left 1/15th 
London on 9 October 1914 to 3/15th London on 15 May 1915, by way of command of the 2/15th; and 
Lieutenant-Colonel G.P. Botterill left 1/4th London on 30 May 1915 immediately to 4/4th London. 
43
 Moxon then commanded 4th Reserve Battalion Wiltshire Regiment until the Armistice. A 48 year-old 
doctor in August 1914, Charles Carter Moxon resigned his commission as Surgeon-Major to serve in South 
Africa in 1900 as a Lieutenant with the York & Lancaster Regiment, and had risen to be Lieutenant-Colonel 
of  5th Yorkshire Light Infantry on 8 October 1912. Having survived the Western Front without a wound, 
Moxon died in 1924 after contracting septicaemia from a slight wound obtained conducting a post-mortem 
on a scarlet fever victim. (British Medical Journal 12 April 1924 1(3302) p.691). 
44
 See Chapter Two. 
45
 George Duckworth Hale was born in 1868. 
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elevation. Secondly, Lieutenant-Colonel E.J. McFarlane, a retired Regular Sergeant-Major 
of the Manchester Regiment,46 was appointed to command 3/5th Warwickshire, the only 
representative of other ranks without officer experience appointed as first CO to the New 
Armies. 
 
  Regular Indian Army TF/Vols SR/Militia Empire Citizen 
  Ret Active Ret Active Ret Active Ret Active Ret   
Colonel 
0.5% 
(0%)   
1% 
(0%)   
10% 
(1%)   
1.5% 
(0%)     
Lt-Col 
1.5% 






(2%) 6% (7%) 
.5% 



































(4%)     
2% 
(2%) 1% (0%) 
.5% 
(0%)       
2Lt     
0% 
(1%)               
ORs 
.5% 
(1%)                   




Table A3.4: First and last (brackets, italics) appointments to TF Reserve Battalions 
expressed as percentages in terms of rank in August 1914 
 
Of 94 battalions whose identity was kept throughout the war, 24 per cent had one CO, 43 
per cent had two, 23 per cent had three, five per cent had four and five per cent had five. 
The turnover, as Table A3.4 shows, involved the retirement of nearly all the Colonels, and 
a reduction in the number of retired TF Lieutenant-Colonels, and an increase in the number 
of officers who had been active Regular Captains and retired and active TF Captains in 
August 1914. 
                                                      
46
 Edward John McFarlane was born in 1868 and had been pensioned since 1907. He commanded 3/5th 
Warwickshire from 4 February to 1 June 1916 1916, and 27th Durham Light Infantry from 1 January 1917 to 
20 September 1918. 
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A3.4 Second-line Territorial Battalions 
Ninety-one second-line Territorial battalions remained in the UK for the duration of the 
war. These had a different role to the reserve battalions, performing home defence duty.47 
 
  Regular Indian Army SR/Militia TF/Vols 
  Ret Active Ret Active Ret Active Ret Active 
Colonel 2 (2%) 0   0  0 0 1 (1%) 15 (17%) 0  
Lt-Col 0 0   0  0 5 (6%) 0  16 (18%) 12 (14%) 
Major 3 (3%) 0   0  0 3 (3%) 0  6 (7%) 24 (26%) 
Captain 1 (1%) 0   0  0 1 (1%) 1 (1%)  0 0  
 
Table A3.5: First COs of home service second-line TF battalions 
As might be expected, the pattern of appointments, as Table A3.5 demonstrates, (as it 
would not have been decided at the outset which battalions would go overseas and which 
would not), followed a similar pattern to the active second-line battalions. When compared 
with Table 2.3, the only differences revealed are a lower number of retired Territorial 
Colonels in the home service group (17 per cent as against 29 per cent), and a higher 
number of active Territorial Majors (26 per cent as against 12 per cent). Unsurprisingly, 12 
Territorial Lieutenant-Colonels who were commanding first-line battalions in August 1914 
percolated down to these home service battalions.48 
 
                                                      
47
 None of these battalions were, however, amongst the 12 second-line TF infantry battalions who were sent 
to Ireland after the April 1916 uprising, the nearest thing to active service in the UK, all of whom went on to 
active service in France. 
48
 Lieutenant-Colonel C.M. Cowan from 1/8th to 2/8th Royal Scots; Lieutenant-Colonel D.R. MacDonald 
from 1/5th to 2/5th Northumberland Fusiliers; Lieutenant-Colonel H. Barnett from 1/4th to 2/4th Royal Scots 
Fusiliers; Lieutenant-Colonel A.B. Hopps from 1/4th to 2/4th Cheshire; Lieutenant-Colonel H.J. Roberts from 
1/6th to 2/6th Royal Welsh Fusiliers; Lieutenant-Colonel G. Dixon from 1/5th to 2/5th Border; Lieutenant-
Colonel W.C. Blackett from 1/8th to 2/8th Durham Light Infantry; Lieutenant-Colonel E.G. Bulk from 1/5th to 
2/5th Seaforth Highlanders; Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. Black from 1/6th to 2/6th Seaforth Highlanders; 
Lieutenant-Colonel A.W.G.T. Leith-Buchanan from 1/9th to 2/9th Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders; 
Lieutenant-Colonel P.B. Ford from 1/3rd to 2/3rd Monmouthshire; and Lieutenant-Colonel L. Tebbutt from 
1/1st to 2/1st Cambridgeshire. 
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In comparison with the Territorial reserve battalions which can be followed until 
November 1918, there was a somewhat more marked turnover in command. Of the 75 
units whose history can be traced until the Armistice,49 only 17 per cent retained their 
original CO; 31 per cent had two, 33 per cent three, 17 per cent four, and two per cent five. 
As Table A3.6 shows, there was a decrease in the number of retired senior officers, and an 
increase in the number of officers active in 1914. However, the changes are not great, and 
there is no evidence of a move to install younger officers with recent active service to repel 
possible enemy invasion, perhaps because that threat was seen as becoming more remote 
the longer the war went on. 
 
  Regular Indian Army TF/Vols SR/Militia Citizen 
  Ret Active Ret Active Ret Active Ret Active   
Colonel 2% to 1% 
0% to 




6%     








8%   
Major 3% to 1%       
3% to 
1%   7% to 3% 
26% to 
23%   
Captain 1% to 3% 
0% to 




1% 0% to 3% 
0% to 
13%   
Lt     0% to 1%       0% to 1%     
2Lt             0% to 1% 0% to 1%   
Citizen                 0% to 3% 
 
Table A3.6: Status in August 1914 of first and last COs of the second line TF Battalions 
 
Of interest are the two citizen soldiers. Lieutenant-Colonel A.V. Cowell was an Army 
Schoolmaster in 1914 and commanded 2/4th Buffs from 2 March 1916 to 1 November 
1917 (when he was transferred to command 1/1st Highland Cyclist Battalion).50 Lieutenant-
                                                      
49
 Not cut short by amalgamation. 
50




Colonel S.G. Guy was a Labour Exchange manager in 1914, and commanded 2/6th 




The home service battalions were undeniably the poor relations in the evolution of 
battalion command during the war. The Special and Extra Reserve battalions were the best 
off, with a quarter of appointments from amongst either wounded or invalided senior 
officers with experience of the new warfare, perhaps because of their role in reinforcing 
Regular units. Otherwise, they demonstrated a traditional within-regiment seniority 
approach. 
 
The other training reserve battalions and second-line Territorials received an even more 
sparse leavening of active officers as the war progressed. No attempt is evident to extend 
the emerging merit-based appointment approach within the active battalions to the non-
active. The likely reason is simple, in that there was no need to. The training battalions 
were training other ranks, and there were efficient and experienced NCOs to achieve this. 
The CO remained an administrative figurehead. The home defence battalions similarly had 











1.   No one can take your integrity - you have to give it away. 
  
2.  Soldiers want to know how much you care before they care how much you know. 
  
3.   What you do is more important than anything you say. 
  
4.   Never give anyone reason to question your integrity. 
  
5.   Accept responsibility for the shortcomings of the unit; pass credit for success on to 
your subordinates. 
6.   Never allow yourself to be perceived as self-serving.  If subordinates believe you're 
trying to get ahead at their expense, all you'll get is minimum effort and little 
initiative.  Be selfless, always. 
 7.   Be compassionate. 
  
8.   Never violate or be perceived to violate your own rules or policies. 
  
9.   Be willing to admit when you are wrong. 
  
10.   Reward soldiers and publicly recognize those that make the tough decisions – those 
who choose the harder right over the easier wrong. 
11.   Use the chain of command to pass on new information and policies.  Avoid making 
too many "public announcements." 
 12.   Let your leaders know that mistakes are OK as long as we learn from them. Explain 
to them the difference between mistakes and mission failure, versus doing 
something illegal or immoral. 
 13.   Allow subordinates to "change your mind" now and then. 
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14.   Identify your lane and stay in it. 
  
15.   Share hardships; be visible.  Do what your soldiers do, eat what they eat, sleep 
where they sleep.  Ensure your subordinate leaders do the same.  There is no 
substitute for personal example. 
16.   Give young officers and NCOs a chance to grow.  Spend time with them, listen to 
them and let them talk to you one-on-one. 
17.   Mentorship takes time.  Ensure you take the time with your lieutenants and 
 captains. 
18.   Be consistent with rewards, awards and punishment.  Formulate your philosophy 
before you deal with the first case.  Be just. 
 19.   Praise in public, criticize in private.  Recognize good soldiers at every possible 
opportunity. 
 20.   Be technically and tactically proficient.  If there is something you don't know, say 
so and ask a soldier or NCO to teach you - they'll love it. 
21.   Let your leaders lead.  Give them mission-type orders.  Don't micromanage. 
22.   Foster teamwork and camaraderie among your commanders and staff.  Discourage 
too much competition, except at sports events. 
23.   Have a sense of humor. 
24.   Be open and accessible.  Make yourself available to soldiers by getting out into 
their work areas. 
25.   Perceptions are reality. 
26.   Prepare your unit to function without you. 
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27.   Sexual harassment - ensure your leaders know what it is, how to identify it, and 
how to deal with it quickly and justly.  Ensure you do the same. 
28.   Establish a good relationship with your fellow battalion commanders. 
29.   Insist on leaders giving orders in their own names.  
30.   If you don't understand an order, talk to your boss and ask for clarification. 
31.   Never walk past something that is not right; if you do you have set a new and lower 
standard. 
32.   Bad news never improves with age.  Insist that your leaders make timely reports, 
even if all information is not immediately available.  Then give them time to get 
follow-up information.  If necessary, assist them in confronting challenges. 
33.   Lead from the front.  Your personal example counts more than you will ever know. 
Your behavior in a variety of situations will shape and guide the actions of others. 
34.   Don't let superior performance go unrewarded.  Don't allow continued poor 
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